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
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FONTES

STANISŁAW BÓBR-TYLINGO
(Halifax, Canada)

UN MEMORANDUM FRANÇAIS D'OCTOBRE 1863

Le Mémorandum que nous publions ci-dessus se trouve aux archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, série: Memoires et documents. Pologne 34.

Le mois d'octobre 1863 est le mois où prend fin la discussion diplomatique entre les trois puissances européennes, France, Angleterre et Autriche d'une part, et la Russie d'autre part au sujet de la Pologne, discussion causée en fait par le soulèvement de la Pologne russe en janvier 1863 et provoquée par la convention d'Alvensleben signée entre la Russie et la Prusse le 8 février à Saint-Pétersbourg. Toutes les suggestions des puissances, toutes les insinuations françaises d'une entente séparée furent repoussée par la Russie. D'abord, au début de l'année, quand le Tsar pouvait craindre une campagne militaire, il refusa d'une manière polie sans rompre le fil de négociation; en septembre par contre la réponse russe fut un "coup de camouflet inouï et sans exemple dans l'histoire contemporaine".[1] Le gouvernement impérial français devait ou laisser tomber toute la polémique ou prendre une initiative hardie ou s'efforcer de trouver un moyen propre à satisfaire l'opinion publique sans provoquer un conflit armé.

Cette opinion publique, à cause de l'insolence de la réponse russe, ne considérait pas la question polonaise comme terminée, et elle croyait que ce qui paraissait un renoncement n'était que recueillement et préparation au conflict. Elle était même prête à accepter une guerre contre la Russie. Beaucoup de Français "voudraient voir nos armées marcher sur Varsovie et nos flottes entrer dans la Baltique". "La fierté nationale s'est vivement émue du ton d'insolence et de défi dont sont empreintes les dernières communications du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg".[2] "L'empereur sentait d'autant mieux cet entraînement de l'opinion, qu'il le partageait".[3] Le malaise général à Paris, en octobre 1863, est bien souligné par les rapports des diplomates qui y résidaient.

[1]) Rapport de Paris, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienne — HHS, Frankreich 60, 24.IX.1863.

[2]) Les rapports des procureurs généraux. Archives du Ministère de la Guerre, Paris, dossier G/9-94, rapport de Nancy, 24.X.1863. Rapport de Rouen, 15.X.1863, Archives Nationales, Paris, dossier BB/30.

[3]) Emile Ollivier: *L'Empire Libéral*, VI,p.354.

"L'émotion produite par la note et Mémorandum du Prince Gortchakoff est loin d'ailleurs d'être effacée ici, — notait le Ministre de Bade. Chacun y comprend la portée d'un défi qui doit être relevé tôt ou tard. Si d'une part l'irritation au sujet des notes russes a été profonde, bien qu'habilement dissimulée chez l'Empereur Napoléon, de l'autre les amis du maintien de la paix n'en déplorent pas moins encore que le Prince Gortschakoff, en se donnant une passagère satisfaction d'amour propre, ait compliqué gratuitement et d'une manière aussi grave une situation déjà tendue et périlleuse".[4] *Napoléon voulait-il la guerre ou désirait-il assurer la paix? se demandait le chargé d'affaires autrichien. Dans la question de Pologne l'Empereur se trouvait moins libre encore que dans toute autre. Très populaire en France, la cause polonaise soutenue avec éclat ne pouvait sans danger être abandonée. Le grand parti libéral ne le permettrait pas et les anciens partis retourneraient contre l'Empereur le reproche qu'ils avaient adressé aux deux gouvernements tombés en 1830 et en 1848. La France ne lui pardonnerait jamais le soufflet qu'il lui avait attiré et elle lui rappellerait qu'il n'y avait pas de contrées si lointaines, où l'atteinte portée à l'honneur de la France dût demeurer impunie".*[5] *Drouyn de Lhuys, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, était dans un état "de découragement, d'embarras et d'inquiétude difficile à exprimer".*[6]

C'est alors que le Mémorandum fut élaboré. Il faisait d'abord l'historique de la question polonaise. L'année 1863 s'était ouverte sans que pussent être prévues les graves complications futures. Certes, depuis deux ans une certaine agitation régnait dans la Pologne russe, mais rien ne laissait prévoir une révolte. Le recrutement, transformé en une mesure de proscription, provoqua le soulèvement. Le mouvement, d'abord d'un caractère local, prit un caractère international après la Convention d'Alvensleben. L'opinion publique pressait les cabinets d'intervenir. Le gouvernement impérial français moins qu'aucun autre ne pouvait faillir à la tradition de l'amitié franco-polonaise. Il proposa

4) Generallandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Frankreich 48/2060-2062,15.X.1863. "Im Kreise der best unterichteten, und mit den Verhältnissen am meisten vertrauten fremden Diplomaten hierselbst ist man der Ansicht, es sey für den Kaiser Napoleon unmöglich, die von Russland in der polnischen Frage ihm beygebrachte diplomatische Niederlage ruhig hinzunehmen". Staatsarchiv, Marburg, 9-a/193, Paris 1863, 17.X.1863.

5) HHS. Frankreich 76,12.X.1863. "Auch will gestern noch einer meiner deutschen Collegen von dem Grafen Rechberg (ministre des affaires étrangères) vernommen haben: Fürst Gortchakoff habe durch seine Antworten in dieser Angelegenheit, die schon in einem besseren Fahrwasser sich befänden Vieles verdorben. Von der Seine sey noch wenig zu vernehmen. Ihm, dem Grafen Rechberg, seye das Züruckhalten des Kaisers Napoleon ziemlich unheimlich, so lange man nicht genau wisse, was in Paris ausgebrütet werde". — Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, E 70/73/3, Wien, 4.X.1863. "De grands événements et de très petits hommes- constata Guizot en parlant de la politique polonaise du Second Empire. — Gayot: *Guizot et Madame Laure de Gasparin*. Paris, 1934, p.617.

6) Ainsi le trouva le baron de Hübner, ancien ambassadeur d'Autriche à Paris. — Stanisław Bóbr-Tylingo: Les conversations du baron de Hübner á Paris, *Antemurale*, XVI,1972,p.10.

donc à l'Angleterre et à l'Autriche de s'entendre pour représenter au Cabinet de Berlin les dangers de son immixtion dans cette insurrection. Pour des raisons diverses, la démarche ne fut pas collective. Mais c'était de la Russie que dépendait l'apaisement de la crise. La nature des relations franco-russes autorisait l'Empereur à tenter un effort personnel et amical. Dés 1857, la France s'était efforcée de recommander l'état de la Pologne à l'attention de la cour d'Alexandre II. Les faits n'avaient que trop montré depuis l'opportunité de ces suggestions, et ils témoignaient chaque jour combien il était à regretter qu'elles n'aient pas été écoutées. La Russie declina toute idée d'une entente separée avec la France. Alors, la France s'évertua à former un concert entre Paris, Londres et Vienne destiné à assurer à une démarche commune le caractère européen que comportait "la nature des intérêts en jeu". La Russie accueillit favorablement ces ouvertures et semblait convier les puissances européennes à lui faire connaître les bases d'un futur accomodement. L'Angleterre avança alors la proposition d'un armistice qui fut approuvée immédiatement par la France. L'Autriche de son côté rédigea un programme en six points qui, bien que jugé insuffisant, fut cependant retenu comme base de départ des discussions d'un congrès international. Pour parer au danger que la Russie ne tirât pas parti de la diversité des vues qui s'étaient glissées dans les notes des trois cabinets, le gouvernement français proposa en vain de consolider l'entente par une convention on un protocole. Les trois cours restèrent ainsi à l'égard de la Russie "dans une situation peu propre à rendre leur action efficace" ce que permit alors au Tsar de reprendre par une fin de non recevoir absolue. Le gouvernement impérial estimait qu'au point où les choses en étaient arrivées, les puissances devaient donner à leur dernière communication le caractère d'une complète identité. Acceptée d'abord par les deux autres capitales, puis modifiée, la proposition n'eut aucune suite. Les nouvelles notes séparées adressées à Saint-Pétersbourg déclarèrent la Russie responsable des conséquences qu'entraîneraient le refus de tenir compte des représentations européennes et la continuation du soulévement. Dans un Mémorandum distinct, la France avait exposé comment les stipulations de Vienne relatives à la Pologne devaient être comprises et comment elles l'avaient toujours été. La réponse russe prouvait le peu de fondement qu'il y avait à baser une intervention diplomatique sur les actes de 1815. Le Mémorandum sc terminait par la constatation que le gouvernement français ne prétendait pas imposer sa solution aux puissances intéressés au réglement du problème polonais. "Dans une question essentiellement européenne, il n'est conforme ni à nos obligations ni à nos droits seuls d'aller au devant d'une responsabilité qu'il appartient à tous de partager".

Pourquoi et par qui fut préparé ce Mémorandum? La réponse á la deuxième question ne semble pas difficile. Il fut, sinon écrit du moins dicté, par Drouyn de Lhuys. Son raisonnement set bien celui du Ministre, dont il résume les conversations avec des diplomates

étrangers. Le "Constitutionnel" du 5 octobre constatait: "La France ne se reconnait pas le devoir de faire, à elle seule, la police de l'Europe et de ramener au respect de leurs obligations ceux qui s'en écartent. Elle n'a laissé ignorer à aucune puissance, et à la Russie moins qu'a toute autre, ce qu'elle souhaitait pour les populations polonaises. Dans la défense de cette noble et juste cause, elle est allée jusqu'où l'Angleterre et l'Autriche ont consenti à la suivre; elle est prête à aller aussi loin que ces deux puissances voudraient s'avancer". Le 13 octobre, le même journal officieux revenait en ces termes sur la question: "La Pologne est-elle un intérêt français? Non, nul n'oserait le soutenir, et rien, dans le langage et dans la conduite du gouvernement impérial n'a pu faire naître une telle illusion ni autoriser une telle erreur. Depuis le jour où le sang a recommencé à couler en Pologne, la politique du gouvernement de l'Empereur ne s'est pas démentie un seul moment. C'est au nom de l'ordre européen qu'elle a voulu que la Pologne fût protégée... Ce concert existe: Londres et Vienne ont parlé comme Paris, et il ne dépendra pas de nous que cette entente ne produise ses résultats les plus heureux pour la Pologne".

Caractéristiques sont les omissions du Mémorandum. Il ne parle point des négociations franco-autrichiennes en vue d'une alliance offensive. Ni de la mission du prince de Metternich en mars 1863,[7] *ni d'une nouvelle offre française en octobre, c'est-à-dire au moment même de la rédaction du Mémorandum.*[8] *Silence complet aussi sur les relations franco-prussiennes, aucune mention d'un rapprochement avec Berlin déjà esquissé par la diplomatie impériale. Les offres d'alliance parvenues à Paris à la suite de la mission de Metternich n'étaient même pas citées une seule fois dans cette explication de la politique impériale. Il est vrai que si ces faits étaient bien connus de l'Empereur et de son Ministre des Affaires étrangères, ils restaient ignorés des autres membres du Cabinet. Tout laisse donc supposer que le Mémorandum fut préparé en vue d'une éventuelle discussion en Conseil des Ministres avant le discours de l'Empereur qui devait ouvrir le 5 novembre la nouvelle session des Chambres. Cet écrit avait pour but de prouver que l'échec de l'intervention diplomatique avait été causé uniquement par le refus de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche de s'allier avec le France. Et de fait, Napoléon III ne voulait pas risquer une campagne contre la Russie sans un traité d'alliance avec Vienne ou Londres, de préférence avec les deux. Les offres des puissances mineures comme la Suède, l'Italie, la Turquie, la Perse ou les Principautés Danubiennes étaient certainement utiles mais pas suffisantes pour commencer une guerre. Mais, comme le faisait observer justement Palmerston à l'ambassadeur d'Autriche personne ne pouvait empêcher l'Empereur d'entrer en campagne au secours de la Pologne; à moins de la menacer, de se ranger du côté de la Russie, ce qui était pour l'Angleterre absolument impossible. Napoléon III était*

[7]) Stanisław Bóbr-Tylingo: Napoleon III, l'Europe et la Pologne en 1863-64. *Antemurale*, VII-VIII,1963,p.61-66, 83-91.
[8]) *Ibid.*, pp. 225-228.

assez puissant pour faire tout seul une guerre qui serait populaire en France au plus haut dégré. Ses finances n'étaient pas dans un état brillant, mais la France était un pays plein de ressources, sa flotte était magnifique, son armée nombreuse. Qu'aurait-il à craindre? S'il envoyait dans la Baltique une expédition de 60.000 hommes, cette armée pourrait facilement s'établir en Pologne avant l'hiver, et un corps d'observation de 40.000 hommes sur le Rhin lui suffirait pour tenir la Prusse en respect. Cette combinaison ne serait pas trop chimérique. L'Empereur n'aurait pas besoin de la coopération anglaise pour la réaliser, surtout s'il pouvait compter sur la Suède qui n'avait pas oublié la perte de la Finlande.[9] *L'animosité de Lord Palmerston envers la France était bien connue;* [10] *nèanmoins son opinion exprimée plusieurs fois en 1863, qu'un premier pas effectué par la France aurait entraîné par la suite l'Autriche et l'Angleterre à participer au conflict trouve son entière confirmation dans les documents de l'époque ouverte maintenant aux historiens.*

Archives du Ministére des Affaires Etrangères
Mémoires et Documents

POLOGNE 1807-1871- — Volume 34 fo 242-266

Octobre 1863

Exposé de la situation
POLOGNE

A l'ouverture de la dernière session des Grands Corps de l'Etat, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur se félicitait de la situation générale de l'Europe.[11] Si quelques difficultés subsistaient sur plusieurs points du continent, rien ne faisait prévoir des complications prochaines. Rien

9) Rapport d'Apponyi, HHS England 62,22.IV.1863.

10) "... and his (de Napoleon III) real object and that which lies at the Bottom of his Heart, as well as that of Every Frenchman, is the humbling of England the traditionary Rival of France, and the Main obstacle to French Supremacy in Europe and all over the world". Palmerston à Russell, Public Record Office = PRO 30/22/14 G, 27.X.1863.

"... No man can doubt that at the Bottom of the Bottoms in the Emperor's Heart is the strongest imaginable Desire to humble and prostrate England". — Palmerston à Russell, PRO.30/22/14 G, 27.X.1863.

En même temps Palmerston declara au prince Władysław Czartoryski: "Quant à la guerre ne l'espérez pas, aucune des trois puissances ne la fera. Croyez-moi, c'est avec tristesse que je vous dis cela, car j'aurais été heureux de pouvoir vous aider, mais l'interêt de l'Angleterre s'y oppose, quoique votre cause soit si belle et si juste, je ne puis rien faire pour vous. L'interêt de L'Angleterre avant tout".—Adam Lewak: *Polska działalność dyplomatyczna*, II, 14.X.1863,p.377.

11) Le discours le Napoléon III le 12 janvier 1863 à l'occasion de l'ouverture de la session du Corps Législatif.

surtout n'annonçait que la question polonaise fût à la veille de s'imposer de nouveau à l'attention des cabinets.

Depuis bientôt deux ans une certaine agitation régnait en Pologne. Elle était causée par les pénibles retours que les Polonais faisaient sur eux mêmes, en voyant les changements qui s'accomplissaient autour d'eux sans que leur propre condition se fût sensiblement améliorée. Mais aucun projet de soulèvement ne se manifestait, tout semble au contraire attester que le recours aux armes n'entrait pas plus dans les calculs des hommes investis de la confiance du pays que dans le voeux des populations.

Le recrutement, transformé en une mesure de proscription, poussa au désespoir ceux qu'il menaçait d'atteindre et des conflits éclatèrent simultanément sur plusieurs points.

La question, cependant, ne se présentait encore que sous l'aspect d'un mouvement purement local provoqué par un grief déterminé. La convention signée à Saint-Pétersbourg le 8 février, et par laquelle, sous le prétexte de maintenir la police de la frontière, la Prusse s'engageait envers la Russie à coopérer dans une certaine mesure à la représsion, vint donner à cette lutte un caractère international, et mettre les Cabinets dans l'obligation de s'en occuper [12] L'opinion les pressait de rompre le silence.[13]

Pouvions-nous rester indifférents à cet appel? Des considérations impérieuses ne nous faisaient-elles pas un devoir d'y répondre? La question polonaise est essentiellement européenne, car elle ne saurait se poser sans mettre en cause les plus grands intérêts. La France est signataire des actes sous la protection desquels la Pologne a été placée. Enfin, les sympathies françaises n'ont jamais fait défaut à cette nation dans ses épreuves antérieures. C'est une tradition à laquelle le Gouvernement de l'Empereur pouvait manquer moins qu'aucun autre,

L'Angleterre avait les mêmes droits et les mêmes raisons d'intervenir. Le Gouvernement impérial s'adressa donc à cette Puissance afin de s'entendre avec elle pour représenter au Cabinet de Berlin les dangers de son immixtion dans une affaire dont elle étendait si mal-

12) La convention d'Alvensleben signée le 8 février 1863. Le texte de la convention dans:— Karol Lutostański: *Les partages de la Pologne et la lutte pour l'indépendence.* Paris, 1918, No. 321.

13) Lord Cowley, ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris, nota le 23 février: "The feeling in favour of Poland is becoming stronger every hour here, and the Emperor will be obliged to show that he has done something to satisfy it". — Cowley to Lord Russell, ministre des affaires étrangères, Foreign Office = FO.519/230.23.II.1863. Il ajouta le jour suivant: "Budberg's (ambassadeur de Russie) language is that if France *alone* has any concessions to ask of Russia, everything compatible with the safety of Russian rule in Poland will be granted to her, but that any coalition against Russia will be resisted to the utmost. Fine, but vain words". — *Ibid.* 24.II.1863.

heureusement la portée.[14] Nous savions, en outre, que l'Autriche jugeait comme nous les engagements conclus à Saint-Pétersbourg. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur lui fit part de ses intentions. Déjà elle avait exprimé ses sentiments à la Prusse et a la Russie, lorsque ces deux Cours avaient sollicité son adhésion aux arrangements qu'elles prenaient entre elles. Le Cabinet de Vienne ne crut pas devoir renouveler ses observations. Les démarches près de la Cour de Prusse ne purent donc pas être collectives comme nous l'eussions désiré. Elles eurent néanmoins pour résultat d'obtenir de cette Puissance des explications qui atténuaient les craintes que l'on avait eues de la voir participer activement aux hostilités.

Les représentations portées par la France et l'Angleterre à Berlin n'étaient toutefois qu'un incident qui laissait subsister tout entières les difficultés de la situation. C'est dans le royaume de Pologne qu'était le foyer de l'insurrection. C'est de la Russie que dépendait l'apaisement de la crise que la mesure du recrutement avait déterminée.

Lorsque nous avions dû manifester notre manière de voir à la Prusse, désirant prévenir toute fausse interprétation, nous avions tenu à éviter une action isolée. La nature de nos relations avec la Russie nous autorisait et nous invitait à la fois à tenter auprès d'elle la voie des efforts personnels et des conseils amicaux, avant d'en venir à des communications officielles, à une action combinée.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur n'avait pas attendu pour faire entendre de sages avis d'y être contraint par une urgente nécessité. Dès paix, la confiance qui unissait si heureusement les deux Cabinets, s'était 1857. Sa Majesté, désirant mettre à profit, dans un intérêt d'ordre et de sentie portée par la sincérité même de son estime et de son amitié pour l'Empereur Alexandre, à recommander l'état de la Pologne à la sollicitude de la Cour de Russie. Ce langage était digne d'être compris par le

14) Le gouvernement français proposa le 21 février aux gouvernements de Londres et de Vienne d'envoyer au cabinet de Berlin une note commune relative à la convention d'Alvensleben. Le projet de note est cité dans: Stanisław Bóbr-Tylingo: Napoleon III, l'Europe et la Pologne en 1863-4, *op. cit.*, p.40.

Lord Russell constata: "Drouyn (de Lhuys, ministre français des affaires étrangères) has no right to say that we have rejected his proposal. But we did not think it right to lay all our blows on the valet, and leave the master unscathed ... the Petersburg dispatch, as that must be our main effort".— Russell à Cowley, FO 519/200, 2.III.1863.

Le refus anglais est du 1er mars. Etant donné l'opposition de l'opinion publique prussienne—précisa-t- il était à espérer que la convention resterait lettre morte. Cowley informa Russell: "I should not tell you the truth if I did not say that the Emperor and his Minister are bitterly disappointed at your declining the combined note, and I much doubt their moving any more in the Polish matter. A day or two perhaps will bring them round, but Drouyn said to me this afternoon, that as the combined note was the first step in French Proposals, and as that had fallen to the ground, he would not pursue the remainder, unless fresh events should make it necessary. I presume therefore that he will, if he remains in the present mood, decline to make any representation to St. Petersburg".—Royal Archives = RA, Windsor, Cowley à Russell, 1.III.1863, H 50/84.

