



POLAND AND UKRAINE POLES AND UKRAINIANS

Relations after 1990

Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences

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PREFACE

The year 2020 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Polish-Ukrainian relations outside the control of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was possible because a non-communist government was formed in Poland after the elections of June 4, 1989, and the USSR was undergoing a process of structural reconstruction in the spirit of increasing the independence of the Soviet Union republics and their democratization.

The first Polish-Ukrainian relations were still unofficial. In September 1989, a delegation from the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” took part in the first congress of the Ukrainian People’s Movement for Reconstruction. Then, on 4 and 5 May 1990, a Polish-Ukrainian meeting took place in Jabłonna. Already at that time, it was postulated that research teams should be established to objectively evaluate the common history, to abandon the cultivation of negative stereotypes, and to remove the existing obstacles on the way to Polish-Ukrainian cooperation.

The Polish parliament played a special role in building a friendly atmosphere around the Ukrainian aspirations for emancipation and then independence. The announcement of the declaration of sovereignty by the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) on July 16, 1990 initiated a friendly debate in the Polish Senate, which resulted in the adoption of a resolution applauding the decision taken by the Ukrainians. The Sejm also adopted a declaration on this issue. Another important step in building good Polish-Ukrainian relations was the Senate’s resolution of August 3, 1990 condemning the Operation “Vistula”. The Senate passed it after a stormy debate and not without difficulty.

The policy of rapprochement with Ukraine was consistently implemented by the Polish government. On October 13 and 14,

1990, Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski visited Kiev to sign the *Polish-Ukrainian Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions for the Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations*. In December 1990, a delegation from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to Warsaw and discussed a number of issues, including the problem of national minorities, the opening of cultural and information centres, the conclusion of a consular convention and an agreement on cooperation and youth exchange. As a result, Poland and Ukraine concluded many bilateral agreements, even before the collapse of the USSR and before the adoption of the declaration of independence by the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR on August 24, 1991. Mutual relations in the future were to be built on this foundation.

Thirty years after these events, the inevitable question is whether the elites of the two nations have persevered in their pursuit of cooperation on various levels in a spirit of mutual understanding. The Polish-Ukrainian conference, which took place (remotely) in November 2020 at the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences, was devoted to this issue, and the papers presented at it, although unfortunately not all, were included in this collection.

It opens with a paper by Paweł Skorut (*Ukraine in the Eastern Foreign Policy of Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Between September 12, 1989 and October 26, 1993*), devoted to Polish-Ukrainian relations in the years 1990–1993, implemented at the government level. It provides a solid introduction to Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first years of independent Ukraine.

The next article (*Czesław Miłosz's reflections on the Political 'diseases' of the 20th century in the context of harmonizing bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine*), by Volodymyr Horbatenko, shows the traps and threats that have appeared and are appearing in our part of Europe, and threaten Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations. Inspired by the prose of Czesław Miłosz, the author points out the worst of them: dehumanization and the use of violence

against other people and entire nations, as well as against ethnic and religious groups; blurring the line between good and evil; enslavement of the human mind; erosion of national identity; extreme nationalism and pseudo-patriotism. The author presents them one by one with reference to the present situation in Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations. He emphasises the danger of the collapse of European values and he reminds that the responsibility for this collapse stems not only from the decisions taken by politicians, but also from individual choices of ordinary people.

The Ukrainian debate on one of the most recognizable Polish monuments – the Cemetery of Eaglets – was the subject of the text of Iryna Matsyshyna (*'Eaglets' Cemetery debate in the context of Ukraine's political discourse*). The author presented several phases of the debate taking place in Ukraine around this necropolis over the years. In 2002, it concerned the inscriptions placed during the restoration of the cemetery; in 2005, the symbolism behind the image of Szczerbiec was discussed; in 2015, the dispute was provoked by the return of the statues of two lions to the Cemetery; in 2017, the debate was triggered by the proposal of the Polish minister of internal affairs and administration, Mariusz Błaszczak, to place an image from the Cemetery on the cards of Polish passports. In her very interesting text, the author shows also the role of the Lviv city authorities in heating up this debate, which is harmful not only to Polish-Ukrainian relations, but above all to historical truth.

In the next paper (*The 2015–2017 Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians and its results*), Waldemar Rezmer writes about the importance of historical truth in Polish-Ukrainian relations and the difficulties that historians encounter when trying to establish it. This is a very factual text showing the circumstances of the establishment of the historical seminar “Poland – Ukraine: difficult questions”, operating in 1996–2008, and the Polish-Ukrainian Historical Forum, which was active in the years 2015–2017. W. Rezmer shows how extra-scientific pressures have undermined historians' efforts

to explain the past. The results of the work of the Historical Forum could harm the UPA's national myth that was being forced through in Ukraine at the time, which is why the deliberations of the Forum were closed. The author's conclusions are pessimistic: as long as political goals are more important than historical truth, cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian historians will not be possible.

While Waldemar Rezmer emphasizes the importance of facts in the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, Leonid Zashkilnyak focuses on their interpretation, emphasizing the need for mutual understanding of the arguments of the other side. He points to the most glaring differences in the Polish and Ukrainian interpretations of the events of 1918–1920 and of the Second World War. He criticizes the Polish side for the lack of understanding of the fact, obvious to Ukrainians, that their constant aspiration in the 20th century was to build an independent state, and that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the UPA) was the vehicle of these aspirations. He believes that the concepts used in Polish historiography build a positive image of Poles as victims of massacres, and a negative image of Ukrainians, who appear at most as victims of retaliatory actions. He calls for an objective application of concepts.

Leonid Zashkilnyak's text undoubtedly stirs up emotions and a desire to engage in polemics. The UPA's struggle for an independent Ukrainian state seems understandable, but its glorification cannot gain Polish acceptance, since it was carried out by cruel ethnic cleansing in the territories inhabited by the Polish population. Nevertheless, Leonid Zashkilnyak's text is important because it allows us to understand the arguments of the other side and its expectations towards Poland.

The text written by Oksana Kukuruz (*The role of scientific consulting in the process of forming a good neighbourhood policy between Ukraine and Poland*) is reassuring and free from emotion. The author proposes to create a good practice of scientific advice on issues of historical policy. Such good practice needs to be used by politicians

and parliamentarians who, both in Poland and in Ukraine, tend to accept the interpretation of historical events guided by their own views and preferences rather than by the search for objective truth. The author precedes her conclusions with a theoretical analysis of what the policy of good neighbourhood is, with reference to the *Polish-Ukrainian Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation*, signed in 1992.

Another approach to the problems of the neighbourhood was demonstrated in the work of Alla Kyrydon and Serhiy Troyan (*The Ukrainian-Polish borderland as a heterogeneous sociodynamic space*). The authors presented theoretical models of the borderland and made an attempt to relate them to the present Polish-Ukrainian borderland.

The collection closes with a text by Włodzimierz Osadczy concerning the state of material relics of the Polish presence in Ukraine. The author reviewed religious buildings (in Sokal, Stara Sil, Komarno, and Chemeryntsi), as well as castles, palaces and other buildings (in Berezhany, Pomoriany, Tartakiv, Chervonohrad, Khyriv). He showed their very bad condition and negligence. The lack of care for their protection is seen as a continuation of the policy dating back to the 19th century, the aim of which was to destroy all traces of Latin culture in this area. This is still happening with the inaction of the Polish and Ukrainian governments.

The predominance of texts on historical memory testifies to the importance of this problem in Polish-Ukrainian relations. A shift away from scientific historical research in favour of escalating feelings of harm does not bode well for the future. It builds a negative image of both nations. The longer this continues, the more difficult it will be to re-establish a substantive historical dialogue. Polish thinking about Ukraine and Ukrainian thinking about Poland reduced to considering the accounts of mutual harm will make it impossible in the long run to see the common goals that Poland and Ukraine should have in the united Europe.

However, a precondition for dialogue and cooperation is to be open to the arguments of the other side. For this reason, we encourage you to read this small volume in order to better understand Polish and Ukrainian narratives.

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Translated by
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Paweł Skorut

UKRAINE IN THE EASTERN FOREIGN POLICY OF MINISTER KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI. BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 12, 1989, AND OCTOBER 26, 1993

Abstract

During the four years of Krzysztof Skubiszewski's leadership of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1989 and 1993, the only stable element was Skubiszewski himself. In the first years after the political and social breakthrough, Poland underwent a tremendous transformation, not only in political terms, but also in the way of political thinking and strategic solutions that were best for the country. It should be remembered that Poland itself was a country which was an object of political games between the USA and the USSR/Russian Federation. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that during the described period of time, one could often encounter instability in the Polish eastern policy, as well as a desire to undertake bold solutions. Obviously, the constant vectors which had a considerable impact on Warsaw's position were the stationing of Soviet and later Russian troops on Polish territory, as well as a restrained attitude of Western Europe at that time towards the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, and the lack of a clear plan: what to do after the collapse of the USSR? Is this already the end of history?

Despite so many uncertainties, Krzysztof Skubiszewski's ministerial office led the Republic of Poland unscathed through international problems of the years 1989–1993, in the midst of which he

managed to mark, sometimes with great determination, the Polish *raison d'état*. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, with his academic knowledge of international law, was the person who laid a solid diplomatic foundation for the Republic of Poland for decades to come.

Key words

USSR, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Ukraine, foreign policy.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski was Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 12, 1989 to October 26, 1993. At the time of this important turning point for Poland and Europe, he was entrusted with the Ministry by five consecutive prime ministers, who probably perceived in him as a person capable of 'cutting the Gordian knot' of Poland's deeply rooted foreign policy anxieties. That is, those related to "Poland's eternal dilemmas: East–West, Russia–Germany".¹

During the four years of his ministerial work, Prof. Skubiszewski became known as a man who was "an active participant in the processes changing the face of Poland and Europe at that time".² He created and implemented a difficult foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, which in 1989 regained the ability to sovereignly shape its foreign affairs, with all the consequences for the politically independent state. Despite the obvious diplomatic challenges, Skubiszewski's foreign policy – according to a 1991 CEBOS survey – was accepted by the Polish society of the time, which saw it as "serving the public well and in line with its interests".³

1. S. Stomma, *Pisma wybrane. 1976–2003* [Selected Writings. 1976–2003] (Kraków: UNIVERSITAS, 2017), 312–313.

2. "List Lecha Kaczyńskiego, Prezydenta RP, jaki został odczytany na mszy żałobnej w intencji K. Skubiszewskiego" [Letter of Lech Kaczyński, President of the Republic of Poland, which was read at the funeral mass for K. Skubiszewski], accessed December 5, 2020, <https://warszawa.naszemiasto.pl/warszawa-pogrzeb-krzysztofa-skubiszewskiego/ar/c1-2978904>.

3. "Popieramy Skubiszewskiego" [We support Skubiszewski], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, February 25, 1991.

Biting through the 'dog collar'

The security of the Polish state in the late 1980s and early 1990s was strongly influenced by the changes in international relations under the influence of the Fall of Nations. Factors having a direct impact on the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, and being related to the Polish *raison d'état*, were: a) the process of reunification of Germany,⁴ b) evolutionary nature of the Soviet Union's disintegration that followed,⁵ c) Poland's aspiration to become politically closer to the countries of Western Europe.⁶ The latter was both difficult and urgent to implement, as the countries to the West of the fallen Iron Curtain did not hurry after 1989 with any clear-cut political declaration towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There was an assumption that in the name of stabilization, Western Europe might once again recognize the primacy of Russia in this area.⁷ Additional challenges for the Polish government included both the liquidation of the Soviet military bases on the territory of the Republic of Poland, and the plan of the Soviet command to withdraw the Soviet Army troops from the former German Democratic Republic through the territory of Poland.⁸

4. H. Kohl, *Pragnąłem jedności Niemiec* [I wanted German Unity] (Warszawa: Świat Książki, 1999); M. Tomala, *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Reakcja Polaków* [German Reunification. The Reaction of Poles] (Toruń: Polska Fundacja Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2000).

5. Z. Brzeziński, *Wielkie bankructwo* [The Great Bankruptcy] (Paryż: Instytut Literacki, 1990); P. Kowal, *Testament Prometeusza* [Testament of Prometheus] (Warszawa–Wojnowice: PAN, 2019).

6. A. Towpik, "Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa okresu transformacji. Droga do NATO" [Polish Security Policy of the Transformation Period. The Road to NATO], [in:] *NATO w dwadzieścia lat po akcesji. Wspomnienia, analizy, pytania, wnioski* [NATO Twenty Years after Accession. Memories, Analysis, Questions, Conclusions], ed. M. Winiarczyk-Kossakowska, S. Półgrabi-Sanetra, P. Skorut (Warszawa: Aspra, 2020), 25–35.

7. *Ibid.*, 26.

8. J. Makarewicz, "Nowa polityka wschodnia" [New Eastern Policy], [in:] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, *Minister Spraw Zagranicznych RP 1989–1993* [Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland 1989–1993], ed. P. Skubiszewski, J. Stańczyk (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2016), 47–60.

Because of the political and social changes that took place in the countries of the so called 'people's democracy' in 1989 and afterwards, and in view of the goals set by the national interest, the political authorities of the Republic of Poland were aware of the need to organise its foreign activity around three centres: Moscow, Bonn, and Washington. According to Paweł Kowal, when analysing Polish foreign policy of the 1990s, it is necessary to mention one more centre, the Vatican, as the role of John Paul II at that time was a substantial support for the Republic of Poland.⁹

The creation of Polish foreign policy in the face of events beyond its eastern border was an example of combined action of both political realism and constant consideration of the changes occurring within the USSR. The attempt to combine these two factors was illustrated by the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Professor K. Skubiszewski, and the inclusion of his proposals in the content of the opening speeches made by successive prime ministers before the Sejm. For example, in the exposé delivered by Tadeusz Mazowiecki on August 26, 1989, the new prime minister assured:

The transformations in the Soviet Union arouse our positive feelings. We understand well their significance, also for the political opening in our country. We wish to maintain good neighborly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. [...] We understand the importance of the obligations arising from the Warsaw Pact. I declare to all its participants that the government which I shall form will respect this Pact.¹⁰

9. P. Kowal, *op. cit.*, 49–52, 355–361; 7 dni: *Wschód. Testament Prometeusza*. Paweł Kowal [7 Days: East. Testament of Prometheus. Paweł Kowal], audio, accessed December 29, 2020, <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/130/5065/Artykul/2249143,Testament-Prometeusza-%e2%80%93-ksztaltowanie-sie-polskiej-polityki-wschodniej-po-1989-r>.

10. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Siemiątkowski, eds., *Exposé Prezesów Rady Ministrów 1989–2019* [Exposés of the Presidents of the Council of Ministers 1989–2019] (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2020), 12.

It is worth mentioning that the philosophy behind Tadeusz Mazowiecki's strategy of planning Polish foreign policy towards the USSR was quickly (less than a year after he was sworn in) met with harsh criticism from some members of the Polish political scene, who perceived such a course of action as "mending the 'dog collar' instead of biting it through".¹¹

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who after five months of Mazowiecki's premiership accepted, in January 1991, the mission to form a new government of the Republic of Poland, spoke in a similarly realistic tone, although somewhat more boldly in view of the events that had already taken place in the USSR, and had become known to the international public opinion. In his speech delivered before the Sejm, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki advocated cooperation with the USSR, but also with the Soviet republics:

The government will continue to pursue a foreign policy that strengthens the independence of the state. The government will pursue the Polish *raison d'état* and the national interest (...). We will maintain good relations with both the USSR and the Soviet republics, especially the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus, which are our neighbours. We shall manage our relations in these two directions – with the Union as a whole and with the republics – without interfering in the internal transformations beyond our eastern border; we shall strive to conclude a new treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that will govern the totality of our relations.¹²

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who led the work of the Council of Ministers for less than twelve months, was no longer in office when the world saw the event that definitively ended Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's

11. J. Kurski, "Rok Mazowieckiego" [The Year of Mazowiecki], *Konfrontacje*, no. 9 (1990).

12. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Siemiątkowski, eds., *op. cit.*, 28.

revolutionary work – the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact undeniably and strongly contributed, among other things, to the strengthening of the sense of security by the countries of the former communist bloc, but also it became the harbinger of a utopian mirage, “the end of history”.¹³ The collapse of the USSR – although symptomatically anticipated – took place on December 26, 1991, i.e. five days after the exposé in the Sejm by the new Polish prime minister, Jan Olszewski.

Jan Olszewski was aware not only of the obvious irreversibility of the events beyond the eastern border of the Republic of Poland, but also of the challenges that they were to entail. Here, the map of Europe was becoming a space in the middle of which the borders of new states were being drawn. And with their national interests at stake. States that had as much in common with Poland as they had in common with each other. States that were to become the Republic’s direct neighbours, as well as coalition partners in the common security policy:

Developments in the East make our relations with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus of paramount importance. There are both opportunities and threats for us in the East. The Government will continue to strive to build lasting, comprehensive good neighborly relations and close cooperation. We will continue, develop, and intensify the policy of interaction with our eastern neighbours. We will strive to create treaty-based ties with them, facilitating economic, political and security ties, as well as cultural and people-to-people.¹⁴

The political transformation in Europe and the collapse of the communist bloc forced the Polish political authorities not only to

13. F. Fukuyama, *Koniec historii* [The End of History] (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 1996).

14. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Siemiątkowski, eds., *op. cit.*, 42.

make a realistic assessment of reality, but also to draw up new development plans for the country. The country which in 1991 was able to verbalize its condition as being at a crossroads:

We find ourselves today between two worlds: the Western world, which is peacefully forming and uniting, and the Eastern world, which is disintegrating. We do not yet belong to the former, we no longer belong to the latter. We have made a decision to join the structures of the West, but for the time being we have no alliances, no anchorage, no security. We must make an effort to change this risky state.¹⁵

The danger of staying at the crossroads for too long could involve not only political stagnation, but also lack of participation in creating a new political order in Europe. This seemingly trivial observation must have been realized also by Waldemar Pawlak, who, in his statement read out in the Sejm on July 1, 1992, assigned a new role to Poland as a political stabilizer of the new European order. And what is equally important, he announced the Republic of Poland's participation in active construction of the security system of Europe. Europe with new, democratic roots since 1989. According to Waldemar Pawlak, the fulfilment of such political goals was essential for Poland to strengthen its subjectivity and political sovereignty:¹⁶

Can Poland contribute to the stability of the new Europe? (...) Poland will contribute to building a new European order and to co-creating a pan-European security system. (...) We will consistently strive to develop good neighborly and partnership relations with independent states in the East: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Lithuania and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Our interests in

15. *Ibid.*, 35.

16. *Ibid.*, 68.

this region require an active and long-term policy and commitment of greater resources.¹⁷

When, on July 10, 1992, Hanna Suchocka delivered her exposé as the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, some troops of the North Soviet Army Group were still stationed in Poland, the Soviet Union had already ceased to exist for seven months, and in December 1991, Ukraine became politically independent by referendum. In addition, the Commonwealth, along with other states in the region, namely Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, found themselves in the so-called grey zone of security, which gave no guarantee of protection against external threats. It is therefore no coincidence that Hanna Suchocka, in drawing up a plan for the development of Polish foreign policy, strongly emphasized the need to create situations outside the country that would strengthen its sovereignty, and saw Poland's potential for initiating such actions:

Poland's sovereignty and independence, the strengthening of its security and the creation of favourable external conditions for the civilizational and economic development of the country remain the lasting objectives of our country's foreign policy. We are convinced that our country is able to influence its international environment in a way that corresponds to our interests and at the same time contributes to the creation of a better, safe and prosperous Europe.¹⁸

The future security of Europe became a challenge also for the states that regained the ability to sovereignly determine their political existence after 1989. This issue became all the more urgent in the 1990s, as it was not uncommon in public discourse to raise suggestions of dissolving NATO:¹⁹

17. *Ibid.*, 57.

18. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Siemiątkowski (eds.), *op. cit.*, 75.

19. R. Zięba, "Security of NATO and EU member states", [in:] *International*

Today we live in a state neighbouring with countries towards which Poland can pursue a friendly policy. We also have every reason to believe that our foreign partners will be favorably inclined to maintain good relations with Poland.²⁰

The consequence of such an approach to relations with Poland's immediate neighbours was the adoption of not only a clear orientation of Poland's foreign policy towards European affairs, which was obvious to Western European countries, but also a guarantee that Poland would actively participate in the creation of an active foreign policy in the East.

The foreign policy of the Polish state must be stable and open to changes taking place in our neighbourhood. Its success is not possible without a consensus on the foundations of the Polish *raison d'état*, and its unchanging priority remains the European orientation.

In the eastern policy there is a particular opportunity for an active policy. In our relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania we are particularly interested in the following issues: security and balance, economic exchange and the situation of Poles living beyond our eastern border.²¹

Polish foreign policy in the first years after 1989 was strongly dominated by issues arising not only directly from the national interest of the Republic of Poland, but also from the changing conditions of reality, which took place outside the area of its direct influence, *Security after the Cold War*, ed. R. Zięba (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008), 263–296; R. Kupiecki, *Organizacja Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego* [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2016), 68–78.

20. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Siemiątkowski, eds., *op. cit.*, 76.

21. *Ibid.*, 82–83.

including the Soviet Union. It is not without a reason, therefore, that successive prime ministers of Poland in the years 1989–1993 paid great attention to this issue, and saw in the political changes taking place in this area not only a source of security for the democratic transformations, but also a space for political exploration for Poland.

The pains of German reunification

On November 28, 1989, Helmut Kohl indicated a new coordinate in international relations – the reunification of Germany, which was an unexpected and unannounced tactical move by the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. It also naturally became an issue that focused the attention of K. Skubiszewski's cabinet who perceived it not only as a result of the ongoing transition, but also as a challenge to Poland's sovereign policy. It put the country in a difficult position, since Poland, striving for socio-political changes itself, had to accept the changes taking place in the neighbouring countries while at the same time trying to secure the durability of its borders:

After all, history is not, and cannot be, a decisive factor in the perception and shaping of today's reality. Europe is changing. We do not deny these changes, we embrace them, and we are their co-creators. However, we must take care of our state interest.²²

The other aspect for both countries – Germany and the Republic of Poland – was their growing awareness not only of the irreversibility of the changes that had already occurred, but also of the weakening political position of the USSR, which, however, was surely still to be reckoned with and was increasingly bolder in its political expectations. This audacity, though cautious, was

22. K. Skubiszewski, *Polityka zagraniczna i odzyskanie niepodległości. Przemówienia, oświadczenia, wywiady 1989–1993* [Foreign policy and the recovery of independence. Speeches, statements, interviews 1989–1993] (Warszawa: Interpress, 1997), 29.

undoubtedly underpinned by the dual-track strategy deliberately pursued by Poland: on the one hand, not ignoring Moscow's opinion, and on the other hand, consistently implementing the state's sovereign policy.

An important question which underlies the narrative of the 'Fall of nations', was the issue of the financial bankruptcy of the Soviet economic system, and consequently the lack of the USSR's ability to support the important security mainstays of the declining empire, such as the German Democratic Republic. The GDR itself was a country on the brink of economic collapse at the end of 1989, as reported by Hans Modrow, the last prime minister of the GDR, in his talks with Kohl.²³

The sight of so many interrelated factors, which were strongly dependent on each other, must have inspired Krzysztof Skubiszewski's fear that an agreement could be reached between Bonn and Moscow on the reunification of Germany, without Warsaw taking part in it. Contrary to Helmut Kohl's judgment, the German unification was not only a matter of the German people, but it also entailed the question of recognition of the Polish western border by the united Germany, i.e. by a new political entity.

H. Kohl's consistency in advocating the idea of limiting the circle of participants in the talks on German reunification to only four countries of World War II's victorious coalition,²⁴ could not only awaken the stereotypes about the Vistula River, dating back to the communist period,²⁵ but also affect some of the priorities that were outlined in the Polish foreign policy and presented in the Sejm in April 1990:²⁶

23. H. Kohl, *op. cit.*, 149–166.

24. *Ibid.*, 156.

25. Perhaps the best example of the Polish People's Republic's endeavours to create stereotypical images of the German threat is the book by W. Gomułka, *O problemie niemieckim* [On the German problem] (Warsaw: KiW, 1968).

26. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 43.

(...) As for our western neighbour, we have initiated the Polish-German cooperation that pursues common goals and interests. We will continue this work on the assumption that a unifying and then united Germany will confirm our western border as final.²⁷

Hence, it was not without reason that the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki exerted strong pressure on Bonn, through the United States and France, demanding, as soon as possible, the recognition of the Polish western border by the united Germany.²⁸ The pressure measures taken by Warsaw were motivated not only by the Polish *raison d'état*, but also by the perception of the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Poland, which, in the opinion of K. Skubiszewski, had an impact on the whole of Central and Eastern Europe:

(...) Poland as a European country had, and I think still has, a key role to play. This is due to its geostrategic location in the region and its geostrategic location between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hence, the position of Poland, both political and military, is significant. This affects the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.²⁹

As a result of K. Skubiszewski's foreign policy, and following a clear signal sent to H. Kohl from the United States, France and Great Britain, over a month after the reunification of Germany, on November 14, 1990, a treaty was signed between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany confirming the

27. *Ibid.*

28. R. Romaniec, *Albo uznać tę granicę, albo nici ze zjednoczenia. Traktat 2+4 i polsko-niemiecka granica* [Either you recognize this border, or there is no reunification. Treaty 2+4 and the Polish-German border], accessed May 3, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/pl/albo-uznacie-t%C4%99-granic%C4%99-albo-nici-ze-zjednoczenia-traktat-24-i-polsko-niemiecka-granica/a-18705885>.

29. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 100.

existing border between them.³⁰ This document definitively dispelled Poland's concerns about the possible threat and instability of the Polish western border. Moreover, it strengthened – in the eyes of both the partners from the area of the so-called Western Europe, and the countries seeking independence from the Soviet Union – the position of the Republic of Poland as a state skillfully negotiating with European leaders, including both politicians and non-politicians.

The issue of eastern borders

Poland and Canada were the first countries in the world to recognize the independence of Ukraine on December 1, 1991.³¹ Warsaw sent congratulations a few hours after Kyiv had announced the preliminary results of the independence referendum, which was organized on December 1, 1991. It is worth emphasizing that the message from the political authorities of the Republic of Poland was not preceded by any political or territorial expectations, as was the case for example with Romania or Moscow.³²

30. *Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o potwierdzeniu istniejącej między nimi granicy* [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on the confirmation of the border between them], *Journal of Laws* of 1994, no. 14, item 54.

31. W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989–1993* [Poland's relations with Ukraine in 1989–1993] (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2002), 21–41; “Jako pierwsza na świecie Polska uznała Ukrainę” [Poland was the First in the World to Recognize Ukraine], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 2, 1991.

32. A consequence of Ukraine's awakening aspirations for independence was the growing expectations towards Kyiv by some of its neighbours. Moscow, representing the interests of both the collapsed Soviet Union and, additionally, the Russian SFSR, intervened in early December 1991 regarding Ukraine's possible secession from the USSR. Both M. Gorbachev, the then president of the USSR, and B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian SFSR, tried to force Kyiv to either remain within the Soviet Union, or sign a political treaty with Russia. Should Kyiv not agree, the planned retaliation included territorial and/or economic claims by Russia. As a result of the pressure, Ukraine joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, an organization created on December 8, 1991, after signing the so-called Belovezhsky

Incidentally, it should be noted that the issue of a possible post-1989 border regulation between the Republic of Poland and the politically independent Soviet republics – Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine – was discussed e.g. in the upper house of parliament, the Polish Senate, in September 1990. Responding to numerous senatorial inquiries, which indirectly also resulted from the position of the Polish government-in-exile, K. Skubiszewski unequivocally expressed his opposition to any attempts at border changes. He pointed out once again – just as he had done in his statement made before the UN in September 1989 on behalf of the Polish government – that the military-political treaties of the Third Reich and the USSR of 1941, which changed the borders of the Second Polish Republic, should be condemned unambiguously, being “invalid from the very beginning, since they violated the absolutely binding norms of international law, broke treaties, and were contrary to international moral standards”.³³

In his attempt to justify the position of the Polish government regarding the eastern borders of the Republic, Skubiszewski raised three very important and significant issues, which, even today, would be difficult to question. First, in spite of the fact that the Yalta Agreements were perceived as actions inconsistent with

Agreement. The signing of the agreement by Leonid Kravchuk, as well as the ratification of the agreement by the Ukrainian parliament on December 10, 1991, was followed by the recognition of Ukraine's independence by the USSR on December 26, 1991. In 2018, Ukraine withdrew from the CIS.

Contrary to Moscow's intentions, Romania made territorial claims on the politically independent Ukraine. The Romanian Parliament demanded the return of the territories seized by the USSR in 1940 and annexed to the Ukrainian FSSR: northern Bukovina, southern Bessarabia, Hertsa and Khotyn. Bucharest, recognizing these territories as its own, made recognition of Ukrainian independence conditional on the return of the said territories. Formally, it was not until January 8, 1992 that Romania sent its acceptance of an independent Ukraine. See: “Ukraina od poniedziałku niepodległa?” [Ukraine Independent as of Monday?], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 29, 1991; “Moskwa grozi Ukrainie” [Moscow Threatens Ukraine], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 8, 1991.

33. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 71.

Polish interest, it was on their basis that the territorial order was created, lasting uninterruptedly until 1989. Poland, which did not conceal its inclinations towards Western Europe, had to be aware that raising territorial claims against, for example, Ukraine or Lithuania, could not only be incomprehensible to its future ally to the west of the Oder river, but could also become an insurmountable obstacle in its attempt to establish more permanent relations with, for example, Western European Union countries. Moreover, almost at the same time, Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government demanded that Poland participate in a series of planned meetings between the two German states and the four powers of the so-called anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. the 2+4 conference. Also, the intended goal of K. Skubiszewski's cabinet was to obtain a guarantee for the Polish western border, issued by the new reunified German state.³⁴

Secondly, being aware of the existing international order, including administrative control of territories that could be potentially claimed by neighbouring countries, one had to take into account the necessity of potential military action, or war. Only that way – with an optimistic assumption of the success – it was possible to force the countries to abandon their claims to disputed territories.

And thirdly, Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania were still part of the Soviet Union in 1990. Therefore, taking military action to regain the lands lost under the Yalta agreements would mean a military conflict with the USSR. The Soviet Union, although in decline, still existed politically and had not only the largest army in Europe at the time, but also had their troops stationed in the GDR and Poland. Moreover, it was a country that had nuclear weapons, as did Ukraine.³⁵ Provoking the USSR by Poland to defend the territories of the republics of Belarus and Ukraine, and thus to restore the international order, would not only be 'a shot in the foot' for Poland, but also a fulfillment of the warnings addressed to the West,

34. H. Kohl, *op. cit.*, 261–263.

35. *Ibid.*, 69–81.

in particular to the USA, by M. Gorbachev, who, in his book *Reconstruction and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World*, claimed that the collapse of the USSR would lead to the emergence of even greater military conflicts in the world.³⁶

As a result of the judgement made by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government and Krzysztof Skubiszewski as the head of the Polish foreign policy, with regard to the eastern borders of the Republic of Poland, a statement was included in the *Declaration on Principles and Basic Directions of Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations*, signed on October 13, 1990, asserting that there were no bilateral territorial claims between the Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR.

Between the Wiejska street and the Ukrainian nation

The resolutions of the Polish parliamentary chambers, which were passed simultaneously with the events in the USSR, and the subsequent steps taken by the cabinet of Minister Skubiszewski, were closely related to, and undoubtedly contributed to the process of shaping the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland towards a sovereign Ukraine.