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Souverain qui allait donner, en émancipant les serfs, un témoignage éclatant de sa sagesse. Les faits n'ont que trop montré depuis l'opportunité de ces suggestions, et ils témoignent chaque jour combien il est à regretter qu'elles n'aient pas été écoutées.[15]

[15]) Pendant l'entrevue de Stuttgart, le 25 septembre 1857, Napoléon III avertit le tzar, Alexandre II, que la question polonaise pouvait devenir le principal obstacle à l'entente des deux pays. "Dans les rapports de la Russie avec la France, je ne vois qu'une seule question délicate, c'est la question polonaise; si elle doit surgir et mettre en mouvement la diplomatie de l'Europe, j'ai des engagements que je ne puis renier et je dois ménager l'opinion publique, qui, en France, est très bienveillante pour la Pologne. J'en previens loyalement V.M. (Votre Majesté) de peur de voir rompre nos bonnes relations que j'ai à coeur de conserver".—Paroles notées par le comte Kissélew: Serge Goriainow: Les étapes de l'alliance franco-russe. *Revue de Paris*, février 1912, p.775.

Charles Roux nota dans son étude sur la politique étrangère du Second Empire: "Peut être est-ce l'intérêt témoigné par Alexandre II à la cause du rois de Naples qui encouragea Napoléon III à exprimer celui qui, il portait à la cause polonaise et à toucher d'une main tres délicate, trés-legère, à la question de Pologne. En tout cas, il se risqua à en parler. "Pourquoi, dit-il au Tzar, ne donneriez-vous pas une amnistie générale?—Il m'est, répondit Alexandre, impossible d'amnistier les chefs de l'insurrection qui, à l'étranger, n'avaient jamais cessé de conspirer. Mais j'ai étendu l'amnistie à tous ceux qui on fait leur soumission. Mon désir est de voir prospérer le royaume de Pologne sous le sceptre de l'empereur de Russie". Napoléon III n'insista pas davantage et Alexandre II ne fut nullement froissé de cette intercession amicale.—François Charles Roux: *Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoléon III.* Paris, 1913,p.221.

L'historien allemand exprime une opinion tout à fait opposée à celle de l'historien français. "Als Napoleon auch auf die Verhältnisse in Polen eingehen wollte, hatte er beim Caren an eine sehr empfindliche Saite gerührt. Nach einer Unterdung mit Napoleon, in der dieser die polnische Frage zur Sprache gebracht hatte, wandt sich der Car erregt zu einer der Personen seiner Suite mit den Worten; 'Denken Sie, man hat gewagt, mir von Polen zu sprechen".—Ernst Schüle: *Russland und Frankreich vom Ausgang des Krimkrieges bis zum italienischen Krieg 1856-1859.* Berlin, 1935, p.105.

En septembre 1857, à Stuttgart " . . . on laissa pratiquement de côté le problème polonais, épineux, mais essentiel pour la Russie".—Victor Tapié. Le traité secret de 1859 entre la France et la Russie. *Etudes d'Histoire Moderne, et Contemporaine,* V,1953,p.118.

Les deux interlocuteurs donnèrent plus tard deux versions différentes de cette entrevue. En proposant à l'Autriche une alliance, Napoléon III déclara au prince Metternich, ambassadeur d'Autriche: "Lorsque l'empereur de Russie vint à Stuttgart, il me proposa une alliance offensive et défensive. Je lui demandais pour quoi faire? Est-ce pour arranger ensemble les affaires de l'Italie, de l'Orient et de la Pologne? Il me répondit que pour le moment il n'avait aucun but spécial mais que l'intérêt des deux pays était de s'allier. Il avait même déjà rédigé un projet de traité. Je refusais nettement en lui disant que je cherchais vainement l'intérêt que j'aurais à ameuter contre moi l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et l'Allemagne sans profit aucun".—Lettre du prince Metternich. HHS Frankreich 70,30.VI.1861.

Une traduction anglaise du document est publié dans: V. Wellesley, R. Sencourt: *Conversations with Napoleon III.* London, 1934, p.197.

Le prince Metternich répéta sa conversation à l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre, lord Cowley, qui nota une version un peu différente: "This led him (Napoléon III) to talk of alliances in general when he said that no alliances were worth anything which had not some object or interest in view, that when at Stuttgart, he had refused to sign an alliance offensive and defen-

En présence des conjonctures qui venaient justifier ses prévisions, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté regarda comme un devoir de ne point dissimuler ses préoccupations au Cabinet russe. Il lui exposa, avec une franchise sans réserve nos perplexités au milieu d'événements dont l'opinion du pays, aussi bien que les intérêts généraux de l'Europe, ne nous permettaient pas de rester les spectateurs indifférents. L'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur avait pour instructions de conseiller, dans les termes les plus conformes aux rapports amicaux des deux Gouvernements, une politique de réparation et de progrès. Il devait pressentir les concessions que la Russie serait disposée à faire et encourager toute combinaison propre à ramener la paix en Pologne.

Le Gouvernement anglais, dans une dépêche adressée dès lors à son représentant à Saint-Pétersbourg, avait parlé d'une amnistie générale et de la restitution des privilèges accordés aux Polonais par l'Empereur Alexandre 1er.[16] Le Cabinet français ne pouvait qu'approuver des demandes qui rentraient jusqu'à un certain point dans l'ordre d'idées plus général où il s'était placé lui-même; mais pour laisser à la Russie le mérite d'une entière spontanéité, il s'abstint de les appuyer directement. Le Cabinet de Londres ayant proposé ensuite d'inviter les signataires du traité général de Vienne à exprimer des voeux analogues, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté annonça l'intention de n'adhérer à cette proposition que dans le cas où elle obtiendrait l'assentiment des autres Puissances.

Nos efforts ne s'étaient point ralentis. Nous avions signalé au Cabinet russe l'intérêt qu'il avait à prévenir, en prenant résolument l'initiative, les représentations suggérées par la Grande-Bretagne. Mais nous n'avions obtenu aucune promesse, aucune assurance qui nous per-

sive with Russia, because the policy of the two countries must be divergent. France and Russia must hold opposite opinions with regard to Poland and the East".—Cowley to lord Clarendon, private, 5.VII.1861. Clarendon Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, C 88, Alexandre II fit allusion à cette entrevue au début de l'année 1863. Il remercia l'ambassadeur d'Autriche, le comte de Thun, de la loyale conduite de François-Joseph envers la Russie qui luttait à ce moment contre l'insurrection de la Pologne. Il le mit en garde contre les offres du gouvernement de Paris. La France, souligna le Tzar, avait toujours été l'ennemi de l'Autriche. Déjà à Stuttgart, Napoleon III avait proposé à la Russie le demembrement de la monarchie danubienne et l'annexion de la Galicie. Lui, Alexandre II avait refusé une telle alliance. —Revertera: *Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten.* Deutsche Revue, mars-avril 1903,p.258.

Walewski, ministre des affaires étrangères, confirms dans une lettre à Napoleon III que le Russie avait demandé a Stuttgart avec instance de signer un arrangement avec la France. Walewski à Napoleon III, 28.XII. 1858. G. Raindre; Les papiers inédits du Comte Walewski. *Revue d'France,* 15 mai 1925, p.287.

16) La note du 2.III.1863. Le même jour Lord Palmerston, le premier ministre anglais, écrivit au lord Russell: "The French Government are evidently made disappointed that we have not fallen into the Trap laid for us, and that we have not joined them in laying the Ground for an attack by France on the Prussian Rheinish Provinces. But we ought to play their game back upon them and urge them more strongly perhaps than is done in the Despatch of which I have the draft ... in making a representation about Poland to the Government of Russia. The convention between Russia and Prussia may now fairly be considered as a Thing of Time past". Palmerston à Russell, 2.III.1863 = PRO 30/22/14E.

mît d'espérer un résultat satisfaisant d'une plus longue insistance personnelle. D'autre part, l'insurrection se développait, l'opinion publique devenait de jour en jour plus pressante. Le moment était donc venu de suivre une autre voie.

Le Gouvernement de S.M. Britannique nous avait devancés dans ses communications officielles au Cabinet russe. L'Autriche, sans envisager les événements du même point de vue que l'Angleterre, continuait d'observer à l'égard des Polonais une neutralité bienveillante. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur se flattait donc de l'espoir de former entre les trois Cours une entente qui assurerait à leurs démarches le caractère européen que comportait la nature des intérêts en jeu, et qui réunirait à la fois toutes les garanties de modération et de force.

Nous comprenions toute l'influence que la cour d'Autriche pouvait exercer sur la marche des affaires, si elle eût consenti à exprimer nettement sa manière de voir à Saint-Pétersbourg, et nous eussions désiré qu'elle formulât une déclaration à laquelle la France et l'Angleterre se seraient associées. Elle eût fait savoir au Cabinet russe que l'expérience ayant prononcé qu'elle reconnaissait l'impuissance des combinaisons imaginées jusqui'ici pour réconcilier les Polonais avec leur condition présente. Le Gouvernement anglais jugea préférable d'adopter la forme de représentations communes. Tel fut aussi le dernier avis de la cour d'Autriche. Les trois Puissances avaient donc à se concerter sur l'objet de ces représentations.[17]

Le Cabinet de Londres, dans sa première communication, avait pris pour point de départ les traités de 1815. La Russie venait précisément de répondre en contestant l'interprétation que le Principal secrétaire d'Etat y avait donnée; elle se bornait, comme moyen de pacification, à parler d'amnistie après la guerre et à promettre de ne retirer aucune des concessions qu'elle avait faite. Le Gouvernement Impérial doutait du succès de toute démarche qui serait basée exclusivement sur les traités. Suivant lui, les choses devaient être envisagés de plus haut. Les actes de 1815 ont concédé assurément aux Polonais de précieux avantages, en faisant revivre le nom de la Pologne, en stipulant pour elle des institutions nationales, en établissant certains liens entre toutes les parties du royaume tel qu'il existait antérieurement au premier partage. Mais ces arrangements n'ont point calmé le sentiment national, ils n'ont point prévenu le retour de ces commotions qui menacent périodiquement le repos de l'Europe. Sans méconnaître que les traités offraient aux Cabinets un motif légal d'intervention, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pensait donc que l'on devait invoquer principalement les intérêts d'ordre européen communs à toutes les Puissances.

17) Lord Russell voulait que la note française fût "mild, strong, conciliatory, threatening, saying more than it means and meaning more than it says. A form of rest to which all the Powers who have none of the booty of Poland in their power can subscribe".—Russell à Cowley, 19.III.1863, FO 519/200.

Les deux Cabinets appréciérent ces considérations, et le Gouvernement de l'Empereur en fit le sujet d'une dépêche à l'Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Pétersbourg. Elle concluait en signalant l'opportunité d'aviser aux moyens de placer la Pologne dans les conditions d'une paix durable.

L'Autriche, tout en alléguant ses intérêts spéciaux comme Puissance limitrophe plus exposée au contrecoup de ces troubles, tint un langage semblable au nôtre. L'Angleterre sans abandonner son argumentation première sur les traités, dont elle ne voulait pas paraître déserter la défense, reproduisit en les résumant les idées développées par nous. La plupart des Etats de l'Europe y donnèrent leur adhésion, et imprimèrent ainsi aux communications des trois Cours le caractère d'une manifestation véritablement européenne.

La Russie parut accueillir favorablement ces ouvertures. Bien qu'elle s'efforça de rejeter sur les encouragements du dehors et sur les menées révolutionnaires la responsabilité du mouvement polonais, elle reconnaissait la profondeur du mal et l'inefficacité des moyens employés jusqu'ici pour y porter remède. Elle ne contestait ni les intérêts généraux engagés dans l'affaire de Pologne, ni les intérêts particuliers des Etats limitrophes. Elle ne déclinait point la compétence des Gouvernements signataires de l'Acte final de Vienne, et semblait au contraire accepter leur concours à une délibération dont elle conviait les trois Puissances à lui faire connaître les bases.[18]

Si l'accord des Cabinets avait été nécessaire dans cette première phase, il ne l'était pas moins dans celle où la question allait entrer. Toute divergence de vues pouvait en effet donner au Gouvernement russe l'espoir de diviser les cours alliées, et l'on devait craindre qu'il ne saisit l'occasion de le tenter, si elle lui était offerte. Il nous parut donc opportun d'appeler sur ce point l'attention des deux Cabinets.

L'Angleterre fut d'avis que les négociations à ouvrir avec la Russie devraient être précédées d'un armistice. La pensée d'arrêter le plus tôt possible l'effusion du sang était trop conforme aux sentiments du Gouvernement français pour ne point obtenir son approbation, et en même temps qu'il y acquiesçait lui-même, il la recommandait à la Cour d'Autriche.

De son côté, le Cabinet de Vienne rédigea un programme divisé en six articles, dont le principal avait pour objet de réclamer en faveur de la Pologne des institutions semblables à celles de la Gallicie. Jugeant ces données insuffisantes, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté déclara qu'il ne pourrait les accepter si des modifications notables n'y étaient apportées,

18) Les notes relatives à la Pologne sont publiées dans T. Filipowicz: *Correspondence of the British Government respecting the Insurrection in Poland: 1863.* Paris, 1914; K. Aegidi, A. Klauhold: *Staatsarchiv. Sammlung der officiellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart 1863-4.*

de son côté, l'Angleterre maintenait la proposition d'un armistice.[19] Le Cabinet de Vienne reconnut en partie la justesse de nos observations. Cependant, tels qu'ils ont été définitivement rédigés, les six points ne répondaient que bien imparfaitement aux difficultés qu'il s'agissait de règler. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur ne consentit à admettre ce programme que dans l'intérêt de l'entente, et en établissant qu'il serait pris simplement pour point de départ des conférences. Nous eussions en outre attaché du prix à ce que l'Europe entière fût appelée à prendre part aux négociations. Nous l'avions formellement proposé, et la Russie semblait se prêter à cette combinaison, pourvu qu'il fût admis que d'autres questions intéressant l'Europe pourraient être également débattues dans le Congrès. La France déclara qu'on la trouverait toujours prête à aborder au grand jour toutes les discussions de cette nature. Mais l'Angleterre et l'Autriche insistèrent pour repousser cette extension de compétence. Dans un esprit de conciliation, le Cabinet français se rallia à l'opinion des deux autres Cours qui demandaient que la discussion fût déférée seulement aux huit puissances signataires du traité de Vienne et limitée à l'affaire de Pologne.

Les trois Cours n'étaient pas parvenues à éviter, dans les nouvelles communications adressées à leurs ambassadeurs à Saint-Pétersbourg, des nuances de forme qui ne pouvaient échapper à l'attention de la Russie.[20] D'ailleurs cette Puissance n'ignorait pas les lenteurs et les difficultés que l'entente avait rencontrées avant de s'établir. Tout faisait prévoir que les craintes manifestées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se réaliseraient, et que la Russie chercherait à tirer parti de la diversité des vues pour éluder les négociations.

Afin de parer, autant qu'il était possible, à ce danger, le Gouvernement Impérial fit aux Cabinets de Vienne et de Londres la proposition de consolider l'entente en prenant, sous la forme d'une convention ou d'un protocole, l'engagement de poursuivre de concert le réglement de l'affaire de Pologne, par les voies diplomatiques ou autrement, s'il était

19) Russell expliqua au lord Cowley: "We may ask the Russians and the Poles to cease fighting, and if they do so we may effect some good. But I am more and more persuaded that unless some interval of quiet is obtained, it is of no use to propose terms of accommodation. The Russians will not observe them, and Poland will not accept them as real and sincere. The armistice is, I believe, the only rational proposal to make".—Russell à Cowley, FO 519/200, 21.V.1863. Il précisa ensuite sa pensée: "If indeed an armistice was established, the Russians and the Poles might be induced to accept the terms upon which they would live together in peace. But if there is no armistice how are the two parties ever to be reconciled? I should like to see an Austrian Archduke King of Poland on the Vistula, and the King of Italy on the Brenta, with a guarantee to Austria for Dalmatia". Russell à Cowley, 28.V.1863, *ibid.*

20) Drouyn de Lhuys constata au lord Cowley: "Si la Russie n'est pas persuadée que nous resterons unis pour l'action, elle se mocquera de nous". —Drouyn de Lhuys au lord Cowley, F.519/207, 23.VI.1863.

Le même jour Cowley nota: „Drouyn de Lhuys game is to me very clear. He wants to lead England and Russia step by step into a war for Poland, as he did it in 1853-54 for other purposes".—Cowley à Russell, 23.VI.1863 FO.519/230.

nécessaire. Cet engagement, outre l'avantage immédiat de rehausser l'autorité du langage des cours alliées, eût offert à celle d'entre elles dont la position réclamait le plus de ménagements, les garanties d'une solidarité complète dans toutes les éventualités.

Nous étions persuadés que le plus sûr moyen de prévenir les complications est de se montrer disposé à y faire face avec toute la fermeté qu'elles exigent, et que les conflits entre les gouvernements naissent moins souvent des résolutions hardies que des atermoiements et des hésitations qui laissent les difficultés s'aggraver. Notre opinion n'ayant pas prévalu, les trois Puissances restèrent à l'égard d'elles-mêmes comme de la Russie, dans une situation qui était peu propre à rendre leur action efficace.

En effet la Cour de Russie répondit à leur programme par une fin de non recevoir absolue. Elle promettait de tenir compte des six points, mais seulement lorsque l'insurrection serait comprimée. Elle écartait toute idée d'une suspension d'armes, et, déclinant la compétence des signataires de l'acte général de 1815, qu'elle avait reconue précédement, elle proposait d'entamer avec l'Autriche et la Prusse, à titre de Puissances co-partageantes, une négociation séparée.

Le Cabinet de Vienne repoussa sans hésiter cette proposition comme contraire à ses devoirs envers les deux autres Puissances; et il s'en expliqua à Saint-Pétersbourg avec une spontanéité et une franchise qui faisient honneur à sa loyauté.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur exposait en même temps à Londres et à Vienne le vive impression qu'il avait éprouvée en recevant les réponses de la Russie. Il estimait qu'au point où les choses en étaient arrivées, les Puissances devaient donner à une dernière communication ce qui avait manqué aux précédentes, le caractère d'une complète identité. Les trois Cabinets auraient pu réfuter dans des Dépêches distinctes les passages des notes Russes qui touchaient plus particulièrement chacun d'eux. Ils auraient reproduit dans une Dépêche identique les vues qui leur étaient communes. Ce document n'eût pas fermé à la Russie tout retour aux idées de conciliation, mais si elle eût persisté dans l'attitude qu'elle venait d'adopter, la discussion aurait été considérée comme close, et après avoir rejeté sur le Cabinet russe la responsabilité de la lutte, les Puissances auraient revendiqué le droit de ne plus prendre conseil que de leurs devoirs et de leurs intérêts.

Sous la réserve des changements de rédaction qui pourraient être arrêtés d'un commun accord, l'Autriche accueillait cette ouverture. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique s'y montrait également favourable; mais son opinion s'étant modifiée, la proposition ne pouvait plus avoir aucune suite.

Les trois Cours adressèrent donc de nouveau à Saint-Pétersbourg des communications séparées. Elles se trouvèrent toutefois d'accord en faveur d'une identité partielle: leurs conclusions étaient conçues dans les mêmes termes. Elles déclaraient unanimement la Russie responsable des conséquences qui pouvaient entraîner le refus de tenir compte de leurs représentations et la prolongation des troubles de Pologne.

Tout en s'abstenant de discuter les Traités, qu'il considérait comme une base insuffisante le Cabinet Français n'avait pas voulu que l'on pût prendre son silence pour un acquiescement à l'interprétation que la Russie donnait aux stipulations de Vienne. Il avait exposé dans un *mémorandum* comment elles devaient être comprises et comment elles l'avaient toujours été.

S'il eût été possible de douter du peu de fondement qu'il y avait lieu de faire sur une négociation renfermée dans les limites des actes de 1815, la réplique de la Russie l'eût surabondamment démontré. Le Gouvernement français ne pouvait désirer une preuve plus authentique de la justesse des observations que dés le principe il avait présentées sur ce point à ses alliés.

Ainsi, à tous égards, le résultat des démarches des trois Cours ne justifiait que trop complètement nos craintes et nos avertissements. Nous pouvions du moins nous rendre le témoignage d'avoir tout fait pour imprimer à l'action des Puissances une direction plus en rapport avec les nécessités de la discussion qu'elles avaient à soutenir. Du moment où la question Polonaise a été posée, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, dans la mesure de ses droits et de ses devoirs envers l'Europe n'a rien négligé pour la résoudre, et sa fermeté dans les conseils a été égale à sa franchise.

Toujours attentif au spectacle douloureux de la lutte qui se poursuit en Pologne, il ne perd de vue aucun des grands intérêts qui s'y rattachent. Il conserve la persuasion que ses sentiments ne diffèrent pas de ceux des autres Cours et il se refuse à croire que l'union des Cabinets dans une affaire si digne de leur sollicitude, demeure entièrement stérile.

Nous ne prétendons pas, toutefois, imposer nos solutions aux Puissances intéressées comme nous, ou même plus directement encore que nous, au réglement des difficultés pendantes. Dans une question essentiellement Européenne, il n'est conforme ni à nos obligations ni à nos droits seuls au devant d'une responsabilité qu'il appartient à tous de partager.