The Sejm's and the Senate's resolutions, often addressed directly to the Ukrainian people, should be read as an important signal sent by Poland apart from the official, governmental documents. These parliamentary acts of will – having a form of statements – were often issued in the wake of the important decisions taken by the Ukrainian

36. A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, *Michaił Gorbaczow a idea i praktyka pierestrojki* [Mikhail Gorbachev and the Idea and Practice of Perestroika] (Łódź: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2016); P. Skorut, „Rewolucja czy ucieczka do przodu? Przebudowa i nowe myślenie Michaiła Gorbaczowa wobec zagrożeń destabilizacji bezpieczeństwa i układu bipolarnego w XX wieku” [Revolution or escape ahead? Reconstruction and new thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev in the face of threats of security destabilization and the bipolar system in the 20th century], [in:] *Obszar Europy Środkowej w geopolityce mocarstw. Od Mitteleuropy do integracji europejskiej* [Central Europe in the geopolitics of the superpowers. From Central Europe to European Integration], ed. G. Baziur, P. Skorut (Oświęcim: Wyd. PWSZ w Oświęcimiu, 2017), 231–241.

people, such as the vote of the Verkhovna Rada, or the result of the referendum vote. For example, the declaration of the Polish government's support for the Ukrainian people, sent on December 2, 1991, was followed on December 6, 1991 by a resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, being the third statement issued by the lower chamber of the Polish parliament on the Ukrainian question.³⁷ Wiesław Chrzanowski, the then Marshal of the Sejm, included in the document his congratulations on "the creation of the independent Ukrainian state" which – in the opinion of the signatories of the Sejm's resolution – became "an important event not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe and the whole world". Additionally, in the process of building the Ukrainian state based on the sources of democracy, Chrzanowski saw a sign of hope that the rights of national minorities living in Ukraine would be respected.³⁸

Table 1: Resolutions of the Polish Sejm and Senate on the question of Ukraine, adopted during Krzysztof Skubiszewski's term of office.

Item	Document name	Date	Notes
1	Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland	July 28, 1990	Position of the Polish Sejm on the declaration of independence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia
2	Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland	August 3, 1990	Resolution of the Senate condemning the actions carried out in the years 1947–1950 as part of the so called Operation "Vistula"

37. *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 6 grudnia 1991 r. w sprawie niepodległości Ukrainy* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of December 6, 1991 on the independence of Ukraine], *Monitor Polski* (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), 1991, no. 45, item 316.

38. *Ibid.*

3	Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland	August 30, 1991	The Senate's statement regarding Ukraine's declaration of independence
4	Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland	August 31, 1991	The position of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland towards Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August 1991
5	Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland	December 6, 1991	Sending congratulations following the independence referendum in Ukraine

Source: Own research.

It is worth noting that there was one more reason for the Polish Senate to pass its resolutions. The resolution of August 3, 1990 contributed to the process of creating positive Ukrainian-Polish relations in the first years of the 1990s. The adopted text condemned the actions carried out in the years 1947–1950 by, among others, the Polish Army and by a unit of the National Security Corps, as part of the Operation “Vistula”.³⁹ According to the senators’ statement, the described pacification action, which was carried out by the communist authorities of Poland, was realized in a way “typical of totalitarian systems, based on the principle of collective responsibility”.⁴⁰ The adoption of the resolution by

39. *Deportacyjna akcja „Wisła”. Istota i skala problemu* [The “Vistula” deportation action. Essence and scale of the problem], electronic document (Gorlice, 2007), 2–4, accessed January 22, 2021, [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/WydBAS.nsf/0/41dbefb1739cf039c12572d600486dcd/\\$FILE/Deportacyjna%20akcja%20Wis%C5%82a.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/WydBAS.nsf/0/41dbefb1739cf039c12572d600486dcd/$FILE/Deportacyjna%20akcja%20Wis%C5%82a.pdf).

40. *Uchwała Senatu RP potępiająca akcję „Wisła”* [Resolution of the Polish Senate Condemning the Operation “Vistula”], of August 3, 1990, [in:] *Zwizek*

the Senate was met with a response from the Ukrainian side, and on October 9, 1990 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine issued a statement which included a paragraph saying “that the people of Ukraine with understanding accepted the resolution of the Polish Senate”.⁴¹ Moreover, it was also hoped that despite the negative common historical experiences, new and better contacts between the countries could be established.

Warsaw–Kyiv

The announcement, at the turn of June and July 1990, of the independence aspirations of the Soviet republics: Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, prompted Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to adopt a dual-track policy towards the events that took place beyond the eastern border of the Republic of Poland. This reaction was dictated by the realism of Warsaw, which was aware both of the changes in international relations and of the persisting threat of intervention – not only political – in Polish affairs by Moscow. Although the Vistula river region was undoubtedly aware of and convinced of the irreversibility of the changes which had taken place in Europe after 1989, it was difficult to draw the final line of those changes, even in 1990.

Therefore, Polish foreign policy, led by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, adopted a two-track approach to the perception of changes in the Soviet Union. This meant that, on the one hand, Moscow ceased to be regarded by Poland as the only point of reference for Warsaw in the prism of the implementation of foreign affairs in the East. The result was an attempt by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to treat Moscow, Minsk and Kyiv equally. The adoption of such strategy quite quickly had a positive impact on the develop-

Ukraińców w Polsce w dokumentach z lat 1990–2005 [Association of Ukrainians in Poland in Documents from 1990–2005], ed. R. Drozd, document no. 6 (Warszawa: Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 2010), 21.

41. W. Gill, N. Gill, *op. cit.*, 22.

ment of diplomatic contacts between the Republic of Poland and the politically independent Soviet republics in the following years. On the other hand, in view of the political persistence of the USSR, for reasons including the security of the Republic of Poland, a constant contact between the Polish political authorities and their Soviet counterpart was maintained.

As a result of the foreign policy pursued by Poland, in the autumn of 1990, Warsaw drafted a declaration, which was sent in the form of a proposal to the capitals of the Soviet republics seeking political independence. This was undoubtedly an example of a pre-emptive move on the part of the Republic of Poland, as it made attempts to reach an agreement with the separatist republics at a time when they were not yet subjects of international law. One did not have to wait long for a reaction. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who paid a foreign visit to the USSR in October 1990, including a visit to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, signed in Kyiv on October 13, 1990 a *Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions for the Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations*.⁴²

Among the fourteen points included in this document, attention should be drawn to at least four elements whose conclusion undoubtedly raised hopes for the possibility of working out better relations between the two peoples. This point of view is supported by the reflection that the way of presenting the issues elaborated in the Declaration, i.e. in the tone of an interstate agreement, gave the parties of the Soviet republics confirmation of the rightness of their separatist agenda, and thus an incentive to continue their actions. First, Article 1 states that the parties to the Declaration are "sovereign states" whose actions are aimed at "maintaining and developing mutual cooperation" and the actions are "not directed against

42. It is worth noting in passing that during his visit to the USSR, K. Skubiszewski also signed the Declaration in Moscow on October 14, 1990. See: K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 405.

third parties”.⁴³ It should be noted that in the following part of the discussed article 1, the parties to the Declaration, in the manner customary for sovereign states, supported themselves with reference to both the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, or the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁴⁴ A significant addition to the content of Article 1 was Article 2, which strongly emphasized the rights of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples to self-determination in the international arena *without outside interference*, as well as the independent right to determine their economic or political development. The form and content of the expressed bipartisanship were not coincidental, since each side was guaranteed by this article what they most expected at the time. The Republic of Poland sought to secure the social and political changes that took place in and after 1989, and to have its sovereign foreign policy decisions recognized, while Ukraine’s goal was to ensure that the USSR does not oppose to Kyiv’s attempts to gain national and political independence.

Secondly, an extremely important issue addressed by the Declaration was the question of common borders. In Article 3, both sides confirmed to each other both the absence of any territorial claims and – which was particularly significant – the commitment that they would not be disputed in the future. An important accent of the findings of this article was the declarants’ attention to the fact that care about maintaining the inviolability of their borders should be seen “as an important element of peace and stability in Europe”.⁴⁵

The third and equally important issue was the commitment of the parties to establish diplomatic missions on their territory. It

43. Декларація про принципи та основні напрямки розвитку українсько-польських відносин, 13 жовтня 1990 р. [Declaration on the principles and main direction of the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations, October 13, 1990], accessed January 28, 2021, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=616_176.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

should be noted that this was a bold assertion, as the Ukrainian SSR was not an independent political entity at that time, which would be a subject of international law. And Poland itself, as was later pointed out by Kyiv, was in no hurry to establish a high level diplomatic representation in Ukraine.⁴⁶

The fourth element, which was fundamentally incorporated into the Declaration, was the mutual obligation to develop political, economic and cultural cooperation. The actions through which these goals were to be achieved included the will to mutually respect the rights of minorities on their territories, as well as the striving to support their cooperation “by recognizing the ethnic and cultural kinship of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples, and taking care to preserve the positive heritage of their centuries-long relations”.⁴⁷ It must be admitted that the reverse of these arrangements was the inclusion of the role of the Republic of Poland in the process of introducing Ukraine to “direct and equal participation in the pan-European process and in European structure”.⁴⁸ Which effectively meant Kyiv moving away from Moscow, and Ukrainians orienting themselves towards Western Europe.

The dynamically developing events in 1991 across Poland's eastern border were not situations that left the Republic of Poland unprepared. The declaration of independence by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on August 24, 1991 and the announcement of the holding of a referendum in this matter met with much goodwill on the part of Poland, which pointed to the Declaration of October 13,

46. E. Mironowicz, *Polityka zagraniczna Ukrainy 1990–2010* [Foreign policy of Ukraine 1990–2010], (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersyteckie Trans Human, 2012), 60–72.

47. Декларація про принципи та основні напрямки розвитку українсько-польських відносин, 13 жовтня 1990 р. [Declaration on the principles and main direction of the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations, October 13, 1990], accessed January 28, 2021, http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=616_176.

48. *Ibid.*

1990 as an example of “how both states treated each other as sovereign entities”.⁴⁹ Krzysztof Skubiszewski, in a statement he made on 26 August 1990, referring among other things to Ukrainian independence, additionally pointed out that the establishment of consular relations was already agreed and that “the establishment of diplomatic relations had been the subject of consultations even before the recent changes”.⁵⁰

Table 2: Polish-Ukrainian agreements and accords signed during the office of K. Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Item	Document name	Date of adoption	Prime Minister in office
1	Declaration on principles and basic directions for development of Polish-Ukrainian relations	October 13, 1990	Tadeusz Mazowiecki
2	Agreement on cooperation and exchange of young people	June 22, 1990	
3	Communication on the exchange of government envoys and the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future	September 7, 1991	Jan Krzysztof Bielecki
4	Treaty of good neighbourhood, friendly relations and cooperation	May 18, 1992	Jan Olszewski

49. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 165.

50. *Ibid.*, 166.

5	Declaration on cooperation in the Carpathian Euroregion	February 14, 1993	
6	Agreement of administrative and self- governing bodies of border areas of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine and Hungary creating the Carpathian Euroregion	February 14, 1993	Hanna Suchocka

Source: Own study

K. Skubiszewski's project of the gradual establishment of diplomatic relations with Ukraine after the Verkhovna Rada's announcement of the country's independence aspirations was, in Kyiv's view, lacking in dynamism. The first Polish diplomatic representative in Ukraine was appointed in 1991 and it was Jerzy Kozakiewicz. He served as consul general and special representative of the Polish government in Ukraine. The establishment of mutual diplomatic representations at the level of embassies took place in January 1992. The former Consul General, Jerzy Kozakiewicz, became the head of the Polish diplomatic mission in Ukraine. While in Warsaw, he presented his letter of credentials to Hennadii Udovenko, who served as Ambassador Extraordinary and later Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Poland from 1992 to 1994. In August 1994, he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.⁵¹

It must be admitted that the caution and slight restraint demonstrated by Warsaw towards Kyiv's expectations e.g. in September 1991, resulted directly from the Polish government's rational assessment of the situation in Europe and in the USSR. However, the

51. "Jak ułożyć się z Rosją?" [How do you settle with Russia?], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, August 28, 1992.

Polish government could not be accused of passivity towards partnership relations with Ukraine. It can only be accused of a consistent implementation of the dual-track policy. An example of Polish openness to Ukrainian affairs was, as already mentioned in the article, the Polish congratulations and support for Ukraine after the results of the independence referendum were announced. It is worth mentioning that Poland was the first European country to recognize the independence of this country, while other countries, including but not limited to the USA, West Germany, Great Britain or France, recognized Ukraine's independence only after Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR on December 25, 1991.⁵²

According to Krzysztof Skubiszewski, an independent Ukraine was as necessary for a sovereign Poland as a sovereign Poland was for an independent Ukraine. The head of Polish diplomacy, understanding Polish priorities, expressed it in his statement:

On the other hand, new states are emerging, especially in the western zone of the former USSR: Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states. This creates a completely new geopolitical situation, very convenient for Poland compared to the last centuries. It is in our vital interest to support the independence of these states. For their independence and security will to some extent determine our independence and security. And Poland's independence and sovereignty are for us supreme values.⁵³

52. A. Graczow, *Gorbaczow*, [Gorbachev] (Warszawa: ISKRY, 2003); A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, *Michaił Gorbaczow a idea i praktyka pieriestrojki* [Mikhail Gorbachev and the Idea and Practice of Perestroika] (Łódź: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2016).

53. P. Skubiszewski, J. Stańczak, eds., *Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Minister Spraw Zagranicznych RP 1989–1993* [Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 1989–1993] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2016), 44.

Nuclear weapons, between challenge and policy

The creation of the Ukrainian state in December 1991 was one of the final touches, a definitive burial of the old world order, bipolarly divided for over four decades in the second half of the 20th century. The collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were already seen as a thing of the past in 1992. However, the collapse of the old world did not mean that Poland did not face new challenges, not only in the political field, but also in the security area.

A major challenge for the emerging new international order in Europe was the problem of post-Soviet nuclear missiles. The independent Ukraine, which inherited from the USSR nearly 12% of its nuclear arsenal, became the third nuclear power in the world at that time.⁵⁴ This issue quickly became the subject of multilateral political debates among countries which either urged Ukraine to disarm itself in order to preserve the military balance in the European region (e.g. the Republic of Poland), or made the further development of diplomatic relations directly dependent on the liquidation of nuclear warheads (e.g. the U.S.). A separate issue was the position of Russia which, apart from its claims to the Crimean Peninsula, demanded that nuclear warheads be kept under surveillance on Ukrainian territory, a demand to which Kyiv was unwilling to agree.⁵⁵

It is necessary to emphasize that in its mutual relations with Kyiv, Warsaw did not reach for political pressure regarding Ukraine's nuclear arsenal. However, this does not mean that Minister Krzysz-

54. J. Kozakiewicz, *Rosja w polityce niepodległej Ukrainy* [Russia in the politics of independent Ukraine] (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1999), 213–235 and 261–268.

55. It is also worth noting that Ukraine has been pressured to disarm from nuclear warheads by NATO, among others, which has made Kyiv's participation in the Partnership for Peace program conditional on getting rid of its nuclear arsenal. See: K. Fedorowicz, op. cit., 163–225; "Partnerstwo lub broń" [Partnership or Weapons], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 3, 1993.

tof Skubiszewski did not make efforts to persuade Ukraine to disarm itself of this type of weapon in the name of the new order being created, the pillars of which were to include, among others, participation in the Vienna negotiations and OSCE membership. Skubiszewski informed Polish parliamentary committees about his aspirations towards Ukraine in November 1992:

We emphasized the issue of the status and commitments of the republics at the Vienna Disarmament Forum. We were the first to advocate the earliest possible inclusion of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and possibly other republics, in the CSCE. We would like to see these states as participants in the Vienna negotiations, we would be in favor of their accession to the NPT, and we would be in favor of their close political, economic, and cultural cooperation with regional and subregional groupings.⁵⁶

Discussing the issue of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, it is worth quoting Krzysztof Fedorowicz's opinion, according to which General Konstantin Morozov, Ukraine's Minister of Defense, who visited Poland on 14 January 1992, was to propose to the Polish authorities close political and military cooperation, which would become an alternative to Russian attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet area.⁵⁷ However, given Ukraine's reluctance to hand over its arsenal to Russia, as well as its suspicion of Kyiv's true intentions, Warsaw has been cautious about the suggested proposal.⁵⁸

A very important document in this context, which was signed on May 18, 1992, during the visit of Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine, to Poland, was the *Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation*. The document, preceded

56. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 273.

57. K. Fedorowicz, *op. cit.*, 176.

58. *Ibid.*, 176.

by a preamble, referred in its introduction to, among others, the Charter of the United Nations, the building of a just and peaceful order in Europe, and the building of European solidarity, and confirmed, in its Articles 1 and 2, the Agreement of October 13, 1991 on the Inviolability of the Borders and the Absence of any Territorial Claims.⁵⁹ Additionally, in Article 1, both parties pledged “not to use or threaten to use force”, to “settle disputes peacefully”, and “not to interfere in internal affairs”.⁶⁰

Article 3 complemented the Treaty’s provisions referring directly to the issue of limiting weapons of mass destruction. Its content was divided into three paragraphs, in which bilateral obligations were included. What should be noted in the first paragraph of Article 3 is the expression of Poland’s and Ukraine’s desire not only to build “mutual security, trust, stability, and cooperation”, but also to participate in “mechanisms and structures” of organizations that pursue nuclear non-proliferation. These aspirations are even more strongly emphasized in the second paragraph, which explicitly includes a commitment to “cooperate for security and stability in Europe”, which is to be achieved by agreeing to support the process of disarmament in the field of “nuclear weapons” or other means of mass destruction.⁶¹

The climax of the efforts of K. Skubiszewski’s ministerial office, which was concerned about a possible threat to Poland from WMD, was the provisions of paragraph 3 of the article in question. In it, both parties to the Treaty renounced the “possession, acquisition and production” of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction; in addition, the signatory states guaranteed themselves

59. *Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, sporządzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r.* [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992], *Journal of Laws* of 1993, no. 125, item 573.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

the right to maintain “full control over the production and storage of materials and substances that serve peaceful purposes but can be used in the production of mass destruction”.⁶²

K. Skubiszewski’s unquestionable success in convincing Ukraine to remain an atomic free state was communicated to members of the Polish parliamentary committees on November 18, 1992, before whom the head of Poland’s foreign policy delivered a speech that included an account of his talks with Leonid Kuchma:

Ukraine is a nuclear power. We take seriously Ukraine’s assurances about its desire to become a non-nuclear state. According to a recent statement by President Leonid Kravchuk, the START Treaty will be approved by the Ukrainian Parliament later this year.⁶³

On December 30, 1992 in Kyiv, there was an exchange of documents ratified by the parliaments of both countries, which was recorded, among others, in the Journal of Laws in 1993. The treaty signed by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine was to be concluded for a period of fifteen years, and then – in the absence of termination by either party – automatically extended, each time for a period of five years.⁶⁴

Poles in Ukraine

Since the beginning of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also paid attention to the issue of the Polish minority located outside the borders of the Republic of Poland. In the opinion of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, “Poles in the

62. *Ibid.*

63. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 282.

64. *Government Statement of October 27, 1993 on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, drawn up in Warsaw on May 18, 1992, Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 125, item 573.*

East were particularly affected by the communist system”, which is why this issue was so important to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet republics that were becoming politically independent.⁶⁵ A voice echoing the government of the day was the concern of the Polish chambers of parliament, the Sejm and the Senate, which in their resolutions of 1990 and 1991, called for respect for the rights of national minorities living in Ukraine.

The documents confirming mutual respect for the rights of national minorities on their territory were: Declaration on Principles and Basic Directions of Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations of October 13, 1990, and Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation of May 18, 1992. Aware of the importance of these documents, which guarantee the rights of the Polish national minority in Ukraine, Minister Skubiszewski, in reporting on Poland’s foreign policy in the east, drew attention to the needs of the Poles living there. Among the needs of the Polish community at that time, Skubiszewski enumerated: a) the lack of premises for Polish organizations, b) financial support of cultural life, c) the development of state education in the Polish language, d) the restitution of religious buildings, e) the care of national memorials and Polish cultural sites.⁶⁶

Another issue of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ activity, which was part of the context of the Polish Diaspora, was Polish graves on the territory of the former USSR. On the Ukrainian territory, there were not only well-known Polish necropolises, but also war graves from the time of World War II and burial places of Poles murdered in Kharkov by the NKVD on the orders of J. Stalin. Through the efforts of the ministerial office of K. Skubiszewski, as early as 1992, attempts were made not only to legally regulate the protection of Polish memorials and resting places, but also to undertake exhu-

65. K. Skubiszewski, *op. cit.*, 286–290.

66. *Ibid.*, 288.

mation work in Kharkov in order to identify the remains of Polish soldiers and build a cemetery, the construction of which was scheduled for 1994.⁶⁷

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67. *Ibid.*, 289.

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**CZESŁAW MIŁOSZ'S
REFLECTIONS ON THE
POLITICAL 'DISEASES' OF
THE 20TH CENTURY IN THE
CONTEXT OF HARMONIZING
BILATERAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN POLAND AND
UKRAINE. PRELIMINARY
REMARKS**

Abstract

In the proposed article, the author presents the political 'diseases' of the twentieth century and the prospects for overcoming them, based on a political analysis of the creative heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian poet and mastermind, Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz (1911–2004). Such 'diseases' include: human violence against human beings, blurring the line between good and evil, the enslavement of the human mind, the erosion of national identity, as well as extreme nationalism and pseudo-patriotism. A deeper insight into these problems allowed us to conclude that the work of Czesław Miłosz will remain a valuable source of knowledge for the people of the so-called 'other' Europe. The article supports Miłosz's claim that living in Central and Eastern Europe gives its inhabitants a chance to create a special type of culture that the rest of Europe

may follow one day. The author also notes that the political thinker has a profound sense of the rhythm of life in this part of Europe.

Miłosz's ideological and theoretical aspirations are related to overcoming the 'inferiority' of peoples through the formation of a "Native Realm" as a set of small homelands. Miłosz's scientific and civic argument touches upon the need to jointly develop a European policy of reconciliation, based on the European principle of deepening the dialogue between citizens of different countries with different historical background, in order to reach common views on the past, the present, and the future. His legacy for both present and future generations is a relentless search for a harmonious model of life in the common home that our planet is for us, overcoming not only old diseases, but also those that arise in modern conditions, such as terrorism, dependence on information, religious bigotry, drug addiction, mental disorders, etc. The article demonstrates that Miłosz, having no illusions about the possibility of an ideal political system, believes that it is possible to limit the scale of injustice in the world, and to form an ideal society. His ideal is a man who, in the face of chaos, seeks his place in the spiritual world, endowed with the ability to take a moral stand and go against the flow in the name of truth.

Keywords

political violence, good and evil, the captive mind, national identity, nationalism, pseudo patriotism.

The world has entered the XXI century. We once dreamed that by this time we would find ourselves in a better, kinder, brighter reality, with no more wars, social upheavals, or conflicts. However, the political problems of the last century – the most brutal in the history of human civilization – continue to haunt us. In view of this, it is worth referring to the creative heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian poet and thinker, Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz (1911–2004), who is rightly considered a chronicler of the twentieth century.

Lithuanians and Poles, especially in Vilnius and Kraków, have a long-established admiration and a deep respect for their great countryman and citizen. Only now Ukraine is truly discovering this poet and thinker of world-wide recognition. Miłosz has been translated into Ukrainian since 1980, when he was awarded the Nobel Prize. The first edition was B. Struminsky's translation of "The Captive Mind" issued by the emigration publishing house "Modernity" (Сучасність). With the independence of Ukraine, it was published thanks to the efforts of M. Ryabchuk in the magazines "Universe" (Всесвіт) and "Modernity" (Сучасність). Book editions appeared at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2000, with the funding of the Ministry of Culture and Arts of the Republic of Poland, a bilingual book "Selected Poetry" (translated by S. Shevchenko) was published. Subsequent publications included: "Roadside dog" ("Придорожний песик", translated by J. Senchishin); "Native Realm" ("Родина Європа", translated by Y. Izdryk); "Selected Works" ("Вибрані твори", translated by N. Bilotserkivets, D. Pavlychka, N. Sidiachenko); "Alphabet" ("Абетка", translated by N. Snyadanko); "Heaven born just now: Poetry" ("Небо народжених щойно: Поезії", translated by S. Zlyuchy); "The Grand Duchy of Literature. Selected Essays" ("Велике князівство літератури. Вибрані есеї", translated by O. Kovalenko, I. Kovalchuk, A. Pavlyshyna); "Prompted by Miłosz" (translated by Y. Andrukhovich, A. Bondar, S. Zhadan, O. Irvanets, M. Kiyanovskaya, O. Kotsarev, B. Matiyash, D. Matiyash, K. Moskalets, T. Prokhaska, O. Slivinsky, Y. Stakhivska); "Land of Ulro" ("Земля Ульро", translated by N. Sidiachenko); "The Issa Valley" ("Долина Ісси", translated by N. Sidiachenko). Along with this, a large number of Ukrainian-language publications devoted to various aspects of Miłosz's life and work appeared.

Czesław Miłosz did not write much about Ukraine, as he had no personal experience related to this country which he knew rather from the stories of his friends Jerzy Giedroyc and Stanisław

Vincenz. But the problems that Miłosz addresses in his work will concern Ukrainians for a long time, along with Poles and Lithuanians, because he was “a sensitive membrane of his time and managed to formulate the cornerstones that still confuse the intellectuals of the planet today, and will be the subject of their thoughts tomorrow, or in 50 years”.¹ These concerns include, first of all, the complex problems of Ukraine’s integration with Europe, its bilateral relations with Poland, and the search for an asymmetric strategy in countering Russian aggression.

Andrzej Franaszek, the author of Miłosz’s most complete biography, notes:

The Life of Czesław Miłosz is a chronicle of the last century, which he experienced first-hand, from the battlefields of World War I seen through the eyes of a few-year-old boy, through the Russian Revolution, the regain of Poland’s independence, the social and national problems of Interwar Poland, the time of the Apocalypse and hell on the streets of occupied Warsaw, the Holocaust and the struggle against two totalitarianisms, the experience of being an emigrant in a world separated by the ‘Iron Curtain’ of America in the 1960s and 1970s, to the fall of the Soviet empire and the beginning of the 21st century.²

Against this background, Miłosz managed to deeply comprehend the main ‘diseases’ of the twentieth century, and warn humanity about their persistence in the future, which is the subject matter of this article. The objectives of our study include key political

1. Я. Поліщук, *Розум поневолений і визволений. Чеслав Мілош: Літописець XX століття: Світоглядні питання польських та українських інтелектуалів у дзеркалі творчості Мілоша*. Український тиждень. September 23–29, 2011, 21.

2. A. Franaszek, *Miłosz: Biografia* [Miłosz: Biography] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012), 9.

issues that affect both past and present, such as violence of human beings against human beings, blurring the line between good and evil, enslavement of the human mind, erosion of national identity, extreme nationalism and pseudo-patriotism.

Human-to-human violence

The political lexicon of the twentieth century has been supplemented by a number of new words and concepts. Here are just some of them: world war, communism, fascism, totalitarianism, Machiavellianism, concentration camp, Holocaust, famine, deportation, information warfare, hybrid warfare. It's not just words. These are signs of unprecedented human-to-human violence. In his famous poem *Campo di Fiori*, written in occupied Warsaw, Czesław Miłosz not only condemns the mass extermination of Jews by the Nazis, but also shows what kind of challenge the Holocaust poses to the Christian and human conscience. In his conversation with Polish intellectuals on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, Miłosz said a horrifying thing: "The Germans wanted the victims not to be considered humans. I remember when the ghetto was closed in Warsaw, there were inscriptions on the walls: 'Jews, lice, typhus', these words went in a row".³ The horrors of the ghetto seen in the German-occupied capital, the irretrievable human losses – those remained in his memory forever. Besides, the years of German occupation ultimately determined the humanistic nature of Miłosz's work, giving him a deep understanding of the extraordinary vulnerability, uniqueness and value of each human life.

3. "Человечество, что остается. «Campo di Fiori» 50 лет спустя. Неопубликованная беседа Яна Блонского, Чеслава Милоша, Ежи Туровича и Марека Эдельмана в связи с 50-й годовщиной восстания в варшавском гетто" [Humanity that remains. "Campo di Fiori" 50 years later. Unpublished conversation between Jan Błoński, Czesław Miłosz, Jerzy Turowicz and Marek Edelman on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising], [in:] *Мой Милош*, Н. Горбаневская (Москва: Новое издательство, 2012), 311.

Miłosz draws also attention to the cynicism and meanness of the violence that took place, driven by ideological justification based on such intellectuals as Friedrich Nietzsche or André Gide, with their appeal to the will, intuition, and the subconscious, as well as the release of eagerness and power from moral reservations. Condemning their work, Miłosz reveals the mechanism of harmful intellectual influence:

The delicate hands of intellectuals are stained with blood from the moment they bring out a word that bears death, even if it appeared to them as a word of life. Their books are not read, perhaps by the broad masses. But they will be read by a journalist writing articles for the daily press. These articles will be read by a tribune of the people, a teacher, a person in the street. And now the coin of ideas, of thoughts starts rolling, its more elegant letters are rubbed out along its way until flat, simplified, it reaches the crowd in the form of a single slogan, a cheap slogan. Then a time comes when the demagogue raises it from the bridge. What are the speeches of dictators who are applauded by millions? They are made of slogans selected in popular brochures, transparent enough to be understandable to everyone; they need to be preceded by the work of scientists and artists, only then an apologist takes them – thanks to this, they are quite tenacious and complex enough so that a small person, deafened by their noise, could not see their falsehood.⁴

Here, as a true humanist, Miłosz expresses his position with unequivocal firmness: “nothing: not even a single high-level slogan,

4. Ч. Милош, *Легенды современности: Оккупационные эссе. Письма-эссе Ежи Анджеевского и Чеслава Милоша* [Modern Legends: Occupation Essays. Essay letters by Jerzy Andrzejewski and Czesław Miłosz] (Санкт-Петербург: Изд. Ивана Лимбаха, 2016), 117.

not a single truth, not a single distant goal can justify the torment of an individual”. Starting from this maxim, Miłosz condemns communism as an inhuman regime guilty of terrible crimes, including “both physical tortures, to which it subjected millions of defenceless human beings, and spiritual torture, such as fear and abandonment – out of fear – of common moral instincts and religious practices”.⁵

Miłosz was one of the first to suggest that Russian communism should be considered a criminal system in the same way as Nazism, and that August 23 should be an annual day of remembrance of the conspiracy between two dictators that led not only to the outbreak of a terrible war, but also to the establishment of a colonial principle, pursuant to which “nations are no different from cattle that are bought, sold and that are completely dependent on the will of each subsequent owner”.⁶ For Miłosz, violations of human rights that are not publicly recognized or condemned are a slow-acting poison that generates hatred between the nations instead of friendship. At a time when Russia still has not admitted the Soviet Union’s participation in unleashing World War II, this approach remains relevant.

Miłosz links the danger of perpetuating violence to the support from collective consciousness and public opinion. He notes that the crimes of the twentieth century are to be blamed not only on the authorities and dictators, but also on an ordinary German, who did not question the guardian’s role of the Fuhrer in the 1930s; on a Pole who justified the dictatorship and went to Germany for an internship before the war; on an Ukrainian who enlisted for the service of one dictator in order to defeat the other; or, say, a Russian who, with his tacit or active consent, helped to send dissidents to psychiatric hospitals. The poet appeals to the human conscience, as he notes in his essay *The experience of war* (1942):

5. Ч. Милош, “Достоевский и западное религиозное воображение” [Dostoevsky and the Western religious imagination], [in:] *Мой Милош*, Н. Горбаневская (Москва: Новое издательство, 2012), 210–211.

6. Ч. Милош, *Велике князівство літератури. Вибрані есеї* [Grand Duchy of Literature. Selected essays] (Київ: Дух і Літера, 2011), 19–20.

Everything depends on how a person's conscience overcomes doubt. If doubt settles in it, if the conscience considers the struggle for 'living space' to be a natural state, then realistic politicians will appear on stage, for whom the only basis of international relations would be the balance of power and the chess game of states, which, as we know, no longer leads to "small wars" between the two states, but inevitably ends with fireworks for the entire globe.⁷

The thinker is convinced that wars and human-to-human violence would disappear only if we overcome such remnants of the past as the military upbringing of young people since childhood, blind faith in an ideology or a leader, and intellectual justification for violence in the name of an idea.

Blurring the line between good and evil

Analysing the past, Miłosz warns of the danger of the mass consciousness being guided by ideologically-grounded false political promises. Using an example of the Polish society, he demonstrates how the distinction between good and evil is lost. After the brutal German occupation, the Poles came to terms with their subordination to Moscow, seeing it as a much lesser evil, and hoping for some change. However, it turned out that a more perfect totalitarian government, which makes use of the concepts of good and public good, is able to break all previous social ties and change the worldview of the whole nation.