STUDIA

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PASEK AS A HISTORIAN *

The historical period which the *Memoirs*** of Jan Pasek cover presents a fascinating but at the same time a most complicated scene. Marked by religious conflicts, dynastic disputes, vast territorial changes and a shifting of power, it formed a nucleus of many problems with which the European states were to be faced in the centuries to come. Protestant and Catholic soldiery raised arms against each other in an endless war during this era; the Bourbon, Habsburg, Vasa, Romanoff, and other royal houses of Europe engaged in bitter struggles for the sake of their empires and crown; and all of Christendom was saved from the Ottoman might by ". . . a man sent from God, whose name was John." [1]

The countries which were most strikingly affected in their territorial changes as a result of the dynastic disputes in the seventeenth century

*Jan Chryzostom z Gosławic Pasek was born in the Polish Mazovian voivodeship of Rawa around 1636, but neither the exact date nor place of his birth is known. Marian Władysław Pasek and Jadwiga Pasek, née Piekarska, the memoirist's parents, came from Polish gentry, the so-called *szlachta zaściankowa* or *zagrodowa* (yeomanry). The mother was the only daughter of the judge of that district; Jan was their only child and apparently a very much beloved son. Little is known of the memoirist's childhood and youth before he entered the army, except that he was educated at the Jesuit College of Rawa, and that he must have joined the army in December, 1655, and Domaszewski's armoured company in 1657. From then on Pasek himself records the story of his life in his *Memoirs* quite accurately. Pasek died peacefully at home, in the village of Niedzieliska, some time in the summer of 1701.

** The original manuscript of Pasek's *Memoirs* is lost. Its eighteenth-century copy, discovered among the holdings of the Imperial Library of St. Petersburg, was transferred to the Biblioteka Narodowa (National Library) in Warsaw, where it is located to this day (No. 4501). The preserved copy of the *Memoirs* covers the years 1656-1688, thus stretching over a period of thirty-two years of the seventeenth century. Its first fifty pages, some middle ones, and the end are missing. When excerpts of the *Memoirs* came to light in 1821, they instantly became a literary sensation. Proofs of the popularity of the *Memoirs* till this day are their many editions, the interest of literary historians in them, and the influence which they have exerted and exert on poets or historical writers.

[1] *Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Joannes.* Words used by the preacher who celebrated the *Te Deum* in St. Stephen's Cathedral upon Sobieski's victory over the Turks at Vienna. See Nevin N. O. Winter, *Poland of Today and Yesterday* (Boston: L. C. Page and Company, 1913), p. 75.

were Sweden, Muscovy, Turkey, Brandenburg, and Poland. In the middle of the seventeenth century, during which the preserved portions of Pasek's *Memoirs* begin, the Commonwealth of Poland still stretched over a territory of some 350,000 square miles, although already diminished in size and was inhabited by some 10,000,000 peoples; [2] toward the end of the century, its territories shrank considerably and its population decreased by a third. Marked by great unrest throughout the whole of Europe, it was a time of interminable wars on Polish soil. Falling under the reign of Jan Kazimierz, it is considered the "Deluge", one of the most disastrous periods in Polish history.

The reign of Jan Kazimierz was followed by that of Michał Wiśnioweicki. The Polish provinces were ravaged by Cossacks, Tartars, and Ottomans until, on November 11, 1673, the Polish grand hetman Jan Sobieski gained a splendid victory over the Turks at Chocim in Bessarabia. As subsequent Polish king, he restored peace to his land. "He is one of the few leaders of the seventeenth century," writes the English historian David Ogg, "to whom the epithet 'great' is applicable." [3] By his famous victory over the Porte at the gates of Vienna in 1683 he made Poland's name shine with splendour in the world again. His rescue of Vienna, according to the Polish historian Roman Dyboski

> . . . was the last memorable historical success of independent Poland on the stage of European affairs . . . It remains in her everlasting credit that on this occasion she drew her sword chivalrously to help a neighbour who was not at all her friend. The Victory of Vienna is the last noble reflex of the great crusading impulse of the Middle Ages, the last service generously rendered to a common European cause in an age of Machiavellian diplomacy and selfish national interest.[4]

With the glorious reign of Jan Sobieski, the preserved portions of the *Memoirs* of Jan Pasek end.

"Pasek is more than a symbol of the past," writes Professor Jerzy Pietrkiewicz

> he is its personality, and personality outlives the symbols we fashionably attach to the past.[5]

From the *Memoirs* we learn that in 1656 Pasek participated in the battles with the Swedes under his beloved commander Stefan Czarniecki, "experiencing sometimes misery and sometimes good fortune," [6] and that at Trzemeszno Czarniecki's division, together with 2,000 Crimean

[2] F. L. Carsten, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1964), V, p. 559.

[3] David Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 460.

[4] Roman Dyboski, *Outlines of Polish History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 116-117.

[5] Jerzy Pietrkiewicz. "A Polish 17th-Century Diarist". *Slavonic and East European Review*, 1953-1954, p. 439.

[6] Jan Pasek, *Pamiętniki*. Władysław Czapliński, ed. Wrocław Ossolineum in ser. Biblioteka Narodowa, 1968). 1656,6.

Tartars, put six thousand Swedes to the sword.[7] His military service under Czarniecki, "a leader in the style of all great and lucky warriors," Pasek found very enjoyable indeed.

Together with his relative Filip Piekarski, Pasek fought Rakoczy during his invasion of Poland in the following year. Pasek's descriptions of the Swedish and Hungarian wars, although quite brief and to the point, give us an intimation, from the very start, of his political credo, his robust sense of humour, and his narrative skill. From his speeches to the senators in Grodno we learn that during all these trying years of the "Deluge" in Polish history, he stood steadfastly on the side of his fatherland and his king.

Pasek loved warfare and his military career was both diversified and exciting. He spent 1658 and 1659 with Czarniecki's division fighting the Swedes in Denmark, on land and sea; he fought the Muscovites at Mohylew, Krzyczów, and Połonka in 1660 and shared in the glory of the Polish victory in these battles; he participated in the civil war and fought at the battle at Mątwy in 1666. Military events and turmoils of war seemed such an inseparable part of his life that even when he no longer took part in them he continued to write about them in his *Memoirs*. He wrote down, for example, that in 1671 the Crimean Tartars were attacked at Kalnik and in 1672 the Tartars captured Kamieniec; that in 1673 the Poles gained a splendid victory over the Turks at Chocim and again at the gates of Vienna ten years later, and even though Pasek learned of the course of the Vienna campaign only from his relative Stanisław, his accounts of it are interesting, quite accurate, and detailed.

As an outspoken man, Pasek willingly and quite readily expressed his various opinions at all times. He commented on the Great Elector's secret ambitions, the latter's attitude toward the Polish army, and on the behaviour of the imperial troops in Denmark in 1658. He complained about extravagance in Polish fashions and commented on the life of the Polish court, he confessed his ambivalent feelings toward the confederacy of 1661 and his reluctance to be bound to it by an oath of allegiance. After his arrest on false suspicion of spying for the confederacy he revealed his courageous determination to speak his mind, his equality as a nobleman even before his superiors, and his true loyalty to his country and the king. He spoke freely of his hatred for Archbishop Prażmowski, the French-born Queen Maria Ludwika, and their schemes to bring a Frenchman to the Polish throne; he could find no logical explanation for Lubomirski's being tried for aspiring to the Polish throne, and during the civil war his sentiments were with Lubomirski, even though his regiment stood on the side of the king.

Pasek also took an active part in the regional councils and Diets of the Polish Commonwealth and admonished all young men to do the same, for "all the public meetings in the world are mere shadows as compared to the meetings of the Diet! There one learned etiquette, law, and many things which one never heard of in school. I wish every one

[7] *Ibid.*, 6.

such a chance." [8] He attended the Diet in 1662 in Warsaw and the regional council meetings in Węgrzynowice in 1667; he gave precise instructions pertaining to the agenda of the Diet to the deputies of Rawa, while serving in the capacity of a deputy chamberlain there. He attended the funeral of Queen Ludwika in 1667 and the Diet in 1668 in Warsaw during which King Jan Kazimierz voluntarily proposed his abdication. He attended many more Diets in Warsaw and even several in Grodno. In 1669 he was present at the election of the king, and rejoiced over the choice of Michał Wiśniowiecki, a native Pole. He also attended the coronation ceremonies, the Coronation Diet immediately following, and the royal wedding in Częstochowa the next year. He participated in the election of King Jan Sobieski in 1674 and witnessed the burial of two Polish kings, Jan Kazimierz and Michał Wiśniowiecki, and the coronation ceremonies *of a third, all at the same time,* in Kraków, in 1675.

The range and scope of Pasek's experiences and interest are immense. He enjoyed the best military encampment of his life on the estate of the Castellan's wife [9] at Strzała in 1660, gave an eloquent eulogy in honour of Jan Rubieszowski and Jan Wojnowski, two companions at arms, fought duel with the Nuczyński brothers and Jasiński in Kozierady, and went on a mission to rescue the Polish envoys in Minsk during the battles with the Muscovites. He escorted the Muscovite envoys to Warsaw in 1662, saw Mazepa at the royal court once again, and went on an adventurous trip to Wilno. He witnessed Lubomirski's apology to the King and his taking of the oath of allegiance.

Czapliński attributes the varying length of the chapters to the interest which Pasek's listeners displayed in his respective stories, which quite justifiably accounts for the fact that certain portions of the *Memoirs* are treated in greater detail than others. The Swedish and Hungarian wars are described very briefly, for example; Czarniecki's expedition to Denmark, Pasek's debates with the senators in Grodno, the battles at Basia (Krzyczów) and Połonka, and the victory at Vienna, on the other hand, with greater detail and length; the years, 1670, 1671, 1675, 1679, 1681, and 1682 are covered in several sentences, while still other incidents are omitted in their entirely. The omissions of various facts can be attributed to the fact that he *Memoirs* were not written as the events occurred; quite naturally, the details of the less interesting stories fell into oblivion, while thanks to the many repetitions, the more popular ones were retained in his memory and faithfully recorded. The legal papers, royal letters, speeches, and other documents in the *Memoirs* can safely be considered authentic, for Pasek, like other Polish noblemen of the time, must have safeguarded and treasured them.

The historical significance of the *Memoirs* and their element of truth have been investigated by many Polish historians and other

[8] *Pam.*, 361.

[9] Castellan's wife—wife of Castellan Tomasz Olędzki na Chłędowie, who lived on an estate called Strzała, a village some three kilometers north of Siedlce. The estate Strzała belonged to her as the heiress of the Wodyński family.

scholars, yet their judgments are not uniform. Brückner [10] did not attach to them much historical value and Pollak maintained that Pasek was silent about some facts of his life and generally was not sincere about his life at all. Czermak disbelieved Pasek's narratives about the size of the enemy forces and smiles at his political credo, yet admitted that he willingly read the description of battles, beaming with life and full of enthusiasm, vivacity and humour.[11] Mickiewicz referred to the *Memoirs* as a historical romance, and Czubek went so far as to say that they are full of historical mistakes, that the dates are inaccurate, and that we cannot rely on them safely and should use them with great care. But the historical facts in the *Memoirs* serve merely as a background to the story of the author's life, a fact of which the author reminds us several times. "Not a history but a *cursum vitae meae* do I write, but *statum Reipublicae,* in order to remind myself of my deeds in case my memory were to fail me." [12]

Pasek did not record his life day by day and in cipher, like Pepys; quite rightly so writes Pietrkiewicz,

> he viewed the years from the comfortable perspective of old age. He had no political or religious cause to protect from the commentators of history, like the greatmasters of self-justification, e.g. the Duc de Saint-Simon. He wrote no spiritual autobiography like the prominent Jesuits of Saint Theresa. He possessed no intellectual subtlety, like John Evelyn, to deprive his record of the redeeming triviality which novelists yearn in their quest.[13]

Since the *Memoirs* were recorded toward the end of his life, historians should not expect any special accuracy in details such as numbers and dates. Historical precision is by no means to be expected in memoirs. It is amazing indeed that he remembered so much accurately.

Czapliński went further than most other Polish historians and literary scholars and quite correctly concluded that the *Memoirs* are an important historical source despite their want of precision; even though Pasek tends to magnify some events or change their course for the sake of witticism on occasion, he never completely invents them; though no expert in politics, he is nevertheless not quite ignorant of it. Numerous facts can be cited as examples of this theorem, such as Denmark's attitude toward Poland during the Swedish wars, the Great Elector's aspirations to the Polish throne, and the capture of Kolding; France's schemes in Poland, Condé's attitude toward Louis XIV, and the battle at Mątwy; the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki to the Polish throne, the confederacy of Gołąb, as well as many other facts, are shown in complete accordance with historical truth. The accusations of many

[10] Brückner, Aleksander, ed. Jan Pasek, *Pamiętniki.* Kraków: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1928. Pollak, Roman. ed. Jan Chryzostom Pasek, *Pamiętniki.* Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1963.

[11] Wiktor Czermak, "Szczęśliwy rok". *Przegląd Polski,* 1887, p. 509.

[12] *Pam., 158-9, 1659.*

[13] Pietrkiewicz, p. 448.

scholars that Pasek augmented the successes of his army by depicting the greatness, righteousness, unconquerability, valour, and courage of Polish soldiers and presented them in the most favourable colours are not justifiable in view of the findings of Czapliński [14] and others, which prove Pasek to be correct. Furthermore the historical sceptics should keep in mind that Pasek was above all a military man, and a brave soldier at that, and that his idolization of his army and his commander Stefan Czarniecki is quite genuine and sincere; also that the opinions of Polish historians on the seventeenth century are divided.

The *Memoirs* are filled with numerous authentic details. Pasek remembered correctly, for example, that his father died in a Christian way on the eve of St. Barbara, whom he worshipped, fully conscious, and as if falling asleep. He also recalled many years later than on August 8, 1667, when he was courting the widow, he was heartened when he saw her youngest daughter, Marysia, who was two years old at the time, and hoped that God might still give him a son. He remembered specific accounts of individuals, such as of Łukasz Wolski or the dragoon who killed the famous otter, and recalled well the reactions of various individuals to the events of the time. We can also rest assured that Czarniecki's words quoted in the *Memoirs* are authentic, for apparently nothing sticks more in the memory of old soldiers than the image of their leaders and their warm and encouraging words. Pasek remembered such visual details as that when the Voivode twisted his beard it was a sign of anger or worry, and recorded these for us many years later; and even such fantastic stories as those of the bear at Jan Kazimierz's court, Sułkowska's encounter with the King during the civil war, and the mysterious coral reef in the vicinity of the island Anholt in the middle of the Kattegat were not invented by him.

The *Memoirs* are furthermore an excellent reflection of the living speech of an ordinary Polish nobleman in the second half of the seventeenth century, a fine example of chatty style, and an excellent source of Polish customs of the time; a vivid picture of a nobleman-knight, citizen, and farmer. So far as the depiction of customs is concerned, the views of most literary scholars are in general agreement that no other work of the seventeenth-century Polish prose can compare with the *Memoirs*.

Negative descriptions of Pasek such as: a liar and an undistinguished man, a nationalist who disdained foreigners, a patriot who fought for both duty's and booty's sake, a superficially educated man without a broader political outlook, a fanatic without a deeper spiritual life, have appeared much too frequently in Polish criticism.

In reply to the argument that Pasek lies concerning his own personal affairs, we can quite safely maintain that truth-telling memoirists are virtually nonexistent. Every memoirist, whether intentionally or not, tries to represent himself and his deeds as favourably as possible, that is in a

[14] Władysław Czapliński, "Polacy z Czarnieckim w Danii (1658-1659)." *Rocznik Gdański* IX and X, 1937.

better light than his contemporaries would, and there is no reason why Pasek should be an exception to the rule. Though the aim of most of them is to give the truth about themselves, we can see that even in the case of St. Augustine the toil to recollect the truth proved futile at times. While our "inner censor" prevents us from hiding unpleasant memories from our consciousness, "we are often still incapable of speaking of our secret shame, however well we may know it is nothing abnormal or shocking to others." [15]

It can furthermore be maintained that even though Pasek was not a man of extremely high position, it seems quite unfair to call him undistinguished. Clever and greedy to the point that he called money the interpreter of his wishes, he was nevertheless capable of moderation, which he proved with the Danes and on numerous other occasions; as a soldier he showed bravery, valour, vitality, and courage, and did not side with the Swedish invader in 1657 or join the confederacy of rebelling soldiers in 1661, but remained faithfully on the side of his country and his king throughout, even though he stood to gain less by doing so. Pasek's misdemeanours need not be emphasized too much, for he was quite often in the right, nor should his weaknesses be stressed too much, for they can easily be explained in the light of the baroque. Viewed in the perspective of all men living in that age of endless quarrelling and duelling, boasting, and the restless search for power and personal success, indeed his faults seem relatively insignificant in the perspective of the entire European scene.

The Polish nation was the first in Europe to introduce a parliament based on the principle of liberty, equality and fraternity, writes Paul Cazin. [16] The *Memoirs* of Jan Pasek stress the true expression of the freedom-loving spirit of the Poles amidst all the baroque struggle for power and success and the swiftly changing fortunes of the time. For in this country

> . . . which was known as the asylum of heretics, where the churches stood next to synagogues and mosques and where there was a jealous spirit of liberty, a spirit partial to novelty, subtlety, and discussion . . .

liberalism and tolerance had been practiced for centuries.[17]

> Poland is the only example afforded by history, according to Winter of a nation deliberately committing self-destruction for the sake of absolute individual liberty.[18]

A born story-teller, Pasek must have disarmed his listeners with the vividness and colour of his stories, with the sincerity and humanity of his self-portrayal. His *Memoirs,* thus, are the most interesting, entertaining, and instructive Polish memoirs in existence. They are a valuable historical source all this criticism notwithstanding.

[15] Roy Pascal, *Design and Truth in Autobiography* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 61.
[16] Paul Cazin, *Poland* (Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1961), 18.
[17] *Ibid.*, 21.
[18] Winter, 8.

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GOLDONI'S COMEDIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLAND

Italian culture and civilisation flourished in Poland, mainly in the form of music, drama and poetry, since 1514, when King Zygmunt married Princess Bona Sforza and brought her to Cracow with an entourage of courtiers, musicians, painters, architects, gardeners and others. Italian literature flourished in translation: Castiglione's *Il cortegiano* appeared in a freely-rendered version by Łukasz Górnicki (1564), Tasso's *Gerusalemme liberata* was translated into *ottava rima* by Piotr Kochanowski (1614), and many of the *drammi sacre* of Metastasio were performed at the courts of the "Saxon" kings August II and his son August III in Warsaw between 1696 and 1764.[1]

August III was particularly fond of the Italian repertoire. Visits by companies of the *commedia dell'arte* to his court were frequent.[2] When their visits ended, he invited companies of Italian players to perform, and the repertoire in Warsaw, at the royal "Operalnia", included *Momolo cortesan, Momolo sull'Brenta, Le trentadue disgrazie d'Arlecchino, La donna di garbo, Il paroncin veneziano* and *I due gemelli veneziani* were performed in the 1748/9 season. Eleven more of Goldoni's comedies and *intermezzi* were performed between 1751 and 1756.[3]

When Stanisław August (Poniatowski) was elected to the throne of Poland in 1764, he at once established the National Theatre(Teatr narodowy) in Warsaw. There were already some half-dozen royal theatres in Warsaw: in the Royal Castle, at the Łazienki palace, and elsewhere. In addition, there was a number of other private theatres belonging to magnates and aristocrats. Similar private theatres are known to have existed in the provinces: the Radziwiłł family had their own at Nieśwież, the Branicki family at Białystok, and others. But almost nothing is known of these theatres.[4]

[1] David Welsh, "Tasso in Eastern Europe," *Italica* XLVIII (1971), pp. 345-52, and the same author, "Metastasio's Reception in 18th Century Poland and Russia," *Italica* XLI (1964), p.. 41-42, give brief accounts.

[2] Mieczyslaw Klimowicz, "Komedia dell'arte w Warszawie XVIII w.," *Pamiętnik literacki*, LXV (2), (1974), pp. 79-92. This essay was also published in French in *Italia, Venezia e Polonia tra Illuminismo e Romanticismo. Atti del III Convegno di Studi promosso e organizato dalla Fondazione Giorgio Cini* ... (Firenze, 1973).

[3] Mieczyslaw Klimowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.

[4] *Bibliografia literatury polskiej "Nowy Korbut"* 4 (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 152-89.

King Stanisław had several reasons for establishing a National Theatre: he wished to raise the cultural standards of Poland after 50 years under the Saxon kings. He sought also to rival other royal courts in Western Europe, especially that of France. But there were two difficulties: finding actors, and establishing a repertoire. To solve the first, the king sent Carlo Tomatis, whom he had appointed director of the National Theatre, to Venice. His task was to recruit Italian players, singers and ballet-dancers for Warsaw. At the same time, a small French company was invited also, though their stay was short and the French repertoire was less successful than the Italian.

Tomatis managed to bring back some thirty Italians for the first Warsaw season (Autumn-Spring, 1765/6), who performed several of Goldoni's latest comedies. By far the greatest success of the season was *La buona figliola,* in which Catterina Ristorini played Ceccina. Fashionable Warsaw was enraptured: ladies' dresses and hats, even flower-shops and boutiques were named after 'la Cecchina' and the play continued to hold its place in the repertoire of the National Theatre for at least two decades, being given in Italian and later in Polish translation (*Czekina*).