From Miłosz's point of view, the evil that came to Poland and to the neighbouring countries of the so-called 'other Europe' is deeply rooted. It is derived from messianic ideas, which, in particular, were born in Russia. The worst thing is that these ideas were supported by intellectuals. This applies in particular to Fyodor Dosto-

7. Ч. Милош, "Опыт войны" [War experience], [in:] *Мой Милош*, Н. Горбаневская, (Москва: Новое издательство, 2012), 171–172.

evsky with his contradictory love for his neighbour, combined with his faith in the “God-bearing nation” who will bring Europe “their Christ on the blades of bayonets”.⁸

Accordingly, in Miłosz’s opinion, Russia, despite the undoubted influence of its culture and despite historical transformations of political regimes, remains an aggressive geographical and geopolitical space. By pointing out this disease of the twentieth century, Miłosz manifests his critical attitude to the West, whose representatives handed over half of Europe to Russia in Yalta, being “guided not only by the desire to appease the bear, but also by the desire to get rid of territories inhabited by peoples, claims, complaints and mutual hatred which no one is worthy to understand”.⁹

Pursuant to Miłosz, the loss of the principles of the humanistic Western European worldview is largely due to the recognition of the ‘secondary’ nature of the Eastern European peoples and the artificially formed border between the two Europes. After all, the situation today is almost mirrored in the West’s attitude towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

In this context, the following question is extremely important. What does European policy mean, is it holistic and consistent in terms of values? This question just came to the minds of Ukrainians after 2014, when Ukraine fell into a kind of grip – between Russia’s expansion, with its television propaganda of violence, and Western policy of indulgence towards the aggressor. In the conditions of a hybrid warfare, it turned out that European policy, with its excessive political correctness and general relaxation, caused some Western leaders to flirt with Putin. Such a policy should be considered not only anti-Ukrainian, but also anti-Russian, as it contributes to the final elimination of the remnants of democracy in today’s Russia. Here one must agree with the Lithuanian intellectual Leonidas Donskis, who noted:

8. Ч. Милош, *Земля Ульро* [The Land of Ulro] (Київ: Юніверс, 2015), 117.

9. Cz. Miłosz, *Prywatne obowiązki* [Private Obligations] (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1985), 115.

The triumph of Stalinism and Hitlerism in pre-war, military Europe was a tragic consequence of the collapse of Western liberal democracy, and the rise of Putinism is directly related to the shaking of European political values in the world economy, politics and international relations.¹⁰

Observing the current situation at a time of information wars, when black becomes white, when a crime becomes a feat, and a lie becomes the truth, we can confidently say that Miłosz's diagnosis of history, of which he was a partial witness, extends to our present and, presumably, to our future. Of course, Miłosz is far from considering it possible to completely overcome evil in the foreseeable future. He claims that the idea of building a paradise on Earth is ephemeral. However, we must clearly define the boundaries between good and evil in order to accept this world as it is. Not in the name of its preservation, but in the name of hope for the formation of a harmonious system. Only that way will humanity be able to overcome the cruel automatism of history, and continue to live with the awareness of the mortality of cultures, the inevitability of suffering.

Enslavement of the human mind

Miłosz sees the emergence of the phenomenon of enslaved mind as a result of the qualified victory over totalitarianism. Enslavement of the human mind is understood as the fall of a significant part of people into the trap of a deceptive sense of liberation from personal responsibility for the country, society, everyday life; the desire for security at all costs after several years of fascist captivity; the commitment of the intelligentsia to seductive idealisms associated with a 'bright future', the possibility of taking over the entire globe. Miłosz described these and other reasons in detail in his book *The*

10. Т. Венцлова, Л. Донскіс, *Предчуття і пророцтва Східної Європи* [Premonitions and prophecies of Eastern Europe], Пер. з литовської Георгій Єфремов, Олег Коцарев (Київ: Дух і Літера, 2016), 25.

Captive Mind (1953), which, according to Irena Grudzinska-Gross, was “not an analysis of communism as such, but rather an attempt to find out the reasons for its attractiveness to some eastern European writers and intellectuals”.¹¹

The main sign of an enslaved mind is the collaboration of intellectuals. Using examples from Polish post-war life, Miłosz provides an in-depth analysis of the psychological mechanisms of this phenomenon, trying to show how talented and seemingly quite decent people cooperate with absolutely immoral authorities, deceiving themselves in the most challenging ways and justifying their actions to themselves and others. However, according to Miłosz, for a thinking person, such an adaptation means their end as a free person. A fear of thinking is instilled in their soul at their own wish and such person falls into the peculiar ‘ticks’ of dialectical materialism in its Stalinist form, which “creates social and political conditions in which a person loses the ability to write and think differently than required, and at the same time is forced to agree with this requirement”.¹² There is not a single convincing argument, no wisdom of life’s observations, no torments of writers and artists’ creativity that could stop the onslaught of an organized state machine.

Miłosz addressed the problem of terrorism, which has taken over the world today, back in the 1950s in *Native Realm*, where, arguing with representatives of the West, he claimed that “terror is not monumental at all”, allegedly it is “abject, with a furtive glance”. Its nature and consequences are much deeper: “it destroys human society, and changes the relationships between millions of individuals into channels of blackmail”.¹³ These words, in particular, are con-

11. И. Грудзинская-Гросс, *Милош и Бродский: магнитное поле* [Miłosz and Brodsky: magnetic field], Пер. с польского М. Алексеевой (Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2013), 48.

12. Ч. Мілош, “Поневолений розум” [The Captive Mind], *Бібліотека Прологу і Сучасності*, в. 145, Сучасність, 1985, 30.

13. Cz. Miłosz, *Rodzinna Europa* [Native Realm] (Warszawa: Biblioteka Półityki, 2009), 244.

firmed by the current wave of spiritual terrorism directed against religious, linguistic, cultural, or civilizational enemies.

Returning to this problem several decades later, the thinker draws attention to the ability of terrorism to change, to acquire unpredictable forms:

Awareness of the importance of man in society did not prevent murders in the twentieth century from being committed under the banner of destroying class enemies or representatives of the 'lower' race. It is not known what new motivations will appear to kill people, but the reasons can be the most cunning and unpredictable. The wave of terrorism that has risen is in many cases directed against religious enemies. Violent and bloody clashes occur between non-believers. All this takes on new forms and a great mass character.¹⁴

Already in our times, Miłosz, in a conversation with a Ukrainian writer and scientist Mykola Ryabchuk, expressed doubts about the significance of the book *The Captive Mind* in modern times. This doubt is certainly true in relation to Poland, where in the 1980s and 1990s there was an irreversible process of transformation from a pro-Moscow to a pro-Western orientation, both in human consciousness and in practice. However, for Ukraine, this book still has lasting significance today, given that a significant part of the population after 2014 still openly or covertly supports pro-Moscow political forces.

Erosion of national identity

Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko very accurately called the last century "the century of the great fornication of history with geography". This name refers to large-scale mass escapes of representatives of different nations, deportations of entire peoples, urban-

14. В. Мастеров, *Миłosz заглядывает в XXI век* [Miłosz looks into the 21st century], *Новая Польша*, no. 4 (2011), accessed September 10, 2019, www.novayapolsha.pl/pdf/2011/04.pdf.

ization and other socio-political processes and upheavals that have caused and still cause the erosion of national identity. In this context, Miłosz's position on the decisive role of the native language as a factor of human self-preservation is important for the Ukrainian present situation in a complex and unpredictable world. Emphasizing the importance of this problem, Miłosz justifies his position with the following arguments:

- emigration does not necessarily mean a break with the native land, tradition, language; preservation of the native language in a foreign language environment allows one to cleanse oneself of superficiality and strengthen the spiritual connection with one's homeland, thus recognizing the power of language over man and the world, its infinite possibilities, shades, and meanings;

- the native language is the most perfect tool for securing national identity, a means of preserving one's inner self; the desire to encapsulate the world in the native language is a powerful mechanism for the formation of the individual and civilization;

- changing the language entails not only the expansion of the world's borders, but also partial, yet irreversible transformation of the individual; accordingly, Miłosz notes that “by changing the language, we become someone else” and we betray “the expectations of people who speak that language”;¹⁵

- considering that we inherited the language of the enslaved society with its introduced habits, our task is to cleanse it from the superficial, calling things by their names, freeing the past from fabrications and legends; language is considered healthy if it is a desperate fighter who tries to capture and reproduce the existing reality.

According to Miłosz, the mismatch between language and reality exists objectively. At the same time, the twentieth century was the proof of the vulnerability of European culture, in which, under the pressure of totalitarian rule, “clear criteria of good and evil, truth

15. Ч. Мілош, *Абетка* [Alphabet], (Харків: Треант, 2010), 21.

and falsehood disappeared". Under these conditions, "language has become the property of the people who own power, since they have monopolized the media and can now arbitrarily change the meaning of words".¹⁶ At the same time, Miłosz argues for the need to overcome a distorted cultural identity, which leads many people to perceive their own national culture as 'provincial'. Analysing the Polish identity, Miłosz goes beyond the stereotype of so-called 'Polishness'. He defines this concept through the following series: the Polish language and Polish literature, deep Catholic religiosity, understanding of the history of Poland as a struggle for independence, Polish messianism. Olena Brazhovska, a researcher of Miłosz's oeuvre, remarks: "Miłosz is one of the poets-thinkers who wrote almost exclusively in their native language, but crossed the borders of national literature. He had a sense of being part of Polish literature, but said that he was brought up by the whole world's culture".¹⁷

Throughout his work and life, Miłosz manifests his belief that identity must be multifaceted, that one can be both a Polish writer and a patriot of Lithuanian land, a resident of a small county in a forgotten corner of Europe and at the same time a full citizen of the world.

Extreme nationalism and pseudo-patriotism

In his reflections, Miłosz uncompromisingly turns his attention to ambiguous, painful problems concerning illusions of great power, which are equally dangerous both in the Russian and the Polish context. In the late 1990s, the poet published an extremely valu-

16. Ч. Мілош, *Вибрані твори: Поезія; Статті* [Selected Works: Poetry; Articles] (Київ: Юніверс, 2008), 303.

17. Е. Бразговская, "Это я или культура, в которой я вырос?" Чеслав Милош об аутентичности поэта в культуре. *Сегменты идентичности в творчестве зарубежных славянских писателей* ["Is it me or the culture I grew up in?" Czesław Miłosz on the poet's authenticity in culture. Segments of Identity in the Works of Foreign Slavic Writers], Бодрова А. Г., Бразговская Е. Е., Князькова В. С., Котова М. Ю. и др.; отв. Редактор М. Ю. Котова (Санкт-Петербург: Изд-во С.-Петерб. ун-та, 2014), 84.

able book *Wyprawa w Dwudziestolecie* [*An Excursion through the Twenties and Thirties*], in which he honestly and uncompromisingly depicted the problems of people in the interwar period, capable of gaining freedom and unable to properly manage it.¹⁸

Miłosz believes that nostalgic maintenance of historical memory in conditions that have undergone radical changes is dangerous and can lead to collective psychosis. This was the case in the interwar Polish twentieth century, when exclusivity in access to the 'national rite' only for persons who met certain criteria led to the division of the country's inhabitants into citizens of the first and second categories. This problem is pointed by Miłosz not only in recognition of the difficult national history, but also as one that has, to some extent, preserved to the present day. Manifestations of extreme nationalism and pseudo-patriotism can be traced in such historical and modern phenomena as mutual Polish-German, Polish-Russian, or Polish-Ukrainian hatred; in religious fanaticism, which causes enmity between Catholicism and Orthodoxy; in various manifestations of contempt in inter-ethnic relations, in the illusions of great power with territorial claims, etc. Having presented his negative view of these phenomena on historical examples, Czesław Miłosz came to the conclusion that any nationalism, whether Polish, Ukrainian or Russian, is dead, even if it is expected to become more and more triumphant. And whatever the future form of coexistence, it should not preclude friendly competition of peoples.

Conclusions

The work of Czesław Miłosz will remain a valuable source of knowledge for the inhabitants of the so-called 'Other Europe' for a long time to come. In his opinion, being in Central and Eastern Europe gives its inhabitants a chance to create a special type of culture, which, perhaps, one day will be taken as a model by the rest of

18. Cz. Miłosz, *Wyprawa w Dwudziestolecie* [*An Excursion through the Twenties and Thirties*] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2016), 612.

Europe. The poet has a deep sense of the rhythm of life in this part of Europe. His ideological and theoretical aspirations are related to overcoming the 'secondary importance' of peoples through the formation of a "Native Realm" as a set of small homelands. The reflections of this great Polish poet and political thinker are extremely important in the context of establishing friendly bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine. The legal framework adopted over three decades prevails over historically determined problems that remain unresolved in relations between the two countries. Despite the existing problems, largely resulting from the 'diseases' of the twentieth century, and despite the need to address current issues such as cross-border cooperation, historical heritage, or labor migration, there is every reason to recognise the upward trajectory in relations between Poland and Ukraine. Evidence of this is the establishment of scientific cooperation, mutual translations of books by Polish and Ukrainian authors, restoration of justice in the perception of historical memory, promoting the development of national minorities – Ukrainian in Poland and Polish in Ukraine, assistance from the Polish government and Polish society provided to Ukrainian soldiers. Friendly relations between the two countries are dictated by the mutual interest of the two countries in ensuring stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the future of both countries in the equal European community that Czesław Miłosz dreamed of throughout his whole life.

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'EAGLETS CEMETERY' DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE'S POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Abstract

In this paper, the author presents her analysis of the discourse regarding the 'Eaglets' Cemetery that took place in the years 1997–2018 in Ukraine, and identifies its four waves that are related to political processes in the country. She proves that the political discourse, which gained its relevance during the time of the elections or during the crisis of political power in Ukraine, expanded the field of interpretation to the discourse of historical memory. But instead of generating values, the discourse brought out the postponed conflicts. The author demonstrates that the political elite uses the politics of memory as a symbolic capital, in order to influence and control the political processes in the country. Hence, the 'traces of history' that were embedded in the political discourse shattered even further the historical memory, leading not to mutual understanding, but to frozen conflicts. The study analyses forms of attitudes to political reality with regards to the discourse around the 'Eaglets' Cemetery. The author uses a structuralist approach, with reference to the theories of Y. Lotman and C. Lévi Strauss.

Keywords

Political elite, political discourse, symbols, meaning, 'Eaglets' Cemetery.

Symbolic language, which is used in political discourses, consists of arguments, metaphors, phonologies, language, communication and normative acts. It is applied through stories that are told via the news in the media. This is a condition for the functioning of discourse, through which meaning is developed which shapes a political reality. Official political discourse creates a regulation that points to the official text. It is related to topics that are included in the public space. Topics that society should reflect on become a challenge for the political authorities. Therefore, the carriers of political discourse are both the political elite and political institutions, as well as society, which, at the community level, is able to have an impact on the change or adjustment of political discourse. History is the most vulnerable and painful topic in political discourse. The interpretation of historical facts, where some are silenced and others acquire a new meaning, is done by political actors in the public space. Through interpretation, it is possible not only to establish a mechanism for introducing certain values into society, but also to predict the stability/instability of the development of the political system. When the values transmitted through political discourse acquire their own antitheses, the system undergoes internal fluctuations caused by value conflicts.

The problems of national memory related to the above-mentioned discourse in modern Ukraine are addressed by such Ukrainian researchers as I. Bulkina, A. Veselova, A. Gritsenko, Y. Zerniy, G. Kasyanov, L. Nagorna, or M. Ryabchuk, whose attention is primarily focused on the Ukrainian context. The works of J. Assmann,¹ R. Koselleck,² P. Nora,³

1. Я. Ассман, *Культурная память: Письмо, память о прошлом и политическая идентичность в высоких культурах древности* [Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination] (Москва: Языки славянской культуры, 2004).

2. Р. Козеллек, и др., *“Пространство опыта и горизонт ожиданий – две исторические категории”* [‘Space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ are two historical categories], *Социология власти*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2016).

3. П. Нора, *Проблематика мест памяти* [Problems of memory places], accessed June 8, 2018, <http://ec-dejavu.ru/m-2/Memory-Nora.html>.

J. Rancière,⁴ P. Ricœur,⁵ or M. Halbwachs⁶ allow us to understand that there is a field for interpretation when it comes to historical discourse upon which the strategy of shaping the national memory is officially built.

There are different forms of collective memory: national, cultural (J. Assmann), communicative (M. Halbwachs, P. Nora), or historical (P. Ricœur). Its main substance is historical events. Emphasizing some and silencing other events leads to a situation in which some fragments are represented in public space. P. Ricœur calls these fragments 'traces of history'. Thus, the scholar dilutes the concepts of 'history' and 'memory'. History, in his opinion, puts events in a single logic, while memory sees only fragments. Thus, national, cultural, communicative, and historical memories need constant support from the authorities. If the 'traces of history' are not included in the official political discourse, not only the connection with the past is destroyed, but we also lose the national identification of the present. Therefore, historical memory can be understood as a practice used by political institutions, which – through a set of historical knowledge, ideas and values – establishes common codes, and influences the unification of the nation by means of a particular discourse.

In this study, we will rely on a structuralist approach, where the focus is not on the political reality, but on the attitudes toward the political reality. Therefore, the matter of this research is not the subject of political reality, but the form of attitude towards political reality. In this study, the form of attitude is represented through the 'Eaglets' Cemetery discourse. The systemic approach, based on Yuri Lotman's theory, allows to analyse the role of the subject on the periphery of the political system as a principle of (un)restraining

4. Ж. Рансьер, *На краю политического* [On the Shores of Politics] (Москва: Праксис, 2006).

5. П. Рикер, *Память, история, забвение* [Memory, History, Forgetting] (Москва: Издательство гуманитарной литературы, 2004).

6. М. Хальбвакс, *Социальные рамки памяти* [The Social Frameworks of Memory] (Москва: Новое издательство, 2007).

the development of the system in accordance with its centre. If we think of the subject as an actor of discourse, it is possible to trace its interactive role in creating myths and distorting myths. Claude Lévi-Strauss introduced the concept of 'cold societies', i.e. the societies which, with the help of special institutions, stop the influence of historical factors that threaten the balance and stability of the system. The main weapon used by such societies is the creation of myths. Therefore, historical memory, according to C. Lévi Strauss, has a mythologized form. According to the scholar, the 'freezing of facts', typical of a cold culture, is the wisdom that allows the system to evolve linearly during internal non-linear processes. Myth is not understood here as a fictional story, but as a narrative of fundamental significance, passed down from generation to generation.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the construction of a memorial began at the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, where participants of the Ukrainian-Polish battles for Lviv in 1918 were buried, and then reburied in a separate cemetery (known under the unofficial name of the 'Eaglets' Cemetery). After 1918, participants of the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1920 began to be buried there. "According to Polish sources, a total of 6,022 people – the military and volunteers – were involved in the fightings in Lviv on the Polish side. 1,421 of them were under 18 at that time, and 2,650 people were under the age of 25. 439 participants, including 120 schoolchildren and 76 students, died as a result of their injuries".⁷ Among Polish people, the prevailing opinion is that it was mostly young Polish high school students that were buried at the cemetery (the youngest, Antoni Petrykiewicz, was 13 years old). According to Lyubomyr Khakhula, who carried out a research project on the Polish and Ukrainian press (including such titles as "Vysokiy Zamok", "Postup", "Gazeta Wyborcza", "Rzeczpospolita", "Polityka", and some online publications), "in the early 2000s, some Polish newspapers reported

7. "Цвинтар орлят" [Eaglets Cemetery], *Саїм "Varianty"*, accessed June 11, 2018, <https://varianty.lviv.ua/51842-tsvyntar-orliat>.

that the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery “was home mainly to Polish students who died in the fightings against the Ukrainians for Lviv in 1918–1919”.⁸ In his painting entitled Lviv ‘Eaglets’ during the defence of the cemetery in Lviv (1926), a Polish artist Wojciech Kossak visualized the Eaglets themselves. This image influenced the Polish way of thinking about the participants in the Ukrainian-Polish battles for Lviv in 1918. The painting shows young men holding rifles in their hands, defending the cemetery.

There is also a monument at the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery bearing an inscription “Tomb of the Polish Unknown Soldier”, which is believed to be a grave of Ukrainian Sich riflemen. The cemetery is also home to the graves of “volunteer pilots from the United States and military advisers from the French Mission who were part of the Polish troops”.⁹

Over time, at the beginning of World War II, all those who took part on the Polish side and died during the hostilities (both military staff and civilians, as well as veterans) began to be buried there. After World War II, a wave of true vandalism began at the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery: the tombs were deliberately destroyed and used for the construction of the streets of Lviv. In 1971, the cemetery was razed to the ground.

The analysis of the discourse regarding the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery allowed to identify four waves of the debate that coincide with the political processes that took place in Ukraine.

2002 – The first wave of the debate

In May 2002, during the restoration (some scholars use the term ‘reconstruction’) of the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery, which was carried

8. Л. Хахула, “Проблема відновлення польського військового меморіалу у Львові в польській та українській пресі кінця XX – початку XXI століття” [The problem of restoring the Polish military memorial in Lviv in the Polish and Ukrainian press of the late 20th and early 21st centuries], *Україна-Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість*, no. 7 (2014), 120.

9. Л. Петренко, “Цвинтарний детектив Міста Лева” [Detective of the Lions from the City Cemetery], *Zaxid.net*, December 29, 2015, accessed March 10, 2017, https://zaxid.net/tsvintarniy_detektiv_mista_leva_n1378004.

out in the years 1997–2005, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski cancelled a meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, scheduled for May 21 in Lviv. On that day, a memorial plaque was to be unveiled in Lviv. The meeting was scheduled so as to coincide with the opening of the cemetery to mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the *Ukrainian-Polish declaration of mutual understanding and unity*. The reason for the cancellation of the visit was the decision of the Lviv City Council, which agreed to open the cemetery to Polish soldiers, but refused to approve the inscription proposed by the Polish side which was to be placed on the monument. According to the decision, the inscription on the mass grave at the cemetery was supposed to be: “Unknown Polish soldiers who died for Poland in 1918–1920” – without the words “heroically” and “independence”, upon which the Polish side insisted.

Later, in 2005, under Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, the conflict was resolved: the plaque was installed in the central part of the monument with an inscription reading in Polish: “Here lies a Polish soldier who died for the Homeland” [Tu leży żołnierz polski poległy za Ojczyznę]. Another memorial sign was installed in front of the entrance to the memorial, with an inscription in both Polish and Ukrainian: “Ukrainian and Polish soldiers who died during the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918–1919 are buried here”. But the discussions around the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery did not end there. For example, even then a Ukrainian politician Oleh Tyahnybok opposed to the Polish inscription on the said plaque (“Here lies a Polish soldier who died for the Homeland”), arguing that this was a violation of Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which defines the Ukrainian language as the only official language in Ukraine.¹⁰

If the Ukrainian media discourse spread fear that Lviv would return to Poland, then the Polish media discourse formed a framework of indignation, which generally produced mutual hostility

10. “Цвинтар під загрозою” [Cemetery under threat], *Львівська газета*, June 22, 2005.

between the two nations. Under these conditions, the Ukrainian political elite split: one part of it, including most of the former party officials of the country and the region, tried to avoid public discussion on this topic, because it was inconvenient to them; the others linked the theme of the 'Eaglets' Cemetery to the issue of the UPA soldiers' memorial in the Przemyśl province. Let me remind you that in 1991, the Polish episcopate decided "to hand over the Carmelite Church in Przemyśl to the Greek Catholics for the period of 5 years until they build their own church. Before 1946, this church had been a Greek Catholic cathedral, *the seat of the Ukrainian church hierarchs*".¹¹ Another story is related to the exhumation of the remains of UPA soldiers in the Polish city of Bircza. In 1946, the 26th division of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) "Lemko" attacked the city, in which the NKVD troops and Polish military personnel were deployed. After the defeat of the UPA, the defenders of the city and the civilians who died in fighting were buried in the cemetery, while 23 UPA soldiers were thrown into a pit. As Lyubomyr Khakhula writes: "Neither the deputies nor the public agreed to a decent reburial of the remains of the UPA fighters, because they never forgot the murders committed by this formation, and were afraid of the return of the UPA legend".¹² The search for their remains, and then the reburial negotiations took as many as 10 years. Only in 2000, the remains of the soldiers were reburied and crosses were installed with an inscription reading: "Here rest the Ukrainian insurgents who died in the struggle for an independent Ukraine".

The newly elected mayor of Lviv Lyubomyr Bunyak and the president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma shared a common position

11. Ю. З. Павлів, *Депортації українців із польсько-українського прикордоння 1944–1951 рр. у регіональній пам'яті України* [Deportations of Ukrainians from the Polish-Ukrainian border in 1944–1951 in the regional memory of Ukraine], Кваліфікаційна наукова праця на правах рукопису, Спеціальність: 07.00.01 – історія України, Львів, 2018, р. 180, accessed September 11, 2019, <http://www.inst-ukr.lviv.ua/download.php?downloadid=448>.

12. Л. Хахула, *op. cit.*, 129.

on this contentious issue. During two May sessions of the city council, Lyubomyr Bunyak tried to persuade the deputies to make a compromise. He gave examples of inscriptions on Ukrainian burials in Poland, and called for understanding. Even a letter from the OUP (Association of Ukrainians in Poland), which talked about “negative stereotypes and prejudices about the common historical past”, did not manage to convince the deputies. “We appeal to you to come up with a balanced decision regarding the opening of the Polish military cemetery, which is scheduled for May 21 this year, remembering that maintaining a positive image of Ukraine and the fate of Ukraine’s aspirations for integration with Europe will depend on this”, the letter said.¹³ Leonid Kuchma, with his authoritarian approach to government, for the first time faced opposition from the community of Western Ukraine, supported by the local authorities. The political changes associated with the parliamentary elections of March 31, 2002, led to a redistribution of struggles between regional elites. The activation of the counter-elite (represented by V. Yushchenko), which was a consequence of the loss of power by the Communist Party of Ukraine in 2002, brought the Galician and Kharkiv elites to the arena of struggle. In autumn 2002, on the second anniversary of G. Gongadze’s disappearance, a new protest action “Uprising, Ukraine!” began, demanding the impeachment of the president. Added to this are a number of international scandals including accusations concerning the president’s involvement in the illegal sale of the ‘Kolchuga’ system to Iraq. All this influenced the fact that Leonid Kuchma was interested in supporting Poland. Aleksander Kwasniewski served as a mediator between Ukraine and Eastern Europe when it was necessary to reconcile the two sides. Yet, the president was unable to influence the decision of the local council.

13. *Об’єднання українців у Польщі. Депутатам Львівської міської Ради* [Association of Ukrainians in Poland. Deputies of the Lviv City Council], accessed March 21, 2017, <http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/inform/orlata/zuwp1405.htm>.

2005 – The second wave of the debate

On June 25, 2005, when the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery was finally opened, emotions did not subside in the Ukrainian media. In the centre of the discourse regarding this issue, a new topic emerged: the ‘Szczerebiec’ sword, whose image is placed on the Tomb of the Five Unknown Soldiers, in front of the Monument of Glory. The tombstone bears an inscription: “Unknown heroes who died in the defence of Lviv and the South-Eastern Land”. After the opening of the Cemetery, a rumour began to spread that the sword symbolizes the conquest of Ukraine by Poland. The military burials committee at the Lviv City Council “recognized that the ‘Szczerebiec’ sword on the central plate can be considered a military symbol”, and that this “infringes the decision of the city council, according to which the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery should have no signs that could be interpreted in terms of conquest”, as the newspaper “Vysoky Zamok” wrote in 2005.¹⁴

At that time, Oleh Tyahnybok, a People’s Deputy to the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), and the chairman of the Svoboda Party, said in a comment to “Press Time”: “I believe that yesterday [June 24, the opening day of the Cemetery – I.M.] was a day of national shame. (...) We need to divide this matter into two separate issues. The first one is the opening of the Cemetery and honouring the fallen soldiers. I am in favour of this being done. The second question concerns monumental symbols and inscriptions. Even the Poles admitted that they were taking advantage of the submissiveness of the Ukrainian authorities, and they even violated the protocol that was signed between the two presidents. According to this treaty, it was forbidden to install any monumental military symbols. And yet, the ‘Szczerebiec’ sword, which symbolizes the

14. “«Поховані» на «Цвинтарі орлят» суперечки воскрешають?» [‘Buried’ in the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery disputes resurrect?], *Високий Замок*, November 17, 2005, no. 211 (3222), accessed February 21, 2010, <http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/inform/orlata/arhiv2005.htm#13>.

victory of Polish weapons over Ukraine, over Kiev – we have it in the cemetery”.¹⁵

There was a public debate about the significance of the sword: some considered it a symbol of conquest, others did not. Based on the conclusion of the military burials committee of the Lviv City Council, on June 13, 2005 the City Council adopted decision no. 2553 on dismantling the sword. Paragraph 4 of this document was formulated as follows:

“(…) to consider unacceptable the installation of sculptures, architectural elements and military symbols. (...) Therefore, we can assume that, in the opinion of the members of the committee, the Polish side did not take into account the instructions of the Lviv City authorities during the construction of the complex in the Lychakiv Cemetery, and crossed the line set by the deputies, who still consider the decision to be a great compromise”.¹⁶

Let me remind you that the opening of the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery by V. Yushchenko took place after pressure from his administration was exerted on the local authorities of the city. Therefore, during the country’s political crisis of 2005, related to the conflict between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the president was accused of betraying the national interests of Ukraine. On September 8, 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers, headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, was dissolved by the decision of the president, and the debate around the ‘Szczerebiec’ sword began to subside.

15. “Відкриття, Цвинтаря Орлят є національною ганьбою – Тягнибок” [Opening of “the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery is a national shame” – Tyahnybok], Інтернет видання *lviv.proua*, June 25, 2005, accessed June 27, 2006, <http://lviv.proua.com/news/2005/06/25/162340.html>.

16. “Дамоклів меч-щербець” [Damocles Sword-Szczerebiec], *Львівська газета*, July 19, 2005, no. 125 (691), accessed July 15, 2018, <http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/inform/orlata/arhiv2005.htm#12>.

2015 – The third wave of the debate

The third wave of the discourse regarding the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery concerns the statues of two lions, about which it is necessary to give a small historical digression. In 1934, during the construction of the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery, two sculptures of lions were built as part of a memorial complex (made by the Polish sculptor Józef Starzyński). They stood at both arches of the Monument of Glory, with their front paws resting on shields bearing Polish inscriptions: “Always faithful” (Zawsze wierni) and “For you, Poland” (Tobie Polsko). However, the Soviet authorities decided to remove the statues in 1967 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution (one was installed on the Lviv–Vynnyky road, and the other was moved several times around the city, and was finally installed in Kulparkov (Kulparkiv), near a psychiatric clinic).

On June 13, 2005, in line with already mentioned Paragraph 4, the city council decided “to consider unacceptable the installation of sculptures, architectural elements and military symbols that are not approved by the decisions of the Lviv City Council”.¹⁷ However, on December 16, 2015, without the approval of the Lviv City Council, the Lions were installed in the Cemetery (previously covered with wooden shields with the sign “Restoration”). This date is not accidental, since the day before, on December 15, Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Ukraine. The Polish side tried to symbolically support the Ukrainians during the Revolution of Dignity. But the topic of lions acquired a political connotation in the context of the country’s internal regional policy.