The Italian company also performed *Il mercato di Malmantile,* which was less successful, perhaps because of what Giuseppe Ortolani later described as its "pueriltà . . . improprietà" and "verse infame e zoppicante".[5] *Gli uccelatori* and *La Cassina* were also performed, again with Ristorini in leading roles.

During the next season (1766), *La calamità de'cuori* was produced, also *Le nozze di Dorina* and *Il signor dottore.* In 1767, the theatre was temporarily closed, due to lack of funds and disagreements behind the scenes. When it reopened a year later, an increasing number of Polish plays and foreign plays in Polish translation were staged. A large number of the latter were provided by Franciszek Bohomolec (1722-84).[6] He was a prolific writer and translator of plays, who wrote for the Jesuit school theatres and later for the National Theatre. Bohomolec spent some four years in Italy, and drew upon Goldoni's comedies for several of his own, which he transposed to a Polish setting and gave Polish names to characters. His *Figlacki kawaler z księżyca* (Figlacki, the man from the moon) draws copiously on Goldoni's scenario *Arlecchino imperatore nella luna* (1743) and his play introduces also features of the *commedia dell'arte* (*lazzi* e.g. beatings and like, and dialect). Likewise, his *Chelpliwiec (The Boaster)* derives from Goldoni's *Il bugiardo* and *I due gemelli veneziani* (which had already been performed at the Saxon court in Italian).

Bohomolec was eventually succeeded as director of the National Theatre by Wojciech Bogusławski (1757-1823), an even more prolific playwright and translator from Italian, French and German, who also

[5] *Tutte le opere di Carlo Goldini a cura di Giuseppe Ortolani XI'* (Milano, 1959), p. 1312.

[6] Jan Kott, ed. *Franciszek Bohomolec. Komedie.* 2 vols., (Warsaw, 1959), I, p. 31.

drew on Goldoni's comedies.[7] But the records of the theatrical repertoire under his direction are lamentably scanty. Often our knowledge of the plays presented between 1770 and 1790 are drawn from surviving playbills, the Warsaw newspapers, or private correspondence. Titles are frequently distorted, and often the author's name is not given, the work in question being identified as "from the Italian" or French as the case may be. Nor were the translators concerned to rely on the original language. A comedy entitled *La locandiera* was performed in 1775 and again in 1784, apparently by an otherwise unidentified Italian company. Was this Goldoni's celebrated piece? We do not know, since the records give no more than the title.[8]

During the next 25 years, i.e. until the National Theatre was closed in 1794, plays, operas and divertissements were performed in Polish, Italian, French and German alternately. The greatest success of the 1770's was *L'amore artegiano,* in a free version by Bogusławski (1771, 1774), followed by *Il viaggiatore ridicolo* (1775), *Fra i due litiganti, il terzo gode* and *La finta ammalata* (1776), and *La calamita de'cuori* was revived the same year. Bogusławski's Polish version of *L'avvocato veneziano* appeared in 1779 as *Mecenas poczciwy,* and another version was printed in 1787 with the title *Dziwak dobroczynny,* although the latter was not performed.

By the 1780's the German repertoire began outnumbering the Italian and French, with plays by Kotzebue, Lessing, Schiller etc.[9] However, Bogusławski's Polish version (from the French) of *I due gemelli veneziani* was performed in 1781. *Il feudatorio (Dziedzic)* is mentioned on a play-bill for 1780, and *Un curioso accidente* has survived in a manuscript translation, although there is no record of it being performed. In 1785, *Fra i due litiganti, il terzo gode* had nine performances in Italian, with revivals (in Polish) in 1788 and in German (1793). *Le bourreau bienfaisant,* again in a Polish version by Bogusławski (1785) was localised into a Polish setting, with Polish names and manners, and proved a popular success in Warsaw and elsewhere.

Before the final closure of the National Theatre in 1795, *Il talismano* was given three performances in German (1790), and a Polish version of *Il vero amico (Przyjaciel prawdziwy)* also had three performances that year. The intermezzo *L'amante militare* was performed twice.

One of Bogusławski's main achievements in the Polish theatre of his time was frequent tours of the provinces. His companies, despite innumerable hardships, performed in most of the major Polish town, in-

[7] F. Raszewski. Bogusławski. 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1972), *passim.*

[8] Ludwik Bernacki. *Teatr, dramat i muzyka ze Stanisława Augusta,* 2 vols. (Lwów, 1925). This compendium of materials is still the primary source for such material, the originals having been destroyed in World War II.

[9] Jan Kott, *ed., Teatr narodowy w Warszawie 1765-1794* (Warsaw, 1967). See also Mieczysław Klimowicz, *Początki teatru stanisławowskiego* (Warsaw, 1965). A brief survey of Goldoni's reception in Poland is Mieczysław Brahmer, „Goldoni in Polonia", in *Studi Goldoniani* a cura di Vittorio Branca (Venezia-Roma, 1957), pp. 239-46.

cluding Lwów, Wilno, Poznań, Kalisz, Białystok, Gdańsk and Dubno. The repertory of these companies included Polish versions and adaptations of *La famiglia del' antiquario, Il servitore, Il bugiardo, Le donne curiose, L'amante militare, L'amore artegiano* and *Il vero amico.* But the manuscripts have all disappeared, and other of Goldoni's comedies may well have been performed under different titles.

Although Goldoni's comedies and intermezzi had their greatest popular success in Poland during the latter part of the eighteenth century, a number have of course remained in the repertoire of the leading Polish theatres in Warsaw and the provinces until the present time. In addition, three volumes of his comedies in translation, with useful introductions, were published in the series "National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa)" (Ossolineum) between 1951 and 1957.

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AMERICA VIEWS POLAND: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FINAL PARTITION TO THE REBIRTH OF THE POLISH NATION **

At the turn of the twentieth century one observer of American-Polish attitudes commented: "The partition of Poland a century and a half ago was long the favourite example for American orators of a great international crime. And until within a couple of decades, the interest of our people in Poland remained largely rhetorical and literary... yet even now it may be doubted if Americans have anything like an adequate realization of the unhappy plight of the Polish provinces of Russia, Austria and Prussia".[1]) This rather astute perspective suggests

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**The scope of this survey is somewhat pretentious. The author would like, accordingly, for the reader to be reminded of the physical dimensions of the problem, which necessitated a limitation of sources that could be consulted. To this end only printed materials were used ,and only those of national prominence. Hence local newspapers and the like were eliminated. Further, the author is aware of the difficulties of assessing public opinion. Most of the periodicals consulted, for example, *Harpers Monthly, North American Review* and *The Saturday Evening Post,* did not contain any material pertaining to Poland during the years covered and are not cited. Thus there is a considerable reliance on smaller number of sources *(Niles Weekly Register* or *The Nation)* which indicates an inadequate appraisal of public opinion, but they were the only sources containing data.

I should like to emphasize that this is a pioneer effort, undertaken by one whose field is Nineteenth Century American History. It is offered as an exploratory effort rather than as an assertive analysis. I embraced this undertaking because it is my belief that American historians are much too isolationist in their discipline and should be more cognisant of the world around them.

Inasmuch as this essay represents an American image of Poland, there are naturally, few references to standard Polish histories by non-American scholars. The major statements on Polish history, the *Cambridge History of Poland* and Wandycz's *Partitioned Lands of Poland,* have been consulted for guidance and assistance.

Finally, the author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Piotr S. Wandycz, of Yale University, for criticism of a most significant nature and to Miss Susan Fought, my graduate assistant at Texas A & M for thoughtful and thorough aid. But most of all to my friend Stanisław Bóbr-Tylingo of St. Mary's University, Halifax, Canada, for introducing me to the courage of the Polish people.

[1] *The Nation,* 99 (Dec. 24, 1914), 732.

that Americans possessed a self-serving image of Poland — one long on talk and short on substance. Its astuteness is verified by a survey of American concepts of Poland from the final partition to the rebirth of that nation.

During the era of its revolution America went through a process of developing a nation while Poland went through a process of being dismembered. The fall of Poland to an America on the rise did not go unobserved; many speculated as to the why. The political system of Poland which had created a state of constant and corrosive factionalism was singled out as a major factor for the decline. In 1764 Benjamin Franklin wrote: "Abroad the Poles are cutting one another's throat a little... (and) sacrificing a few thousand citizens ever so often... if they are fond of this Privilege, I don't know that their neighbours have any right to disturb them of the enjoyment of it".[2]) Thomas Jefferson, in 1778, saw Poland once more on the verge of a self-inflicted crisis. He suggested that the separation of powers in that country, whereby the Diet controlled by Prussia and the King controlled by Russia enabled Poles to work against Poles and so appealed to their individual interests that any attempt for a national consensus was impossible. A few decades later he would reaffirm that conclusion.[3]) During the Constitutional Convention Alexander Hamilton warned the Founding Fathers against constructing a government so dispersed in power that the example of Poland would be repeated. He declared: "Poland as a government of local sovereignties might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more strikingly be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defence it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbours".[4])

The dismemberment of Poland was therefore viewed by Americans with disdain, misunderstanding and a large dose of cynicism. Hamilton welcomed it, thinking perhaps some profitable trade with the more friendly Prussia could be gained.[5]) He also hoped that as the European powers greedily fought over the bones of Poland they would be distracted from preying upon the struggling American colonies.[6]) John Adams disagreed. He could not see how a Poland depopulated by war, suffering from unsettled and divisive conditions could be a potential source of commerce. He was honourable enough, however, to condemn the treatment rendered that poor shattered nation.[7])

Throughout American history this final partition has received

[2] Leonard Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, (New Haven, 1967), II, 17-18.

[3] Andrew Lipscomb, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, (Washington D.C., 1903), VII, 222, 224-25; XIII, 66.

[4] Harold C. Syrett, ed., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, (N.Y., 1961), IV, 194, 201, 204; Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention* of 1787, (New Haven, 1924), I, 290.

[5] Syrett, *ibid.*, I, 276.

[6] *Ibid*, XVI, 15.

[7] Charles Francis Adams, ed., *The Works of John Adams*, (Boston, 1852), VII, 108.

numerous interpretations. George Bancroft, one of the nation's first professional historians, wrote that the partition was disgraceful, but apparently only because Poles had played a meritorious rôle in the winning of the war for independence. He had approved the second partition because it had been a victory for Protestantism.[8]) After the Civil War Congressman and cabinet officer George Boutwell deplored the final partition, but only because it dispersed countless revolutionaries into other European countries enabling them to work their agitation elsewhere.[9]) More recently Thomas A. Bailey has concluded that Americans received the news of dismemberment with sorrow and repulsion, deploring the greed of those European countries partaking of the benefits.[10]) This view, however, does not correlate with most interpretations. Other historians have expressed the general American evaluation of the fall of Poland by blaming their incompetent aristocracy who held the value of their lands above the welfare of their nation. And one commentator, who has exhibited an extreme anti-Polish bias, has labelled the partition a blessing, welcomed by most Poles, bringing law and order after two hundred years of lawlessness.[11])

Between the Final Partition and the Great Uprising of 1830 Americans paid minimal attention to Poland. The creation of the Duchy of Warsaw by Napoleon was welcomed, as were most activities by the French in those days of anti-British feelings.[12]) Conditions under the revived state have been described as liberal, responsive to the needs of the people, with much being accomplished. Emphasis, however, was given to the French influence, thereby suggesting that the Poles were not entirely responsible for any progress made.[13])

The deliberations by the Congress of Vienna over the future of Poland disturbed the Americans. The creation of the Kingdom of Poland, which in effect was a vassal-state of the Russian Tsar, elicited harsh anti-Russian denunciations and sympathetic pro-Polish declarations. It was felt that Poland, in view of its tragic past, deserved complete and genuine independence. This initial reaction, however, was considerably tempered when several leading Polish citizens openly accepted

[8] George Bancroft, *History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent*, (N.Y., 1967), II, 475; IV, 276; V, 104, 150, 182, 432ff.; VI, 473.

[9] George S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs*, (N.Y., 1902), I, 145.

[10] Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day*, (Ithaca, 1950), pp. 9-10.

[11] John B. Rae and Thomas H. D. Mahoney, *The United States in World Affairs From Its Beginnings to World Leadership*, (N.Y. 1955), 56-58; Louis S. Gerson, *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920*, (New Haven, 1952), 1-3. It should be pointed out that Gerson is not a professional historian and is regarded by serious Polish scholars as weak in Polish history. See the review of his work in *The American Historical Review*, vol. 60 (1954-55) pp. 203-04. Also comments to the author from Professors Stanisław Bóbr-Tylingo and Piotr S. Wandycz.

[12] *Niles Weekly Register*, 3, (Sept. 26, 1812), 50-51.

[13] Julia Swift Orvis, "Partitioned Poland, 1795-1914" in Bernadotte E. Schmidt, ed., *Poland*, (Berkeley, 1945), pp. 49-52.

the new "Constitution of the Polish Kingdom" (which had granted a considerable degree of local autonomy). And when Alexander I was enthusiastically greeted by crowds of Poles, the Americans wondered if the Poles really desired their own sovereignty.[14])

Policies pursued by Russia in its newly acquired province, however, received a most unfavourable press. The creation of economic monopolies did not set well with those theoretical advocates of the free enterprise system. Compulsory military training was condemned as creating a militaristic state. Suppression of speech was denounced. And when the Tzar opened the Polish Diet in 1820, with a throne address warning that his principles would never be compromised, these autocratic threats were sharply denounced.[15])

These condemnations, however, should not be interpreted as indicating an all favourable image of Polish society for a number of adverse judgements were made. Singled out for criticism were such situations as the Polish nobility supporting the Russians and the decadent and degenerate life of the upper classes with their exploitation of the lower classes. But, in sum the general tone was that Poland was at the mercy of a harsh fate.[16])

When the Great Uprising of 1830 broke out several Americans rallied behind the cause. James Fenimore Cooper, visiting Paris at the time, organized a committee of Americans to raise funds for the Poles.[17]) In Boston over $2,000 was donated by William Ellery Canning's congregation, standards were erected in honour of the fight and speeches of support forthcoming. Similar meetings and activities took place in Philadelphia, New York and Brooklyn. As a symbol of American sympathy the Congress donated, in an unusual act of generosity, 23,000 acres of land in Illinois to exiles who escaped after the uprising collapsed.[18]) Even John Randolph (a pronounced slaveholder) protested to President Jackson the harsh suppression that followed.[19]) A point was even reached whereby the Russian Ambassador formally protested against the harsh anti-Russian tone of the American press, causing a slight diplomatic flurry.[20])

The severe repressive tactics adopted by Russia to crush the rebellion were roundly condemned. A "Death March" of 48,000 prisoners

[14] *Niles Weekly Register*, 7, (Jan. 14, 1815), 20; (Mar. 4, 1815), 430; (July 29, 1815), 64; and 9 (Oct. 21, 1815), 132; (Dec. 9, 1815), 260.

[15] *Ibid.*, 10 (Aug. 17, 1816), 409; 12 (Mar. 8, 1817), 30; 17 (Nov. 27, 1819), 173; 19 (Nov. 11, 1820), 172-73.

[16] *Ibid.*, 12 (June 7, 1817), 237; 13 (Nov. 1, 1817), 157; 19 (Oct. 28, 1825), 128; H. H. Fisher, *America and the New Poland*, (N.Y., 1928) p. 25.

[17] James Franklin Beard, ed., *The Letters and Journals of James Fenimore Cooper*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), III, 35-36; VI, 309-10.

[18] *Niles Weekly Register*, 46 (July 19, 1832), 348; (May 3, 1833), 166-167; (May 17, 1834), 196-97; 41 (Sept. 24, 1831), 69.

[19] John Spencer Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, (Washington, D.C. 1929), IV, 419-20.

[20] William Appleton Williams, *American-Russian Relations 1781-1947*, (N.Y., 1952), pp. 17-19; Jerzy Jan Lerski, *A Polish Chapter in Jacksonian America: The United States and the Polish Exiles of 1831*, (Madison, 1958), p. 28ff.

into the interior of Russia and the cruelty of the despotic rule of the Tzar for condoning mass killings were singled out as especially harsh.[21]) In general there was considerable castigation of the treatment meted out to the Poles.

Behind the surface, however, a different undercurrent flowed. The American Minister to Russia, James Buchanan wrote that the harshness adopted to restore order was greatly exaggerated. He justified all retaliatory activity on the grounds that an assassination plot against the Tzar had been uncovered and hence required appropriate response. Buchanan casually dismissed allegations that Russia looted the provinces of Poland, taking back to the homeland treasures, machinery and other items of value. He noted that only symbolic works had been confiscated — thrones, flags, sceptres and the like.[22])

Anti-Polish criticisms emanated from other quarters. Poles were accused of assisting the Russians in crushing the uprising. Gangs of Poles were reported to have hung people from lamp posts in vigilante fashion with summary justice as the order of the day.[23]) To cap the image, the major reason for the failure of the uprising was assigned to Polish factionalism with many aiding the Russians. Americans believed that intrigue, conspiracy, internal bickering and mutual suspicion took precedent in this great hour of decision.[24])

Revealing in this context is a journal notation by Ralph Waldo Emerson. In the midst of this crisis he noted that all of Polish history was not equal to the idea of John Locke, namely the necessity to defend private property.[25]) And even Fenimore Cooper's commitment becomes less than a genuine feeling when one reads a letter he wrote to George Washington Lafayette in 1834. The purpose of that particular correspondence was to request the Marquis's son to recover $100 he had loaned to a Polish general exiled in Paris after the collapse of the revolt.[26])

The general American reaction to the uprising of 1830 has been ably summarized by Jerzy Jan Lerski in *A Polish Chapter in Jacksonian America: The United States and the Polish Exiles of 1831.* A two part theme emerges from this study: that initially a genuine and sincere feeling of sympathy and concern for the Poles swept the country, quickly replaced by realism and self-interest. The granting of lands, the raising of sums of money and the voting of resolutions of support was one thing; application of these noble thoughts another. This discrepancy be-

[21] *Niles Weekly Register*, 42 (Aug. 18, 1832), 23; 44 (June 8, 1833), 238; (Aug. 17, 1833), 408.

[22] John Bassett Moore, ed., *The Works of James Buchanan*, (Phil., 1908), II, 303, 354, 364-65.

[23] *Niles Weekly Register*, 41 (Nov. 12, 1831), 201-02; (Nov. 5. 1831), 177-78.

[24] Julia Swift Orvis, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58; *Niles Weekly Register*, 41 (Oct. 22, 1831), 455-56.

[25] Merton M. Sealts, Jr., ed., *The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, (Cambridge, 1973), III, 197-98.

[26] *Cooper Papers*, III, 49-50.

tween theory and practice is well illustrated by the reception given to those Polish exiles who attempted to settle upon the lands granted by Congress. There, in Illinois, the noble dream became an ignoble nightmare. American suspicions, greed, hostility to foreigners (particularly Catholic) and land speculators rendered the experiment a dismal tragedy. As Lerski puts it "The great outburst of American sympathy towards Poland was sincere but it could not be sustained indefinitely . . . practical every-day considerations of domestic policy in their cumulative massivity outweighed it".[27]) Lerski, however, might be charitable in his summation. That sympathy, while probably sincere by those who expressed it, was perhaps superficial and hence could not be sustained.

More explanatory, however, is the nature of American-Russian relations, not only from 1776 on, but specifically after 1830. In those years, relations between the two countries improved considerably, thus augmenting the anti-Polish attitude which had existed subliminally since the days ot fhe revolution. Emerson aptly verifies these on-going themes in a diary note of 1843. Orators in America and statesmen in Europe, he wrote, were much too harsh on Russia's treatment of the Poles. He thought the Russian government was composed of gentlemen of intelligence and good manners pursuing a wise policy. The Anglo-Saxon governments, however, comprised of politicians and demagogues on the make were pursuing an unenlightened policy of fantasy.[28])

This dichotomy of attitude — a surface sympathy that was superficial, appears once more in American reaction to the revolutions and uprisings of 1847-1848. Rhetorical indignation everywhere condemned the harsh suppression of these challenges; both Russia and Prussia received a bad press. Public opinion supported the revolutions in principle. In detail, however, a different picture emerges. *Niles Weekly Register* condemned the Polish aristocracy for siding with the Russians and Prussians and thus suppressing the movement in order to prevent any economic and social reform. More revealing, however, is that many marvelled at Russian efficiency in establishing the "principle of legitimacy".[29])

Emerson probably best expressed the general American attitude towards these revolutions. In Paris at the time, he heard Lamartine deliver his famous speech calling for French support of the insurgents. His reaction to the address: France should mind her own business and leave Russia and Poland alone. The same applied for America.[30]) This position of non-interference was echoed by the American Minister to Great

[27] Jerzy Lerski, *op. cit.*, p. 145 and passim. Lerski incorrectly interprets a township as containing 23 acres. (pp. 145 and 215). It should read 23,000 acres, or thirty-six square miles.

[28] *Emerson Journals, IX*, 17.

[29] *Niles Weekly Register*, 7 (Oct. 2, 1847), 69-70; (Oct. 9, 1847), 96; Arthur J. May, *Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe*, (Phil., 1927).

[28] *Emerson Journals, IX*, 17.

Britain, Edward Everett and probably reflected the basic belief of most Americans.[31])

The Crimean War is another footnote illustration of the contradiction between America's rhetorical support but practical indifference towards the Poles. After years of praise for the Russians, with abundant suggestions that Poland was best served by the government of the Tzar, they could not understand why the Poles did not take advantage of the Russian preoccupation in the Crimea and launch an insurrection.[32]) And when James Buchanan, now at the Court of St. James, received a delegation of the Polish Democratic Union, he was most cordial to them. He recorded that his sympathies, as always, lay on the side of the Poles who had been the object of high-handed robbery and greed. He ardently desired their independence.[33]) Such reversals of opinion can either be considered as intellectual re-orientation or cynicism. Given Buchanan's character there is little to suggest the former; and much to suggest the latter.

The American ambivalence towards Poland reached a climax during the January uprising of 1863. That insurrection underlined another prevailing dilemma — a rhetorical sympathy for the Polish cause, but an understanding with Russia. This pro-Russian attitude had characterized most of American-Russian relations since the American Revolution. The Russian support of the Americans in that struggle against Great Britain; the mutual respect developed between the two nations during the diplomatic spadework of John Quincy Adams; the abnegation by Russia to claims of the Pacific North-west and other acts of mutuality had contributed to this American-Russian rapprochement. And in 1861 when the Tzar conditionally abolished serfdom within his domains, pro-Russian sympathies became more pronounced. Implicit in these developments, of course, is down-grading of pro-Polish sympathies.[34])

More than assumed humanitarian reasons, however, sustained and reinforced this Russian-American Entente. Russia, alone of the major European powers, adopted a friendly policy towards America in its struggle to maintain the Union, at least friendly in the sense of not being hostile. By the summer of 1862 the United States and Russia, therefore, had reached an informal agreement that both countries would pursue a policy of non-interference in respect to each other's affairs and thus pragmatically aid each other.[35])

Thus when the 1863 uprising broke out, any official American response was pre-conditioned, by this understanding with Russia and by

[81] Henry Blumenthal, *France and the United States, Their Diplomatic Relations*, 1789-1914, (Chapel Hill, 1950); pp. 56-57; May, *op. cit.*, 124.

[32] Fisher, *op. cit.*, 27.

[33] *Buchanan Works*, IX, 179 & 289.

[84] John W. Wieczerzak, *A Polish Chapter in Civil War America: The Effects of the January Insurrection on American Opinion and Diplomacy*, (N.Y., 1967), p. 21ff.

[35] John Bigelow, *Retrospectations of an Active Life*, (N.Y., 1909), I, passim; Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy*, (N.Y., 1964), p. 302ff.

the grave internal problems confronting the nation. Further, the championship of the Poles by Louis Napoleon, at best a thorn in the side of America, did not contribute to any desire for the Americans to question a pro-Russian policy. Their response to the crisis, labelled by one authority as "cautious sympathy" was hence predictable. Cautious because of the desire not to alienate Russia; sympathy, only in the context as prevailed in 1830.[36])

Very little genuine sympathy can be discerned by the American government (and for the most part by a majority of the people) for the Polish cause. President Lincoln understandably viewed the uprising entirely in terms of national self-interest almost to the point of coldheartedness. At first he feared the situation might lead to an Anglo-French alliance, against Russia, leading to a general war that would prove harmful to the United States. Later he shifted to the position that the uprising was a positive good because it served to distract Europe from America's problems.[37]) More meaningful for his purpose, however, was the importance of the principle: if interference were advocated then a two-edged sword would have been forged which could be swung against America.[38]) That Lincoln would have supported non-interference, regardless of the domestic situation, was an already established fact. In 1852 he had served on a committee for the state of Illinois which had passed resolution praising the Hungarian attempt at self-determination, and condemning Russia for interfering in that struggle. But the resolutions also emphasized the traditional isolation attitude of American-European relations. It was obvious, therefore, that America's only position would be one of non-interference.[39])

What is significant, however, in evaluating the American reaction to the uprising is the tone of its official policy. The note of May 11, 1863 of Secretary of State Seward rejecting the proposal of Louis Napoleon to intervene in the Polish-Russia confrontation demonstrates a harsh anti-Polish attitude. That note — which surely had the approval of Lincoln — invoked the traditional American policy of non-interference in European affairs, and Europe in American. The Farewell Address of Washington and the Monroe Doctrine were cited as diplomatic stepstones. This by itself was sufficient ground for rejection of Napoleon's note, and had matters been permitted to remain at that stage, refusal to participate would have been legitimate and understandable. But the note contained certain phrases which in the context were unnecessary and only served to raise considerable doubts about America's true attitude to the Poles. References were made to the enlightened and humane character of the Tzar, of the impartial justice and administration within his realm, phrases calculated to appease the Tzar, but callously insensitive to the

[36] Wieczerzak, *op. cit.*, 61ff.
[37] Jay Monaghan, *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Affairs, (N.Y., 1945), pp. 290-92; 319 & 337.*
[38] Blumenthal, *op. cit.*, 103-104.
[39] Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,* (New Brunswick, 1953), II, 115.

Polish struggle. There was no dire need to substantially underline the American friendship with Russia, non-interference by itself was sufficient. But if the American sympathy for the Poles was more than platitudinous piety, these phrases were hypocritical for some sympathy for their cause could have been expressed without alienating Russia, particularly by a person so dexterous with words as Seward.[40])

Other reactions to the uprising serve to emphasize the harsh American view of Poland. The Minister to Russia, Cassius M. Clay, labelled the insurrection a plot of Roman Catholics against Greek Catholics and therefore deserve to be repressed, if need be harshly.[41]) And in London the Secretary of the American Legation, Bayard Taylor, puzzled over the question of why the Poles did not appreciate the goodness of the Tzar, who was acting in their best interests according to Taylor. They were better served by the Tzar than they would be by themselves.[42]) And in Paris John Bigelow, like Lincoln, saw the misfortune of the Poles as America's good fortune.[43])

Between 1865-1914 Polish nationalists shifted their strategy from insurrectory tactics to that of boring from within in order to build a solid base upon which a rebirth of their nation could be established. One writer was misleadingly characterized this period as a time when Poles were absorbed with material pursuits, with most classes opposed to national unity, and only the intelligentsia manoeuvring for independence.[44]) If this is true, then it matches what was happening in America. During those years the United States underwent an economic revolution which substantially altered its basic structure — shifting from a small business, agrarian economy to a massive corporate materialistic one. In the process all the prevailing patterns of life were changed and challenged. A fundamental alteration in immigration patterns accompanied that shift with increasing numbers coming from eastern and southern Europe as opposed to the old areas of northern Europe and England. Subsequently the American attitude towards eastern central Europeans, previously indifferent due to a lack of numbers, becomes almost contemptuous.[45])

That shift to blatant prejudice started as soon as the Civil War was over. America, as it faced the problem of reuniting the nation, was reminded of how internal factionalism had led to the demise of Poland, and like the Founding Fathers were determined to avoid a duplication.

[40] George E. Baker, ed., *The Works of William H. Seward,* (Boston, 1884), V, 328-84; Harold E. Binn, "Seward and the Polish Rebellion of 1863", *American Historical Review,* (1940), 828ff.; Daniel B. Carroll, *Henri Mercier and the American Civil War,* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 15-19.

[41] James Bond Robertson, *A Kentuckian at the Court of the Tzars, The Ministry of Cassius Marcelius Clay to Russia,* (Berea College, 1935), p. 150ff.

[42] Wieczerzak, *op. cit.;* pp. 83 & 88.

[43] Bigelow, *op. cit.,* II, 75.

[44] Gerson, *op. cit.,* pp. 8-9. That Gerson does not understand the nature of Polish society during this era of "positivism" is seen in Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland,* (Seattle, 1974), Chapter 13.

[45] John Higham, *Strangers in the Land,* (N.Y., 1955), pp. 72-75.

George Templeton Strong, taking note of the divisiveness within America, warned that factionalism in Poland practically required her elimination. As he expressed it: "They made her a nuisance to her neighbours and too weak to prevent them from abating her and using her to manure their estates".[46])

This image of Poles being a factious people conditioned American minds as immigration from Poland multiplied — some 500,000 migrating between 1865-1910.[47]) They posed a considerably assimilation challenge in a predominantly Anglo-Saxon nation. Marked differences of culture stood out. Poles were clannish, and vodka drinkers, Roman Catholics who spoke some strange dingaling language. One political scientist, Woodrow Wilson, in a much too quoted comment, referred to these immigrants as coming from a mean order, of lower classes, composed of a sordid group of dumb and troublesome beings who threatened the vitality of American life.[48]) The strongest expression of repulsion appeared in Josiah Strong's *Our Country.* He believed that world salvation depended upon the survival of Anglo-Saxon values as personified in America. Threatening this salvation were those motley immigrants from eastern Europe with their intemperance, Catholicism, provincial ways, possessing insane and criminal tendencies.[49]) And a prominent historian of the era echoed these sentiments labelling Slavs as an illiterate, undesirable social and political lot.[50]) John Higham, a most distinguished historian on the impact in America of this "new immigration" has demonstrated that the general American image and attitude was uncharitable at best, hostile in general and cruel in several ways.[51]) To climax this view a special presidential commission appointed in 1911 studied the patterns of immigration and concluded that Poles were highstrung, temperamental, revolutionary malcontents with an inordinate degree of insanity and criminality.[52])

Reporters and periodical writers travelling through Poland during these years fanned the outbursts of intolerance and added to the long history of America's backhanded sympathy for Poland. One, who maintained an affection for the Poles and foresaw a rosy future for them, em-

[46] Allan Nevins and Milton Halsey Thomas, ed., *The Diary of George Templeton Strong, the Postwar Years,* 1867-1875, (N.Y., 1952), IV, 21.

[47] Fisher, *op. cit.,* 55.

[48] Woodrow Wilson, *A History of the American People, Reunion and Nationalization,* (N.Y., 1901), V, 212-13. I am indebted to Professor Betty Unterberger of the Texas A & M History Faculty for this qualification of Wilson. Currently she is preparing a monograph on his rôle in the restructuring of Austria-Hungary.

[49] Josiah Strong, *Our Country, Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis,* (N.Y., 1912), passim.

[50] John Holladay Latane, *America as a World Power, 1897-1907,* (N.Y., 1907), p. 286.

[51] See Higham *op. cit.*

[52] *Presidential Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Hearings, v. Dictionary of Races,* (Wash. D.C., 1911).

phasized that the vodka bottle constituted their main source of solace.[53]) A second suggested that Poland, split into a dozen different factions, was no longer a menace to the Tzar. He concluded that Poles had failed to learn the lesson of brotherhood, solidarity, energy and perseverance. Its best possible hope, apparently a lamentable one, was that she might become prey to socialistic schemes.[54]) And a third condemned the Germanification of Poland at the turn of the century, but not because it denied Poland her nationality. Rather he feared such a policy would lead to a "slavonization peril" which could have been prevented by a better assimilation policy.[55])

Thus on the verge of World War I the general American conception of Poland had changed very little in more than a century. The Poles were a nuisance, incapable of self-government, highly erratic and certainly most undesirable. Years of tragedy had taught them little, and centuries of assumed culture had failed to civilize them. They were far better off being governed by Russia, Prussia and Austria. But, of course, they were entitled to their own national existence.

The years of World War I altered temporarily, some of these adverse attitudes. Wilson, who had repented his earlier views (because of politics and propaganda) exerted what influence he could on behalf of the war sufferers. And, in part, influenced by Colonel House, a close friend of Paderewski, he would call for a free and independent Poland in his Fourteen Points — Point Thirteen.[56]) That sentiment was shared by Secretary of State Lansing, but qualified to the degree that a free Poland should not include either the Ukraine or Lithuania.[57])

The liberal American press, however, did not possess sufficient confidence in Polish character to share in the enthusiasm for a rebirth of that nation. One journalist speculated, "It is certain that they are not strong enough to defend themselves against their powerful neighbours. It is by no means certain that they are competent for self-government. Their history does not indicate they are".[58]) Another believed that the arrogant pride and egotism of the Poles, their unwillingness to compromise when necessary, their inherent lack of capacity for co-operation, traits of the tragic history of Poland's past, would only ensure an equally tragic future. For, he observed, "if Polish history means anything it means that long continued Polish independence is impossible".[59]) And Albert Putney, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the State Depart-

[53] Edward Steiner, "Cracow and Polish Patriotism", *Outlook*, 70 (Mar. 1, 1902), 539-47.

[54] Robert Atter, "Poland Today", *North American Review*, 181 (July, 1905), 99-100.

[55] "The Polish Question", *Outlook*, 73 (Mar. 7, 1908), 531-33.

[56] Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, (Boston, 1928), III, 43; IV. 262-64; Victor S. Mametey, *The United States and East Central Europe*, (Princeton, 1957), 49 & 84.

[57] Mametey, *op. cit.*, 92; Gerson, p. 77.

[58] "The Problems of European Peace", *Outlook*, 114 (Jan. 10, 1917), 58-60.

[59] Gregory Mason, "Poland's Future: Russian or German", *Outlook*, 112 (Feb. 2, 1916), 273-77.

ment, half-heartedly endorsed Polish independence, taking pains to underline their anti-semitic and imperialistic deficiencies.[60]).

In the meantime, Wilson and House diplomatically pressed forward for a free Polish state. Their pro-Polish attitude, however, was conditional; it was not based entirely upon the lofty principle of self-determination. One aspect of that policy was to woo Polish support away from the Central Powers — those nations needing Poles in their armies "proclaimed the existence of the hereditary Kingdom of Poland on November 5, 1916". Further, when the New Kingdom, under Pilsudski, did not include any German or Austrian Polish territories, and in fact was under considerable German control, American attention became focussed upon the Polish question.[61]) Once Russia was removed from the war the idea was advanced that Poland would be an ideal buffer state between the western and communistic world. This anti-communism figured significantly in persuading Americans of the desirability for an independent Poland.[62])

With independence achieved, the Polish government faced a host of internal and external problems. Herbed Hoover has itemized a number of them: anarchy, famine, disease, homes destroyed, bankruptcy, revenue sources depleted, and a population demoralized by years of war and subjugation.[63]) He, however, was most disturbed by the socialistic tendencies of the new government. To him Piłsudski, who unlike his peers had an awareness of the lot of the common man, was a most dangerous being. To this end, therefore, America's economic leverage was used to counter-balance Piłsudski by having Paderewski made Prime Minister while Piłsudski remained as head of the government.[64])

This forced replacement did not set well with American liberals, smacking as it did of Wilsonian interference in Mexico. Paderewski was considered a tool of the reactionaries in Poland and their cohorts in America. Further, the instability of changing government so quickly, particularly under the opera-comique tactics used, suggested that the new Poland was going the way of the old Poland.[65])

Certain domestic and foreign policies adopted by reborn Poland created a most unfavourable image in the minds of American critics. Anti-semitism, a trait commonly associated with the Poles, appeared to be in the ascendancy when the new Polish state failed to suppress an outburst of anti-semiticism. Henry S. Morgenthau, Sr., investigated these incidents and reported that considerable anti-Jewish feelings and prac-

[60] Mametey, *op. cit.*, 92.
[61] Raymond Leslie Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (N.Y., 1939), p. 66.
[62] Seymour, *op. cit.*, III, 43, IV, 262-64; Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 79ff.
[63] Herbert Hoover, *Further Addresses upon the American Road*, (N.Y., 1940), p. 227 ff.
[64] Herbert Hoover, *An American Epic*, (Chicago, 1961), III, chap. VIII; Bernadotte E. Schmidt, "Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1932", in Schmidt, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 73; Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[65] Albert C. Barnes, "The Paderewski Adventure", *The New Republic*, 17 (Jan. 25, 1919), 367ff.

tices did exist in Poland.[66]) It also looked as if the Polish aristocracy had not learned their lessons of the past; that they were still living in the middle ages, functioning under the notion that the masses were there to exploit. In Poland, wrote one observer, there are no fourteen points.[67]) This same attitude seemed to be common, for another writer commented, "The Polish situation is helpless . . . An estrangement from reality exists in all aspects of Polish life. . . Poland is drifting toward a catastrophe".[68])

Most disturbing to Americans were the expansionistic tendencies of Poland. On the spot commentators and most subsequent historians have been highly critical of those disturbing imperialistic ambitions of Poland while the world was caught up in a maelstrom. The claims to Lithuania, the Ukraine and Galicia led many to believe that Poland's main object was to recreate an old passé glory. Woodrow Wilson, at least a sympathetic friend of the nation, softened his views, wondering perhaps if he had been misled as to Polish respect for self-determination of nations.[69]) To some it appeared that Poland's aspirations were dangerous both to the stability of its existence and to the peace of Europe. The interpretation, therefore, was drawn that after the Western world had done all that it could to assure a free Poland, it was being rewarded with an unrealistic and troublesome governmental policy. One, however, contends that the Poles were moderate in their claims, in terms of both their historic claims and what they could have seized from Russia.[70])

The American officials were considerably embarrassed by these Polish projections, but argued for the integrity of the government. In 1920 after the Russians had penetrated deep into Polish territory and a new dark hour had descended, Secretary of State Colby called for the continued independence of Poland.[71])

Historians have been as critical of the policies pursued by Poland after its rebirth as were commentators of the time. Thomas A. Bailey has written: "Nations like Poland had received much but were greedily reaching out for more".[72]) Another has condemned the attempt of Poland to recreate its old grandeur, and has pictured it as government floating around without any sense of perspective.[73]) And a third has suggested that Poland, better off partitioned, was once more proving the wisdom of that state of being.[74])

[66] Eugene S. Bagger, "Poland and the Jewish Problems", *The Nation*, 108 (Jan. 25, 1919), 135-37; Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

[67] "Paderewski's Adventure", *The Nation*, 108, (June 17, 1919) 908-09.

[68] Benjamin Ginzburg, "The Tragedy that is Poland", *The Nation*, 111, (July 17, 1920), 65-66.

[69] Gerson, *op. cit.*, 99 & 113.

[70] "Poland and the Entente", *The Nation*, 111 (Sept. 18, 1920), 321-23; Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[71] John Spargo, "Bainbridge Colby" in Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, (N.Y., 1958), X, 200-05.

[72] Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*, (N.Y., 1945), p. 35.

[73] Melbourne W. Graham, "Polish Politics, 1918-1938" in Schmidt, ed., *op. cit.*, 129.

[74] Gerson, *op. cit.*, 99ff.

Overall the American view of reconstructed Poland differed little from the traditional image. "Conspiracy is the vocation of the few, but it seems to me to be an avocation of two-thirds of the Polish people. Intolerance, pride and bigotry" are common traits of Poles characterized one writer. The government was described as totalitarian, unrealistic and incorrigible, quite consistent with its history.[75]) And it appeared to Americans that freedom had not brought freedom, independence independence or self-determination self-determination. Rather, the result was a rebirth of factionalism, class exploitation, and too little democracy.

[75] "Fomentations in Poland", *The Nation*, 116 (Feb. 28, 1923), 252; "Reaction in Poland", *The Nation*, 118, (May 4, 1924), 558-70; Elbert Francis Baldwin, "Present Day Poland", *Outlook*, 137 (Aug. 24, 1924), 638-39.

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THE JANUARY UPRISING AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR[1]

When the new year 1863 dawned on the United States nobody suspected that the most decisive battle of the civil war, that of Antietam, had already been fought. General Lee's march towards Maryland was anxiously followed by the governments of France and England bent on mediation and, if rejected by the North, on recognition of the South.

[1] ABBREVIATIONS:

Admiralty —	Admiralty Archives in Public Record Office;
AE —	Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris;
AE B —	Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, Brussels;
Clarendon MSS —	Bodleian Library, Oxford, Clarendon Manuscripts;
FO —	Archives of Foreign Office, in Public Record Office;
HHS —	Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna;
Marine —	Archives du ministère de la marine, Paris;
PRO —	Public Record Office, London;
RA —	Royal Archives, Windsor;
Rigsarkivet —	Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen;
Staatsarchiv, Marburg —	Staatsarchiv, Marburg, Germany;
APP —	*Die auswärtige Politik Preussens 1858-71*, Berlin, 1932-1945;
Balace —	Francis Balace: *La guerre de sécession et la Belgique, Documents d'archives américaines* 1861-1865. Louvain, 1969, XXVIII-320p;
Diplomatic correspondence —	*Executive Documents printed by the order of the House of Representatives during the first session of the thirty-eight Congress, 1863-64. Papers relating to Foreign Affairs;*
Filipowicz —	*Confidential Correspondence of the British Government respecting the Insurrection in Poland:* 1863. Ed. by T. Filipowicz. Paris, 1914, in 4°, XXX-453p;
Lewak —	Lewak Adam: *Polska działalność dyplomatyczna*, Warszawa 1937-1963. 2 vol.;
ORN —	*Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series II*, volume 3, Washington, 1922;
Richardson —	Richardson James D.: *A compilation of the messages and papers of the Confederacy*, Nashville, 1905, 2 vol.;
Staatsarchiv —	Aegidi K. Klauhold A.: *Staatsarchiv Sammlung der officiellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart 1863-64.*

Palmerston, the British prime minister, stated to his foreign secretary, Lord Russell: "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the northwest of Washington, and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great defeat they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait a while and see what may follow." [2] At the same time Russell wrote up a memorandum suggesting in common with France and Russia an offer of mediation to both parties. If the North refused, the recognition of the South would follow.[3] Three days later the news from the battle began to arrive in Europe. The English diplomacy became more cautious.[4]

But not so the emperor of the French. On 30 October his foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys, sent a note to London and Saint-Petersbourg proposing a mediation of the three powers in the American civil war. The Western Hemisphere—noted an American historian—had been transformed "into a gigantic Poland, ripe for partition by the powers of Europe." [5] Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign minister, described the offer to Henri Mercier, his minister in Washington: "The emperor has decided that there is an opportunity to ask England and Russia to unite with France in a joint effort to obtain an armistice of six months between the North and South. All warlike acts, direct or indirect, on land and sea, would temporarily cease and such a truce could subsequently be extended if necessary".[6] The French proposal found the British cabinet already committed against immediate action. "Our answer to the French

[2] Palmerston to Russell, 23-IX-1862. Spencer Walpole: *The life of Lord John Russell*, London 1889, II, p. 350. Palmerston to Gladstone, 24-IX-1862. Philip Guedalla: *Gladstone and Palmerston*, London, 1928, p. 232-3.