Only one week after the installation of the Lions, on December 24, 2015, Maryan Batyuk, a deputy from the Svoboda party, reported a criminal offence – the disappearance of the lions that had stood

17. “Відновлення Цвинтаря орлят було можливе лише без левів – документ” [Restoration of the Eagles Cemetery was possible only without lions – a document], *Європейська правда*, October 30, 2018, accessed January 11, 2019, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2018/10/30/7088780/>.

at the entrance to the city from the city of Vynnyky, and at 95 Kulparkovskaya (Kulparkivska) Street. At that session, Valeriy Veremchuk, the head of the People's Control faction, also supported Svoboda, and explained that the missing lions were already standing in the Lychakiv Cemetery without the permission of the Lviv City Council. Later, a statement was issued by the People's Movement of Ukraine, saying that the case was qualified not just as a criminal act, but treason: "Unauthorized installation of monumental sculptures of stone lions on December 16–17, 2015 at the Polish memorial is a planned pro Moscow provocation by the Lviv city authorities and personally by the mayor, A. Sadovy. We are convinced that this provocation is designed to upset the public and ignite a new conflict with Ukraine's ally".¹⁸

In early 2016, a statement was published by Svoboda deputies in the Lviv Regional Council, who stated that the return of lion sculptures to the 'Eaglets' Cemetery could have serious consequences:

Such structures, in the original context of their installation, carried unambiguous symbolism, which, together with other existing military symbols, e.g. the Szczerbiec sword, created and will now create a context that may carry an anti-Ukrainian meaning, symbolize the occupation of Ukrainian lands, and offend the national feelings of Ukrainians.¹⁹

In early December 2015, a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Council at the Department of Historic Environment Protection of the Lviv City Council was held. During the meeting, the Polish side

18. Л. Петренко, "Цвинтарний детектив Міста Лева" [Detective of the Lions from the City Cemetery], *op. cit.*

19. "Львівські депутати вважають, що леви на польському цвинтарі символізують окупацію" [Lviv deputies believe that lions in a Polish cemetery symbolize the occupation], *Високий замок*, January 27, 2016, accessed April 17, 2016, <https://wz.lviv.ua/news/157884-l-vivs-ki-deputati-vvazhayut-shcho-levi-na-pol-s-komu-tsvintari-simvolizuyut-okupatsiyu>.

did not insist on restoring the inscriptions “Always faithful” (Zawsze wierni) and “For you, Poland” (Tobie Polsko), as, in their opinion, they were inappropriate. It was decided that the shields would simply have the coat of arms of Lviv.²⁰ However, Poland received a key message from Ukraine that the restored Lions were “a symbol of the Polish occupation of Lviv”, and were related to the “military”, which has worsened the relations between the two countries.

When it comes to the political developments in Ukraine, it should be recalled that on October 25, 2015, local elections were held in Ukraine. The City Council included 7 political parties, most of which were radical:

- PP²¹ “Samopomich” – 24 seats
- Petro Poroshenko’s “Solidarity” Bloc Party – 10 seats
- WO “Svoboda” – 8 seats
- PP “Hromadyans’ka pozytsiya” – 7 seats
- PP “Hromads’kyy rukh Narodnyy kontrol” – 6 seats
- PP “Ukrayins’ke ob’yednannya patriotiv – ukrop” (Ukrainian Association of Patriots – Ukrop) – 5 seats
- PP “Ukrayins’ka Halyts’ka partiya” – 4 seats

Among 11 candidates for mayor, Andriy Sadovy, the leader of the largest faction in Lviv, won in the second round. And it was after the elections that the newly elected parties which did not agree with the choice of a new mayor started to issue their public statements. Today, the debate does not subside, and there is still a threat that it may be used in new political confrontations.

2017 – The fourth wave of the debate

A new conflict around the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery arose in 2017, when the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of Poland, Mariusz Błaszczak, announced the campaign “Design with us the

20. Л. Петренко, “Цвинтарний детектив Міста Лева” [Detective of the Lions from the City Cemetery], *op. cit.*

21. Political Party {ad. translator}.

passport of Poland 2018”. One of the propositions included placing images of the rotunda from the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery on the pages of Polish passports. Thus, Ukraine was faced with the prospect of its territory being depicted in foreign passports. In early August 2017, Polish Ambassador Jan Piekło was handed a note of protest from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The protest was also joined by the Polish intellectuals, who called on Minister Błaszczak to abandon such a controversial decision (the letter was signed by 122 representatives of journalists, artists, experts, and public figures). After that, the topic was closed. “On the new passport, instead of the image of the Gate of Dawn (a monument located on the territory of modern Lithuania), the image of the Tomb of Maria Piłsudska will appear, and instead of the image of the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery in Lviv, the figure of Anton Petrykiewicz will appear”, Mariusz Błaszczak announced at the end of the social campaign “Design with us the passport of Poland 2018”.²²

Over the following years, there were a number of provocations around the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery:

- On March 14, 2018, an explosion occurred at the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery, and although nothing was damaged, a provocation was recorded;

- On July 28, 2018, a group of unknown people of athletic appearance damaged the shields around the lion sculptures;

- On November 4, 2018, Polish football fans staged a ‘fire show’ at the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery (this is how they celebrated the 100th anniversary of the struggle of Poles against the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic);

- On December 15, 2018, three unknown persons, being on the territory of Lychakiv Cemetery, specifically at the Polish Mili-

22. “Польські паспорти будуть без Цвинтаря орлят і острої брами” [Polish passports will be without the Eaglets Cemetery and the Sharp Gate], *PolUkr*, accessed July 12, 2020, http://www.polukr.net/uk/blog/2017/09/polski-paspor-ti-budut-bez-cvintarya-orlyat-ostroyi-brami/?fbclid=IwAR128j-YUER-w14h641SYBmWUfMbgaSmCBonT_QS4Dr-VFAzPWDZHV3d0w3M.

tary 'Eaglets' Cemetery, committed acts aimed at inciting national hatred, namely: tore the plywood sheets of scaffolding (fencing), which covered two sculptures of concrete lions installed on both sides of the Monument of Glory.

– On October 25, 2018, the Lviv Regional Council adopted a statement on the illegal presence of lions on the territory of the cemetery. The deputies' joint statement "refers to the illegal installation of lion sculptures on the territory of the Lychakiv Cemetery, which were previously part of the Polish military-propaganda memorial complex and are becoming a factor of probable provocations in Lviv".²³ But, just like the issue of the Szczerbiec Sword, the question of the lions remains in a state of a postponed conflict, which could at any time become the subject of political struggle in the new election campaign in Ukraine.

To date, the Polish side has limited itself to a request, addressed to the Lviv local council, for some cosmetic work. Poland is not yet ready to talk to the Cabinet of Ministers about the construction or restoration of the Memorial.

Thus, the discourse of the 'Eaglets' Cemetery is one of the important pages of Ukrainian-Polish relations. The involvement of the political elite, which used this discourse in the struggle for power, turned historical memory into a mechanism of manipulation. Having certain media resources, the regional political elite had an influence on either resolving or postponing controversial issues, which they created themselves, generating new 'agendas' in order to attract attention during the election campaign or political confrontations. The question of reconciliation and formation of a common historical memory on the part of Ukraine was quite controversial.

The confrontation of the two countries with regards to the discourse of the 'Eaglets' Cemetery took place through the following

23. "У місті Лева – знову скандал із левами" [In the city of Lviv – again a scandal with lions], *Високий замок*, October 31, 2018, accessed March 21, 2019, <https://wz.lviv.ua/article/379834-u-misti-leva-znovu-skandal-iz-levami>.

two discourses, held on a domestic level, which were outlined separately for Ukrainians, and separately for Poles:

– Ukrainian discourse: “Pantheon of Polish weapons”. It was based on the ideas of betrayal (“Fallen for Poland in Lviv is treason”), shame (“How many times will we bend our necks, because the Poles wanted to”), and insult (“What will we tell our children who come to the cemetery and ask: with whom did the Poles fight so heroically?”).²⁴

– Polish discourse: “Memorial of Polish defenders of the Kresy capital”. It was formed around the concept of persecution of Poles, an attack on the Catholic faith (“Their graves are built on our graves”), or justice (“Let’s rebuild the cemetery according to the Inrush project” /Rudolf Inrush being the author-architect of the Memorial/).²⁵

The common denominator for the two sides was the fact that both Ukraine and Poland had political forces interested in either prolonging the conflict or resolving it as soon as possible. In addition, the general public from both countries was involved in this political discourse, participating in the debate and decision-making. Political discourse also led to the development of the everyday life discourse, which reflected certain prejudices between Ukrainians and Poles. While rumours were being spread in Ukraine that Poland was seeking to reclaim the Kresy territory, Poland talked of the threats for Poles in Lviv: “In particular, representatives of the Lviv public warned the youth of Krakow not to visit the Lychakiv Cemetery, except in large groups, as otherwise no one would be able to guarantee their safety”.²⁶ On the other hand, the debate around the ‘Eaglets’ Cemetery demonstrated the ability of the local community to develop its own political discourse, which may not be in line with the national discourse, or may even be in conflict with the official political discourse of the

24. Л. Хахула, *op. cit.*, 126.

25. *Ibid.*, 128.

26. *Ibid.*, 133.

country. This would be a sign of hybrid democracy (in the context of Kuchma's authoritarian rule).

Another factor is that when the political system is in a state of fluctuation caused by internal impulses, it begins to be affected by foreign policy discourses in order to influence border actors, which (according to the theory of Yuri Lotman) may threaten to shift the centre of the system towards the periphery (i.e. Kresy from the point of view of Poland). The situation with the Lviv lions and the Polish passports shows that when the domestic political discourse is unstable, when it is unable to produce values that stabilize the political system, the system receives external impulses from the discourses of other countries, which further affect its internal instability. In the discourse of the 'Eaglets' Cemetery, the centre of the political system was weak, therefore, on the periphery, the "traces of history" (as defined by Paul Ricœur) were used by the political elite, not as a strategy of memory, but as a symbolic capital aimed at influencing and controlling political processes in the country.

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Waldemar Rezmer

THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN FORUM OF HISTORIANS 2015–2017 AND ITS RESULTS

Abstract:

The topic of the article is the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue of historians initiated in 1996. It was conducted in 1996–2008 in the formula of a historical seminar under the title “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions” (13 seminars were held). Their lasting result is ten volumes of material, published under the title *Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions*. Political and media activities blocked the work of the Seminar in 2008. The Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue was broken. It was resumed in 2015 in the form of the Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians, established by the Polish and Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance. Five scientific meetings were held in the years 2015–2017. At the turn of 2017 and 2018 the work of the Forum was suspended, and in February 2018 Dr. Volodymyr Viatrovykh, President of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, announced that he “does not see any possibility of its continuation”. Publishing materials from any of the Forum’s five sessions was not possible.

Key words

The Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians 2015–2017; Historical Seminar “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions”, Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, Volyn crime.

Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the 20th century should be competently and impartially studied, and their re-

sults promoted as widely as possible. This finding also applies to the crime committed in 1939–1947 on the inhabitants of Volyn, Eastern Galicia (Eastern Lesser Poland) and the south-eastern territories of today's Republic of Poland. Poles, on the basis of their historical experience, know that normal good neighborly relations will not be achieved without a final explanation of the Volyn crime (in such a mental shortcut it lies in the historical consciousness of Polish society). It is in the Polish – and not only Polish – well-understood interest that Ukraine should be a democratic, law-abiding and prosperous country. However, it should also know its history. Therefore, the crime committed on the inhabitants of these areas should be “restored to the historical memory of contemporary generations”¹ not only in Poland, but also in Ukraine.

This is how the initiators and participants of the International Historical Seminar “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions” understood their task when they started this scientific undertaking in the mid-1990s. They understood that there could be no dialogue and no lasting reconciliation without building a solid substantive foundations for it. It could only be achieved through the historical truth about the causes, course and tragic consequences of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the first half of the 20th century. Establishing facts and revealing the truth was the most important goal, otherwise their work would not make any sense. “Since [...] no official Polish and Ukrainian research centers have undertaken comprehensive research on the subject, two social organizations: The World Association of Home Army Soldiers and the Association of Ukrainians in Poland decided to take the initiative to change this state. The inspiration for [...] actions was a conference of Polish

1. *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 15 lipca 2009 r. w sprawie tragicznego losu Polaków na Kresach Wschodnich* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 15, 2009 on the tragic fate of Poles in the Eastern Borderlands], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 31, 2013, item 606.

and Ukrainian historians organized by the 'Karta' Center in 1994 in Podkowa Leśna".²

The initiators of the Seminar were persons from the top management of the community of the 27th Volyn Home Army Infantry Division – World Association of Home Army Soldiers – Volyn Branch (Edmund Bakuniak, Władysław Filar, Andrzej Żupański), who managed to find a partner in the form of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland. According to the agreement signed in 1996, both Unions did not participate in the scientific work of the Seminar, but provided it with organizational support.³ The scientific and factual management of the seminar was taken over by the Military Historical Institute in Warsaw on the Polish side, and by the Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University in Lutsk on the Ukrainian side. The 'Karta' Center dealt with publishing issues. For some time the financial, organizational and technical support was provided by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Scientific Research Committee, the Council for the Protection of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom, the Office for War Veterans, the Stefan Batory Foundation, the 'Polish Community' Association and the Academy of National Defense. As the organizational conditions changed in 2005 (e.g. the Military Historical Institute ceased to exist in Poland, the Institutes of National Remembrance were established in Poland and Ukraine), the Seminar had to be given a new shape. It was decided that two research units, the Nicolaus Copernicus University

2. "Wstęp" [Introduction], [in:] *Polska–Ukraina: trudne pytania*, t. 1–2. *Materiały II międzynarodowego seminarium historycznego "Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w latach 1918–1947"*, Warszawa, 22–24 maja 1997 [Poland–Ukraine: difficult questions, vol. 1–2. Materials of the Second International Historical Seminar "Polish-Ukrainian Relations in the Years 1918–1947", Warsaw, May 22–24, 1997] (Warsaw, 1998), 7.

3. The most important provisions of this agreement are provided by Andrzej Żupański, *Tragiczne wydarzenia za Bugiem i Sanem przed ponad sześćdziesięciu laty. Poznaj werdykt historyków polskich i ukraińskich* [Tragic Events Behind the Bug and San More than Sixty Years Ago. Learn about the Verdict of Polish and Ukrainian Historians] (Warsaw: Rytm, 2007), 10.

in Toruń and the Ivan Franko National University in Lviv would be responsible for the scientific side. The Nicolaus Copernicus University was to be supported organizationally and financially by the World Association of Home Army Soldiers and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance. The University of Lviv was to receive assistance from the I. Krypjakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, and the Centre for Research of Liberation Movement in Lviv.

The first Seminar took place in March 1996 in Lutsk and was hosted by the Lesya Ukrainka Volyn State University. In total, thirteen seminars were held between 1996 and 2008. The last one – the thirteenth Seminar – was held in Lviv between June 3 and June 6, 2008. All the seminars were attended by several dozen researchers from several Polish and Ukrainian research centers. Most of them participated in a number of meetings, some in all. The Polish team consisted of 34 historians, who came from 10 Polish academic centers, while on the Ukrainian side there were 49 historians representing 9 academic centers in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community living in Poland, Germany and the United States.

In the papers and in the course of discussions, many important issues were analysed and a huge number of previously unknown documents and descriptive sources were discovered. They often encountered extremely painful facts, monstrous deeds, difficult to describe even for professional historians, due to their drastic nature. However, the participants of the seminar believed that only by showing the truth, even the most terrible one, they were paving the way for real reconciliation, and not the reconciliation that was top-down declared and medially trumpeted.

The lasting result of the seminars from 1996–2001 is nine volumes of material published under the title *Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions*. Volume 9 was printed in 2002 and includes materials from the ninth and tenth seminars. Unfortunately, financial

and technical difficulties caused that only four volumes, apart from the Polish language version, were published in Ukrainian (volumes 3, 4, 5, 9).

The eleventh seminar (outside the program), balancing the whole achievements of Polish-Ukrainian scientific meetings from 1996–2001, took place in April 2005 in Warsaw. The materials from this meeting, in the form of 10 volumes, were published in 2006.⁴

Closing the first round of the Seminar (11 scientific meetings), its participants – members of the Polish team as well as the Ukrainian team, and many of their collaborators, including the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, and the ‘Karta’ Center – were fully aware that they did not manage to investigate and discuss many important issues, and did not manage to answer all the difficult questions concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the 20th century. For this reason it was decided that the Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue should be continued in the form of another (2nd) round of the Seminar. The readiness to take over the scientific responsibility for its continuation was expressed by Prof. Waldemar Rezmer, Dean of the Faculty of Historical Sciences at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, and Prof. Leonid Zashkilnyak of the Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, then deputy director of the II. Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Unfortunately, out of the planned second series of seminar meetings, only two have been carried out: the twelfth Seminar (October 12–13, 2006) at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, and the thirteenth Seminar (June 3–6, 2008) at the Ivan Franko National University in Lviv. The organizational and financial difficulties were growing. A massive media campaign against the organiz-

4. *Polska–Ukraina: trudne pytania. T. 10: Materiały XI międzynarodowego seminarium historycznego „Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w latach II wojny światowej” Warszawa, 26–28 kwietnia 2005* [Poland–Ukraine: difficult questions. Vol. 10: Materials of the Eleventh International Historical Seminar “Polish-Ukrainian Relations in the Years of World War II” Warsaw, April 26–28, 2005], Warsaw, 2006.

ers and participants of the seminar intensified. They were accused of evil intentions, ideologizing research on the past, and even of betraying national interests. They were told that “the basic precept of the Polish and Ukrainian national interest (...) is (...) concern for the sovereignty of the state and democratic order in this state. Polish-Ukrainian conflicts can only bring harm. Both our nations need peace and secure borders”.⁵ It was argued that taking up sensitive subjects does not serve to develop partnership contacts between both countries, it can only spoil them.

Twelve years ago, Adam Michnik wrote in an article entitled “The Wound of Volyn”: “We expect historical science to draw up a reliable balance of facts. From moral reflection – an accurate balance of sins. From political thought – an honest balance of interests”.⁶ In other words, historians, both Polish and Ukrainian, should be required to objectively use all available instruments of the scientific workshop to present a true and complete picture of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the 20th century. Clerics and moral authorities should be required to make ethical assessments on the basis of the historical material provided, politicians should be required to draw conclusions from the past and to conduct a realistic policy that takes into account the vital interests of the Polish and Ukrainian states.

Unfortunately, these rightful demands did not correspond to reality. In practice, it is not known why historians studying Polish-Ukrainian relations were asked much more than researchers of other historical problems. They were supposed to be not only professionals in their scientific discipline, reliably reproducing the image of the past, but also guardians of human conscience and follow the ‘realpolitik’. There are people who still believe that

5. A. Michnik, “Rana Wołynia” [The Wound of Volyn], [in:] *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie. Historia i pamięć* [Polish-Ukrainian Relations. History and Memory], ed. J. Marszałek-Kawa and Z. Karpus (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008), 256–257.

6. *Ibid.*, 253.

these last two tasks are even more important than purely historical research.

Those who authenticated such theses and formulated historical policy guidelines probably did not realize that exactly the same arguments were made during the communist period, when it was claimed that taking up borderline issues, including Polish-Ukrainian issues, could harm Polish-Ukrainian relations, that it would suit the purposes of Western German revisionists and American imperialists. A significant and influential part of the Polish political elite, including the circle of people associated with the “Kultura” magazine in Paris and the “Tygodnik Powszechny” circles, tried hard to bring about Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. In these circles it was believed that the investigation of the Volyn crime and other painful topics would make it difficult to tighten the strategic Polish-Ukrainian partnership, and could only spoil this process. This was a mistaken assumption, the negative effects of which are now being revealed with full force. The authors of this concept did not understand that

...the reference to Giedrojc's policy and the so-called Jagiellonian idea has long since lost any semblance of a political proposal, but has become a handy tool in the 'Cold Civil War' waged since 2005. [...] the authors do not seem to understand that Poland should not be held hostage to relations with Kiev in the sense that any attempt at contact with Russia is immediately interpreted as a betrayal of Kiev and the abandonment by the Republic of Poland of its previous foreign policy rudiments. In such an approach, Poland's entire activity in the East boils down to a zero-one pattern: if with Kiev, then against Moscow; if anything with Moscow, then against Kiev. Such a policy can only result in paralysis and hostage to Russia and Ukraine. Such an approach seems particularly absurd when the

Ukrainians themselves do not see their own position as a confrontation between Russia and the West.⁷

The effect of political and media activities was to block further scientific meetings in the formula of the Historical Seminar “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions”. In this way, the difficult but fruitful Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue was broken. The harmfulness of this fact was quickly realized. Historical questions were increasingly weighing heavily on current Polish-Ukrainian relations. There was a growing conviction that the full truth about the tragedy of the inhabitants of Volyn and the southeastern part of the Second Polish Republic in 1939–1947 had to be revealed. Under this social pressure, on July 15, 2009, on “the 66th anniversary of the beginning of the so-called ‘anti-Polish action’ by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on the Borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland – mass murders of ethnic cleansing and genocidal origins”, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in its special resolution “On the tragic fate of Poles on the Eastern Borderlands” stated that “the tragedy of Poles on the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland should be restored to the historical memory of contemporary generations. This is a task for all public authorities in the name of the better future and the understanding of the peoples of our part of Europe, especially Poles and Ukrainians”.⁸

Janusz Kurtyka, President of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, was a supporter of the revival of the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue between historians, which could lead to “the restoration of the historical memory of contemporary generations” as indicat-

7. B. Sienkiewicz, “Ukraina jednak buforowa” [Ukraine, though, a buffer state], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, March 9, 2010, 25.

8. *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 15 lipca 2009 r. w sprawie tragicznego losu Polaków na Kresach Wschodnich* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 15, 2009 on the tragic fate of Poles in the Eastern Borderlands], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 31, 2013, item 606.

ed in the Sejm's resolution. On his initiative, in December 2009, a working meeting of the Institute's management took place in Warsaw, with the participation of the last organizers of the seminars: Prof. Leonid Zashkilnyak and Prof. Waldemar Rezmer. It was agreed then that the seminar would be resumed. The scientific matters were to continue to be managed by Prof. Zashkilnyak from the Ivan Franko National University in Lviv and Prof. Rezmer from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, while Polish and Ukrainian Institutes of National Remembrance were to be responsible for organizational, financial and publishing issues. President Kurtyka had already made the necessary arrangements with the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.

The tragic death of President Janusz Kurtyka on April 10, 2010 in the Smolensk catastrophe has cancelled the realization of these arrangements regarding the resumption of the Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue in the already proven formula of the Historical Seminar "Poland-Ukraine: Challenging Questions".

Recognizing the importance of historical problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations and the need for a constructive debate on issues related to the common past, less than a year later, in February 2011 the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Ukraine – Radosław Sikorski and Kostiantyn Gryshchenko – established the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum, whose aim was "to provide a platform for civil dialogue and cooperation between the two nations, to serve [...] as a consultative and advisory body, to increase contacts between Poland and Ukraine, and to strengthen the process of rapprochement and reconciliation between the two nations".⁹ Minister Sikorski stated that "our intergovernmental dialogue will now be complemented by a dialogue of intellectuals, artists, journalists and the people of culture". In turn, Minister Gryshchenko emphasized that the Forum "faces a huge task of

9. *Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum*, accessed December 2, 2020, <http://www.kew.org.pl/polsko-ukrainskie-forum-partnerstwa/>.

reviewing the pages of history and issuing our recommendations for the future by the authorities, well-known personalities, to move towards a European Union in which the nations sharing common values and building a common future are united”.

Expectations that the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum would become a platform to inspire and create optimal conditions for the Polish-Ukrainian historical debate were not confirmed. The historical projects undertaken within its framework were (and still are) of a marginal nature, as the most important and most emotional and controversial subjects were avoided.¹⁰ Meanwhile, historical issues in Polish-Ukrainian relations have become increasingly important. This was, among others, related to the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, falling in 2013.

Already in March 2013, the first page of the “Alehistoria” supplement to “Gazeta Wyborcza” was marked with a huge title “Rzeź wołyńska” (Volyn massacre), and in the article one could read that

In the fall of 1942, the Banderivtsi (members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) took a decision that the Poles must be removed from the future Ukrainian state.¹¹ On February 9, 1943, a unit of the UPA (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), an armed branch of nationalists, murdered the entire population of the first Polish village of Parośle. Others followed, and by June 9, 1943, nine thousand Poles were killed. These first attacks were often extremely cruel, and people were killed with e.g. axes. By slaughtering the population of individual villages, the UPA

10. See, for example: The Program of the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum Meeting in Kiev of June 3, 2017, accessed December 2, 2020, <https://jagiellonia.org/w-kijowie-odbylo-sie-posiedzenie-polsko-ukrainskiego-forum-partnerstwa-pawel-bobolowicz/>.

11. “Rzeź wołyńska” [Volyn Massacre], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, supplement: Alehistoria, March 25, 2013, 1 and 7.

wanted to encourage the remaining Poles to escape and at the same time hide a premeditated genocidal cleansing under the guise of an alleged folk rebellion.¹² (...) when, after the first attacks, it turned out that some Poles did not flee, but created self-defense bases, in May 1943 the UPA command decided to murder the entire Polish community in Volyn. On July 11, the UPA carried out a simultaneous, concentric attack on 99 Polish villages. It was a slaughter.¹³

“Ethnic cleansing bearing the hallmarks of genocide”, which started in Volyn and later transferred to the area of Eastern Galicia and the land of present-day Poland, lasted until May 1945. “About 100,000 Poles fell victim to it, it was planned and carried out in cold blood by one of the two factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists”.¹⁴ It reached its peak in mid-July 1943. On July 11–12, nearly 200 attacks on localities inhabited by Poles were recorded. In addition to the UPA units, the OUN Security Service militia took part in them, as well as the local Ukrainian population (the so-called *siekierniki* – people killing with axes), sometimes encouraged by the prospect of impunity for the robbery of the murdered Poles. Another wave of murders took place in August 1943 in the western districts of Volyn. “The fate of two neighbouring villages – Ostrówek and Wola Ostrowiecka, in which almost all 1100 inhabitants were murdered – has become a symbol”.¹⁵ The liquidation of the Polish population bearing the hallmarks of genocide was the first stage of depolonization of Volyn. As early as in the fall of 1943, the OUN leadership ordered the destruction of the material evidence of the

12. *Ibid.*, 8.

13. *Ibid.*, 9.

14. *Ibid.*, 7.

15. G. Hryciuk, “Rana, która wciąż krwawi” [A Wound that is Still Bleeding], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, supplement: *Wołyń 1943. Przed 70. rocznicą zbrodni* [Volyn 1943. Before the 70th Anniversary of the Crime], June 22, 2013, 1.

presence of Poles in the area: “Even the trees that could testify to the existence of once Polish villages there were to be grubbed up”.¹⁶

The highest legislative and executive authorities of the Republic of Poland also addressed the issue. On June 20, 2013, the Senate of the Republic of Poland adopted a resolution in which it called the Volyn crime “an ethnic cleansing bearing the hallmarks of genocide”.¹⁷ On June 27–28, 2013 in Warsaw, under the patronage of President Bronisław Komorowski, an international scientific conference “Volyn Crime – History, Memory, Education. On the eve of the 70th anniversary” was organized by the Institute of National Remembrance and Education. On July 2, 2013 the Polish Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the Volyn crime as an ethnic cleansing bearing the hallmarks of genocide.¹⁸ It stated:

July 2013 will mark the 70th anniversary of the apogee of the wave of crimes committed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland. The organized and mass dimension of the Volyn Crime gave it the nature of ethnic cleansing bearing the hallmarks of genocide. In 1942–1945 in Volyn and Eastern Galicia about 100 thousand Polish citizens became victims of the crime.¹⁹

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Uchwała Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 20 czerwca 2013 r. 70. rocznicę Zbrodni Wołyńskiej* [Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of June 20, 2013 on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn Crime], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 12, 2013, item 582.

18. *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 12 lipca 2013 r. w sprawie uczczenia 70. rocznicy Zbrodni Wołyńskiej i oddania hołdu Jej ofiarom* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 12, 2013 on commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Volyn Crime and paying tribute to its victims], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 31, 2013, item 606.

19. *Ibid.*

On July 4, 2013, ceremonies to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Volyn crime with the participation of Bronisław Komorowski, President of the Republic of Poland, Kostiantyn Gryshchenko, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, and Archbishop Mieczysław Mokrzycki, Metropolitan Archbishop of Lviv, took place in Lutsk. Three years later, on July 22, 2016, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, by way of a resolution, established July 11 as the “National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Genocide committed by Ukrainian Nationalists on Citizens of the Second Republic of Poland”. The Sejm paid tribute to all the citizens of the Second Republic murdered by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943–1945.²⁰

The majority of Ukrainian commentators were surprised by the fact that the Polish side raised the issue of the anniversary of the Volyn crime. The motives were different from the need to remember the crime and commemorate the places where its victims are buried.

The political changes in Ukraine, initiated at Majdan in 2014, led to a revival of Polish-Ukrainian contacts not only in the political sphere, but also at other levels important for our societies. It should have been thought that this would also be done in historical research. It turned out, however, that the actions of the new Ukrainian authorities were ambivalent. It can be pointed out that in April 2015, on the day of the visit to Kiev of the Polish President Bronisław Komorowski, and immediately after his speech in the mentioned Council, the Verkhovna Rada passed a law *“On the legal status and respect for the memory of participants in the fight for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century”*.

20. Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 lipca 2016 r. w sprawie oddania hołdu ofiarom ludobójstwa dokonanego przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na obywatelach II Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1943–1945 [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 22, 2016 on paying tribute to the victims of genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in 1943–1945], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 29, 2016, item 726.

In order to weaken the effect of the decision of the Verkhovna Rada, very badly received in Poland, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, during a telephone conversation with the President of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski, announced the introduction of changes to this law; in fact, his declaration was never realized.

A political clash was created between Warsaw and Kiev, which originated from historical issues, and – I suppose – was to be mitigated by making a decision to reactivate the Polish-Ukrainian debate on historical issues. Less than a month later, in May 2015, during a meeting between the management of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in Kiev, it was decided that a team of historians would be formed under the auspices of both Institutes to investigate the causes, course and effects of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the first half of the 20th century, especially in the most bloody years 1939–1947.

In order to implement this agreement, a meeting of historians took place on July 28, 2015 in the Warsaw headquarters of the Institute of National Remembrance. It was agreed that the Polish group of historians participating in the debate would include: Prof. Grzegorz Hryciuk (University of Wrocław), Prof. Grzegorz Mazur (Jagiellonian University), Prof. Grzegorz Motyka (Polish Academy of Sciences), Prof. Jan Pisuliński (University of Rzeszów), Prof. Waldemar Rezmer (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń), Dr. Mariusz Zajączkowski (Institute of National Remembrance). Prof. Waldemar Rezmer was elected as the chairman of the group.

By agreeing to participate in the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue of historians, I believed that only by following this path we would be able to draw a complete picture of the causes, course and effects of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and the Volyn crime. The experience of several years of participation in the seminars “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions” prompted me to think that the knowledge of what happened in Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the

20th century permeates and becomes established in the historical awareness of Poles and Ukrainians. This process cannot be stopped. However, one should make sure that this knowledge is based on historical facts, scientifically verified by professional researchers.

On November 2–5, 2015 in Kiev, the first meeting took place, with the participation of Polish historians (listed above) and Ukrainian ones: Prof. Bohdan Hud', Prof. Ihor Iliushin, Prof. Ivan Patrylak, Prof. Yuri Shapoval – Chairman of the Ukrainian Forum Group, Dr. Volodymyr Viatrovych, Prof. Leonid Zashkilnyak. The inaugural part of the meeting was attended by: Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Culture of Ukraine Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine Serhiy Kwita, Counselor, Deputy Head of the Diplomatic Mission of the Republic of Poland Rafał Wolski, as well as Director of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) State Archive Ihor Kulyka.

The first part of the meeting, on November 3, 2015, was devoted to organizational issues and establishing fundamental principles of work of the Polish-Ukrainian team of historians. Having experience from previous work in the Historical Seminar “Poland–Ukraine: Challenging Questions”, I believed that regulating these issues would prevent disputes on extra-territorial issues. Therefore, I presented “Aims, tasks, methods, deadlines for the work of the Group/ Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians/Dialogue of Historians”.

After discussion, it was decided that:

- periodical scientific meetings would be called *Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians*;

- the substantive scope of its work would cover the years 1939–1947;

- The Forum would be composed of 6 Polish and 6 Ukrainian scholars and 2 secretaries, respectively. In addition, no more than 2 specialists from each side, not belonging to the permanent composition of the Forum, invited by the Polish and Ukrainian side to carry out the commissioned research task (development of the topic) and present the results of the research;

- meetings would be conducted by two persons – the presidents of the Polish and Ukrainian historians team;
- the list of topics would be mutually agreed; if necessary, the list could be extended and the topics modified;
- on each of the topics previously approved by the Forum members, the paper would be prepared by a Polish and Ukrainian historian. During each meeting two topics would be heard and discussed;
- within the framework of both Institutes of National Remembrance, a team would be established to edit the Forum's materials in 'paper' and electronic form. The publication would be of scientific and popularizing character;
- the Forum meetings would be held twice a year, alternately in Poland and Ukraine;
- the meetings would be closed to the public and the media.

During the second part of the meeting, on November 4, 2015, Prof. Jan Pisuliński delivered a paper "Polish-Ukrainian relations 1939–1947 in Polish historiography – a review of research", while Prof. Leonid Zashkilnyak presented "Inventory of problems of common history of the 20th century". The conclusions of both lecturers became the basis for determining the topics that should be addressed first, with a caveat that, if necessary (in order to reveal new and controversial problems), the list of topics could be extended after approval by the Forum members.

From November 2015 to autumn 2017, five Forum meetings were held – the last ones on October 19–22, 2017 in Cherkasy, Ukraine.

While participating in the Forum, I assumed that the aim of the committee was to explain the most difficult issues of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the years 1939–1947. Therefore, the group was composed of professional historians with serious achievements and scientific authority, who knew the sources and were able to make a critical, objective analysis. I thought that by

means of a painstaking but authentic scientific dialogue, we would come to reliable substantive findings. There is always a problem with the interpretation of historical facts and there does not have to be unanimity, but thanks to professional approach to the problem, using all available sources and historical workshop, it is possible to establish (prove) irrefutable, unquestionable facts.

The first two meetings of the Forum gave hope that this is how we would work and recreate Polish-Ukrainian relations based on undisputed facts. Unfortunately, later there were signs that the Ukrainian side was not interested in establishing undisputed facts, but in reconstructing the full picture of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the 20th century, especially all aspects of the Volyn crime. Probably, the management of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (President of the Institute, Volodymyr Viatrovych was a member of the Forum) realized that history was not its ally. They realized that the results of the research presented at the Forum, confirmed by the exhumation of the victims of the crime, would undermine the myth of the UPA and its members as noble knights of the independence struggle, which they were building hard during that time. Volodymyr Viatrovych – the President of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and a member of the Forum – claimed that the mass crimes in Volyn and Eastern Lesser Poland were the result of the Second Polish-Ukrainian War. He included such theses in his book published in 2011, entitled “The Second Polish-Ukrainian War 1942–1947”, which already had three editions.²¹ It met with devastating criticism from professional Polish and Ukrainian historians. One of them, Grzegorz Motyka, in his review wrote:

In fact, it is not even a scientific work, but a loose historical sketch. Although perhaps it should be said rather explicitly that we are dealing with a kind of

21. В. В'ятрович, *Друга польсько-українська війна 1942–1947* [Second Polish-Ukrainian War 1942–1947], Київ, 2011; Київ, 2012; Warszawa, 2013.

defensive speech delivered by an able but emotionally involved attorney. The author does not even try to conceal the fact that he is defending the bandwagon faction of OUN and UPA, against, in his opinion, unjust accusations of murdering Polish civilians. He decided to devote himself to this task to such an extent that after reading the book I even have the impression that the author is not very interested in what actually happened between Poles and Ukrainians during World War II. With this I am trying to explain to myself why Viatrovych writes under a predetermined thesis, rejecting or omitting all arguments and facts that do not fit in with it.²²

Professor Motyka pointed out that “the use of the term *war* does not preclude the simultaneous use of the term *genocide*”. In his opinion, Viatrovych’s use of the term *war* is a result of an attempt to deny the crimes of the UPA’s anti Polish action.²³

However, being unable, for political and propaganda reasons, to ‘put down’ the Forum by its own voluntary decision, the Ukrainian side took actions which were to lead to this. They consisted in escalating the historical conflict instead of limiting and deescalating it.

It was initiated at the third Forum, which was held in Kiev on October 24–27, 2016. As agreed, it dealt with the topic “July 1943 – the course of events in Volyn in the view of documents”. In Poland, the main work on the tragedy of Volyn is the book by Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko entitled *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjon-*

22. G. Motyka, “Nieudana książka. Recenzja książki Wołodymyra Wiatrowy-
cza *Druha polsko-ukraińska wojna 1942–1947* (Druga wojna polsko-ukraińska
1942–1947)” [Unsuccessful book. Review of the book by Volodymyr Viatro-
vych *Druha polsko-ukraińska wojna 1942–1947* (Second Polish-Ukrainian
War 1942–1947)], *Nowa Europa Wschodnia*, no. 2 (2012), electronic docu-
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spory-o-wolyn/152,Grzegorz-Motyka-Nieudana-ksiazka.html](https://zbrodniawolynska.pl/zw1/historia/spory-o-wolyn/152,Grzegorz-Motyka-Nieudana-ksiazka.html).

23. *Ibid.*

alistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945 [*Genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the Polish population of Volyn 1939–1945*], vol. 1 and 2, Warsaw, 2000. At previous meetings, Ukrainian members of the Forum questioned its scientific value and credibility of the sources on which it was based. In order to check the factual basis of these allegations, a special team of historians under the leadership of Dr. Tomasz Bereza was appointed to carry out a re examination, but on the basis of completely different sources, not used by the Siemaszkos. It was at the third Forum that Tomasz Bereza reported on the bloody Sunday of July 11, 1943 in the south-eastern districts of Volyn, including a detailed account of the slaughter of the Polish residents of Orzeszyn and the surrounding colonies. It was then again alleged that these new sources were also unbelievable. Therefore, I suggested that, according to the scientific workshop, the findings of the historians should be empirically verified and the victims of the crimes that are still lying there in a nameless pit should be exhumed. After all, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance had an excellent team of Prof. Krzysztof Szmagryk specializing in such exhumation works. However, there was no consent to this. Soon after all, Svyatoslav Sheremeta, secretary of the State Inter-ministerial Committee for Wars and Political Repression, responsible for matters of historical commemoration, forbade the Polish team to carry out any exhumation and search. So we had a situation where, if we presented facts and sources that confirmed them, they were questioned, and if we proposed to carry out material verification, we received an administrative ban in response. The Forum member, Professor Motyka, asks a question, “which many Ukrainians may find incorrect: if indeed the Polish estimates of the number of victims are so exaggerated, why do almost all requests for permission to exhume people murdered by the UPA meet with a negative reaction from the Ukrainian authorities? After all, there is no easier way to resolve the dispute than to analyse the remains still resting in nameless graves”.²⁴

24. *Ibid.*

The second way of action, which was supposed to make the Polish side resign from further work of the Forum – as this allowed to accuse it of interrupting the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue – consisted in provocative, anti-Polish actions of the Ukrainian authorities, carried out – as it seems – with the knowledge and consent of the Ukrainian IPN.

As I explained earlier, at the first Forum in November 2015, we adopted a list of topics to be examined and discussed, and, if new and controversial topics should be revealed, to request their inclusion on the list of topics to be examined. What turned out. Knowing that in the last decade of October 2017 the fifth Forum was planned (it was held on October 19–22 in Cherkasy), three days before the arrival of the Polish group, i.e. on October 16, a mausoleum dedicated to the riflemen of Carpathian Sich was unveiled on Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians. The plaques were placed there reading: “Heroes of the Carpathian Ukraine shot by Polish and Hungarian occupants in March 1939” and “On March 18, 1939, on Veretsky Pass, Polish border guards from the Border Guard Corps shot about 600 captured Carpathian Sich riflemen”.

At the meeting in Cherkasy, I pointed out to our partners that during the two years of the Forum’s work they have not once raised the issue of the members of Carpathian Sich from the Veretsky Pass. They also did not present any evidence to support the thesis of mass execution of members of these structures in March 1939. However, there was no resistance to accuse Polish soldiers of this crime. I asked myself, what is it like? We meet, we have to explain difficult problems, narrow down the conflict area, and our partners create their new areas in an exceptionally perfidious way? How is it possible that the central institutions of the state (including the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (IPN)), with which we try to maintain the partnership relations, whom we support on the European arena and provide help in very different areas, are suddenly blocking our activities,

which should not cause any controversy, because they are the foundation of humanitarianism.

The next stage of the escalation of the conflict was a statement by Svyatoslav Sheremeta, secretary of the Ukrainian State Commission dealing with the issue of commemoration, who three weeks after the Forum in Cherkasy, on November 13, 2017, declared that the cemetery in Bikovnia, where the remains of 3,500 Poles from the so called Ukrainian Katyń list are buried, was established and exists illegally.²⁵ I was surprised and astonished – a Ukrainian official questions the legality of the necropolis ceremonially unveiled in 2012 by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, the highest representatives of both countries.

Unfortunately, there were more and more such cases. One can recall, for example, the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski on November 5, 2017 in Lviv, during which he wanted to visit the museum – the Prison on Łącki Street. He refused, however, when he found out that there were *“exhibitions in the museum that refer to the three occupations of Lviv: Polish, mentioned as the first, German, and Soviet”*.²⁶ Unfortunately, similar statements were also made during the discussion at the Forum. Many times I drew the attention of Dr. Viatrovych, President of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and other members of the Ukrainian team to the fact that Poland has never occupied Eastern Małopolska and Volyn. The areas we are talking about were part of the Republic of Poland under international law. However, there was no reaction to my comments, objections and protests. During the last meeting, at the fifth Forum, Dr. Viatrovych again

25. “Szeremeta: Cmentarz Katyński w Bykowni pod Kijowem jest nielegalny” [Sheremeta: Katyń Cemetery in Bykovnia near Kiev is illegal], *Kresy.pl*, November 15, 2017, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/regiony/ukraina/szeremeta-cmentarz-katynski-bykowni-kijowem-nielegalny-video/>.

26. “Mer Lwowa: rozdrapywanie ran historycznych jest zgubne” [Mer of Lviv: the tearing of historical wounds is disastrous], *Dzieje.pl. Portal Historyczny*, November 6, 2017, accessed December 3, 2020: <https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/mer-lwowa-rozdrapywanie-ran-historycznych-jest-zgubne>.

used the term ‘Polish occupation’, and almost all Ukrainian historians – members of the Forum – followed him. This meant that historical facts did not matter to them. It escalated.

I regret to note these actions. As they were escalating, on November 17, 2017, I resigned from the post of vice-president of the Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians and from chairing the Polish team of historians in this body. I would like to remind you that the aim of the Forum was to conduct a substantive Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue, especially with regard to the dramatic period in the history of both nations – the years 1939–1947. Meanwhile, instead of dealing with the authentic problems of the difficult Polish-Ukrainian history, we had to – of necessity – point out new cases of falsification or warping. The historical facts are unambiguous, so I could not accept the relativisation of history and bending to political, ideological and propaganda needs. This path led ‘to nowhere’. It was, after all, a scientific debate on selected topics, which ended with a substantive conclusion, and then the publication of its results. Unfortunately, the edition of materials from the five Forum meetings also became an unsolved problem. It was not possible to publish the results of the research, because the Ukrainian members of the Forum – responsible for the elaboration of the selected topics – did not pass the texts of papers (expert opinions) to the Forum secretaries.

The proverbial ‘final nail in the coffin’ of the Forum was stuck three months later. In February 2018, Dr. Viatrovych said that “he did not see the possibility of its continuation in the previous format”. The new format was, according to him, “to continue the historical discussions in Ukraine, where there are no restrictions or political dictates on previous assessments”.²⁷ In other words, in con-

27. “Ukraiński IPN nie widzi możliwości współpracy z Polską w ramach forum historyków” [Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance does not see any possibility of cooperation with Poland within the framework of the forum of historians], *TVP Info*, February 7, 2018, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://www.tvp.info/35923820/ukraiński-ipn-nie-widzi-możliwości-współpracy-z-polską-w-ramach-forum-historyków>.

temporary Poland, scientific debates cannot be conducted because “there are limitations and political dictates”. These absurd accusations were formulated by a person who forgot about the adoption, by the Verkhovna Rada in 2015, of the Law No. 2538-1 *“On the legal status and respect for the memory of participants in the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century”*. It provided for the penalization of all those who would show disregard for the veterans, denying the purposefulness of their fight. This also applied to the veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, among whom were those responsible for “ethnic cleansing bearing the hallmarks of genocide” in Volyn, Eastern Galicia and south-eastern areas of today’s Republic of Poland.

Already the day after the announcement of the President Viatrovych, Dr. Jarosław Szarek, the President of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), expressed his surprise with this statement and reminded that “the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue concerning also the difficult aspects of our common past, started much earlier than the establishment of the Ukrainian IPN. For this reason we are convinced that despite the unfavorable position of UIPN, Polish-Ukrainian scientific contacts will continue”.²⁸

In the aforementioned announcement, the President of the Ukrainian IPN also wrote:

(...) discussions about the past should remain the prerogative of historians, not politicians. It is the thoughtful professional conversation, not loud political declarations, that is one of the foundations of understanding between nations.²⁹

28. “IPN ‘zdziwiony’ oświadczeniem Wiatrowycza” [IPN ‘surprised’ by Viatrovych’s statement], *Kresy24.pl*, February 8, 2018, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://kresy24.pl/ipn-zdziwiony-oswiadczeniem-wjatrowycza/>.

29. “Ukraiński IPN nie widzi możliwości współpracy z Polską w ramach forum historyków” [Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance does not see any possibility of cooperation with Poland within the framework of the

If Dr. Viatrovykh and part of the Ukrainian elite – who actively support the creation of the myth of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – were guided by this right statement in their actual activities, then the Polish-Ukrainian historical debate would probably be at a different, much more advanced stage.

It is to be hoped that the current (since December 4, 2019) President of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, Anton Drobovykh, who replaced Volodymyr Viatrovykh, dismissed by the new Ukrainian authorities, who is considered to be one of the architects of Ukrainian historical policy and who is considered in Poland to be the apologist for the activities of the OUN and the UPA, remembers this.

Leaving the post of president of the Ukrainian IPN and becoming an active, prominent politician (member of the European Solidarity party, member of the Verkhovna Rada), Dr. Viatrovykh boasted that during his term of office, from 2014, he managed to achieve most of his goals. He also informed:

I have received assurances from Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk that, regardless of the change in the position of president, the Institute will maintain its status as an authority and an instrument of national remembrance policy, and that the format and directions of its work will be continued.³⁰

If such a declaration of the Prime Minister was actually made, there is little chance for a constructive Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue.

forum of historians], *TVP Info*, February 7, 2018, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://www.tvp.info/35923820/ukrainski-ipn-nie-widzi-mozliwosci-wspolpracy-z-polska-w-ramach-forum-historykow>.

30. "Wołodymyr Wiatrowycz zwolniony ze stanowiska szefa ukraińskiego IPN" [Volodymyr Viatrovykh dismissed from the post of head of the Ukrainian IPN], *Dzieje.pl. Portal Historyczny*, September 18, 2019, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/wolodymyr-wiatrowycz-zwolniony-ze-stanowiska-szefa-ukrainskiego-ipn>.

Despite such discouraging signals, however, it was assessed in Warsaw that the new authorities of the Ukrainian IPN in Polish-Ukrainian context will perhaps change their priorities in their actions. Political and ideological issues will come to the fore. In this way, conditions will be created for the resumption of dialogue on historical issues. The new leadership could entrust the dialogue to professional historians, whose only goal would be to reconstruct the facts and, on the basis of them, to determine the actual course and take stock of the bloody Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1939–1947.

Probably based on such an assumption, on December 3, 2020, the President of the Polish IPN, Dr. Jarosław Szarek, met with the President of the Ukrainian IPN, Dr. Anton Drobovych:

They discussed the issues of exploration, exhumation and commemoration by the Polish side in Ukraine, and the question of Ukrainian activities in Poland. (...) In the communication sent to PAP after the meeting, the president of the IPN stressed that the foundation for further cooperation can only be the historical truth, including the painful truth about the victims of genocide by Ukrainian nationalists. He stressed that the Polish side demands the preservation of memory, the possibility of burying the victims of genocides and crimes of totalitarianism, fallen soldiers, as well as their worthy commemoration with due respect. He stated that it is still necessary to resume the search and exhumation process in Ukraine. (...) The Ukrainian side insisted on the need to return to the original version of the Monastyrz hill commemoration as a condition for further exhumation and commemoration in Ukraine. This, in turn, cannot be accepted by the Polish IPN until the doubts about

the number and identity of people buried there are finally clarified.³¹

The effects of the meeting in Warsaw do not give grounds for optimism. All the more so because Dr. Drobovych stated ultimately that only unconditional fulfillment of the Ukrainian expectation would open the way to obtain “unlimited number of exploration permits in Ukraine”,³² while the management of the Polish IPN has communicated that “unfortunately, the effects of positive gestures made so far by the Polish side justify the limited trust in such declarations. (...) The IPN is of the opinion that a state that takes seriously its obligations towards citizens who have been victims of wars and repressions cannot decline to seek to establish their fate, as well as find and arrange a burial place. Adopting the Ukrainian solution – while there are significant discrepancies in the documents regarding the number of people buried in the Monastyrz hill grave – would be such an omission”.³³

The public was informed that the presidents of the institutes decided that there was a need “to establish a joint Polish-Ukrainian group to deal with specific issues in this area”.³⁴ However, they did not set a deadline for their decision, which means that they put it off *ad calendas graecas*, i.e.: in your dreams.

The Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians will probably meet a similar fate. During the Warsaw meeting, the Presidents of both institutes agreed that “the resumption of the meeting of the Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians would take place after the publication in both countries of the hitherto existing findings”.³⁵

31. “Prezes IPN Jarosław Szarek spotkał się z dyrektorem ukraińskiego IPN Antonem Drobowyczem” [President of the IPN Jarosław Szarek met with Anton Drobovych, Director of the Ukrainian IPN], *Dzieje.pl. Portal Historyczny*, accessed December 3, 2020, <https://dzieje.pl/wiadomosci/prezes-ipn-jaroslaw-szarek-spotkal-sie-z-dyrektorem-ukrainskiego-ipn-antonem-drobowyczem>.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

However, it will be extremely difficult, given that – as I informed earlier – it could not be done before, as the Ukrainian participants of the Forum did not provide the texts of their papers (expert opinions). Will they do it now? Will the door to the Polish-Ukrainian Forum of Historians be opened?

Translated by Michelle Atallah

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Leonid Zashkilnyak

SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES ON INTERPRETATION OF UKRAINIAN-POLISH RELATIONS IN THE YEARS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Abstract

Exposure and evaluation of Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II is a controversial topic, both in a semi-scientific debate and in the public sphere not only in Ukraine and Poland, but also throughout Central and Eastern Europe. While studying the past, the key problem is not transforming historical sources into a narrative, but their interpretation. While doing this, historians must bear in mind the methodological aspects of their work, in particular the following truths: (1) history is always an interpretation of history; (2) 'history of historians' means generalization of various actors of the process, which requires seeing also the 'Other'; (3) history and common memory always contain various stereotypes and myths, memories and experiences, forcing them to overcome and delineate shaky boundaries between good and evil for themselves and for the 'Other'; (4) a historian must be aware of the purpose of his writing, which is not a search for 'historical truth', but an explanation of the causes and consequences of a historical situation, starting from contemporary circumstances and the state of the latest scientific knowledge; (5) a historical interpretation is not an 'absolute truth', but only one of the possible explanations of the events.

In order to explain the reasons for the development of the conflicting nature of Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II, it is necessary to place a whole series of related facts into a temporal and spatial chain, which demonstrates a steady increase in the 20th century in the struggle of two national movements – Polish and Ukrainian – to create independent countries on the territory of the common historical residence of the two nations. These struggles often had a military character (1918–1923, 1939–1947) and led to a large number of victims among the civilians. During World War II, the Ukrainian people's liberation movement came up with a radical program of a national uprising and the formation of an independent Ukrainian state in the western lands, where this movement had the greatest influence and tradition. During the fightings, the Ukrainian participants met with strong opposition from the Polish Underground State, which sought to restore the *status quo ante bellum* of the Polish State. At the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, an armed conflict for the territories of future states broke out, in which many Poles and Ukrainians, including civilians, were killed. Taken together, these struggles can be qualified as a large-scale conflict and mutual extermination. There was also a small number of mutual war transgressions, which can be covered by the terms 'war crimes', 'ethnic cleansing', or 'crime against humanity'. There is no legal basis to unilaterally qualify as 'genocide' only the crimes committed by 'Ukrainian nationalists'. The 'painful past' of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in the twentieth century does not justify undermining the Ukrainian people's liberation movement and depriving it of the right to recognize their subjectivity in the historical process. The joint development of the two neighbouring countries and nations, as well as their present and future relations should not be held hostages to the past.

Key words

Methodology of research regarding historical conflicts, Polish-Ukrainian relations, World War II, Polish-Ukrainian border territories.

The coverage and assessment of the Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II includes controversial topics, addressed both in the semi-scientific discussions and in the public sphere not only in Ukraine and Poland, but also in the whole region of East Central Europe. These topics have an impact on the general atmosphere of mutual relations between the countries and peoples. It is about the events that took place more than 80 years ago (the beginning of World War II) and which happened in various conditions and surroundings, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. It is not a coincidence that politicians and large part of both Ukrainian and Polish societies emphasize that studying and explaining those events should be a domain reserved for professional historians. In this text, we are talking about scientists-historians. In a professional environment, there is no need to cite the bibliography regarding this topic – it is well known.¹

In a professional community, it is not customary to speak of methodological matters. But I have to do it, showing my dissatisfaction with today's situation regarding the presentation of the chosen topic. First, some preliminary theoretical remarks.

First note. The 'real' story is not what we know about the event, but what we learn from it by examining the past from its sources. History is always an interpretation of events by a historian-

1. At this point I will present only the publications inviting to the fullest knowledge of polemics and literature: О. Каліщук, *Українсько-польське протистояння на Волині та в Галичині у роки Другої світової війни: науковий і суспільний дискурси* [Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in Volyn and Galicia during World War II: scientific and social discourses] (Львів, 2013); G. Motyka, *Wołyn'43* [Volyn'43] (Kraków, 2016); В. В'ятрович, *За лапштунками "Волині-43". Невідома польсько-українська війна* [Behind the scenes of 'Volyn-43'. Unknown Polish-Ukrainian war] (Київ, 2016); Л. Хахула, "Різуни" чи побратими? Сучасні польські дискурси про Україну ["Rizuni" or brothers? Contemporary Polish discourses about Ukraine] (Львів, 2016). Cf.: *Українсько-польське протистояння на західноукраїнських землях у роки Другої світової війни: матеріали до бібліографічного покажчика*, Укладач О. Каліщук, Львів (Луцьк, 2007).

researcher. Historians have never been neutral, even if they appear as such. No historian is free from their social environment, upbringing, culture and the current needs of the time, let alone language, cultural or mental conditions, and other individual personality traits. This is an axiom with which historians often disagree. In line with their rhetoric, a historian is always an 'utterer' of the subjectivity of his social environment. This is a known and unfortunately 'pessimistic' rule.

But there is also an 'optimistic' aspect – the professionalism of a historian, or what Marc Bloch designated as a researcher's 'craft'. And here it is appropriate to make a second methodological remark. While it is tempting to make generalizations and pass judgements about various actors of the historical process, one must always take into account the views from a different side or, in other words, from 'the other'. Especially when it comes to such topics as Ukrainian and Polish communities realizing certain socio-political interests in a certain city and at a certain time. Another conclusion drawn from this axiom is that we must take into account the existence of the perspective of the 'Other', which must be included in the research, thus contributing to a complete recognition of the subject.

Third. In view of the above, the social role of a historian grows significantly in the complex process of maneuvering between 'knowledge, imagination, and speech'. Historians produce texts. They, just like doctors, must be well aware of the consequences of their statements affecting the interests of many people and communities, many 'others'. In this case the medical principle *non nocere* – 'do no harm' – applies. History and social memory always contain various stereotypes and myths, memories and experiences, defining the stark boundaries between what is good and what is bad for oneself and for the 'Other'.

In such cases, it is always difficult to talk about recent history or about the past while there are still emotionally involved witnesses of the past events. Therefore, it will be purposeful to recall the remarks of Maurice Halbwachs who notes that collective memory

perceives the group 'from the inside' and it aims to present it with such an image of the past in which it could always recognize itself and which excludes any major changes; history leaves out any periods without changes as 'empty' interludes, and the only worthwhile historical facts are those that reveal a process or event, or contain an element of transformation.²

In other words, the latest developments, before they are 'transformed' into 'history', must pass through a period of 'cooling' emotions and expanding the view to include the account of the 'Other'.

Fourth. In historical research, it is important to raise awareness of this manner of perception – what is the purpose of the scientific and historical reflection on the Ukrainian-Polish relations, which in the 20th century were often conflicting? From my point of view, this goal is to identify and explain the causes and consequences of conflicting situations, not for the mere purpose of presenting their course or their political or legal assessment, but also the impact they have on the present and the future. Therefore, none of the conflicts between Ukrainians and Poles in the 20th century can be considered and assessed in isolation from one another. After all, the chain of these conflicts in the modern era began before World War I, and had its continuation and effects. Hence, it is very important to see the whole chain of events. Remembering this, we must ask ourselves the following question: By focusing our attention on conflict situations, are we not distorting the history by presenting only its negative aspect?

The fifth and final note. Today, a large volume of sources and historiographies from the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the 20th century have been accumulated, allowing for the reconstruction of events in almost every town and leading centre of political life of Ukrainians and Poles. These studies are worth continuing

2. J. Assmann, *Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach starożytnych* [Cultural Memory and Early Civilization Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination] (Warszawa: WUW, 2008), 58.

for various reasons. But two points must be added: the first – historical facts are so varied and complex that their interpretations may be divergent; second – on the basis of known facts, various interpretations can be made, sometimes even mutually exclusive. And it is so in every story. In this context, it is important not to forget my third comment above.

Now let's move on to the terminological interpretation in the hope that there is no need to speak on a factual level among professionals. I want to emphasize that in matters of interpretation it is important not to repeat the terminology of historical sources, as they always use metaphorical terms corresponding to their time, which carries emotional burden and is narrowed down to a specific place. A simple example: in the works of many historians and journalists, the phrase 'Volyn slaughter' often appears, linking the zoological term 'slaughter' to Volyn and Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1942–1944. However, this is not a scientific term that describes the entire course of events in Volyn in the period in question. The term comes from the emotional accounts of Poles-refugees from Volyn, who, by using this term, wanted to emphasize the catastrophic nature of the suffering of war. Do we have to use this term in the scientific debate today? From my point of view, the events in Ukrainian-Polish relations in Volyn in the years 1942–1944 should be described using adequate scientific term, namely 'attack', 'national conflict', 'social conflict', 'murder', 'plunder', etc. A historian's job is to help understand what happened and why. And in order to explain the events, we need to put individual facts into the general context of the developments in the region and Europe, and build a consistent chain of events that would allow us to obtain their scientific explanation and evaluation.

What is this chain of events? I will only present my point of view.

Historians-researchers understand that in the 20th century in Central and Eastern Europe a situation arose when many na-

tions waged a national-liberation fight for independent statehood. Among them were Ukrainian and Poles. The Ukrainian and Polish nations entered the 20th century as enslaved and separated by the then empires. As early as in the nineteenth century, the representatives of their intellectual elites shaped the programs of national liberation and the creation of independent nation states. The problem was that Polish politicians relied on an enduring tradition of 'historical law' and saw a future independent Poland almost exclusively within the borders of the Commonwealth of 1772, including Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. They put faithfulness to tradition above political realities. A vast corpus of literature has been written on this subject. In these visions of the future Polish state, the Ukrainian national liberation movement, which was already formed organizationally and politically at the beginning of the 20th century, was often ignored. The movement was particularly active in Galicia under the rule of Austria-Hungary.³

However, the formation and maturation of the Ukrainian national movement and its 'grievances' against part of the state-political heritage of the Republic of Poland, as well as its plans to oust the Poles not only from Right-bank Ukraine but also from the Polish 'Piedmont' in Galicia met with opposition and powerful resistance from the Polish population, especially in cities, and then also

3. Народна програма, "Діло", Lviv, December 24, 1895. The idea of dividing Galicia into two ethnic parts arose back in 1848 in the milieu of the activists of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, which acted as a representative of the interests of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) population during the revolutionary events in Lviv. Later, the Ukrainian leaders removed this requirement from the political program, expecting an agreement and cooperation with Poles in extending the self-governing rights of the entire province. The disappointment in carrying out another attempt at agreement – the "new era" (1890–1894) – motivated the Ukrainians at the beginning of the 20th century to sharply expose the idea of dividing Galicia into the Ukrainian and Polish parts. Cf.: М. Кугутяк, *Галичина: сторінки історії. Нарис суспільно-політичного руху (XIX ст. – 1939 р.)* [Galicia: pages of history. Essay on the socio-political movement (XIX century – 1939)] (Івано-Франківськ 1993), 32–39.

from the Polish political circles. The accumulated Ukrainian-Polish clashes at the end of World War I grew into a Polish-Ukrainian war over Galicia and Lviv. The particularity of this conflict consisted in the fact that shortly after Ukraine lost the war, Poles and Ukrainians were already acting as allies in the joint struggle of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) and the Republic of Poland against the Bolshevik onslaught. Both wars, according to the figurative statement of the Polish historian Maciej Kozłowski, became a 'Pyrrhic victory' for Poland, because it resulted in a great rift between Ukrainians and Poles, "natural neighbours and allies";⁴ and, what needs to be added separately, they aggravated disagreements and conflicts within the Ukrainian national camp, resulting from the signing of the 1920 treaty by the head of the UPR Symon Petliura, and the transfer of lands dominated by the Ukrainian population to Poland (Galicia, Western Volyn, Kholmshchyna, Podlasie, Lemkivshchyna, etc.). The Ukrainian population and politicians of Western Ukrainian lands, which were incorporated into the Polish State, did not accept the decision of the Petliura government, felt deceived, and saw the Polish State as an 'aggressor' and 'invader' that destroyed an important entity created by the Ukrainian nation – the West Ukrainian People's Republic.⁵

Further events showed that the peaceful coexistence of Poles and Ukrainians in one country is under question. The general mood of the Polish and Ukrainian population in the interwar period demonstrated the persistence of prejudices and emotional tensions from both sides, despite various attempts to reach some

4. M. Kozłowski, *Między Sanem a Zbruczem. Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918–1919* [Between San and Zbruch. Fighting for Lviv and Eastern Galicia 1918–1919] (Kraków: Znak 1990), 105–106.

5. Б. Гудь, В. Голубко, *Нелегка дорога до порозуміння. До питання генези українсько-польського військово-політичного співробітництва 1917–1921 рр.* [The road to understanding is not easy. On the question of the genesis of Ukrainian-Polish military-political cooperation in 1917–1921] (Львів, 1997), 54–59.

compromise. The Ukrainian society did not receive territorial autonomy, as was provided for in international agreements of the years 1919–1920.⁶

On the other hand, the defeats of the Ukrainian national movement in wars, the tenacity of Polish governments on the Ukrainian issue contributed to the radicalization of moods – initially among the youth – and the emergence of a radical wing of the Ukrainian national liberation movement – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) – which was not the only radical organization in exile, in Poland, or in the Soviet Union. Like all radicals, they developed a ‘revolutionary scenario’ of achieving independence of their national state under changed international conditions. These conditions dictated the choice of those allies who would seek a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and of the European regime. Germany and its allies challenged this regime and thus drew the attention of the Ukrainian radical movement, which hoped that the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state would be possible in the turmoil of a European war. Just like the Polish politicians had hoped earlier that the European wars of the 19th and early 20th centuries would help them regain independence.