[3] Guedalla, *op. cit.*, p. 239-247. Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer: *The United States and France: civil war diplomacy*, Philadelphia 1970, p. 339. Henry Shelton Sanford, Brussels, wrote to Seward on 27 September 1862: "The late news from home causes our best friends over here to say, 'you will never succeed—you had better make up your minds before utterly exhausted to a separation which seems inevitable'."—Balace, 27-IX-1862.

[4] "General McClellan's work during the week ending the 18th has done a good deal to restore our drooping credit here."—Charles Francis Adams to his son, London, 17-X-1862, Worthington Ch. Ford: *A cycle of Adams letters 1861-1865*, Boston 1920, I, p. 192.

[5] Burton J. Hendrick: *Statesmen of the lost cause*, New York 1939, p. 114. The remark was not his. John Motley, American minister in Vienna, wrote on 25th November 1862: "The President's proclamation was just in time. Had it been delayed it is possible that England would have accepted the invitation of France, and that invitation was in reality to recognize the slave-holders' confederacy, and to make with it alliance offensive and defensive. I am not exaggerating. The object is distinctly to unite all Europe against us, to impose peace, and to forcibly dismember our country."—George William Curtis: *The correspondence of John Lothrop Motley*, London, 1889, 25-IX-1862, p. 101-2.

[6] Drouyn de Lhuys to Mercier, AE. Etats-Unis, 30-X-1862. Daniel B. Carroll: *Henri Mercier and the American civil war*, Princeton, 1971, p. 240. On December 1, 1862 Stoeckl, Washington, wrote to Gortchakow of the violent repercutions" created in the North by news of the "proposal made by France to our Cabinet and to that of London to offer collective mediation in the affairs of the United States".—Woldman Albert A.: *Lincoln and the Russians*, New York, 1861, p. 131.

overture about America will be of a negative kind for the present, but only for the present"—wrote Russell to his ambassador in St. Peterburg, Francis Napier.[7] Russia's reaction was also, predictably, negative. As prince Gortchakow, Russian vice-chancellor, had stated to the American chargé d'affaires, Bayard Taylor: "We desire, above all things, the maintenance of the American Union as one and indivisible nation." [8] He repeated now his statement: "The action of Russia would be governed entirely, as heretofore, by the most friendly feelings towards the United States. He would take no step which could not bear that interpretation." [9] President Lincoln, who had written a personal letter to the Tsar anxiously inquiring as to Alexander II's stand on the new French proposal could be satisfied.[10] His secretary of state answered Russian cajoleries with the assurance that Russia "has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best." [11] The explanation of reasons for such a friendship was correct. When in 1857 William Seward did not have any responsible office he was free to express his horror of the despotism of the tsar over the oppressed Poles.[12] In Europe he was known for saying that "The United States is and for ever must be a living offence to Russia and to Austria, and all despotic governments." [13]

Lincoln and Seward believed that Napoleon III had a design to make the intervention in Mexico "an introduction to aggressions against the United States in the Gulf of Mexico or on its coasts." [14] At the same time Henry Sanford, minister in Brussels, informed Seward that there was "a systematic effort from Paris to popularize the idea of intervention in some shape in our affairs." [15] He did not have to wait too long. On January 9, the new French note proposed that the two warring parties appoint commissioners to meet together and if they could not agree to a restoration of the union should agree upon terms of separation.[16] The American reaction was sharp and passionate. It was evident that the Emperor would not be satisfied with the refusal. His victorious wars against Russia and Austria, his successful interventions in the Danubian

[7] Russell to Napier, 12-XI-1862, *Russell papers, PRO. 30/22/14.*

[8] Taylor to Seward, 26-X-1862, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[9] 11-XI, 12-XI, 15-XI, 28-XI, 7-XII-1862, *ibid.*

[10] Woldman Albert A.: *Lincoln and the Russians*, p. 127. "In his nation's hour of need, Lincoln eagerly clasped the only hand extended to him though it was the hand of a colossus of barbarism and reaction".—*Ibid., p.* 122-3.

[11] Seward to Taylor, 23-XII-1862, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[12] Woldman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[13] Burton J. Hendrick: *Lincoln's war cabinet*, Boston, 1946, p. 210. Stoekl reported from Washington: "At the very moment when they clamor for the extermination of the Southern rebels, the New York newspapers call the disorders which have recently broken out at Varsovie patriotic uprisings, and accuse us of cruelty for having suppressed them".—Stoekl to Gortchakow, 23-V-1861, Woldman, *op, cit.*, p. 89.

[14] Seward to Dayton, Paris, 29-XII-1862, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[15] Sanford to Seward, 18-XII-1862, Balance, p. 118.

[16] Drouyn de Lhuys to Mercier, AE. Etats-Unis, 9-I-1863.

Principalities, in Montenegro, Syria and Indochina were there to prove that a next step would be taken. What it would be? The American Congress passed a resolution that it would be obliged to look upon any further attempt at mediation as "an unfriendly act." [17] It was generally believed that before Congress met again the United States should be at war with France. The friendly advice of Napoleon given to the Polish exiles that they should use every effort to discourage the insurrection in Russian Poland betrayed his desire to turn his undivided attention to the American continent.[18] The response of Seward was negative [19] but at the same time he was very anxious to deny that any alienation existed between Mercier and his government.[20] It was with some anxiety, as the Austrian minister in Washington noted, that the Emperor's reaction to the Seward refusal was awaited. "It remains to be seen what the reaction of the Cabinet at Paris will be,"—reported Stoeckl—"Here we are concerned about this as it is feared that this may be the preliminary for the recognition of the South by France." [21]

Napoleon did not make any move and Drouyn de Lhuys explained to William Dayton, the American minister in Paris, that his suggestion of January 9th had been made "in a kind spirit." [22] Dayton himself gave the reason for such strange moderation on the part of the Emperor. "The insurrection of Poland has driven American affairs out of view for the moment. A disturbance on the continent, especially in Central Europe, is so near at hand, and touches the interests of so many of the crowned heads of these countries, that distant events fall out of sight until these more immediate troubles are settled." [23] The same language was held by the American minister in London, Charles Adams. At this precise moment much apprehension was entertained of serious difficulty growing out of Polish events. Some efforts to arrive at a diplomatic settlement would be increasing "and probably successful." In the meantime the advantage should be taken of the interval for military action

[17] *Papers relating to foreign affairs accompanying the annual message of the President to the first session of the thirty-eigth congress*, 1863, p. 813.

[18] Articles of the Northern press sent by Mercier to Paris. AE, Etats-Unis, 20-II-1863. Staatsarchiv, vol. III-IV.

[19] Case and Spencer, *op. cit*, p. 395. Gideon Welles noted in his diary: "Some days since, Seward handed me a dispatch as I entered the President's office on Cabinet day, from Mr. Dayton at Paris, stating the French Government was pressing friendly mediation. I handed it back after reading, with the remark that it was wholly inadmissible. Seward made no reply, but handed the dispatch to others to read as they came. There was, I think, a response similar to mine from each".—*Diary of Gideon Welles*, New York 1960, I, 10-II-1863.

[20] Seward to Adams, London, 24-II-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[21] HHS. USA, 17-II-1863. Woldman, *op. cit.* p. 98.

[22] Dayton to Seward, 26-II-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[23] Dayton to Seward, 23-II-1863, *ibid.* Stoekl was writing on April 26: "As for France, it appears that she has equally renounced all idea of intervention. . . If mediation was impracticable three months ago, it is even more so today",—Woldman, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

in America. "This is all that is needed to protect us from the possibility of European intervention." [24]

The diplomatists of the Confederation noticed the outbreak of the Polish military effort to regain independence with real dismay. Hotze reported from London that the uprising was beginning to assume the features of a revolution and already the British press was manifesting that sympathy which it had been so slow in according to the Confederation, "and with which they have so often deluded apparently well-founded hopes." [25] The European mind at this moment—wrote Mann from Brussels—was almost exclusively preoccupied with Poland and the Poles. The sympathies of all ages, sexes and conditions were ardently enlisted for the success of the patriots. The king of Prussia by signing the Alvensleben convention had rendered himself the most odious of monarchs. Mann believed that the revolt of the Poles would again be stifled, and that the partitioning powers would continue to hold Poland in subjugation "for a period at least far beyond the present." The exclamation of Kościuszko when he fell from his horse severly wounded in the battle of Maciejowice, "Finis Poloniae," seemed to have been prophetic. "If there be one citizen of the Confederate States who is disposed to accept of any terms from the soi-disant United States but unconditional independence, let him keep the fate of fallen Poland constantly and vividly before his eyes." [26]

On March 2 England sent a note of protest on behalf of Poland to St. Petersburg [27] and invited all signatory powers to the treaty of Vienna of 1815 to forward similar observations to Russia.[28] Poland "presents a new subject of more pressing importance"—noticed Adams with satisfaction.[92] John Motley, the minister in Vienna, was happy to say that Polish events had diverted attention in Europe from American affairs. The insurrection would be crushed although it could last for months. He did not believe in any intervention on the part of the Western powers. "There will only be a great deal of remonstrating, and a great talk about liberty and free institutions on the part of that apostle of liberty and civilization Louis Napoleon." [30] On 26 March Dayton com-

[24] Adams to Seward 26-II-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence*. At the same time Henry Adams wrote to his brother: "Of all results, a restoration of the Union on a proslavery basis would be most unfortunate. Yet I dread almost equally a conquest that would leave us with a new and agravated Poland on our hands."—Worthington Chauncey Ford: *Letters of Henry Adams*, 1858-1891, Boston, 1930, p. 94, 20-II-1863.

[25] Hotze, London, to Benjamin, 14-II-1863, Richardson, p. 435.

[26] Mann, Brussels, to Benjamin, 27-II-1863, *ORN*.

[27] Filipowicz, No. 108, 2-III-1863.

[28] *Ibid*, No. 131, 4-III-1863. George Cornwell Lewis, secretary for war, wrote to lord Clarendon: "A joint remonstrance from France and England to Russia about Poland, while a civil war is raging, is a *measure*, not merely a *dispatch*. It is far more important than a similar remonstrance to the United States about *their* civil war, would be."—Sir George Lewis to Clarendon, Clarendon MSS. C 531, 23-II-1863.

[29] Adams to Seward, 6-III-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence*.

[30] John Motley to his mother, 3-III-1863, George William Curtis: *The correspondence of John Lothrop Motley*, London 1889, p. 119.

municated to Drouyn de Lhuys the resolution of Congress concerning foreign intervention in the American civil war. The French minister made no remarks and was not disposed to enter into any conversation on the subject. "His mind seemed to be preoccupied with Poland and its complications." [31] Seward could state in mid-March that the idea of European intervention was at rest.[32]

The reports of confederate diplomatists were rather gloomy and desponding. Slidell lost all hope that anything would be done for the Confederation until the Polish imbroglio was settled.[33] Mann had to confess that the chances for an early European recognition have not increased in the slightest in the last month. The Emperor seemed to be just as far as ever from taking the initiative in this regard. The restoration of the old European nationalities was becoming more and more a fixed sentiment with the people "of this hemisphere." Almost everybody seemed to be clamorously ardent for the re-establishment of Poland. The manifestations of sympathy for her were as earnest and general at Stockholm as they were at Lisbon.[34] Napoleon, stated Mason, could not take any active steps now; the recent outbreak in Poland forced him to refrain from any act which the United States might choose to consider objectionable.[35] William Gregory, member of the House of Commons, wrote to his friend in Virginia: "We are in Europe somewhat distracted, from the intense interest, which has hitherto been undivided, with which we have been watching the progress of the great struggle in which you are engaged. The horrible barbarities exercised by Russia in Poland, and the threatening anarchy in Greece, are being regarded with great anxiety. The possibilities of the Emperor of the French being engaged in a war with Prussia diminishes the impression which not long ago prevailed among many persons, that the French answer to Mr. Seward's insolent dispatch would be recognition of the Southern Republic." [36] Judah Benjamin, the confederate secretary of state, answered Slidell that the Confederacy did not rely on recognition by France, the more especially as the growing insurrection in Poland threatened complications in Europe that might involve the French government and thus render it averse to any risk, however remote, of difficulties with the United States.[37]

[31] Dayton to Seward, 27-III-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[32] Seward to Pike, The Hague, 12-III-1863, *ibid.*

[33] Slidell to Mason, London, 15-III-1863.—Louis Martin Sears: John Slidell, Carolina, 1925, p. 210. A week later he reported to Benjamin: "The Polish question still engrosses the attention of the Government, the press and the public to the exclusion of every other, and will to do so until it has received some practical solution."—Slidell to Benjamin, 21-III-1863, *ORN.*

[34] Mann to Benjamin, 13-III-1863, *ibid.*

[35] Mann to Benjamin, 19-III-1863, Richardson, p. 441. In another report Mason stated: "It is generally believed that the Poles must be ultimately crushed unless France is driven to interfere, but that they will not be subdued until after a long and bloody struggle."— Mason to Benjamin, 30-III-1863, *ORN.*

[36] N. W. Tilley: "England and the confederacy", *American Historical Review*, XIV, October 1938, 5-III-1863.

[37] Benjamin to Slidell, 24-III-1863, *ORN.*

The fear of difficulties was present in London. Lord Russell wrote, precisely the same day, that there were some disquieting signs on the part of the United States. He did not expect they would come to anything if England kept up her naval force in those seas and her military force in Canada. Otherwise, he should fear some surprise in hopes of a temporary success.[38] "We think much of Poland," he stated three weeks later, "but the cases of Alabama and Peterhoff prevent our forgetting America." [39] "But what if Russia and the United States together wish to make war against us?" [40] "America also makes one anxious."—wrote Queen Victoria to Leopold I.[41]

The English uneasiness about the attitude of Washington was particularly noticed by the foreign diplomatists. The Belgian minister, Sylvain Van De Weyer, reported several conversations with Russell, Palmerston and others members of the cabinet: they all expressed their apprehension that the United States might take advantage of the European situation and suddenly attack Britain.[42] The Austrian ambassador

[38] Lord Russell to the Duke of Somerset, first Lord of the Admiralty, PRO. 30/22/31, 24-III-1863.

[39] Russell to Richard Lyons, minister in Washington, PRO. 30/22/97, 11-IV-1863.

[40] Russell to Lord Cowley, Paris, PRO. 30/22/105, 11-IV-1863. Lord Cowley answered that he did not think that Russia was in a condition to make war on England, even with the assistance of the United States. She did not have a fleet worth speaking of. Besides she would know that France and Sweden would certainly support us. France could never let England have the honour of settling the Polish question alone.—Cowley to Russell, 12--IV-1863, RA. H 50/190. Material from the Royal Archives is used with the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

[41] Queen Victoria to king Leopold I, RA. Y 109/28, 28-IV-1863.

[42] "Plusieurs membres du Cabinet avec qui j'ai eu des entretiens confidentiels au sujet des relations plus que tendues entre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, ne m'ont point caché leurs vives appréhensions à cet ègard. Lord Russell est lui-même convaincu que le Cabinet de Washington veut une rupture et que le Ministre de la Marine pousse à la guerre de la nomination de l'Admiral; de là les mesures exorbitantes prises par cet officier, qui se croit appelé en outre à venger l'affront personnel qu'on lui a fait; de là enfin, le langage hostile à l'Angleterre tenu par tous les journaux qui prennent le mot d'ordre du cabinet de Washington. Dans l'état d'exaspération, me disait hier Lord Russell, oú la saisie de nos navires a jeté nos armateurs et nos négociants, et avec l'esprit qui anime en ce moment la Chambre des Pairs et la Chambre des Communes le refus des Etats-Unis de faire droit à nos justes réclamations ou leur persistence dans les mesures dont nous nous plaignons pourraient avoir les plus graves conséquences.

Sa Seigneurie ne se dissimule point à quel danger le monde entier serait exposé si la guerre éclatait entre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis. La France qui redouble d'efforts pour entrainer l'Autriche à un remaniement Européen, aurait alors ses coudes franches et saisirait avec empressement cette occasion favorable pour reconquérir ce qu'elle appelle ses frontières naturelles. Le langage que tiennent souvent à cet égard l'Empereur Napoléon et son entourage, inspire ici de vives inquiétudes. L'Italie qui ne peut espérer que d'une guerre la conquête de Rome et de la Vénétie, prêtra son concours empressé à une conflagration générale. Ce qui augmente les dangers de la situation, c'est la conviction qu'ont de leur côté, les Etats Unis que l'Angleterre veut à tout prix le dismembrement de l'Union et la destruction de son commerce",—Sylvain Van De Weyer à Rogier, AE, B, Grande Bretagne 25-IV-1863, No. 133.

in London, Rudolf Apponyi, was sending similar reports to his government.[43] The Austrian minister in Washington, Hülsemann, at the same moment, described the American fear of England.[44] Another country was very much afraid of the imminent outbreak of a war between the United States and England which would give France a free hand to commence a war for the independence of the Polish monarchy. The Prussian king, chancellor and diplomats kept watchfully their eyes on the Anglo-American relations.[45] Liberal opinion regarded a war with England as "a concerted arrangement with Russia and against Poland, and consequently against liberalism in Europe." [46]

Seward, on the other hand, regarded the Polish uprising as at its end; "the gallant nation whose wrongs, whose misfortunes, and whose valour have so deeply excited universal sympathy in Europe, is again left to the magnanimity of the Tsar." [47] His interpretation of the Russian magnanimity did not coincide with the general understanding of the expression. We read with amazement that he really believed that the Tsar would "bestow the boom of freedom" on his Polish subjects.[48] The same day Haldeman reported from Stockholm that there was a

Other letters and reports of De Weyer are published in: S. Bóbr-Tylingo: "Napoléon III, l'Europe et la Pologne en 1863-4, *Antemurale*, VII-VIII, 1963, p. 313-316.

[43] "Les relations de l'Angleterre avec les Etats-Unis d'Amérique sont devenues, depuis quelque temps, d'une nature qui menace de conduire à de serieuses complications.

Le langage provoquant des meetings et de la presse Américaine, les conséquences désastreuses que la guerre et le blocus exercent sur le commerce Anglais et sur l'industrie cotonière et les saisies continuelles de navires partis de ports anglais à déstination de ports neutres, sous prétexte qu'ils sont chargés de contrebande de guerre destinée aux Confédérés, toutes ses raisons causent dans le Parlement, dans la presse et le public une irritation profonde et que le Gouvernement parvient difficilement à calmer . . .

Une guerre avec l'Amérique serait infiniment plus populaire ici, qu'une guerre contre la Russie en faveur de la Pologne. L'Angleterre ne fait pas la guerre *pour une idée*. La cause polonaise est pour elle une affaire de sentiment et nullement d'intérêt. Il n'en est point de même de la question Américaine, oú l'Angleterre a son honneur à maintenir, des affronts à venger et les intérêts les plus vitaux de son commerce à sauvegarder".—Apponyi à Rechberg, HHS. England 60, No. 29-A, 25-IV-1863.

"L'entretien que j'ai eu hier avec Lord Russell m'a confirmé dans la conviction que, tant que le Gouvernement Anglais aurait la possibilité d'une guerre avec l'Amérique comme une épée de Damoclès, suspendu sur sa tête, il sera de toute impossibilité de l'amener à une déclaration catégorique sur la conduite qu'il compte tenir dans la question polonaise, Lord Russell est convenu lui-même que cette question ne touchait pas aux intérêts anglais et que, quelque soient les sympathies qu'inspire la cause polonaise, on ne pouvait exiger de l'Angleterre qu'elle s'engagêat dans une guerre qui la forcerait à négliger des intérêts majeurs pour elle. *L'intention* sincère du Cabinet est donc, pour le moment, de ne pas aller plus loin que l'action diplomatique".—Apponyi to Rechberg, lettre particulière, HHS. England 62, 29-IV-1863.

Other reports of Apponyi in: S. Bóbr-Tylingo, *op. cit.*, p. 310-313

[44] Hülseman to Rechberg, HHS. USA, 16-IV-1863.