Even today some members of the Polish society and some historians do not understand the reasons of the radicalization of the Ukrainian independence movement in the conditions of the spread

6. In accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference of June 25, 1919, and subsequent resolutions, as well as the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 14, 1923, Poland undertook to grant autonomy to Galicia. Cf.: О. Красівський, *Східна Галичина і Польща в 1918–1923 рр. Проблеми взаємовідносин* [Eastern Galicia and Poland in 1918–1923. Problems of relations] (Київ, 1998), 129–130 and 253–254; Z. Zaks, “Galicja Wschodnia w polskiej polityce zagranicznej (1921–1923)” [Eastern Galicia in Polish foreign policy (1921–1923)], [in:] *Z Dziejów Stosunków Polsko-Radzieckich* [From the history of Polish-Soviet relations], vol. VIII, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1971), 29–32; J. Pisuliński, *Nie tylko Petlura. Kwestia ukraińska w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918–1923* [Not only Petliura. The Ukrainian question in Polish foreign policy in 1918–1923] (Wrocław: WUW, 2004), 392–397; etc.

of totalitarian ideologies and totalitarian ways of solving social problems. However, how could the representatives of nationally conscious Ukrainian circles react to the destruction of Ukrainian statehood? The logical answer is: in a way similar to the reaction of Poles after the invasion by Nazi Germany.

The beginning of World War II saw radicalisation of all sides of the world conflict, since war – as we know – is a radical, anti-humanist way of conducting politics. The Ukrainian national liberation movement during the war was in fact represented by the only political force – organized nationalists from the OUN. The question arises – what did the Ukrainian nationalists fight for? And the answer is unequivocal: to create an independent and united Ukrainian State. United, since at that time the lands inhabited by a majority of Ukrainians were controlled by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania – all Ukraine's neighbours (!). The revolutionary scenario of Ukrainian nationalists envisaged an armed uprising and the conquest of the areas inhabited mostly by the Ukrainian population. The rest of the strategy concerned tactical means and instruments of combat, including the choice of allies. Undoubtedly, the leaders of both factions of the OUN (A. Melnyk and S. Bandera after the split in 1940) made mistakes with regard to the use of combat instruments and the choice of temporary allies at various stages of the ongoing war. But they never betrayed the main goal – to achieve an independent national state. Therefore, to separate the Ukrainian radical camp from the Ukrainian national movement in its entirety – as communist Russian propagandists have always tried to do – and to denounce it as something inappropriate in the fight for independence is methodological nonsense. This must be emphasized with all force. The outbreak of World War II was a signal for Ukrainian radicals to carry out their program by means of a revolutionary path – insurrection. Just like in 1918, when the Ukrainian and Polish national movements tried to take advantage of the inter imperial conflict for the purpose of their liberation, they

counted on various allies and changed tactics during the war, the result of which I described earlier.

After the beginning of democratic changes in Poland and Ukraine, the ‘white’ and ‘black’ spots of national history began to be filled, especially in the most recent period. In Ukraine, this process was and remains difficult due to the need to overcome the terrible legacy of centuries-long Russian colonialism, the legacy of which is depreciation and disregard for everything that is Ukrainian, including the denial of the mere existence of Ukrainian nation, not to mention the terms ‘Ukrainian fascists’, ‘collaborators’, etc. In Poland in the 2000s, a powerful moment of revision of history emerged, with attempts to put at the centre of contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations the problem of the so-called ‘unsolved’ historical heritage, namely the murders and deportations of Poles in the years 1943–1946 in the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands (Galicia, Volyn, Nadsiania etc.). And the most important: putting on the Ukrainian national movement all the blame for the crimes committed during the German and Soviet occupation, and blaming the most important force of the Ukrainian liberation movement – the OUN and the UPA – for the victims of the ‘defenceless’ Polish civilian population.⁷

Such one-sided treatment of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the borderland during the world war affects not the past, but the future, restores reality of the past in its negative manifestations and, as a result, discredits the Ukrainian national movement and Ukrainians as a nation ‘equal among equals’. Hence the decisions of the Polish parliament and senate from the years 2009–2016 on “genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists”⁸

7. О. Каліщук, *Українсько-польське протистояння на Волині та в Галичині у роки Другої світової війни: науковий і суспільний дискурси* [Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in Volyn and Galicia during World War II: scientific and social discourses] (Львів, 2013), 296–308; etc.

8. The Senate and the Sejm of the Republic of Poland adopted resolutions in which they described, in a unilateral statement, the actions of the Ukrainian

Such a politicized approach to the past has two consequences: it ignores the views of the Ukrainian population on past events and Ukrainian historiography, and secondly, it undermines the objectivity of Ukraine and its national interests in the modern world. In fact, the efforts of the thirteen “Poland–Ukraine: Difficult Questions” seminars (1997–2008) are ‘gone with the wind.’⁹ If the known factual material today quite sufficiently defines the conditions, nature, essence and consequences of the Ukrainian–Polish conflict in Volyn and Galicia, their interpretation differs significantly in the Polish and Ukrainian variants. I admit that in science such

underground (“Ukrainian nationalists”) during the Ukrainian–Polish conflict of 1943–1944 as ‘genocide’ of the Polish nation. Cf.: *Uchwała Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 20 czerwca 2013 r. 70. rocznicę Zbrodni Wołyńskiej* [Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of June 20, 2013 on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn Crime], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 12, 2013, item 582, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20130000582/O/M20130582.pdf>; *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 lipca 2016 r. w sprawie oddania hołdu ofiarom ludobójstwa dokonanego przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na obywatelach II Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1943–1945* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of July 22, 2016 on paying tribute to the victims of genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in 1943–1945], Warsaw: Monitor Polski (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland), July 29, 2016, item 726, [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie8.nsf/nazwa/625_u/\\$file/625_u.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie8.nsf/nazwa/625_u/$file/625_u.pdf).

9. For the course and results of regular seminars of Ukrainian and Polish historians, held in 1997–2008, see: *Polska–Ukraina: trudne pytania* [Poland–Ukraine: difficult questions], vol. 1–11 (Warszawa, 1997–2009) [Ukrainian version of the materials: *Україна–Польща: важкі питання*, тт. 1–10 (Варшава–Луцьк, 1998–2006)]. A summary of the work can be found in a separate volume: *Polska–Ukraina: trudna odpowiedź. Dokumentacja spotkań historyków (1994–2001). Kronika wydarzeń na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej (1939–1945)* [Poland–Ukraine: Difficult Answer. Documentation of historians’ meetings (1994–2001). Chronicle of events in Volyn and Eastern Galicia (1939–1945)] (Warszawa: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, Ośrodek KARTA, 2003); A. Żupański, *Droga do prawdy o wydarzeniach na Wołyniu* [The road to the truth about the events in Volyn] (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2006), and other publications.

differences are a normal practice. But from the entire spectrum of conflicts that began in 1939, and not in 1943 (!), and in which both many Poles and many Ukrainians were killed, the Polish side chooses only the so-called 'anti-Polish action' carried out by the Ukrainian underground, and gives it a key significance in the whole chain of events. It is an ahistorical approach. After all, it is about a mutual fight against underground movements in a desire to secure the emergence of independent national states after war.

Even during the seminars, historians talked about 'armed conflict' or even 'Polish-Ukrainian war' with the addition of 'inter-ethnic', 'civil', and other qualifiers. In this case, we can speak of a clash of two equal parties – the Polish Underground State and the Ukrainian national movement. Such approach is in line with scientific terminology, and makes it possible to apply the Christian principle "we forgive and ask for forgiveness" on the social level.

However, an interpretation that offends the national feelings of Ukrainians and puts one-sided blame on them for 'slaughtering' the defenceless Poles under what is referred to as 'genocidal nationalism' is quite unacceptable. Firstly, the Poles in the borderland were not defenceless – they had not less, and perhaps more underground forces in Western Ukrainian lands (I wrote about it), especially in Galicia and Volyn, and they prepared to take over these lands by armed forces – these are well-known scientific facts documented in literature. Secondly, Ukrainian nationalism is treated interestingly to this day – if you consider yourself Ukrainian, speak Ukrainian and you support the Ukrainian independent state, then you are a true nationalist (!). But if you support also Poland or Russia, then you are a patriot. Is this approach normal? I doubt it. But it must be emphasized that such a degrading attitude towards Ukrainian nation has a long lasting tradition in both Polish and Russian narratives.

I must point out that the terminology and evaluation of the Ukrainian-Polish relations during the years of World War II differ somewhat strangely. When it comes to the conflict in Volyn, in

the Polish historiography and journalism the terms 'slaughter' and 'genocide' are used, and when it comes to the destruction of the Ukrainian population, including entire settlements, it is referred to as 'preventive or retaliatory actions', 'pacification', 'punishment' etc., and only in some cases individual historians dare to write about 'conflict' or 'war'.¹⁰

10. At this point, I will mention only two examples from more recent works by Polish historians, which present good factual arguments, but raise questions about interpretation and terminology. Tomasz Bereza, in his valuable monograph, saturated with source material, on the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II in the Jarosław district of the Lublin region, emphasized that the conflict between the Ukrainian and Polish underground movements is very difficult to define unambiguously, but in its developments, one can find armed attacks and elements of 'ethnic cleansing' on both sides (admittedly the author ironically calls the Ukrainian state-building plans a 'quasi-state', although at that moment (spring 1945) the goals of the Ukrainian underground were already quite understandable and known to all participants of the world war – which is attested by the documents). The researcher himself assesses the situation quite correctly, writing that the authorities of the Ukrainian underground state (the author uses the terms 'authorities' and 'the state' in quotation marks, which is to belittle their status!) "felt obliged to represent the nation they were defending, but also they fought for a living space for them"; on the other hand, "the aspirations of Ukrainian nationalists clashed with the readiness of Poles to defend their state of ownership, reduced by the decisions of the Big Three in Tehran and Yalta". It is in fact the question of an 'armed conflict' ('war'!?) between two national movements, but the author avoids the term that most fully describes the nature of the events. See: T. Bereza, *Wokół Piskorowic. Przyczynek do dziejów konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego na Zasaniu w latach 1939–1945* [Around Pyskorovychi. Preliminary remarks on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Zasania in the years 1939–1945] (Rzeszów: IPN, 2013), 281–282. Another Polish researcher – Mariusz Zajączkowski – in his monograph, scrupulously documented by little known or unknown sources, agrees to admit the fact of a 'guerrilla war' between the two underground movements, but insists that the Polish underground only carried out 'retaliatory' actions against Ukrainians. You have to ask then – if it was a 'conflict' for the territory of the future states, what are the 'retaliatory actions' of the Polish underground for!? It is about ordinary military operations in the field, where the enemy (the Ukrainians) had an advantage in the population. See: M. Zajączkowski, *Ukraińskie podziemie na Lubelszczyźnie w okresie okupacji*

Then a question arises – how to qualify the destruction of entire villages by the Polish underground (Pawłokoma, Sahryń, Piskorowice, etc.)? By analogy, is it necessary to speak of an ‘anti-Ukrainian action’ or ‘genocide’ of Ukrainian civilians, ‘done by the Polish underground’? Wouldn’t it be purposeful to refer to armed attacks on both sides (I emphasize that they began in 1939 and not in 1943) using the term ‘armed conflict’ or ‘war’? Of course it’s not about justifying either side! Crimes are crimes in every situation.

Such a proposal is debatable, but it is difficult to find other terms that would encompass the complexity of Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II without taking into account the entire chain of their development. One can understand the leaders of the Polish underground of that time who wished to maintain the territorial *status quo ante bellum*. However, at the same time, we must also take into account the decisiveness of the leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation movement (and of a large part of the borderland population), who hoped to take advantage of the war situation and make a ‘second attempt’ to create a Ukrainian national state. I leave aside such facts as the need of the Ukrainians to fight on three fronts – anti-Nazi, anti-Soviet, and anti-Polish.

I will not mention here the matter of counting the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. I will only notice that the numbers of victims in today’s literature and journalism do not withstand criticism and need corrections – with regard to the casualties on both the Polish and Ukrainian side. Recent calculations based on the examination of Ukrainian, Polish, German and Soviet source materials show a large overestimation of Polish losses and underestimation of Ukrainian victims.¹¹ This question requires new research in *niemieckiej 1939–1944* [The Ukrainian underground in the Lublin region during the German occupation 1939–1944] (Lublin–Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Oddział w Lublinie, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2015), 427–428. Similar terminology resembles scholasticism or casuistry more than science.

11. Cf.: *Українські жертви Волині 1938–1944 рр. у картах і таблицях. Володимир-Волинський район. Польсько-українське протистояння*

order to meet the requirement of historical scrupulousness. And it seems that this process has already started.

The issue, however, is not the number of victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict – given that even one human life is of particular value – but about what happened during World War II in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland. This gives us the key to understanding, explaining and evaluating the events. The analysis of the documents of the Polish Underground State and the Polish government-in-exile during the war shows that their leaders understood well what was going on in the Polish-Ukrainian relations of that time and used in their writings the terms ‘war’ against the Ukrainians, the ‘civil war’, or the ‘international war’. From 1941, they also made serious preparations for the military conflict, which was often emphasized in their documents.¹² Moreover, the Polish underground formations were the first to start active combat operations against the Ukrainian underground in 1943. As we already know, from March to July 1, 1943, 107 attacks on Ukrainian villages took place in the Volyn province and 722 Ukrainian people (or 1091, according to other data) were killed.¹³ This gives grounds to think, taking into account

[Ukrainian victims of Volyn in 1938–1944 in maps and tables. Volodymyr-Volynskyi district. Polish-Ukrainian confrontation], Упорядники О. Голько, О. Тучак, Н. Халак (Львів, 2014), 77; А. Боляновський, “Проблема кількості польських жертв Волинської трагедії 1943 р.” [The problem of the number of Polish victims of the Volyn tragedy of 1943], [in:] *Україна–Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість*, вип. 6 (Львів, 2013), 129–143.

12. See for example: Л. Зашкільняк, “Українсько-польські відносини в роки Другої світової війни: дослідження та інтерпретації” [Ukrainian-Polish relations during World War II: research and interpretations], [in:] *Historia est testis temporum. Księga Pamiątkowa z okazji Jubileuszu 90-lecia Profesorów Richarda Pipesa, Piotra Wandyczca, Zbigniewa Wójcika*, Biblioteka Europae Orientalis, studia 5 (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2017), 435–469.

13. Я. В. Борщик, “До проблеми польських ‘відплатних акцій’ на (березень – початок липня 1943 р.)” [To the problem of Polish ‘retaliation’ on (March – early July 1943)], *Український історичний журнал*, no. 1 (2016), 113–132.

the murders of Ukrainians in the Chełm region in 1942, that before the 'anti-Polish action' there was an 'anti-Ukrainian action' carried out by the Polish underground. Historians are not supposed to remove these facts from the interpretation of the events. As for Volyn, the Ukrainian population had a huge advantage over the Polish one in this region, while laying firm claims to Polish property in these lands. The social 'explosives' collected there served as a 'detonator' that triggered the participation of the civilian Ukrainian population, sometimes in anti-humanist revenge campaigns against the Polish population. These criminal acts cannot be justified, but it is always worth explaining them from a socio historical point of view.

Unfortunately, today's Europe has a long history of interstate and international conflicts among its neighbours, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. As the authors of the international project "Europe and its painful pasts" ("L'Europe et ses passés douloureux") claim, experience shows that revival of old conflicts is always possible despite various endeavours to solve them in the past. The famous French sociologist Georges Mink writes that "history moves into the present and mobilizes various actors, disadvantaged groups of the population or other frustrated groups that have been forgotten in post-conflict agreements or put into silence. Based on these realities, various interested groups, political parties or states create their memory resources and attract to their repertoire of historicizing strategies to 'return to use' the images of the 'painful' past in their political games".¹⁴ That is why it is so important to critically treat the metaphorical 'images' and 'images' borrowed from a dictionary of past events, because they are always filled with an emotional and biased reaction of participants.

In my view, today is the time to seriously re-examine the events and general evaluation of the Ukrainian-Polish relations during

14. Ж. Мінк, Вступ. Європа та її «болісні» минувшини: стратегії історизування та їх використання в Європі, [in:] Європа та її болісні минувшини, Автори упорядники Жорж Мінк і Лора Неймайер у співпраці з Паскалем Боннаром, Київ 2009, 37.

World War II, and to remove one-sided explanations that prevail in the information space. This space is particularly saturated today with anti Ukrainian rhetoric coming from Ukraine's eastern neighbour. Such rhetoric resuscitates old imperial myths and stereotypes about 'non-existent' Ukrainians or 'fascist' Ukrainian nationalists, endeavours to undermine and distort the image of the Ukrainian national movement, and to wipe the Ukrainian state off the map of Europe. All invectives towards the centuries-long struggle of Ukrainians for their independent state are offensive to the modern people of Ukraine, they violate the principles of peaceful scientific work, and they affect not the past, but the future.

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THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC CONSULTING IN THE PROCESS OF FORMING A GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY BETWEEN UKRAINE AND POLAND

Abstract

The article presents the principles of the Good Neighbour Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The state of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland is described as good neighbourhood. However, attention is drawn to the conflicts related to the historical memory of both nations. It has been concluded that scientific research can significantly raise the level of public policies in general, with particular regard to the good neighbourhood policy. The author draws attention to the reasons that lead to an improper communication between policy makers and law makers on the one hand, and scientists on the other. She describes also the main tasks of scientific consulting institutions at parliaments and governments. The author proposes to create a Ukrainian-Polish network of scientific consultants to public authorities, the objectives of which would include developing a good neighbourhood policy and related legal acts, as well as creating a Ukrainian-Polish scientific platform which would publish scientific research results from both countries, accompanied by information on their potential application in particular policies.

Key words

Good Neighbour Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, relationship between policy and science, scientific diplomacy, scientific consulting, networks of scientific consultants.

The conflicts that have arisen in recent years between representatives of public authorities of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland have shown that in interstate relations there have been attempts by each of the states to impose their own interpretation of historical memory and national heroes. In both countries, there were government officials who, without proper justification for their decisions regarding the controversial issues between the neighbouring states, demanded recognition of their position as the only correct one. Alternately, the Ukrainian and Polish parliaments adopted legal acts based on the deputies' political attitudes to historical issues. On many occasions the sides took diametrically opposite views on some issues, thus provoking numerous discussions in which both government officials and citizens of the two countries were involved. This state of bilateral relations prompted the search for its causes and possible ways to overcome them. One of the identified reasons was the commitment of certain political forces to one or another version of the events, based on emotions rather than facts and their objective interpretation. Therefore, it is extremely important to draw the attention of both Polish and Ukrainian theorists and practitioners to the importance of the scientific evidence in the processes of policy-making and law-making in general, and particularly in the process of developing a neighbourhood policy.

There are very few theoretical works regarding the concept of 'good neighbour policy' in Ukrainian and Polish scientific literature. Most encyclopedias and dictionaries do not explain the essence of this type of policy. The origin of this term is mentioned in M. Roczon's publication, which is an interview with J. F. Melby. The differences between the terms 'Good Neighbour Policy' and 'Eu-

ropean Neighbourhood Policy' are investigated by A. Kuznetsov, while A. Kokoshin and T. Luty focus on the importance of science in the process of policy-making. The essence of scientific consulting and its institutional structure in the USA is described by a team of authors: M. Senchenko, O. Senchenko, V. Hastynshchykov; and with regard to the European Union – by J. M. Bujnicki, P. Gutowski, A. Jajszczyk, J. Gołaś, G. Wrochna, and J. Szwed.

The research of the above-mentioned authors deals with the role of science in policy making in general, not with the policy of good neighbourhood. Therefore, considering the practical need to improve relations between the two neighbouring states, the purpose of this article is to determine the theoretical and practical aspects of scientific consulting in the process of shaping the neighbourhood policy between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. The objectives of the article are: to explain the essence of the term 'good neighbourhood policy'; to analyse political documents and legal acts which use the terms 'good neighbourly relations' or 'good neighbourliness'; to show the politicians' and scientists' perception of the role of science in policy-making; to identify ways of applying scientific research in the process of policy-making in general, and particularly in the policy of good neighbourhood between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland.

The dissemination of the term 'good neighbour policy' in the public sphere is associated with US President F. Roosevelt. In his inaugural address (on March 4, 1933), he announced that he would pursue a 'good neighbour policy', which meant non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic policy of Latin American countries.¹

However, J. F. Melby thinks that the Good Neighbour Policy was in fact created by Sumner Welles who was an American diplomat specializing in Latin America and who was serving as

1. "Good Neighbor Policy", *Britannica*, accessed October 8, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Good-Neighbor-Policy-of-the-United-States>.

US ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and an adviser to F. Roosevelt.²

J. F. Melby believes that S. Welles' book on the Dominican Republic (*Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924*) was the true source of the Good Neighbour Policy: “It was his idea, and Roosevelt picked it up”.³

Today, good neighbourliness is considered a principle of international law, on the basis of which modern countries should build their relations. This idea is stated in a number of international documents. *The Charter of the United Nations* (1945) states that members of the organization agree that their policies regarding non-self-governing territories should be based on “the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic and commercial matters” (Article 74).⁴

The Preamble to the *Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter* (1970) notes: “the peoples of the United Nations are determined to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”.⁵

2. M. Roczon, “Kolos Północy w winnicy Nabota. Stany Zjednoczone i Republika Dominikańska w latach 1869–1966” [Colossus of the North in Naboth's Vineyard. The United States and the Dominican Republic in the years 1869–1966], *Studia i komentarze Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, no. 4 (14), 2010, accessed October 9, 2020, <http://www.iesw.lublin.pl/sk/numery/numer14.php>.

3. R. Accinelli, “Oral History. Interview with John F. Melby”, November 7, 1986, accessed October 9, 2020, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/melby1>.

4. Устав Организации Объединённых Наций и Устав Международного Суда [The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice], accessed October 11, 2020, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010?lang=uk#Text.

5. Декларация про принципи міжнародного права, що стосуються дружніх відносин та співробітництва між державами відповідно до

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975) states that the participating states “will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice”.⁶

Consequently, the invariable essence of the good neighbourhood policy is respect for the sovereignty of other states, and cooperation with them on a contractual and mutually beneficial basis.

Interstate relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland have been actively developed since the two countries regained their independence. In 1992, the *Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendly Relations and Cooperation* was signed. According to it, the parties undertook to “develop relations in the spirit of friendship, cooperation, mutual respect, mutual understanding, trust and good neighbourliness on the basis of international law in the new political situation”.⁷

A number of state and non-state institutions have been established to form good neighbourly relations and cooperation between the two countries. They include: the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland; the Parliamentary Assembly of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland; Deputy Group of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Interparliamentary Relations with the Republic of Poland; the Inter-Parliamentary

Статуту Організації Об'єднаних Націй [The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations], accessed October 12, 2020, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_569?lang=uk#Text.

6. *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975, accessed October 13, 2020, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf>.

7. *Договір між Україною і Республікою Польщею про добросусідство, дружні відносини і співробітництво* [Treaty between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland on Good Neighbourliness, Friendly Relations and Co-operation], accessed October 15, 2020, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_172#Text.

Assembly of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland; Ukrainian-Polish Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation; Ukrainian-Polish Intergovernmental Coordination Council for Interregional Cooperation; Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Polish Commission for the Protection and Recovery of Cultural Property Lost and Illegally Moved during World War II; Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland; Joint Advisory Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Poland on the education of representatives of the Ukrainian national minority in Poland and the Polish national minority in Ukraine; Ukrainian-Polish Council of Youth Exchange; Ukrainian-Polish Partnership Forum; Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians; Platform for political, economic and social cooperation between Ukraine, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania – “Lublin Triangle”; and others.

Apart from institutional relations, the interstate policy is influenced by many other factors. It depends on both the internal state of affairs of the neighbouring countries and the international situation in the world. Interstate relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, in accordance with their status in international organizations, should be developed within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its component – the Eastern Partnership policy. The basic principles that states must adhere to in line with this policy include: the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, respect and protection of minorities, the principles of market economy and sustainable development.⁸

8. *European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy paper*, Communication from the Commission, COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, May 12, 2004, p. 3, accessed October 18, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf.

As we can see, the documents of the European Union refer to the ‘neighbourhood policy’, and not to the ‘good neighbour policy’. A. Kuznetsov believes that there is a certain difference between these terms. According to him, the Good Neighbour Policy is about symmetrical relations between international actors, while the European Neighbourhood Policy – about asymmetrical relations. Besides, he identifies three other differences between the European Neighbourhood Policy (the Eastern Partnership policy) and the standard Good Neighbour Policy: 1) in the European Neighbourhood Policy, apart from interests, European values are taken into account and unilaterally implemented; 2) in addition to partnership cooperation typical of good neighbourliness, the EU proposes to move towards closer, associative relations; 3) for the implementation of the European policy, there are targeted financial instruments funded mostly by the EU.⁹

The European Neighbourhood Policy is defined as “a new European Union policy that aims to create a zone of stability, peace and prosperity south and east of the new borders of the enlarged European Union, by establishing close long-term relations with neighbouring countries”.¹⁰ Therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy, in contrast to the original meaning of the term ‘good neighbour policy’, allows for ‘interference’ in the domestic affairs of the neighbouring state. Another thing is that the ‘interference’ needs to be motivated by noble intentions, i.e. to ensure peace

9. А. И. Кузнецов, “Добрососедство и Европейская политика соседства – в чем различие?” [Good Neighbourhood and European Neighbourhood Policy – what is the difference?], *Балтийский регион* [The Baltic Sea Region], no. 2 (2009), accessed October 21, 2020, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/dobrososedstvo-i-evropeyskaya-politika-sosedstva-v-chem-razlichie/viewer>.

10. Європейська політика сусідства. Глосарій термінів Європейського Союзу [European Neighbourhood Policy. Glossary of terms of the European Union], Видавництво «К.І.С.», Міжнародний фонд «Відродження», accessed October 21, 2020, <http://europa.dovidka.com.ua/ee.html#1>.

and tranquillity in the neighbouring state, and thus the security in their own country.

Relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland can be called 'good neighbourhood', since most of the problems that arise are solved by representatives of the public authorities of both states in a balanced way, in the process of negotiations and consultations. However, disputes and differences in views are known to have often arisen over historical issues.

One of the last conflicts that arose between representatives of the authorities of both states was the adoption, on January 26, 2018, of the amendment to the Polish law "On the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation".¹¹ The amendment, among other things, provided for a fine or imprisonment of up to three years for denying the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists. While disregarding the historical events and their nationalist interpretations by representatives of both nations, it is important, in the context of this article, to take a closer look at how the laws are formulated. The analysis of the amendment was carried out, in particular, by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. It found that the terms "Ukrainian nationalists" and "Eastern Lesser Poland", which were used by the Polish legislator without providing a definition, were ambiguous and could carry multiple interpretations. Thus, due to violation of the principle of specificity of legal provisions, on January 17, 2019 (almost a year

11. *O zmianie ustawy o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej – Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy o grobach i cmentarzach wojennych, ustawy o muzeach oraz ustawy o odpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod groźbą kary, Ustawa z dnia 26.01.2018 r.* [On the amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, the Act on war graves and cemeteries, the Act on museums and the Act on the liability of collective entities for acts prohibited under penalty: Act of January 26, 2018], *Journal of Laws of 2018*, item 369, accessed October 26, 2020, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20180000369>.

after the adoption of the amendment), the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the said provision was unconstitutional.¹²

The use of such ambiguous terms indicates that in the process of drafting the bill, the current politics played major role instead of a balanced state policy and adherence to the basic principles of law-making. The objective of both state policy and laws is to establish clear rules of social relations, and to ensure their stability, not to aggravate the conflicts. This situation could have been avoided if scientists were involved at all stages of both the development and implementation of state policy and legal acts, which means engaging lawyers, political scientists, philologists, historians, and others.

Underestimation of the role of scientific consulting in practice has its roots in theory. When defining a policy, its structure, and other important elements, researchers rarely attach appropriate weight to scientific knowledge. However, a serious policy and the related legal acts should take into account scientific research, which means objective analysis of social phenomena and processes, presentation of their manifestations in adequate terms, as well as forecasting their further development and impact on society and the state.

The above-mentioned amendment to the law concerned two nations, and therefore affected bilateral relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. Solving this type of conflict requires not just diplomacy, but scientific diplomacy. One of the areas of this type of diplomacy is the use of scientific cooperation between countries to solve common problems.¹³

12. *Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 17.01.2019 r. sygn. akt K1/18* [Ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of January 17, 2019, file no. K1/18], Journal of Laws of 2019, item 131, accessed October 28, 2020, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20190000131>.

13. О. А. Мирончук, "Роль наукової дипломатії у розвитку і стабілізації міжнародних відносин в умовах глобалізації" [The role of scientific diplomacy in the development and stabilization of international relations in the context of globalization, [in:] *Еволюція цінностей в епоху глобалізації: зб. наук. Праць* [The evolution of values in the era of globalization], за заг. ред. О. В. Зернецької (Київ: ДУ «Інститут всесвітньої історії НАН України», 2019), 59.

The presidents of the two states are aware of the significant role of scientific consulting in the development of a good neighbourhood policy between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, at least as evidenced by their public speeches. During his official meetings with the Presidents of Ukraine, President of the Republic of Poland A. Duda constantly emphasized the importance of establishing the objective truth about historical events, based on scientific research, not emotions.¹⁴ During Duda's recent official visit to Ukraine, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky told reporters that the Presidents of the two countries discussed issues of historical memory and agreed that these should be resolved by historians.

In a joint interview with the two presidents, V. Zelensky noted that "we live side by side, we are neighbours, and we will be neighbours forever. In the past, there is a history, the results of which you know, one thing is preferred by Ukraine, another thing is preferred by Poland, and vice versa, but it seems to me that these issues should be resolved by professionals, not by politicians".¹⁵

For a certain period, controversial issues of the common past were discussed at meetings of the Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians.¹⁶ The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory organized

14. See: О. В., Кукуруз, "Інформаційна політика президентів Російської Федерації і Республіки Польща щодо України" [Information policy of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland towards Ukraine], *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona*, Житомир – Київ – Краків: Вид. Євенок О. О., Вип. 8 (2018), 41–50.

15. Ексклюзивне інтерв'ю з Володимиром Зеленським і Анджеєм Дудою, розмову вели: О. Кот (телеканал «Україна»), М. Адамчик (телеканал «TVP1») [Exclusive interview with Volodymyr Zelensky and Andrzej Duda; the conversation led by: O. Kot (TV Ukraine), M. Adamchuk (TVP1)], Odessa, October 13, 2020, accessed October 9, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-V78MQKGijQ&t=687s>.

16. Українсько-польський форум істориків: новини й доповіді [Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians: News and Reports], Український інститут національної пам'яті, accessed November 10, 2020, <https://old.uinp.gov.ua/ua-pl-historian-forum-news>.

a photo-documentary exhibition, and prepared a brochure “100 Years of Neighbourhood. Ukraine and Poland”.¹⁷

The scientific approach to policy-making means that it should be based on facts, truth, objectivity, not emotions or political benefits. A good neighbourhood policy, like any other type of public policy, should be developed on the basis of reliable information about the current state of affairs in each country, knowledge of the past, and plans for the future. The correct choice of strategy and tactics for the development of bilateral relations depends on the quality of information. The level of reliability of information increases if we adopt a qualified approach to its collection, systematization, correct establishment of patterns and trends. This role is best performed by scientists, since they use an appropriate data processing methodology.

H. K. Colebatch, analysing the understanding of policies of different types and at different levels, identified that the inherent elements of each policy are: authority (policy is associated with a particular body that is authorized to make decisions); expert knowledge (policy means solving certain problems with the involvement of knowledge about the field in which they arose and possible ways to solve them); order (policy is about ensuring stability and predictability of organized activities).¹⁸

However, applying research results in the process of policy-making is not yet a common practice. Researchers point out the inappropriate relationship between policy and science, and identify the reasons of this situation. A. Kokoshin mentions the following main reasons: politicians are mostly self-confident people who be-

17. Брошура «100 років сусідства. Україна і Польща» [Brochure “100 years of neighbourhood. Ukraine and Poland”], Український інститут національної пам’яті, accessed November 11, 2020, <https://old.uinp.gov.ua/ebook/broshura-100-rokiv-susidstva-ukraina-i-polshcha>.

18. Г. К. Колбеч, *Політика: основні концепції в суспільних науках* [Policy, Concepts in the Social Sciences], пер. з англ. О. Дем’янчука (Київ: Видавничий дім «КМ Академія», 2004), 19–21, 28–35.

lieve that they know how to solve a certain problem better than scientists; politicians and officials work with short texts, they have neither the time nor the desire to read and delve into large articles and monographs; scientists do not know how to effectively present the results of their thorough research, in particular in a concise form.¹⁹

According to T. Luty, the reasons of this insignificant mutual influence of policy and science are as follows: the main criterion used in the activity of modern scientists is quantitative indicators (various ratings); scientists lack capabilities and skills to apply science in policy-making and to effectively communicate with non-academic community and the general public; in turn, politicians, while taking political decisions, tend to focus on ideology rather than on finding an optimal solution based on scientific evidence; politicians want unambiguous conclusions, while various research on the same issue may produce different recommendations; research data cannot always be directly applied to a specific political or social problem, it requires certain level of skill and experience; also, when the scientists' findings are summarised for the needs of politicians, and are interpreted by journalists, politicians, and lawyers, some essential aspects of the problem, as well as ways to solve it, may be ignored.²⁰

In order to increase communication opportunities between policy-makers and scientists, special institutions are being created. In 1914, the library of Congress established a small reference group to provide specialized services to Congress, its Committees,

19. А. А. Кокошин, *Очерк политики как феномена общественной жизни. Ее внутригосударственные и международные измерения, взаимоотношения с идеологией, наукой, разведкой* [Essay on politics as a phenomenon of public life. Its domestic and international dimensions, relations with ideology, science, intelligence] (Москва: Культурная революция, 2007), 85.

20. T. Luty, "Nauka wspierana polityką czy polityka oparta na wiedzy? – pomiędzy światem nauki i polityki, Patriotyzm wczoraj i dziś" [Policy-supported science or knowledge-based policy? – between the world of science and policy. Patriotism yesterday and today], *Seminarium Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności*, vol. X: 2011–2013 (2013), 107–111.

and Congressmen. Since 1970 this think tank has been called the Congressional Research Service. Currently, the Service consists of interdisciplinary research units, two library-reference units, and several specialized divisions. Employees of its departments provide informational support to the legislative process, through: translating scientific articles; providing individual consultations; preparing analytical materials, which include problem identification, strategic research on a particular issue, review of legislation, etc.²¹

In 2015, for the needs of the European Commission, the Scientific Advice Mechanism was established, consisting of: a group of seven independent scientists who act as principal scientific advisers; a secretariat staffed by the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission; and a consortium of European Academies connected in the network “Science Advice for Policy by European Academies”.²²

In many countries around the world, governments have a Chief Scientific Adviser, whose task is to provide politicians with necessary scientific knowledge on current issues. In particular, such institution functions in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, India, the Czech Republic, or Malaysia. There are also international associations of scientific consultants, such as the International Network for Government Science Advice which brings together scientific consultants from all over the world, or the European Science Advisors Forum that provides platform for scientific consultants from EU member states.

The tasks of scientific consultants include: responding to the needs of government agencies; systematizing scientific achievements on a given problem; presenting opinions based on scientific

21. М. Сенченко, О. Сенченко, Гастинициков В. *Мозкові центри країн світу* (Київ: ДП «Вид. дім «Персонал», 2016), 113–117.

22. J. M. Bujnicki, P. Gutowski, A. Jajszczyk, J. Gołaś, G. Wrochna, J. Szwed, “Doradztwo naukowe” [Scientific advice]. *Forum Akademickie*, no. 5 (2018), accessed November 12, 2020, <https://prenumeruj.forumakademickie.pl/fa/2018/05/>.

evidence from reliable sources; presenting several options of solving a particular problem.²³ Scientific arguments, according to T. Luty, should correct political preferences: "Good science must be transformed into good law".²⁴

The potential of scientists to develop a good neighbourhood policy is not sufficiently exploited. Ukraine has a sufficient legal framework to involve the public, including scientists, in the development and implementation of public policies. However, in practice, their participation is not always effective due to a number of reasons which were mentioned earlier in this article, as well as due to an insufficiently developed mechanism of interaction between public authorities and scientists.

Decisions that shape policies in a particular area or a whole country are taken by those in charge. The choice of a particular decision is influenced by a large number of interested parties who care primarily about their own interests. The existence of scientific evidence about certain events from both the past and the present would reduce the level of manipulation of information by other actors in international politics. This is especially important in the context of constant disinformation on the part of the Russian Federation, whose agenda includes fuelling the conflicts between the Ukrainian and Polish nations.

The role of scientific consulting in shaping various types of policies and the related laws consists in: helping the authorities objectively identify the problem that needs to be addressed; indicating its causes; characterizing the state of the problem; describing the possible consequences of its development; offering optimal solutions that would be best for the society.

Consulting means a process in which a specialist provides advice on a specific issue that is important to the client. In this case,

23. See: J. M. Bujnicki, P. Gutowski, A. Jajszczyk, J. Gołaś, G. Wrochna, J. Szwed, *op. cit.*

24. T. Luty, *op. cit.*, 110.

the customers are state institutions which are responsible for developing policies and related legal acts. Specialists who can provide qualified advice in the process of shaping a state policy include, in particular, political scientists. However, in practice, it is *political technologists*²⁵ that are mostly involved in these processes. They are often unreasonably associated with political scientists. However, the task of a political technologist is to provide the customer with the desired result. They are usually not interested in the impact of certain political decisions and legal norms on the country.

This confusion has a number of reasons, including: 1) political reasons: at the beginning of Ukraine's independence there were no certified political scientists, therefore political consultants were persons who were practically involved in political activities, for which education and knowledge of political patterns were not required; 2) theoretical reasons: political consultants and political technologists do not distinguish between *policy*, as a strategic program for the development of society, and *politics*, as a struggle for power. Consulting such specialists leads to a situation in which public policy and the related legal acts are focused on ensuring short-term interests of political actors, for example gaining the support of the electorate before the election; 3) communication reasons: there is no effective communication between the authorities and scientists, in particular political scientists, who have relevant knowledge regarding the development of state policies, and who constantly analyse and can predict the consequences of political decisions and legal norms for the society and the state.

Thus, considering the American and the European models of scientific consulting, it should be noted that for the needs of modern countries, including Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, it would be worthwhile creating national networks of scientific consultants, as well as a Ukrainian-Polish network of scientific advisers with the purpose of shaping a good neighbourhood policy.

25. Eastern-european term roughly meaning 'spin doctor'.

The establishment of a joint scientific platform can contribute to the provision of professional scientific advice to public authorities regarding the maintenance and development of good neighbourly relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. Information posted on such a platform should include, among others: 1) a list of all Ukrainian scientists whose research is dedicated to the Republic of Poland; 2) a list of all Polish scientists whose research is dedicated to Ukraine; 3) electronic versions of research conducted by Ukrainian and Polish scientists, with indication of a type of policy for which this research can be useful.

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THE UKRAINIAN- POLISH BORDERLAND AS A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIODYNAMIC SPACE. THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

Abstract

The article explains the concept of the borderland, national and ethno-cultural identity, the 'Ours – The Stranger – The Other' relations in the context of the borderland, ethnic and sociodynamic situation in the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Polish borderland (Kresy). The borderland is treated as an area near the border dividing certain spaces. In the conditions of the formation of the modern Ukrainian-Polish border, political, economic and sociodynamic factors, as also historical, cultural, ethnic, identity factors have a significant impact on the character of the borderland. The intersection, within one social space, of different social contexts, the transformation of the functional load of the concept of frontier necessitate the need to relate the analysis of the relevant phenomenon to the socio-cultural approach.

Keywords:

borderland, space, identity, ethnicity, culture, Ukraine, Poland.

Introduction

Territorial and political transformations in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s contributed to drastic spatial changes. They

caused fundamental changes in the geopolitical environment of Ukraine, which in turn led to the formation of a new border of the Ukrainian state. Ukraine's first-order neighbours are two groups of states – the first from the Euro Atlantic and European integration space (the Republic of Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary), while the second is formed by the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation). Therefore, in the first case, between 1999 and 2007, a new border of Ukraine with the European Union (EU) member states of the Schengen area was created and is functioning today.

The border between Ukraine and the EU has some features of socio-cultural importance, which Pierre Bourdieu introduced into the properties of the structure of social space. First of all, it is about “feeling the border” as “feeling the situation”, “feeling the distance”, “feeling what can and cannot be allowed”.¹ They define both the essential side of the borderland and the specificity of its functioning, which was pointed out in their research by foreign and Ukrainian scientists.²

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2. Верменич Я. [Vermenych Y.], *Пограниччя як соціокультурний феномен: просторовий вимір* [Borders as a Sociocultural Phenomenon: Spatial Dimension], *Регіональна історія України*, Вип. 6, (2012): 67–90; *Форум «Поверх кордону»: концепція прикордоння як об'єкт дослідження* [Forum “Above the Border”: the Concept of Borderlands as an Object of Research], *Україна модерна, Пограниччя. Окраїни, Периферії*, no. 18 (2011): 47–77; Чорновол І. [Chornovol I.], *Компаративні фронтири: світовий і вітчизняний вимір* [Comparative Frontiers: World and Domestic Dimension] (Київ: Критика, 2015); Anderson M., *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996); Babiński G., *Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie. Etniczność, różnicowanie religijne, tożsamość* [The Polish-Ukrainian Borderland. Ethnicity, religious diversity, identity] (Kraków: Nomos, 1997); Babiński G., “*Tożsamości na pograniczach*” [Identities in the borderlands], [in:] *Tożsamość bez granic. Współczesne wyzwania* [Identity without Borders. Contemporary Challenges], ed. E. Budakowska (Warszawa: WUW, 2005), 99–117; Granowetter M., “The Strength of Weak Ties”, *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 6, vol.

78 (1973): 1360–1380; Kurczewska J., “Granica niejedno ma imię. Trzy podejścia teoretyczne” [The Border has Many Names. Three Theoretical Approaches], [in:] *Granice na pograniczach* [Borders on the borderlands], ed. J. Kurczewska, H. Bojar (Warszawa: Wyd. IFiS PAN, 2005), 365–396; Kyrydon A., Troyan S., “Granice i pogranicza współczesnej Europy. Dynamiczne pole oddziaływania w wymiarze tożsamości i pamięci historycznej” [Borders and Borderlands of Contemporary Europe. Dynamic Field of Influence in the Dimension of Identity and Historical Memory], [in:] *Na Pograniczach. Pamięć – historia – kultura* [In Borderlands. Memory – history – culture], ed. A. Chudzik, D. Wojakowski (Sanok: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa im. Jana Grodka w Sanoku, 2014), 11–30; Kyrydon A., Troyan S. “*Swój-Inny-Obcy w kontekście dialogu kultur*” [“Ours–The Stranger–The Other” in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures], [in:] *Na Pograniczach Kultur i Narodów* [On the Borderlands of Cultures and Nations], vol. VII, ed. P. Frączek, J. K. Karolczuk (Sanok: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa im. Jana Grodka w Sanoku, 2017), 13–28; Nechayeva-Yuriychuk N., “Problems of Cross-Border Cooperation Development along the EU External Borders”, *Eurolimes*, no. 27–28 (2019): 279–294; Sadowski A., “Pogranicze jako przedmiot badań socjologicznych w warunkach integracji europejskiej” [Borderland as a Subject of Sociological Research in the Conditions of European Integration], [in:] *Pogranicza i multikulturalizm w warunkach Unii Europejskiej* [Borderlands and Multiculturalism in the Conditions of the European Union], ed. K. Krzysztofek, A. Sadowski (Białystok: Wyd. UwB, 2004), 15–27; Sadowski A., “Pogranicze – pograniczność – tożsamość pograniczna” [Borderland – Bordering – Borderland Identity], [in:] *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne. Tom XIV. Numer specjalny. Polskie granice i pogranicza: nowe problemy i interpretacje* [Borderland. Social Studies. Vol. XIV. Special Issue. Polish Borders and Borderlands: New Problems and Interpretations], ed. H. Bojar, D. Wojakowski, A. Sadowski (Białystok: UB, 2008), 17–31; T. M. Korczyński, ed., *Swój – Obcy – Wróg. Wędrowki w labiryntach kultur* [Ours – The Stranger – The Enemy. Wandering in the labyrinths of cultures] (Warszawa: WN Katedra, 2015); Troyan S., “Koncepcje teoretyczne pogranicza na Ukrainie” [Theoretical Concepts of the Borderland in Ukraine], [in:] *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne. Tom XIV. Numer specjalny. Polskie granice i pogranicza: nowe problemy i interpretacje* [Borderlands. Social Studies. Volume XIV. Special Issue. Polish Borders and Borderlands: New Problems and Interpretations], ed. H. Bojar, D. Wojakowski, A. Sadowski (Białystok: UB, 2008), 50–57; Wojakowski D., “Kłopoty z pograniczem. Socjologia wobec tradycji i ponowoczesności” [The Trouble with Borderlands. Sociology Towards Tradition and Postmodernity], *Zeszyty naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej. Seria: Organizacja i zarządzanie* [Scientific Journals of the Silesian University of Technology. Series: Organization and Management], no. 65 (2013): 419–431.

The proposed article chooses to focus on the following essential questions:

- a) the concept of borderland;
- b) the concept of national and ethno-cultural identity;
- c) 'ours – the stranger – the other' relations in the context of borderland;
- d) theoretical borderland discourse: ethnic and sociodynamic situation.

The concept of borderland

Mankind is now faced with a paradox described by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck: "With the development of globalization, the importance of borders increases, and the control of borders also increases, although of course they no longer perform the same functions they once did. Today's borders are more like Swiss cheese: they have systemically inserted 'holes' in them in the form of various exceptions to the rules. Their purpose is to provide the movement of information, capital, people and services from one place to another with the click of a computer mouse".³ He continues, "in the 21st century, there is no longer a closed space that can be called the 'Christian West'. (...) Europe is an open network with moving borders, where everything that is outside already exists inside".⁴

The basic structural element of the border is a state of unstable equilibrium. Within the framework of border theory, a number of border issues are considered, also important and relevant to the Ukrainian-Polish border region. The Polish language dictionary defines a borderland as "an area near the border dividing certain spaces" or "a period, state, or area where two cultures, epochs, etc.

3. Бек У. [Beck U.], "Трансформация политики и государства в эпоху глобализации" [Transformation of politics and state in the era of globalization], *Свободная мысль*, XXI, no. 7 (2004): 3.

4. Бек У. [Beck U.], *Космополитическое мировоззрение* [Cosmopolitan Vision] (Москва: Центр исследований постиндустриального общества, 2008), 246.

border each other”⁵. In the conditions of formation, normalization and functioning of modern European borders, including the Ukrainian-Polish border, the character of the borderland is significantly influenced by political, economic and sociodynamic factors, but also by historical, cultural, ethnic, and identity factors. Polish sociologist Andrzej Sadowski describes the borderland as ‘the area, the social space and the political, economic, socio-cultural structures, intercultural contacts occurring there, together forming a laboratory for research, testing many fundamental questions in sociology, both of a general theoretical, scientific-research, and practical nature. They concern especially: nation and ethnic (cultural) groups, cultural contact, ethnic relations, intercultural relations, culturally diverse, pluralistic, multicultural society, and the influence of these variables on political, economic relations, and on the formation of identity structures of the inhabitants’⁶.

Grzegorz Babiński, another Polish sociologist, has a similar perspective, noting that the theoretical consensus around borderlands is quite traditional. This can be interpreted as a sign that the discipline has reached a certain theoretical stability, or as a tendency to theoretical closure.⁷

According to Andrzej Sadowski, “borderland refers to areas concentrated most often at the administrative-political borders or just within the borders of individual countries”. In turn, the social

5. Szymczak M., ed., *Słownik Języka Polskiego* [Polish Language Dictionary], vol. II (Warszawa: PWN, 1979), 1087.

6. Sadowski A., “Pogranicze – pograniczność – tożsamość pograniczna” [Borderland – bordering – borderland identity], [in:] *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne. Tom XIV. Numer specjalny. Polskie granice i pogranicza: nowe problemy i interpretacje* [Borderlands. Social Studies. Volume XIV. Special issue. Polish Borders and Borderlands: New Problems and Interpretations], ed. H. Bojar, D. Wójcikowski, A. Sadowski (Białystok: UB, 2008), 28–29.

7. Babiński G., “Tożsamości na pograniczach” [Identities in the Borderlands], [in:] *Tożsamość bez granic. Współczesne wyzwania* [Identity without Borders. Contemporary Challenges], ed. E. Budakowska (Warszawa: WUW, 2005), 99–117.

(socio-cultural) borderland is “the totality of representatives of two or more ethnocultural communities remaining in permanent contact with each other, realized in the context of their special relationship with the territory (inhabited or imagined territory), whose actions aim at its maintenance (or appropriation), as well as the results of these actions”.⁸

Although the formation of “Europe without borders”, as mentioned by Polish sociologist Dariusz Wojakowski,⁹ has significantly changed the perception of borders, they still function as factors marking both national borders and differences in mentality and national identities of the multiethnic European environment. In the context of the formation and functioning of contemporary European borders, there is the issue of identity, an individual and collective mental choice that is directly influenced by historical memory. Identity, according to German researcher Iver B. Neumann, “is a relationship that is constantly forming and changing within the limits of a particular discourse”.¹⁰

The concept of national and ethno-cultural identity

National identity signifies identification of people with the corresponding national (ethnic) community, the realization of one's own sense of belonging to a particular nationality and to a particular state. National identity means ethnic and civic-political identification. British sociologist and one of the founders of the study

8. Sadowski A., “Pogranicze – pograniczność – tożsamość pograniczna” [Borderland – Bordering – Borderland Identity], [in:] *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne. Tom XIV. Numer specjalny. Polskie granice i pogranicza: nowe problemy i interpretacje* [Borderlands. Social Studies. Volume XIV. Special issue. Polish Borders and Borderlands: New Problems and Interpretations], ed. H. Bojar, D. Wojakowski, A. Sadowski (Białystok: UB, 2008), 24.

9. Вояковський Д. [Wojakowski D.], *Ментальні кордони в Європі без кордонів: монографія* [Mental boundaries in a Europe without borders: Monograph] (Київ: Ніка-Центр, 2015).

10. Neumann I., “Russia and Central Europe's Constituting Other”, *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1993): 349.

of nationalism Anthony Smith distinguished five main elements of national identity: 1) historical territory; 2) common myths and shared memory; 3) common culture; 4) uniform rules and duties; 5) common economy.¹¹

According to the observations of Montserrat Guibernau, a political science professor at the University of London and a researcher at the Center for Global Surveillance, “national identity has acquired a new dimension, making it more open, able to attract foreign components without radically changing its core. In other words, national identity tolerates a higher level of hybridization and border blurriness than it used to”.¹² This trend is realized through the phenomenon of the elimination of borders between nation states, the increase in the level of mobility of people, and the increase in the number and importance of national minorities in various countries.

Ethnic identity refers to a certain group of people with certain social and cultural characteristics: common origin and history, living in a certain territory, having their own culture, tradition, language and religion. Ethnic groups also have their own name, which distinguishes them from wider communities, e.g. Basques as opposed to Spaniards or Silesians as opposed to Poles. Ethnic identity in such groups is usually very strong, its members not only want to maintain their traditions, but also want to be different from other communities – which is a very important feature of ethnic identity.

National identity may be something broader than ethnic identity – it implies a sense of belonging to a broad group of people, which may, after all, consist of many ethnic groups. Both national and ethnic identities are formed in contrast to other nations or ethnic groups. They highlight what is common, drawing attention especially to history, language, territory, etc.

11. Сміт Е. [Smith A.], *Національна ідентичність* [National identity] (Київ: Основи, 1994).

12. Гібернау М. [Guibernau M.], *Ідентичність націй* [The Identity of Nations] (Київ: Темпора, 2012), 247.

Andrzej Sadowski explains three types of collective identities: fundamentalist identities, borderland identities, and inter-border identities, adding that “the typical identity in borderlands is the borderland identity. Its characteristic feature is a sense of uprootedness, surrender, suspension between borderland groups and an outsider identity”.¹³ It is characterized by attitudes of escape from the problems of the borderland, often in the form of various forms of rationalization (escape into education, professional development). It is not a coincidence that borderlands are probably more often inhabited by individuals who are outstanding in some respect, but are lost in some other.

Ethnic identities in borderlands are characterized by: ethnic culture, the formation of their own cultural society and their way of social and cultural communication. This, however, provides for the actuality of dialogue between different cultures. Now researchers look at the borderland primarily as a zone of interaction between different cultures. According to Anna Kholodny, it is “a limited space of changing values within which different cultures first encounter ‘Otherness’ and try to adapt to it”.¹⁴ These categories come to the fore in analysing the often complex and controversial processes of cultural interaction, heredity, and cross cultural communication.

Ours–The Stranger–The Other in the context of borderlands

The cognitive element of identity is often defined by the binary logic of ‘us–them’ or in the triangle ‘ours – the other – the strang-

13. Sadowski A., “Pogranicze – pograniczność – tożsamość pograniczna” [Borderland – Bordering – Borderland Identity], [in:] *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne. Tom XIV. Numer specjalny. Polskie granice i pogranicza: nowe problemy i interpretacje* [Borderlands. Social Studies. Volume XIV. Special Issue. Polish Borders and Borderlands: New Problems and Interpretations], ed. H. Bojar, D. Wójcikowski, A. Sadowski (Białystok: UB, 2008), 27.

14. Klein K. L., ed., *Frontiers of Historical Imagination. Narrating the European Conquest of Native America, 1890–1990* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1997), 210.

er' and is based on the opposition of one's own community to the 'others'/'strangers', including cultural differences in the way certain historical events are recorded in the collective memory. Therefore, the issue of forming one's own positive identity should become a factor that helps to understand oneself and 'others', to build relationships on the level of 'ours – stranger', 'us – them', and to move away from the dangerous negative dichotomy existing at this level.

The process of cultural interaction makes it possible to clearly identify the factors affecting cultural diffusion. Therefore, it is the level of intensity of contact and are the conditions of contact. They can take place naturally, or coercively. The German philosopher Bernhard Wandelfels emphasizes that "if something is 'strange', it will always manifest itself in one way or another and provoke certain reactions".¹⁵ Thus, any forced imposition of culture inevitably results in the rejection and overemphasis of one's identity, historical memory, or language. Under such circumstances, ethnic culture has the capacity to respond to the discomfort caused by the emergence of new elements through internal transformation.

Ethnic culture, with the help of norms, values and ideals, shapes its cultural society, its way of social and cultural communication, and its moral and ethical principles of social life, including its own way of thinking, value system, based on the worldview characteristic of that nation. However, this does not mean that dialogue between different cultures is impossible, which, due to the processes of social acculturation occurring in it, promotes their development.

Dialogue (understood as cultural interaction) gradually shapes common basic values and in this respect has a multilevel human character. A dialogue of cultures based on tolerance and mutual understanding makes it possible to preserve the national characteristics of each culture.

15. Вальденфельс Б. [Waldenfels B.], *Топографія Чужого: студії до феноменології Чужого* [German: *Topographie des Fremden – Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden*] (Київ: ІІІС-2002, 2004), 6.

It seems interesting that the dialogue of cultures is based simultaneously on two imperatives: 'strange' and 'own'. The history of culture is a history of contacts, diffusion, mutual inspirations, thanks to which the conviction was built that we exist as 'we', never as a lonely island, but surrounded by others.¹⁶ Hence the tendency – equally individual and collective – to categorize these others and place them in a broad spectrum of variants: 'own' – 'friend' – 'enemy' – 'other' – 'monster', etc.

The world of the past is considered through the prism of an external system of norms and regularities which are an attempt to understand historical being, and which introduce the inner world of historical figures from specific epochs who become participants in a dialogue with modernity. G. Knabe emphasized that "the living nature of culture and social being are rather manifested in the unique interaction between 'personality' and 'individual', which corresponds to each specific historical and cultural situation".¹⁷ Generally speaking, experiencing the state of the 'Other' can cause someone to display ethical virtues such as compassion, empathy and mutual understanding.

The phenomena of 'Ours', 'The Stranger', 'The Other' – despite all their contradictions – are quite fluid and mobile in culture. They are capable of transformation, marking valuable meanings of the socio-cultural space. The 'Ours–Stranger' opposition is most clearly revealed in the cultural codes that regulate behavioral activity, shaping stereotypes of thinking. As Julia Kristeva points out, the understanding of the Self begins not with the awareness of the Self, but with the confrontation with the Stranger. To the question "Who

16. Korczyński T. M., ed., *Swój – Obcy – Wróg. Wędrówki w labiryntach kultur* [Ours – The Stranger – The Enemy. Wandering in the Labyrinths of Cultures] (Warszawa: WN Katedra, 2015), 342.

17. Кнабе Г. [Knabe H.], "Изменчивое соотношение двух постоянных характеристик человека" [The variable ratio of two constant human characteristics], [in:] *Одиссей. Человек в истории. Личность и общество*, ed. М. Гуревич (Москва: Наука, 1990), 11.

is the Stranger?”, J. Kristeva answers as follows: “One who is not part of the group, one who is not ‘it’, another. (...) The Stranger is mostly defined according to two legal regimes: *jus solis* and *jus sanguinis*, the *law of the land* and the *law of the blood*”¹⁸ – argues the author.

The differentiation ‘Ours–The Stranger–The Other’ is the characterization of oneself with the original forms of one’s own culture, which forms the basis for the self-identification of society, including in border areas.

Sociocultural discourse of the borderland: the situation of ethnic and social dynamic

The problem of studying the phenomenon of the frontier requires the study of the context of social space. This means that the study area is considered, firstly, as the border of cultures, ethnic groups, states, communities, traditions, norms and values, and secondly, as a field in which the superposition of social structures (spaces, dimensions) on the geographical (physical) space of society.

Thus, the border is a specific socio-cultural and ethno-social space on the border of cultures, ethnic groups, certain political entities.

By the degree of cultural distance between neighbouring socio-cultural communities, there are two types of borderlands: 1) cultural-variable, where close cultures coexist; 2) culturally opposed, where communities belonging to different civilizations border. According to the degree of dominance of one of the interacting cultures, the border can be divided into symmetrical-cultural and asymmetrical-cultural. In accordance with this division and on the basis of theoretical and applied analysis, the Ukrainian-Polish border belongs to the cultural variable and symmetrical-cultural vari-

18. Krydon A., Troyan S., “*Swój – Inny – Obcy w kontekście dialogu kultur*” [‘Ours – The Stranger – The Other’ in the Context of Cultural Dialogue], [in:] *Na Pograniczach Kultur i Narodów*, vol. VII, ed. P. Frączek, J. K. Karolczuk (Sanok: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa im. Jana Grodka w Sanoku, 2017), 19.

eties¹⁹ (clarification of this provision, study of its features on both sides of the border is possible and appropriate, based on sociological research).

Consideration of the border as a space of interaction of different cultures, histories, religions, etc. requires the study of society, which fills this space. Ethnonational culture is of great importance in the formation of cultural space in geographical coordinates. Space does not exist in itself, it is created by subjects who enter into certain relationships. Entering the social space means entering the sphere of one's own boundaries, as well as admitting oneself together with one's own existence and functioning of other subjects and institutions. This situation at the border indicates the normative bases of the ethnic and socio-dynamic nature of the border, which is directly related to its Ukrainian-Polish segment.

Thus the border as a socio-cultural phenomenon is based on the following features: 1) the border is territorially bound; 2) it acts as a specific region; 3) it has its own dynamics of development. These features allow us to consider the boundaries of the three approaches. The first is based on the socio-cultural dimension, where the border is a contact zone between two or more ethnocultural communities localized in space. The second is based on the spatial geographical dimension, which means by the border only the territory that is near the border and far from the center. The third is based on the personal and cultural dimension and focusing on the border as a place of formation of a certain type of person in a border society.

Based on the above, in a spatial sense, the Ukrainian-Polish borderland is a historically formed region located far from the

19. *Всеукраїнський перепис населення 2001* [All-Ukrainian population census 2001], accessed December 5, 2020, <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/>; Мручковський П. [Mruchkowski P.], "Етнічна структура населення української частини українсько-польського прикордоння (територіальні відмінності)" [Ethnic structure of the population of the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Polish border (territorial differences)], [in:] *Вісник ОНУ. Сер. Географічні та геологічні науки*, vol. 20, вип. 2 (2015): 109–120.

center near the state borders of Ukraine and Poland. In the socio-cultural context, this borderland is distinguished by socio-cultural contacts between representatives of ethnic groups living in this region.

An important feature of the population of border ethno-contact areas is its ethnic structure and the degree of ethnic differentiation. The ethnic structure of the population of Ukrainian border areas depends on the peculiarities of the state border, which does not always coincide with ethnic boundaries.

Another feature of the Ukrainian-Polish borderland is that the titular nations are linguistically and culturally close peoples, which affects the course of ethnic processes, the formation of borders, and the development of transitional sub-ethnic groups in the borderland.

The nature of the Ukrainian-Polish borderland, where we are dealing with a Ukrainian majority and dispersed ethnic communities, means that factors of locality and sociodynamics are of particular importance to the nature of ethnic relations. Also, the sociodynamic, socio economic, and state-political factors of the integration processes of Poland and Ukraine are, I think, important for the functioning of these communities, including the ethnic self identification of their members.

In terms of theoretical socio-cultural approach the Ukrainian-Polish borderland (on the Ukrainian side) as a territory of residence of various nations and national (ethnic) minorities, especially Ukrainian and Polish, is characterized by strongly expressed multiculturalism and a tendency toward identity diversity, and this requires great attention to take into account the interests of the Ukrainians and other national minorities in the borderland, especially Poles, in order to create favourable conditions for all of them to live and work, and to take into account their specific national, identity-ethnic and identity-cultural needs.

Summary

We conclude that in the situation of explaining the content of the borderland, including the contemporary Ukrainian-Polish borderland, we aim at combining the classical and postmodern approaches, which are treating the borderland from the perspective of consciousness, cultural imagination, and interaction. This methodological approach allows a comprehensive review and analysis of borders and cross-border interactions in modern conditions of increasing mobility of societies and their components. From this point of view, according to D. Wojakowski, reducing the borderland to a specific kind of experience (the incompatibility of cultural content) and to the awareness of such an experience allows for a multidimensional treatment of the concept. In the strongest version, borderland will be defined by the situation when individuals perceive the cultural ambiguity of 'our' territory, that is, they have borderland awareness. In another dimension, borderland will be any situation where individuals ascribe different cultural images to the same territory. This dimension brings the interpretation of borderland closer to postmodern ideas.²⁰

These features of the border play an important role in the interaction of states with the common border that is neighbours of the first order, which include Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. It should be noted that here the border is not only a factor of distance, but also a means of communication between these countries and peoples. Such a border is a specific socio-cultural and ethno-social space, located on the border of cultures, ethnic groups, political entities. This allows us to interpret it not only in territorial but also cultural, ethno national, socio-dynamic framework. The intersection within one social space of different social contexts, the trans-

20. Wojakowski D., "Kłopoty z pograniczem. Socjologia wobec tradycji i ponowoczesności" [The Trouble with Borderlands. Sociology Towards Tradition and Postmodernity], *Zeszyty naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej. Seria: Organizacja i zarządzanie*, vol. 65 (2013): 428.

formation of the functional load of the concept of frontier necessitate the need to turn in the analysis of the relevant phenomenon to the socio-cultural approach.

In the future, it is important to compare the sociodynamic ethno-national situation of the Ukrainian-Polish borderland with other parts of the Ukrainian border, as well as with the situation on the other (Polish) side of the Ukrainian-Polish border.

Translated by Michelle Atallah

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8. Kyrydon, A., Troyan, S. “*Swój-Inny-Obcy w kontekście dialogu kultur*” [“Ours – The Stranger – The Other” in the Context of Cultural Dialogue]. [In:] *Na Pograniczach Kultur i Narodów*, vol. VII, edited by P. Frączek, J. K. Karolczuk, 13–28. Sanok: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa im. Jana Grodka w Sanoku, 2017.

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Włodzimierz Osadczy

**THE POLISH
CULTURAL-CIVILIZATIONAL
LEGACY IN UKRAINE:
HISTORIES, CONDITIONS,
AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE
(ON THE EXAMPLE
OF THE LVIV
ARCHDIOCESE)**

Abstract

Numerous monuments of Polish culture have remained on the territory of today's Ukraine. These are mainly churches, castles and palaces. Today many of them are in a state of ruin or progressive destruction. The article presents the selected examples of the terrifying destruction of cultural monuments in the 21st century. They indicate the large scale of the phenomenon as well as the lack of firm attempts to resist destruction. A thesis can be made about the appearance of the clash of civilizations in this phenomenon and the consent to such a state of affairs. The lack of a firm reaction of the Polish state to a given situation proves a deep moral and political crisis.