[45] APP, III, No. 432, 449, 466, 20-IV, 24-IV, 29-IV-1863.

[46] Sanford to Seward, 28-IV-1863, Balace, p. 140.

[47] Seward to Dayton, 8-IV-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence*.

[48] Seward to Harvey, Lisbon, 24-IV-1863, *ibid.*

widespread apprehension of a general war or revolution all over Europe. The press urged that Sweden should take the initiative that now was the time to rescue Finland from Russia. Prince Czartoryski was still in Stockholm. His journey through Sweden had been a triumph. He had been received "with the same wild enthusiasm as had been displayed for Kossuth in America." [49] Recalling the visit of Kossuth to America, did he know that he was committing a gaffe as one of the organizers of that reception had been a certain Abraham Lincoln? [50]

The confederate diplomats were not too happy with the situation in April 1863. Slidell remarked that there was no change in the aspect of affairs nor did he expect any until the Polish question had been adjusted. Lucius Lamar, special commissioner of the Confederation to Russia stopped in Paris and decided not to proceed to St. Petersburg until that problem was solved.[51]

In the midst of the discussion with England and Austria on the first common protest to St. Petersburg, Napoleon did not forget the American war. He expressed to lord Cowley, the British ambassador, his perplexity over English policy on American affairs. If Great Britain recognized the Confederacy, he would follow.[52]

On April 10 the simultaneous notes of the three powers were sent to St. Petersburg.[53] Subsequently France and England invited the other European capitals, Constantinople included, to join in the diplomatic demarche.[54] An invitation, but from Paris alone, arrived in Washington. Seward, after a consultation with Lincoln, declined the invitation; the existence of a local and transient disturbance was an insurmountable difficulty in the way of any active cooperation with the three powers.[55]

[49] Haldeman to Seward, 24-IV-1863, *ibid.*

[50] Paul M. Angle: *New letters and papers of Lincoln*, Boston 1930, p. 81-83.

[51] Slidell to Benjamin, 11-IV, 20-IV-1863, ORN.

[52] Case and Spencer, op. cit., p. 402. As to Drouyn de Lhuys "uppermost in his mind" was "the condition of the Polish question".—Dayton to Seward, 9-IV-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence.*

William Russell wrote to John Bigelow on the 15th of April: "I am told it is lucky the Polish uprising has cancelled off the surplus energy of France or the Emperor would have found it quite impossible to resist the feeling of intervention".—John Bigelow: *Retrospections of active life*, New York 1909. I, p. 631, 15-IV-1863.

[53] Filipowicz, No. 336, 349, 354.

[54] Staatsarchiv, No. 702, 927.

[55] Seward to Dayton 11-IV-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* Seward had written in 1861: "Russia, like the United States, is an improving and expanding empire. Its track is eastward, while that of the United States is westward. The two nations, therefore, never come into rivalry or conflict. Each carries civilization to the new regions it enters, and each finds itself occasionally resisted by states jealous of its prosperity, or alarmed by its aggrandizement. Russia and the United States may remain good friends until each having made a circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet each other in the region where the civilization first began, and where, after so many ages, it has become now lethargic and helpless."—Seward to Clay, St. Petersburg, 6-V-1861, Diplomatic correspondence.

Seward's glimpse into the future did not prove to be too correct. When they met after World War II "where civilization first began" their greet-

He sent his answer to Cassius Clay, minister to Russia, instructing him to communicate it to the Russian government in an "informal way." [56] Prince Gortchakow expressed the wish to publish it. Clay assented with the explanation to Seward that its publication would aid Russia by "our moral support at home and abroad." [57] The secretary of state approved

ings were far from cordial.—R. Aron: *République imperiale. Les Etats-Unis dans le monde,* Paris, 1972.

Gortchakow wrote at the same time: ". . . for the two countries, placed at the extremities of the two worlds, both in the ascending period of their development, appear called to a natural community of interests and sympathies, of which they have already given mutual proofs to each other".— Gortchakow to Stoeckl, June 1861, Woldman, p. 125.

[56] Seward to Clay, 11-V-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

"The United States Government will probably be very glad to have so good a reason to assign for declining to take a step which might be disagreeable to Russia, the power which is generally most in favour in this country."—Lord Lyons, Washington, to Lord Russell, FO 5/883, 11-V-1863.

Clay, from the American embassy in St. Petersburg, applauded the administration's stand: "It was due from us to be grateful for the past conduct of Russia toward us in our trouble, by a like moral support of herself, in defence of the integrity of her Empire".—Woldman, *op. cit.,* p. 153.

Clay's memoirs do not give any account of the events of 1863. His only reference to Poland is his pride in being acquainted with Mouravieff, "viceroy of Poland."—*The life of Cassius Marcellius Clay,* Cincinnati, 1886, p. 413.

He regarded the Russians as 'the most humane people in existence."— *Ibid.,* p. 422. "The human spirit of Russia. . . that is the reason that Russians never emigrate."—*Ibid.,* p. 425.

Lord Redesdale noted in his Memoires: "General Cassius Clay was United States Minister in Russia at the time which I am writing. He was rather a notorious person whose name "Punch" had, owing to his virulent abuse of England, translated into Brutus Mud. One day General Clay came up to me and began speaking in the friendliest way about England. After some generalities he turned the conversation on to the Polish question, belauding Lord Russell's despatches, which he said made "his old Anglo- Sazon blood boil in his veins when he saw the magnanimous attitude of an English statesman",—Lord Redesdale: *Memories,* London 1915, I, p. 226.

"It is shameful to send Clay back to Russia but it was done to get rid of him".—Thurlow Weed to Bigelow, Bigelow, *op. cit.,* I, 15-III-1863, p. 610.

John Hay, Lincoln's secretary, noted: "This evening Seward read to the President a despatch from Cash Clay in which he discussed the whole field of American politics, European diplomacy, and the naval improvements of the century. This man is certainly the most wonderful ass of the age. He recently sent a despatch to Seward criticizing in his usual abusive and arrogant style the late oration of Summer on Foreign Relations, concluding in regular diplomatic style by saying, "You will read this to Mr. Summer and if he desires it, give him a copy" ".—Tyler Dennett: *Lincoln and the civil war in the diaries and letters of John Hay.* New York, 1939, p. 124, 22-XI-1863. Jay Monaghan: *Diplomat in carpet slippers,* New York, 1962, p. 344.

Henry Adams, attending his father as secretary, met the blunt Kentucky politician and labelled him a "noisy jackass".— Ford; *Henry Adams,* p. 92.

In a speech, in August 1862, Clay declared: "I think that I can say without implications of profanity or want of deference, that since the days of Christ himself such a happy and glorious privilege has not been reserved to any other man to do that amount of good: and no man has ever more gallantly or nobly done it than Alexander II, the Czar of Russia. I refer to the emancipation of the 23,000,000 serfs". Woldman, *op. cit.* p. 116-117.

[57] Clay to Seward, 2-VI, 17-VI-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* Gortchakoff to Clay, 22-V-1863. Archives diplomatiques, 1863, vol. IV. Robertson James Rood: *The ministry of Cassius Marcellius Clay to Russia,* 1939, p. 164.

the action of his minister as "entirely satisfactory." [58] The Polish National Government described the American note as a sympton of the Union's weakness, as an act of mean vengeance against the policy of the western powers in favour of the Confederacy.[59]

Seward and his ministers disagreed once more in their estimate of the diplomatic situation. The former believed that more temperate views were beginning to prevail; his ministers warned him that a European war was imminent. Motley informed him that Napoleon had determined, with or without the alliance of any other power, to make war upon Russia for the purpose of securing the independence of the Polish monarchy.[60] Motley himself was fascinated by the Polish struggle. "There seems something very grand in this occult power, called the Committee of Public Safety, at Warsaw, a new "Vehmgericht". This invisible Committee send as far as Vienna for recruits, and men start off without a murmur, go and get themselves shot, or come back again, as the case may be, and nobody knows who sent for them or how. I have heard of several instances of this occurring in high and well-known families." [61] Adams in London felt a prevailing feeling of distrust as if Europe were on the eve of a great upheaval.[62]

The Confederate dipdomatists did not see an approaching war. The notes of prince Gortchakow, reply to those of the three Western powers, were not likely to disturb the peace of Europe "for at least a twelvemonth." [63] Slidell predicted that by the end of May the Polish question would cease to create any apprehensions of war, and the city of Mexico would probably be occupied by French troops.[64] The Emperor did not press the Polish problem in such a way as to endanger the peace of Europe.[65] The mutual endearments which had passed between Lincoln and Russian despot—wrote De Leon—have greatly edified and surprised the European world and have not a little embarrassed the democratic friends of the Model Republic who were rabid partisans of Poland.[66]

[58] Seward to Clay, 13-VII-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence.*
H. E. Blinn: "Seward and the Polish Rebellion of 1863". *American Historical Review,* July 1940.

[59] National Government to Prince Władysław Czartoryski, 24-VI-1863, Lewak, I, p. 131.
Taylor noted on 6th May "I dined with Gortchacow on Monday night. It was a diplomatic affair—everybody there. Russia sat between France and England, and all three were as jolly together as if there was no such thing as Poland".—Mario Hansen Taylor: *On two continents,* New York, 1905, p. 141, 6-V-1863.

[60] Seward to Dayton, 18-V-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* Motley to Seward, 1-VI-1863, *ibid.*

[61] Motley to his mother, Motley, *op. cit.* p. 132, 31-V-1863.

[62] Ford: A cycle, *op. cit.,* II, p. 41, 26-VI-1862. On 8th May Henry Adams had noted: "the Polish question is becoming so grave that we are let up a little".—*Ibid.,* I, p. 296, 8-V-1863.

[63] Mann to Benjamin, 8-V-1863, Richardson, p. 480-1.

[64] Slidell to Benjamin, 15-V-1863. *ORN.*

[65] Slidell to Benjamin, 25-V-1863. *ibid.*

[66] De Leon to Benjamin, Bigelow, *op. cit.,* II, p. 20, 19-VI-1863.

In May Napoleon did not forget American affairs. He asked Cowley whether the moment was now more favourable for some intervention. The ambassador could not give him any encouragement that such would be the policy of his government.[67] For himself he found the news from the United States "very contradictory." [68] Lord Russell did not intend to go to war about Poland but was ready to meet the Yankees if they took to bullying.[69] This was precisely the attitude the Germans feared: it would allow France to commence a war in Europe.[70] The Russians did not expect any hostile action from England; her interests were more important in America than in Europe and she had not gone to war with the United States.[71] The same distinction between Poland and English involvement in North America was stressed by Russell and Palmerston in conversation with the Polish envoys. England could recognize the belligerency of the South because she had her own territory, merchant fleet and trade relations with her. Poland did not have any of these; her government was still anonymous and unknown. The recognition of belligerent rights was not however followed by a similar recognition of the independence of the Confederate States.[72]

The summer of 1863 brought fresh anxiety to both American

[67] Cowley to Russell, private, FO. 519/230, 26-V-1863.
[68] Cowley to Russell, 22-V-1863, *ibid.*
[69] Russell to Lyons, 20-VI-1863, PRO. 30/22/97.
[70] "Eine ehegestern aus London hier eingetroffene, im strengsten Incognito hier verweilende hohe Person hatte dortselbst mehrfach Unterredungen mit Lord Palmerston, und theilt mit, dass Letzterer Alles aufbiete, um Frankreich zu einem Krieg mit Russland zu drängen, vor welchem er jedoch England sorglichst zu bewahren suche, umsomehr als er das gespannte Verhältnis des Englischen und Nordamerikanischen Regierung nicht ohne Unruhe und Besorgniss vor einem gänzlichen Bruch betrachte". —Staatsarchiv Marburg, 9a/193, Paris 1863, 5-V-1863.
[71] "Quand à l'Angleterre, pendant tout le temps que j'ai été en Russie, les Russes se sont cru un objet de haine pour l'Angleterre. Au fond sans savoir trop pourquoi, si ce n'est à cause de la politique de la Russie en Orient et à cause des projets presque chimériques qu'on prête à la Russie relativement aux Indes. Donc la politique Anglaise dans les affaires polonaises ne surprend pas les Russes, mais d'un autre côté on entend dire que l'Angleterre qui ne fait pas la guerre à l'Amérique pour des intérêts tres-directes, ne se lancera pas dans une guerre contre la Russie, sans intérêt directe, et qui aurait en vue de réaliser des idées françaises. Tout ce raisonnement pourrait être faux. Si l'Angleterre ne fait pas la guerre à l'Amérique c'est que l'Amérique est un adversaire bien plus redoutable que ne l'est Russie attaquée "aussi" par la France et puis, en laissant agir la France seule dans la question polonaise, si sympathique aux masses en Europe, le Gouvernement Anglais ne croirait-il pas abdiquer du rôle qui lui revient dans toute grande affaire? Quoi qu'il en soit quoi et qu'il en adviendra, l'espoir qu'on a ici que l'Angleterre n'entreprendra pas de guerre en faveur de la Pologne, trouve un appui dans les offres qui, à l'heure qu'il est, viennent de Londres de la part de maisons les plus considerables de s'intéresser à l'établissement des chemins de fer en Russie.
La situation diplomatique actuelle a été définie par un homme d'esprit par le mot qu'elle est "entre l'impossible et l'insuffisant", „impossible" par les demandes qu'on pose à la Russie, "insuffisant" par ce que la Russie peut offrir pour satisfaire à ces demandes",—Plessen to Hall, Rigsarkivet, Rusland, 21-V-1863.
[72] Conversations of prince W. Czartoryski and count W. Zamoyski with Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston, Lewak, II, p. 330, 337-8, 17-V, 4-VI-1863.

camps: for the North, fear of new complications with the main European powers; for the South the realization that the Polish problem impeded any policy in their favour: "This untoward question on our path." [73] Slidell had to acknowledge that Poland still engrossed public attention. The prospects of a peaceful settlement were far from being encouraging. No apprehension was entertained of an immediate rupture, but the general opinion among the best-informed persons was that the peace of Europe could not be maintained beyond the end of the coming winter. There could be no doubt of the emperor's readiness to put his armies in motion, and although Poland would be their first ostensible destination, the Rhine frontier could not be ignored.[74] Writing from London, Holtze was even more explicit. The news of the check sustained by the confederate forces at Gettysburg, coupled with the reported fall of Vicksburg, was so unexpected as to spread general dismay. Unfortunately at this very moment Europe felt itself on the verge of a general war. After slight attempts at conciliation, Russia had rejected the joint proposals of England, France and Austria on the subject of Poland. In France public opinion was in a state of unprecedented ferment, all parties and all classes uniting in a clamour for war which must drown soberer counsels, if such there were, in the imperial cabinet. Hotze doubted whether this feeling was less strong in England. Austria might have committed herself too far on this question to make retreat safe or possible. There was, therefore, a substantial danger of a European war, in the turmoil of which the Confederacy would be wholly lost sight of.[75] The reports written by the confederate diplomatists in August were of the same general tone of sadness and despair. Slidell noted that the Russian answer of July 13th had produced quite a panic at the bourse and a very heavy fall of funds. He was however still of opinion that the peace of Europe would not be disturbed before the next spring at all events and probably not then. The Polish question had complicated the Emperor's involvement in American affairs and would continue to do so while it remained unsettled. "So far as we are concerned, I am now satisfied that a general war in Europe would be of advantage to us. The Lincoln government would encourage the fitting out of vessels under the Russian flag to prey upon the commerce of France and Great Britain, who in their turn would open our ports and blockade of the North. The crops of grain are everywhere throughout Europe most abundant in quantity and excellent in quality, and prices will range so low as greatly to check, if not entirely prevent, the importation of breadstuffs from the United States."[76] Hotze noted with relief

[73] Hotze to Benjamin, 4-VII-1863, *ORN*.
[74] Slidell to Benjamin, 19-VII-1863. *ibid.*
[75] Hotze to Benjamin, 23-VII-1863, *ibid.*
[76] Slidell to Benjamin, 5-VIII-1863, *ibid.* On the grain situation in 1863: M. P. Claussen: "Peace factors in Anglo-American relations", 1861-65. *Mississipi Valley Historical Review*, XXVI, 1939. L. B. Schmidt: "The influence of wheat and cotton on Anglo-American relations during the civil war". *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI, 1918.

at the end of August that one of the most formidable obstacles was removed from the confederate path. As the season advanced the fears of a Polish war vanished and there was nothing to apprehend on this score at least until the next spring.[77] The situation and the hopes of the Confederacy were well defined by Benjamin who stated: until the continental powers were relieved from all apprehension on the Polish question it was not to be anticipated that any of them would hazard isolated action in American affairs.[78]

The news reaching the Northern diplomatists from the United States gave them the greatest anxiety. Dayton wrote from Paris warning that the fall of Washington would be followed by the recognition of the Confederacy.[79] But he did not anticipate war whatever the Russian answer would be. France would not move without England and England would not embark on war for Poland.[80] From London Adams reported the prevailing uneasiness in the relations of the continental powers. Russia was evidently preparing for difficulties in the spring.[81] And although the English government had taken pains to announce their determination not to press matters about Poland to the point of war, there was some fear lest the Emperor would be able to involve Britain in hostilities through the pressure of the popular sentiment.[82] At the end of July he reported the general feeling of regret at the federal victories.[83] "I see with great concern that in America the South is losing ground"—wrote king Leopold precisely at the same time.[84] From Turin Marsh reported the Italian expectation of a general war which the king deemed a probable event and hoped that such a war would end in the establishment of the principle of independent nationalities throughout Europe and the promotion of the cause of rational liberty.[85] Pike from The Hague confirmed a "feverish apprehension" of a general conflict as a result of the latest Russian note.[86] Kreismann from Berlin was inclined to believe that it would not come to a European war, and Russia, having carried the day, would be left free to suppress the insurrection.[87]

For Seward the main problem was again the danger of war with France and England. Fresh rumours of an imperial project of inter-

77 Hotze to Benjamin, 27-VIII-1863. *ORN.*
78 Benjamin to Slidell, 17-VIII-1863, *ibid.*
79 Dayton to Seward, 10-VII-1863, *Diplomatic correspondence.*
80 Dayton to Seward, 17-VII-1863, *ibid.*
81 Already in April a dispatch from St. Petersburg had indicated that the Tsar was determined not to yield, had begun to put his army on a war footing and to strengthen the defenses of Kronstadt.—B. P. Thomas: *Russo-American relations 1815-1867*, Baltimore 1930, p. 139, 20-IV-1863.
82 Adams to Seward, 23-VII-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*
83 Adams to Seward, 30-VII-1863, *ibid.* "Luckily", wrote Charles Adams, "the aspect of affairs on the Continent is so threatening that the government is disposed to act with much prudence and selfrestraint as to embroiling us".—Charles Francis Adams: *Charles Francis Adams*, London, 1900, p. 336.
84 King Leopold I to Queen Victoria, RA. Y 85/35, 28-VII-1863.
85 Marsh, Turin, to Seward, 6-VII-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*
86 Pike to Seward, 29-VII-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*
87 Kreismann to Seward, 22-VIII-1863, *ibid.*

vention reached him at the beginning of July. Napoleon was employing his influence to procure a recognition of the Confederacy by the other powers: failing in this, he would proceed alone. And the correspondence from Bogota indicated French designs upon the independence of Ecuador. His estimate of the general situation was that the United States notwithstanding the most earnest and vigorous resistance, were drifting towards a war.[88] As it concerned the European situation he did not believe that a war would occur. The Poles were not yet recognized by either France or England as belligerents. They talked of intervention on behalf of Poland, but they did not act. The diplomatic discussion upon the Polish insurrection might be a proctracted and possibly become an acrimonious one, yet there would be no attempt at actual intervention. The western powers would take care to avoid a war with Russia, at least at the time. Before next spring events might occur which would avert war on the continent for a much longer period.[89]

Seward's apprehensions regarding French policy were not without some foundation. Drouyn de Lhuys repeated once again to Dayton his wish for the termination of the American civil war and said he would be glad if England could suggest some means by which it might be brought about.[90] On 29th August the French cabinet met to discuss the expediency of recognizing the Confederacy.[91] The next day Drouyn de Lhuys met Lord Clarendon who was returning from his mission to Germany. He had been requested to visit Frankfurt for a week and to ascertain the likely result of the conference of German souvereigns and free republics summoned by the emperor Franz Joseph. One of the memorable feature of that assembly was the hoisting of the Mexican flag by the American minister at the German Diet.[92] Drouyn de Lhuys observed that Clarendon might proclaim loudly to his countrymen that France had no designs regarding the colonization of Mexico and that she only desired to withdraw her troops as soon as order was established. The occupation there increased the Emperor's desire to recognize the Southern States, and he asked if Clarendon thought that England would object to France pursuing this course alone. If not, he enquired whether, after a given time, she would follow the French example. Clarendon

[88] Seward to Dayton, 8-VII, 25-VII-1863, *ibid.* Seward to Pike, 13-VII-1863, *ibid.* Seward to Adams, 30-VII-1863, *ibid.*

[89] Seward to Motley, 14-VII-1863, *ibid.* Seward to Clay, 12-VIII, 3-IX-1863, *ibid.* Seward to Morris, Constantinople, 8-IX-1863, *ibid.*

[90] Dayton to Seward, 2-VII-1863, *ibid.*

[91] "Il y a un Conseil à Saint-Cloud aujourd'hui. . . On doit confabuler sur la reconnaissance des Etats du Sud L'Empereur en a l'idée fixe. . . M. Drouyn de Lhuys est contraire. . . C'est une grave détermination, qui pourrait amener la guerre avec le Nord. Mais ce serait une diversion à la Pologne, c'est dont ce plaint M. Drouyn".—L'amiral de La Roncière le Noury: *Correspondence intime,* Paris, 1928, II, p. 3, 29-VIII-1863.