Keywords

Culture, Church, Fortress, Palace, Civilization, Catholicism.

Introduction

Polish culture in the East, also known as borderland culture,¹ is inextricably linked with the progress of Latin civilization in the area of the Byzantine-Ruthenian tradition. It was not the pockets of Polish settlement which emerged alongside Polish colonization in Ruthenia and Lithuania that determined the power of the Polish element, but the presence of the Church in social life. Adam Mickiewicz in his reflections for lectures in French university lecture halls wrote:

But what was the power that moved the Polish nationality and pushed it to the Ruthenian Lands? What was that power which repulsed the speech and nationality of the Ruthenians as far as over the Dnieper? This force did not originate in Poland itself, it came from afar, and was the result of a coincidence of many circumstances which seemingly had no connection with Polish history. The Church took upon itself the work of spreading the Polish language. [...] The Polish language first took its place at the altar, became the language of prayer, and then the language spoken at home.²

As the social and state structures of the Kingdom of Poland developed in the eastern Russo Lithuanian lands, fortresses, palaces and educational buildings became – in addition to churches – permanent monuments of great artistic and historical value. For cen-

1. The concept of 'borderland' is inextricably linked with Polish culture, and includes not only geographic and historical terms, but also a cultural space characterized by a strong mythological and emotional charge. In the mid-19th century, the term 'Kresy' ('Borderland') came to be associated with the eastern borderlands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Source: *Encyklopedia Kresów* [Encyclopedia of the Borderland], (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Kluszczyński, n.d.), 9.

2. A. Mickiewicz, *Pisma Adama Mickiewicza* [The Writings of Adam Mickiewicz], vol. VII (Warszawa: S. H. Merzbach, 1858), 54–55.

turies, these were tangible traces of the presence of Western civilization, also known as Latin civilization, in these lands.

Due to the characteristics of the borderlands, which were constantly exposed to clashes with foreign elements, the sacred buildings, defensive structures, and palaces erected there were characterized by a solid style of workmanship, a characteristic grandeur, and imagination reflecting the fortunes of the borderland magnates, nobility, and also the generous owners of the magnificent Houses of God. The same brawler magnates, stirring up social and political relations in lands far from the reach of royal sanction, immortalized themselves in the cultural field by building monumental works of art: churches, monasteries, orthodox churches, palaces, and monuments, creating charitable foundations.³

After the partitions of Poland, the unity of the Latin culture in the eastern lands became even closer, both in the Russian and Austrian partition. The Latin Catholicism as a feature of Polishness was being systematically and uncompromisingly exterminated in the tsars' state, as a trace of 'foreign rule' in the territories which were the heritage of the Orthodox Russian tsar. In Galicia, the fight against Latinism became the founding myth of the Rusyn national movement, which emerged in the mid-19th century and based its nationality on the traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

In the 20th century, Latin churches in the territories that make up modern Ukraine (excluding the territories of the former Subcarpathian Ruthenia) were unequivocally associated with the legacy of Polish culture. Clearly, Polish manors, or fortresses built by Polish noble families and inscribed in Polish history and culture, were associated with lofty or dramatic events in Polish history.

Throughout history, these monuments have been exposed to constant devastation. On the one hand, as defensive objects, at

3. A. Czołowski, B. Janusz, *Przeszłość i zabytki województwa tarnopolskiego* [Past and Monuments of the Ternopil Voivodeship] (Tarnopol: Powiatowa Organizacja Narodowa w Tarnopolu, 1926), 41.

which the blows of hostile powers were naturally aimed, on the other hand, the devastation was the result of ideological and philosophical struggle, which removed the traces of foreign domination in the areas that were considered their own.

Churches and religious buildings

The devastations that brought destruction to Polish monuments in the East in the course of history are a phenomenon connected with the ruin caused by wars and the intentional anti-Polish and anti-Christian activities of totalitarian systems. It is known that as part of Stalinist repressions all Catholic churches in the so-called Soviet Ukraine were closed. A considerable part of them was annihilated. In later times, after the thaw, due to specific circumstances it was possible to partially revive religious life in these areas. The basis for this was the fact that despite the repressions and Stalinist purges there remained dense areas inhabited by the Polish population, which, because of its peasant nature, did not have to deny its nationality and faith.

In view of the complexity of this issue, I would like to turn our attention to the situation of Catholic churches in the territories of the Lviv archdiocese that, after the Soviet annexation, became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. They include a large part of the former archdiocese, as well as fragments of the former dioceses of Przemyśl and Lutsk. The remnants of a dense ecclesiastical network found themselves in areas devoid of clergy and believers, subjected to total depolonization due to the policy of the Stalinist regime, which consistently destroyed the Polish element both through repression and through orders related to the expatriation of borderland Poles. The Polish population in the former Eastern Lesser Poland suffered enormous losses due to the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalist formations.⁴

4. The fact that genocide was committed is acknowledged by authoritative scientific, legal and political bodies in Poland.

The postwar destruction of Catholic churches became a planned phenomenon due to the neglect of abandoned religious buildings and the ill will of the communist authorities. Of the more than four hundred parishes that had existed within the boundaries of the Lviv archdiocese prior to the 1939 Soviet occupation, a negligible number remained, amounting to 1.8% of the pre-war state.⁵ This was pointed out by Bishop Marcyan Trofimiak, the former bishop of Lutsk and a witness to the faith as well as a tireless priest during the Communist era:

Religious life almost disappeared. In the whole of the Lviv archdiocese, only 13 churches remain in use: the cathedral and St. Anthony's Church in Lviv, and churches in Zolochiv, Stryj, Sambor, Dobromil, Nowe Miasto, Mostyska and Shchyrets. In the Ternopil voivodeship, only 3 churches were active: in Borshchiv, Galushchintsy and the only surviving church of the Lutsk diocese in Kremenets, which as a result of border shifts was placed in the Ternopil voivodeship. In Bukovina the only church in Chernivtsi functioned. Not a single church survived in the Stanislawow voivodeship.⁶

The fall of communism and the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state brought new hope for the continuation of the Latin

5. R. Dzwonkowski, *Polacy na dawnych Kresach wschodnich. Z problematyki narodowościowej i religijnej* [Poles in the former Eastern Borderlands. On ethnic and religious issues] (Lublin: Oddział Lubelski Stowarzyszenia „Wspólnota Polska”, 1994), 49.

6. M. Trofimiak, “Świadectwo archidiecezji lwowskiej obrządku łacińskiego (Ukraina)” [Testimony of the Lviv Latin Rite Archdiocese (Ukraine)], [in:] *Świadectwa Kościoła katolickiego w systemie totalitarnym Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Księga Kongresu Teologicznego Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* [Testimonies of the Catholic Church in the Totalitarian System of East Central Europe. Book of the Theological Congress of Central and Eastern Europe], Lublin, August 11–15, 1991, ed. J. Nagórny, B. Jurczyk, J. S. Gajek et al. (Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin, 1994), 211.

Church and the preservation of its churches. Some of the churches were handed over to the faithful, but many were seized by other confessions or used by state offices. No church in Lviv was handed over to the Catholics as had been demanded by the believers.

The churches that were not handed over to the faithful because of the lack of good will or because of the lack of believers experience a cruel fate, and sometimes the blow that they experienced in the conditions of 'freedom' became for them the end of a centuries-old life, a destruction that could have been avoided both in the times of wars and at the hands of atheistic godlessness. The ruin of Latin churches in the territory of the Lviv archdiocese is a common phenomenon, a kind of 'norm' of today. First of all the victims are the temples built at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in places with small Polish population. However, the destruction of ancient churches of great historical and cultural value also takes place. We will present here selected examples that illustrate the scale of this phenomenon quite clearly.

The Sanctuary of Mother of God of Sokal in the 17th-century Bernardine monastery in Sokal was considered one of the oldest and most venerated places of Marian devotion in old Poland. The miraculous painting of the Mother of God of Sokal dates back to the times of King Władysław Jagiełło.⁷ The complex of the Bernardine monastery and church was considered Sokal's most valuable monument. After World War II, in 1951, the church equipment was taken to Leżajsk, and the miraculous painting of the Mother of God of Sokal was placed in the Bernardine monastery in Stradom in Kraków. Currently the painting is located in Hrubieszów. During the Soviet era, the monastery housed a heavy prison, which existed throughout the period of Ukrainian independence.⁸ In 2010, during the Eas-

7. A. Fridrich, *Historie cudownych obrazów Najświętszej Maryi Panny w Polsce* [Stories of miraculous images of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Poland], vol. 2 (Kraków: Tow. Jez., 1904), 292.

8. G. Rąkowski, *Ziemia Lwowska. Przewodnik krajoznawczo-historyczny po Zachodniej Ukrainie* [Lviv Region. A Sightseeing-Historical Guide to Western Ukraine] (Pruszków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rewasz, 2007), 195.

ter period, Archbishop of Lviv Mieczysław Mokrzycki visited the prison. He talked with the prison authorities about the renovation of the temple. He was the first chaplain in the history of the prison to enter the ward for people sentenced to life imprisonment. “Unfortunately, nothing was done to change this situation and to properly protect the monument from fire. Today it has been completely destroyed”, noted Rev. Andrzej Mihułka, then pastor in Sokal. The former sanctuary in Sokal burned to the ground on March 27, 2012.⁹

The brick *church of St. Michael the Archangel* in Stara Sil was built over the years. The oldest part, the chapel of St. Anne, comes from the mid-14th century, the newest, the chapel of the Holy Trinity, from the interwar period of the 20th century. The beauty and richness of the temple is evidenced by the large stone sculptures of the Evangelists at the outer walls of the building. The architecture of the temple reflects a unique combination of Renaissance and Art Deco, making a great aesthetic impression due to the majesty and harmony of plastic shapes. The reconstruction of the Stara Sil church in the 1930s received recognition from the Holy See, and the chairman of the parish committee, Henryk Krzemieniecki, was awarded the medal “Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice”.¹⁰

Today the building is in a poor condition. After World War II, the communists arranged a warehouse here. In the 1970s, a huge

9. “Spłonął bernardynski klasztor w Sokalu” [The Bernardine Monastery in Sokal Burned Down], accessed September 8, 2020, <https://wolyn.org/index.php/wiesci-z-wolynia/401-spon-bernardyski-klasztor-w-sokalu.html>; K. Czawa-ga, “Spłonął jeden z najpiękniejszych klasztorów na Kresach” [One of the Most Beautiful Monasteries in the Borderlands Burned Down], *Kurier Galicyjski*, no. 6 (154), 2012, 1.

10. P. Krasny, “Kościół parafialny p.w. św. Michała Archanioła w Starej Soli” [Parish Church of St. Michael the Archangel in Stara Sil], [in:] *Materiały do dziejów sztuki sakralnej na Ziemiach Wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Kościoły i klasztory rzymskokatolickie dawnego województwa ruskiego* [Materials for the History of Sacral Art in the Eastern Territories of the Former Republic of Poland. Roman Catholic Churches and Monasteries of the Former Ruskie Voivodship], ed. J. Ostrowski (Kraków: MCK, 1997), 252.

fire broke out. Almost all equipment burned down. In addition, firefighters used water from brine to extinguish the fire, which later accelerated the deterioration of the walls. In the 1990s, the reconstruction began, but it progressed very slowly, mainly due to lack of funds.¹¹ Currently, there is a Roman Catholic parish here, but it is unable to bear the financial burden of restoring the church. In 2001, Pope John Paul II gave his blessing to the renovation work, but since then, nothing has moved in the matter of the church's reconstruction – broken windows haunt you, trees grow under the roof, and fragments of decorations pile up in the courtyard.¹² The object is gradually being destructed.

The parish church of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary in Komarno is one of the oldest and most beautiful churches of the Lviv archdiocese. Founded in the 15th century, and transformed into a beautiful Baroque building in 1656, it has been the destination of numerous pilgrimages because of the miraculous painting of the Mother of God of the Rosary. After the devastation in the communist era, the church was handed over to its rightful owners, Catholics of the Latin rite, in 1992, but soon the local authorities handed the temple over to the Greek Catholic parish. The Catholic believers were expelled to a small chapel-tomb of Fr. Władysław Frydel in the cemetery.¹³

“Greek Catholics have two churches there, yet they seized our historic 17th century church”, explained Rev. Ph.D. Michał Bajcar, who commutes there from Horodok. The priest recounts

11. “Piękny, polski kościół w Starej Soli na Kresach woła o pomoc” [A Beautiful Polish Church in Stara Sil in the Borderlands Cries out for Help], accessed October 29, 2020, <https://nowiny24.pl/piekny-polski-kosciol-w-starej-soli-na-kresach-wola-o-pomoc-wideo/ar/12079062>.

12. “Stara Sól. Kościół Św. Michała” [Stara Sil. Church of St. Michael], accessed October 29, 2020, <https://lwow.info/stara-sol-kosciol-sw-michala/>.

13. K. Skowyra, “Kościół parafialny p.w. Narodzenia Najświętszej Panny Maryi w Komarnie” [Parish Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Komarno], *Radość Wiary*, no. 5 (41), 2004, 20.

that during this winter (2012), when the cold reached minus 30 degrees, he was forced to confess his parishioners at the chapel. “Meanwhile, our church was closed at that time because Greek Catholics were praying in their church – said Roman Catholics from Komarno. – They rarely use our temple, which used to be a pearl for the whole area, but now is falling into ruin because few Greek Catholics come there. We cannot understand where their hatred comes from, after all we are in one Catholic Church. We still pray in the chapel in the cemetery, but we will continue to fight for the return of our church”.¹⁴ Unlawfully seized by the Greek Catholic community, the church has received no thoughtful attention from its new owners. Rev. Bajcar claims that the historic church from the 17th century is in a very dilapidated condition – the roof is leaking, the windows have holes.¹⁵ Finally, in 2016, there was a fire that largely consumed the interior of the temple.¹⁶

An unprecedented desecration of the temple occurred in 2020, when as a result of archaeological work in the crypts of the church, some of the bones of the deceased, along with material from the excavation, were taken near the local cemetery and thrown away. This caused outrage and intervention by the local community and Polish activists. The work was halted, and the Ukrainian police launched an investigation into the possible desecration. Borderland activists have also launched a petition, calling

14. K. Czawaga, “Grekokatolicy blokują kościół w Komarnie” [Greek Catholics block the church in Komarno], accessed December 7, 2020, <https://kuriergalicyjski.com/index.php/polemikii/271-grekokatolicy-blokuj-koci-w-komarnie>.

15. K. Czawaga, “Kościół niezgody” [The Church of Discord], accessed December 7, 2020, <https://kuriergalicyjski.com/rozmaitosci/2737-ko-ci-niezgody>.

16. “Ukraina: Pożar uszkodził kościół w Komarnie, bezprawnie zagarnięty przez Ukraińców” [Ukraine: Fire Damaged the Church in Komarno, Illegally Seized by Ukrainians], accessed December 3, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/ukraina-pozar-uszkodził-kosciol-w-komarnie-bezprawnie-zagarnięty-przez-ukraincow-foto/>.

for a calming of tensions between the two faiths and for concrete actions to resolve the crisis.¹⁷

An example of profanation and blasphemy can be found in the building of the *St. Stanisław Kostka church in Chemeryntsi* near Dunaiv, the former residence of the Latin archbishops of Lviv. After the war, the church in Chemeryntsi was used to house kolkhoz offices and a post office, and for a long time there was no chance of restoring it to worship. In 1995, the ruined temple was given to Greek Catholics, who were supposed to create a Sunday school for religious instruction. The plan was not carried out, and since the area was not fenced, rams, horses and cows invaded the church. In recent years the deteriorating church was turned into a stable. Later it was leased to sheep farmers. In addition to the church, the churchyard was also ruined.¹⁸ It took Rev. Piotr Smolka nine years to fight to get it back.¹⁹

The above-mentioned cases of neglect, devastation and also – which can be neither explained nor justified – profanation of not only cultural monuments, but also sacral objects, called in our tradition ‘Houses of God’, reveal only the tip of the iceberg, under which there is hidden the phenomenon of a massive and irreparable de-

17. “W kościele w Komarnie wstrzymano prace archeologiczne. Ukraińska policja prowadzi dochodzenie w sprawie profanacji” [Archaeological Work has Stopped in the Church in Komarno. Ukrainian Police are Investigating the Profanation], accessed November 29, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/w-kościele-w-komarnie-wstrzymano-prace-archeologiczne-ukrainska-policja-prowodzi-dochodzenie-ws-profanacji/>.

18. “Ukraina: Polacy odzyskali kościół Ciemierzyńcach – wcześniej służył za stajnię” [Ukraine: Poles Recovered the Church in Chemeryntsi – it was previously used as a stable], accessed November 20, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/ukraina-polacy-odzyskali-kosciol-w-ciemierzyncach-wczesniej-sluzyl-za-stajnie-foto/>.

19. K. Cwołek, “Relikwie św. Stanisława z Rzymu przez Gliwice trafiły do Ciemierzyń na Ukrainie” [Relics of St. Stanisław Arrived from Rome via Gliwice to Chemeryntsi in Ukraine], accessed November 20, 2020, <https://gliwice.gosc.pl/doc/5018363.Miejsce-dla-Kostki>.

struction of the Polish cultural heritage, tangible traces of the presence of Western Latin civilization on these territories. I think that mentioning at least these selected examples will be a kind of stimulus to get the relevant departments and institutions in Poland interested in the subject. On the other hand, I do not have any expectations towards the Ukrainian side which, at various levels, has more than once demonstrated its attachment to civilizationally different models, definitely different from the standards of Latin Europe.

Castles and palaces

Aside from Latin churches, it is the castles, fortresses, and mansions that are traditionally associated with Polishness in the Borderlands. As in the case of the Latin churches, only some of the buildings have received proper conservation and care. Mostly it concerns the monuments which are included in the obligatory historical concept, to which the representatives of individual families, owners of castles and palaces, are drawn, giving grounds to obscure or erase their Polishness. Others, on the other hand, suffer irreparable losses which they did not experience either in times of war or in times of other turmoil ravaging tracts of land with centuries-old traditions of civilization. We must realize that because of the neglect – the criminal neglect of recent decades, of recent years – there have been irreparable losses which cannot be made up for or recovered.

The castle of the Sieniawski family in Berezhany is considered to be the most magnificent monument of defensive architecture of the Renaissance period. The castle, known as the Borderland Wawel, was made famous by Juliusz Słowacki. In 2011, a wall of the 500 year old fortress, closely connected with Polish culture, collapsed. The oldest part of the walls, dating back to the middle of the 16th century, was destroyed.²⁰ The Sieniawski Castle in Berezhany, built

20. "Zamek w Brzeżanach popada w ruinę" [The castle in Berezhany is falling into Ruin], accessed October 25, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/zamek-w-brzezanach-popada-w-ruine/>.

from 1554, was one of the most important fortresses in the Borderlands. Built on the plan of an irregular pentagon, with three artillery towers, it resembled a medieval fortress.²¹ When, after World War I, the Berezhany castle fell into ruin, alarm bells went off. The whole society mobilized to halt the march of destruction: "It is a sacred duty of the state and the nation to save this valuable monument, with which so many luminous memories have grown, for posterity and national culture".²² Before the war, Poles were able to conserve the monument and start restoring its pre-partition appearance. The war and the Soviet annexation of the Polish eastern voivodships interrupted the revitalization of the monument. Soviet ruin followed, crowned by the present destruction. In a clumsy attempt to make the monument look like 'Ukrainian Versailles', the new owners are idly tolerating the destruction of this architectural pearl of Podolia.²³

On April 13, 2013 half of one of the towers of the *castle in Chervonohrad* in Podolia collapsed. Today the site of the monument is leased by the Ternopil Diocese of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The lease began in 2002, but since then nothing has been done to restore, renovate or even protect the ruins.²⁴ It is a historic castle belonging to three dynasties founded in the 15th century. In 1672, a huge Turkish army flooded Podolia and occupied Kamianets. The Turks sent troops deep into the country to capture individual fortresses. The defenders of Chervonohrad for several days repulsed

21. R. Marcinek, "Kresowy Wawel (zamek w Brzeżanach)" [Borderland Wawel (The Castle in Berezhany)], accessed October 25, 2020, https://www.wilanow-palac.pl/kresowy_wawel_zamek_w_brzezanach.html.

22. A. Czołowski, B. Janusz, *Przeszłość i zabytki województwa tarnopolskiego* [The Past and Monuments of the Ternopil Voivodeship] (Tarnopol: Powiatowa Organizacja Narodowa w Tarnopolu, 1926), 67.

23. See: "Олексій Бухало, Бережанський замок – як український Вавель став броварнею?" [Berezhany Castle – how the Ukrainian Wawel Became a Brewery], accessed October 25, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/blogs-44529134>.

24. I. Bondarew, "Czerwonogród" [Chervonohrad], accessed November 12, 2020, <https://kuriergalicyjski.com/historia/zabytki/2517-czerwonogród>.

the attacks of the enemy. But the Turks tried a trick – they changed the course of the river Dzhuryn, which surrounded the castle with a loop, and crossed the river on the other side. They captured the castle, felled the defenders, and burned the fortress with the church and monastery. A reminder of the siege remained – a magnificent 16-metre-high Dzhuryn waterfall, the highest plain waterfall in the territory of the present Ukraine. The former glory of the village belongs to the past. A few years before the collapse of the castle tower, the Polish newspaper in Ukraine “Kurier Galicyjski” was warning:

It is incomprehensible why the local authorities are incapable of doing anything but putting up some shed made from an old bus, where they sell beer. There are no toilets, no equipped resting places, no garbage bins. There are, however, kiosks with sausages and alcohol. And it would be worth it to charge money for entering the castle territory and use it for cleaning the monuments. If the situation does not change, in a few years there will be nothing left to see here. What has not been destroyed by war and time, may disappear due to ordinary human indifference to our own history.²⁵

So it has happened and continues to happen.

For centuries, the *castle in Pomoriany* was one of those famous fortresses of the Republic of Poland that successfully resisted Turkish, Tatar and Cossack invasions. When Jakub Sobieski owned the castle in the 17th century, it was the beloved place of his son, the future king Jan Sobieski. The last owner in the interwar period was Count Jerzy Józef Potocki, a diplomat and senator of the Second Republic. In 2018, the front wall of the castle in Pomoriany collapsed.

25. O. Dudar, “Czerwonogrodu nie znajdziemy już na żadnej mapie” [Chervonohrad Can no Longer be Found on Any Map], *Kurier Galicyjski*, no. 13 (113), 2010, 24.

Currently, the remains of the castle are the eastern and southern wings, which were still inhabited at the beginning of the 19th century, a round tower in the northeastern part, and fragments of earth fortifications.²⁶

The former Lanckoronski Palace in Tartakiv was built by Zbigniew Lanckoronski on the foundations of the 17th century castle of the Potocki family, whose one-story wing was used during construction. The palace, in French neo-baroque style, was modeled on the Casino de Paris in Monte Carlo. During World War I, troops quartered in the palace destroyed or looted some of the furnishings, the rest was lost in 1939. After the war, the palace housed offices of kolkhoz and was quite well maintained. In 1995, it was burned down by “unknown perpetrators”. Today it is a ruin without roofs and vaults.²⁷

In 2018, the north side of the former *castle in Sudova Vyshnya* fell. Just near the current border with Poland, some 30 km, the remnants collapsed, no longer salvageable. It was one of the most magical castles in Ukraine, the remains of the Komorowski-Mars residence, surrounded by a unique park, which miraculously preserved its authentic charm. The period of splendor of this beautiful monument ended after the final consolidation of Soviet power in the former Lviv region of the Second Polish Republic. The palace of the Mars family was turned into a dormitory of the local agricultural technical school (it is worth mentioning that before the war the very building of the technical school housed the Polish Cooperative Bank, the Health maintenance organization, and the floor was occupied by a priest). In the 80s, the palace burned down and since then it has been in ruins. Nowadays, the monument is a communal prop-

26. “Zawałiła się część ściany pałacu Sobieskich w Pomorzanach” [Part of a Wall of the Sobieski Palace in Pomoriany has Collapsed], accessed November 12, 2020, <http://slowopolskie.org/zawalila-sie-czesc-scianny-palacu-sobieskich-w-pomorzanach/>.

27. “Tartaków” [Tartakiv], accessed November 20, 2020, <https://kresy.pl/kresopedia/tartakow-3/>.

erty and after the decentralization reform, the authorities of Sudova Vyshnia started to look for an investor who could arrange a hotel or other recreational and service facility in the former Mars Palace. Wandering around the palace and gazing into the dark abyss of its cellars, one has a feeling that one has come 100 years back, to a completely different era.²⁸ Currently, the palace is destroyed by vandals who search for some iron elements for sale, bricks are taken apart for construction. Only the remains of the walls should not fall down on someone. And now birches several meters high grow on the walls.

As in the situation of the previous section, the listed monuments in ruins or in a state unsuitable for reconstruction are extracted from the general picture of progressive ruin overwhelming the majority of Polish monuments in the territories encompassed by the Latin Archdiocese of Lviv, the establishment of the exact number would have to be handled by the relevant departments and institutions of the Republic of Poland. If such records are kept and the knowledge and awareness of the inevitable destruction of Polish traces in the East accompanies the relevant state authorities, this is yet another proof of their ineptitude.

Other monuments

In addition to churches, palaces, and fortresses, other buildings that are particularly valuable to Polish history and culture are also passing into oblivion. On March 24, 2018, a fire consumed the buildings of the former Jesuit college in Khyriv. The Teaching and Learning Center of Jesuits in Khyriv was established in the 19th century and operated until 1939. It was one of the best equipped schools in Poland and Europe. The enormous school building had spacious classrooms, well-equipped labs, a library with approxi-

28. J. Wójcicki, "Magia pałacu Marsów w Sądowej Wiszni" [The Magic of the Palace of the Mars Family in Sudova Vyshnia], accessed November 20, 2020, <https://www.kuriergalicyjski.com/historia/zabytki/6060-magia-palacu-mar-sow-w-sadowej-wiszni>.

mately 30,000 items, and rich geographical and historical collections. The school had its own botanical garden and astronomical observatory. It educated many future scientists, politicians, writers and social activists, including Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, deputy prime minister and builder of Gdynia, General Roman Abraham, or poets Jan Brzechwa and Kazimierz Wierzyński.²⁹

The phenomenon, presented in its fragmentary dimension on selected examples, provokes deep reflection. Here, in the 21st century, when totalitarianisms have vanished and European heritage and Western cultural and civilization models are popularized, terrible things happen beyond the eastern border of Poland as far as the preservation, care and protection of historical monuments are concerned. Many of these devastations date back to the last years, the time of the declared 'European' changes in Ukraine, and take place during the implementation of 'European programs'. Official propaganda about strategic Polish-Ukrainian cooperation/friendship is common. The question arises, if such a ruin exists and progresses in the area of interpenetration of cultures and monuments of friendly nations, then how is the cultural legacy supposed to look like in the borderland where enemies meet?

The clash of civilizations

Trying to understand this phenomenon, one can associate it with the reality at the meeting point of civilizations, where one culture tries to erase or annihilate the traces of the presence of another. Is this not the only rational explanation for the phenomenon of the widespread, massive, and irreversible destruction of Polish monuments in the East?

According to some definitions, the Latin culture reached as far to the East, as far the Gothic cathedrals were built. In the present

29. "Ukraina: Pożar w dawnym kolegium ojców Jezuitów w Chyrowie" [Ukraine: Fire in the Former College of Jesuit Fathers in Khyriv], accessed November 20, 2020, <https://dorzeczy.pl/swiat/59797/Ukraina-Pozar-w-dawnym-kolegium-ojcow-Jezuitow-w-Chyrowie.html>.

situation, the last cathedral – Gothic in foundation but rebuilt over the centuries – survives in Kamenets Podolski. At the crossroads of civilization, Catholic churches were seen as traces of the presence of Latin and Catholic culture. As such, they were viciously destroyed and plundered. They were regarded as border posts of Latin culture, foreign to the local Ruthenian culture, traces that had to be destroyed. The same logic was used by the Russian clerks who plundered churches after every national uprising in the 19th century. The swordsmen of the tsarist empire, consolidating their rule in the territories inhabited by Poles for centuries, appealed for the destruction of all traces of foreign domination. Inseparably – which was also correct – combining the Latin Church and Polish culture into one concept, the new hosts tried to eliminate all material traces, including first of all Latin temples and monasteries. They were called border posts of foreign rule. When, after the November Uprising, more Catholic monasteries were closed down, Tsar Nicholas I joyfully exclaimed: “Praise God, here we have again demolished several enemy strongholds”.³⁰ The propaganda about the Polish occupation of Holy Ruthenia and the need to restore the true Ruthenian character to this area was exploited with all its might. Aren't similar motivations also guiding the current authorities and society in Ukraine, who are indifferent to the ruin and destruction of the remnants of Polish culture in these areas?

Taking the whole spectrum of horrifying events which, in spite of the media silence, appear in the public arena, it can be stated that the situation of Polish monuments in Ukraine is one of the elements of a very difficult relationship which, in spite of propaganda slogans repeated as in the past in the times of ‘unshakable’ Polish-Soviet friendship, predicts a total devastation of the monuments of Polish culture in the former Kresy. This cannot be separated from the

30. W. Osadczy, *Święta Ruś. Rozwój i oddziaływanie idei prawosławia w Galicji* [Holy Ruthenia. The Development and Influence of the Idea of Orthodoxy in Galicia] (Lublin: UMCS, 2007), 355.

general climate created by the prohibition to exhume and bury the remains of Poles – victims of the Bandera genocide, the persistent refusal to return the churches in Lviv (Church of Mother of God of Candles Day, Church of St. Mary Magdalene) to the Catholics, the prohibition to commemorate figures associated with Polish history and culture (the prohibition to perpetuate in the street name St. Józef Bilczewski, Metropolitan of Lviv, and numerous other facts constantly appearing in these areas.

This situation was quite bluntly illustrated by the Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, who remarked in his speech at the Catholic University of Lublin: “Quite often the only motivation for not giving us temples is the slogan «not to give the church back to the Poles»”. How else can one explain the fact of taking away from us the Church of Mother of Candles Day, which adjoins the Latin Metropolitan Curia of Lviv. Those who hastily created a Greek Catholic parish behind the wall of the Curia are not ashamed of the gross abnormality of this state of affairs, which is observed with disgust every day by the residents of the city and tourists”.³¹

Certainly, this state of affairs should mobilize the Polish society, scientific and academic circles, and the organs of the Polish state. A global, comprehensive program of saving the remnants of Polish culture in the East should be created. Such a program should be included in the strategy of Polish diplomacy and should involve a number of activities on various levels aimed at saving and preserving at least the remains of the once magnificent objects radiating to the entire region. In a situation where Poland’s involvement

31. M. Mokrzycki, “Archidiecezja Lwowska, XXV lat wolności, demokracji i dyskryminacji. Referat wygłoszony na KUL 9 maja 2016 r. z okazji inauguracji działalności Instytutu Pamięci i Dziedzictwa Kresów w Lublinie” [The Archdiocese of Lviv 25 years of freedom, democracy and discrimination. Paper delivered at the Catholic University of Lublin on May 9, 2016 on the occasion of the inauguration of the Institute for the Memory and Heritage of the Borderlands in Lublin], *Nasz Dziennik*, no. 135 (5583), 2016, 7.

in various reforms in Ukraine is crucial for the neighbouring country, we should use all tools to encourage and force respect for the Polish legacy in this country. As mentioned in the “Endangered Heritage” Report, the sizable developmental financial aid regularly granted by Poland to, among others, Ukraine (in 2017, it amounted to PLN 61 million) should be combined with efforts to save Polish monuments.³² We also realize that taking care of our monuments abroad is also an indicator of the sovereignty and prestige of the state. Radical changes in this aspect of the functioning of the Polish state will be an integral part of the general sanitation of socio-political relations in our country, testifying to the growth of Poland’s sovereignty and role in world politics.

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NOTES

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