[92] AE. Allemagne, 29-VIII-1863. "It can hardly be doubted that the strength and union of Germany is an advantage for Europe and a bond of peace and progress for the world".— Motley to Seward, 14-IX-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* On the Clarendon's mission: S. Bóbr-Tylingo: "Lord Clarendon's mission to Germany, 1863", *Antemurale,* XI, 1967, p. 185-189.

answered that he had no reason to expect a departure from the policy of strict neutrality that his government had adopted and the country approved. Napoleon expressed to Clarendon his sorrow that England had refused to join him in recognizing the South. He further asked if there were any chances in this respect from his English point of view. Clarendon knew of none and pointed out the difficulty of recognizing a country to which one could not send a representative by sea or by land, and that it would have no practical result "unless we put an end to the blockade which would be war with the North." [93]

The American civil war was rarely mentioned in Polish diplomatic correspondence. Prince Czartoryski noted on the 13th of August that the news coming from America to Paris were more and more of a menacing nature.[94] Another report cited the opinion of lord Granville that should the hostilities break out between England and the United States, American cruisers would prey on British commerce in retaliation for the depredations of the Alabama. Another reported the answer given by cardinal Antonelli to the Russian minister that Pius IX had ordered prayers for Poland but not for the United States because there were complete religious freedom in America, in Russia, on the contrary, the priests were hung and the bishops deported.[95]

A new area of concern was added to England's overseas problems: A copy of a letter written in conjunction by the diplomatic agents of Russia and the United States to the Japanese authorities reached London. It read, "Japan was opened by us and after we had settled down here, the other powers made their appearance . . . Do not fear the English, there are other nations in Japan, and if you require assistance, you may rest assured that we shall give you moral and material support." [96] Other reports followed. They all agreed that Russia was waiting only for a pretext to occupy Northern parts of Japan; the warnings sent previously seemed about to materialize.[97] The other preoccupa-

[93] Clarendon to Russell, Clarendon MSS, C 104, 31-VIII-1863.

[94] Prince W. Czartoryski to National Government, Lewak, I, p. 330, 13-VIII-1863.

[95] Report from London, 8-VIII, from Rome, 9-IX-1863, *ibid.* II, p. 346, 199.

[96] Admiralty 1/5825, 3-VI, 6-VII-1863. "Hakodadi is seldom or never left without the presence of a Russian ship of War".—13-VII-1863, ibid. "Les menées concertées entre la Russie et l'Amérique qui poursuivent un plan commun destiné à contrecarrer l'influence de l'Angleterre au Japon. Les continuels mouvements de l'amiral Popoff de l'Amour à Hakodadi et de Hakodadi à San Francisco ou à Nagasaki et à Shanghai . . .on verrait donc la Russie et l'Amérique unies pour faire du Japon un entrepôt commercial, presqu'exclusivement destiné au commerce américain qui favoriserait ainsi l'ouverture de la nouvelle route de terre que la Russie s'offorce d'ouvrir à travers la Sibérie pour joindre l'Ocean Pacifique à la mer Baltique". —AE, Japon, Yédo, VII-1863.

[97] "The Russian intentions with regard to the Kuriles and Yesso can be easily surmised, and they only await the right time to put them into execution. Ever since the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse, Yesso, and particularly the excellent port of Hakodadi, has been the wintering place of the Russian men-of-war.

The Russians scarcely take the trouble to veil their plans, and the naval

officers, doubtless excellent men, but who, both in discretion and policy, very little ressemble Count Poutiatine, candily own that Russia is merely seeking a pretext. . .

All talk about an approaching invasion and all pictures to themselves the marvellous and heroic deeds they intend performing, and the number of Roosha (Russians) they will kill when the long-expected time arrives; but, notwithstanding the cannon sent hither from Yeddo, the forts which have been built, and the bravados of the Japanese garrisons, the inhabitants of Yesso feel convinced they will soon be called upon to pay hommage to the Tsar.

This conviction has lately become so strong that the invasion and conquest of this island by the Russians is taken into due consideration in commercial and private transactions among the natives. Hakodadi is at present literally besieged by them. The Russian Consul is the learned M. Goskavitch, who, under the simple title of Consul, hides the power of an plenipotentiary. . .

The respectful feelings entertained by the Japanese result from the imposing attitude of the Russians in this part of the globe. The number of Consular officials, popes, doctors, secretaries and interpreters is considerable. At present, the Russian quarter of Hakodadi consists of six or seven excellent houses, a Russian-Japanese hospital, a church etc., but these will soon be increased. Two men-of-war are generally in harbour.

The labouring and merchant classes are already devoted, soul and body, to the Russians, and they will therefore aid them in effecting their plans.

The Japanese have not formed a very high opinion about Russian civilization; and the official visit of some yaconins and Hakodadi merchants to Nicolaevsk has inspired them with great contempt for Russian morals. . .

The Russians know right well that this island contains rich mines, and they are delighted that the Japanese have commenced exploring them on a grand scale. . . The two principal articles the Russians covet are coal and the magnificent oak and pine forests. . .

Hakodadi is excellently situated, and absolutely necessary for the Russian squadron, for in coming hither the men-of-war escape from the icy prisons of the North. . .

The Russian sailor would gladly hasten the course of events: the more able diplomatist disapproves of this, and while patiently awaiting the proper time he sees with inward satisfaction the efforts of the Japanese Government to improve this island by making canals and roads, fertilizing the immense barren plains of the South, and building villages and forts. The fruit must be allowed to ripen—this is the opinion of diplomacy. . .

Any Russian man-of-war with one hundred men and one or two guns would take Hakodadi, and ipso facto the whole Yesso, in less than two hours. . .

When Rear-Admiral Popoff was at this port in the month of June all the midshipmen of his squadron had to pass a very severe examination, and the following question was invariably put to them: How would you take Hakodadi? Twenty-four men were generally thought sufficient, and when, in a single instance, a higher number was given, this excited considerable mirth among the officers who formed the board of examination. . .

It is well known that Russia is changing the geographical limits of its possessions every year, but it is extremely difficult to obtain any information regarding the Manchu Russian territories".—FO. 46/24, Japan, 2-IX-1862.

"The more I study Russian policy with regard to Yesso, the more I feel convinced that Russia is wise and prudent in making Hakodate the centre of their diplomacy and rendez-vous of their men-of-war. . . The policy of the Russian consul differs entirely with that of the other consul. . . The Russian Consul however never determines anything with precision, he likes and always endeavours to be vague in his discussions with the Japanese, and the decisions he makes. . . As regards the opening of Japan, they always assure the Japanese Government, that although England and the other treaty nations are ambitious, they are satisfied with Hakodati.

Why do you demand, that the limits which divide our Mantchourian possessions from your country, shall be definitely fixed? We never interfere with your government and never tell you that you are going too far, you

tion was the news that in case of hostilities breaking out between Great Britain and Japan a scheme was in contemplation for issuing Japanese letters of marque.[98] Russell's reaction was prompt and peremptory. If the next news from Japan should announce hostilities the British force of gunboats or small steamers in the China and Japan seas should be increased to encounter American privateers.[99]

In September it was evident that the western powers would not intervene to save Poland. "The Polish question—noted Pike— will not disturb the peace of Europe." [100] "There will be no war on account of poor Poland"—stated Charles Sumner.[101] And he added in a speech

must therefore act in the same manner towards us, for be assured that if the exact limits were fixed, this would be a source of endless difficulties. You say that we have too many men-of-war in your harbour, but their presence is necessary in order to protect you, and to guard our Mantchourian ports. You ask us why a hospital, principally for Japanese, has been built. It has always been and still is the policy of our great nation to protect and favour those with whom it is on friendly terms. . .

Russia has done its utmost and still tries to appear great and terrible in the eyes of the Japanese Government at the expense of the other European powers, whose policy has been totally misrepresented. They have however convinced nobody but the Japanese respect and fear them and the Russians endeavour to persuade them that the government of St. Petersburg is as redoutable in Europe as in Asia.

The day a governor of Hakodati informed M. Jakovitch he had heard that a conquest was at present impossible without the consent of the great powers. This is quite true, the Russian consul answered, but our government always obtains their consent".—FO. 46/25, 29-IX-1862.

Those who examine and study the policy of Russia in this part of the globe, daily feel more convinced that the principles upon which the Government of St. Petersburgh acts with regard to Corea and Japan, are similar to those it has adopted towards Mantchouria. The present goal of the Russians, the object of their most strenuous endeavours in direct opposition to Anglo-French interests in Eastern Asia, is the North of Japan. . . The Russian representative seizes every opportunity to show the Japanese that the interests of his country are diametrically opposed to those of England and France",— *Ibid.*, Hakodate, November 1862.

"In conversation recently with my colleague of the United States I referred to the Russian squadron in these seas and of the surprising secrecy which appeared to attend its movements, its non-appearance at the scene of active events in this country and even at the remote port of Hakodadi. The detached vessels arriving there leaving it with sealed orders.

Mr. Pruyn said that he had learnt that admiral Popoff was in San Francisco with the greater portion of his ships, and upon my asking what might be the probable motive for a squadron destined for China and Japan frequenting that station, Mr. Pruyn replied that the harbour of St. Francisco would be a most convenient one in the event of any hostilities arising between Great Britain and France with Russia, for a blocading squadron could hardly keep the sea off that port while the Russian ships issuing from its secure harbour would do great mischief to merchant vessels of an enemy in the North Pacific".—FO. 46/37, Jokohama, 15-XI-1863.

[98] Admiralty 1/5851, 25-VII-1863.

[99] 13-VIII-1863, *ibid.*

[100] Pike to Seward, 2-IX-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* "In America all depends on the reduction of Charleston and the sea-bord. That object will probably be accomplished if America is left alone by Europe".—Russell to Cowley, PRO. 30/22/105, 2-IX-1863.

[101] "You were right", wrote Charles Sumner, "there will be no war on account of poor Poland". Charles Sumner to Rudolph Schleiden, Bremen minister in Washington, 6-IX-1863.—Edward L. Pierce: *Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner,* London, 1893, IV, 145.

that amazed the American public opinion that the only friend they had was the republic of William Tell.[102] The Southern opinion was well summarized by De Leon from London: "the Polish question and the Mexican entirely obscured ours." [103]

Napoleon was still "very much disposed" to acknowledge at once the independence of the Southern States with a view of preventing their future interference in Mexico. He followed, however, the advice of his minister for foreign affairs and would do nothing without England.[104] Drouyn de Lhuys again mentioned the subject with the under-secretary Layard. He stressed the importance of Franco-English unity in recognizing the Southern States. He pointed out the claim they had to recognition as an independent community and dwelt upon the certainty of an invasion of Canada by the North sooner or later, and the great value to England at such a moment, of an alliance with France.[105] The French attitude was understandable. Rumors reached them that Russia and the United States had made an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance.[106]

At this very moment the Americans were surprised by the visit of the Russian fleet. On 24 September the Russian Baltic fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Lisowsky arrived in New York; on 12 October the Pacific fleet under the command of Admiral Popow arrived in San Francisco. The explanation was the Polish insurrection and the Russian desire to anchor their men-of-war in friendly ports. Should the hostilities against France and England break out they would prey on enemy merchant ships. The American government did not know that the visit was intended until the ships arrived, and was careful to leave reception entirely to the municipal authorities. The Russians were greeted with unrestrained enthusiasm. As one of their officers remarked, if Russian girls ever manifested a small portion of the interest shown by the American beauties, there would not be a single bachelor in the whole empire.[107]

[102] *The works of Charles Sumner*, Boston, 1880, VIII, p. 470, 10-IX-1863.

[103] Papers relating, *op. cit.*, 30-IX-1863, p. 1313

[104] Cowley to Russell, FO, 519/231, 4IX-8.IX-1863.

[105] Layard to Russell, RA H 51/182,11-IX-1863.

[106] Dayton to Seward, 16-IX-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[107] S. Bóbr-Tylingo: Napoléon, *op. cit.*, p. 223-4, 320-326. S. Bóbr-Tylingo: "Stany Zjednoczone AP a powstanie styczniowe", *Teki Historyczne*, XI, 1960-61, p. 140-144. Joseph W. Wieczerzak: *A Polish chapter in civil war America*, New York, 1967, p. 148-178. Alexandre Tarsaidzé: *Czars and presidents*, New York, 1958, p. 193-222. Woldman, *op cit.*, p. 135-158. F. A. Golder: "The Russian fleet and the civil war". *American Historical Review*, XX, 1915. Margaret Leech: *Reveille in Washington 1860-1865*, New York, 1941, p. 282-3. Adamow E.: "Russia and the United States at the time of the civil war". *Journal of Modern History*, 1930. Duncan Maccallum: "The alleged Russian plans for the invasion of Australia", 1864. *Royal Australian Historical Society Journal and Proceedings*, vol. XLIV, part 5, January 1959.

"Russia has, at last, manifestly identified herself with the desperado Administration of Lincoln. This will exercise a large amount of influence in alienating the feelings of the friends of Poland from the North. It is

The Russian visit did not have any influence on the diplomatic situation. Lincoln and Seward were still worried that the Polish question might force England into the arms of Napoleon. For some time they had been aware of such a danger.[108] Meanwhile, Pike reported from The Hague that the shadow of Poland made all Europe draw back from American affairs.[109] Adams wrote from London about "the prospect of quiet," but warned that Russian preparations for a possible conflict in the spring had aroused a great deal of attention.[110] Slidell informed his government in the same sense. There was in Europe an increasing feeling of uneasiness over the Polish problem. So long as it remained in its present uncertain condition it would be a serious obstacle to recognition of the Confederate States. He was inclined to think that a warlike solution would be advantageous to them "especially since the recent ovation to Russian officers at New York." [111]

On the 5th November Napoleon opened the Session of the Chambers with a speech in which he extended an invitation to a congress embracing all European powers. Dayton reported that the speech was much applauded, the portion of it with reference to Poland particularly so. The general impression among the diplomatic corps was that it foreshadowed war with Russia. A week later he asserted that the con-

most fortunate event, viewed in all its bearings, that could have happened for us, and I regret that it did not occur long ago. . . The North has had no such serviceable sympathizers in Europe as the friends par excellence of Poland".—Mann to Benjamin, 23-X-1863, ORN.

The *"Richmond Examiner"* commented sarcastically: "The Czar emancipates the serfs from their bondage of centuries, and puts forth the whole strength of his empire to enslave the Poles. Lincoln proclaims freedom to the African, and strives at the same time to subjugate freeborn Americans".—Woldman, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

"Harper's Weekly" wrote on October 17, 1863: "The analogies between the American and Russian people have too often been described to need further explanation here, Russia, like the United States, is a nation of the future. Its capabilities are only just being developed. Its national destiny is barely shaped. Its very institutions are in their cradle, and have yet to be modeled to fit advancing civilization and the spread of inteligence. . . At the present time Russia and the United States occupy remarkably similar positions. A portion of the subjects of the Russian empire, residing in Poland, have attempted to secede and set up an independent national existence, just as our Southern slaveowners have tried to secede from the Union and set up a slave Confederacy, and the Czar, like the government of the Union, has undertaken to put down the insurrection by force of arms. In that undertaking which every government is bound to make under penalty of national suicide, Russia, like the United States has been thwarted and annoyed by the interference of France and England. The Czar, like Mr. Lincoln, nevertheless, perseveres in his purpose; and being perfectly in earnest and determined, has sent a fleet into our waters in order that, if war should occur, British and French commerce should not escape as cheaply as they did in the Crimean contest".—*Ibid*, p. 146-7.

John Hay noted in his diary: "The Officers of the Russian Fleet were entertained tonight by the Secretary of the Navy. They have vast absorbent powers and are fiendishly ugly. I grieve to say that Madame Lissovsky is not an exception".—Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 134, 9-XII-1863.

[108] Monaghan, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

[109] Pike, 14-X, 28-X-1863, *ibid.* p. 333.

[110] Adams to Seward, 23-X-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[111] Slidell to Benjamin, 25-X-1863. ORN.

gress was unlikely to meet. At the end of November Dayton stated that the congress engrossed all attention, but each of the great powers was distrustful of other.[112] For Adams the speech meant war. It was received in London with marked disapprobation. The effect of this speech had been to concentrate the attention of all nations upon the difficulties existing in Europe, and to a corresponding degree to divert it from affairs in the United States. A week later Adams informed that the rather sudden demise of the king of Denmark had added one more to the already grave complications of European politics. The uncertainty as to the future had increased, until, in some of the great commercial centres on the continent, it had reached a state of panic. Most of the trading houses were engaged in contracting their operations in anticipation of a rupture in the spring. Even if the proposed congress should finally be assembled, it was viewed as far more likely to terminate in a disagreement than in pacification and general disarmament. At the end of November Adams stated that the refusal of English government to participate in the congress would put an end to that project. In the meantime the Danish question was assuming an aspect more and more serious. So long as such a state of things should continue in Europe, it was not probable that any efforts in favour of the rebels would make headway in England.[113] Seward was satisfied with the complicated European situation. "European statesmen and governments"—he wrote to Adams—"must, in the main, be so far content with governing Europe as to leave the statesmen and governments of America the responsibilities of regulating affairs on this continent." [114]

The Southern diplomatists were not satisfied with the European complications. Slidell reported that the Emperor's speech had excited an immense sensation throughout Europe: it foreshadowed a European war at a not very distant day.[115] De Leon noted that "between the more living questions of Congress, Poland and Mexico the American falls to

[112] Dayton to Seward, 6-XI, 13-XI, 19-XI, 27-XI-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* "The subject of the proposed European congress occupies much attention . . . But this is simply trying again to settle by diplomacy questions which diplomacy has been endeavouring in vain for months and years to adjust".—Pike to Seward, 18-XI-1863, ibid. "You will have learned that the proposed congress of sovereigns and their ministers at Paris is likely to fall through in consequence of England's declinig to enter it. The congress meant the Polish question and nothing else. On this subject England and Austria have held the reins on the French Emperor all summer, and, doubtless, they will continue to act together on it".—Pike to Seward, 2-XII-1863, ibid.

[113] Adams to Seward, 13-XI, 19-XI, 27-XI-1863. *Ibid.* "I read the English reply as the elegy over the entente cordiale".—Henry Adams to his brother, Ford: A cycle, *op. cit.*, II, p. 107, 27-XI-1863.

[114] Seward to Pike, 23-XI-1863. *Diplomatic correspondence.* Seward to Adams, 30-XI-1863. *Ibid,* Stoeckl stated: "There is a strange contrast as to what is happening at this moment on the two continents. In Europe the revolutionists, the Utopians and the other restless spirits are agitating to upset the whole order of things and to substitute for them democratic institutions. In America these same institutions seem to have run their course". Stoeckl to Gortchakow, 4-XII-1863, Woldman, *op. cit.* p. 206.

[115] Slidell to Benjamin, 15-XI-1863.—John Bigelow: *France and the confederate navy,* London, 1888, p. 146-7.

the ground, at least for the moment." [116] Still in December, Slidell thought that the peace of Europe would not long be preserved. Hotze in a despatch of December 26 gave a very accurate picture of the whole situation. The Polish insurrection had been stimulated by special machinery that no other nation than one "of generations of illustrious exiles" could command. Already it had directly alienated France and Russia, and indirectly, through the proposed congress, given the coup de grâce to the Anglo-French alliance.[117]

The Lincoln government did not believe that the congress would even meet; the prevailing opinion in Washington was: a congress meant war.[118]

Napoleon did not reconcile himself to a setback and proposed a modified form of congress in the shape of ministerial discussions. It failed as did the first proposition. The result was immediately noted by Pike: there were no longer any alliances in Europe. France felt offended at England's refusal and declined to act in concert with her to prevent a rupture between Denmark and German Confederation.[119]

Meanwhile the Polish insurrection was drawing to a close. Benjamin wrote in January 1864: "Our own wrongs have but heightened our sympathy for suffering Poland and increased our contempt for the so-called statesmanship which preserves a short-lived peace at the expense of duty to humanity and the honour and dignity of a great nation." [120] And Pike could state at the end of the year: "The general aspects of the European world are peaceable . . . The Danish question, the Roman question, and the Polish question, all of which have been so long threatening the public peace, are disposed of on terms that are accepted by the leading powers, if not satisfactory to them." [121]

The American civil war did not have any influence on the January uprising or on the diplomacy of great powers with respect to it. It did not come to a war against Russia not because of any consideration of the American situation but because Austria, as she had done during the Crimean war, did not see any reason to weaken the great power of the Russians in Europe.

The influence of the January uprising on the American civil war was

[116] De Leon to Benjamin, 15-XI-1863.—John Kutolowski: "The effect of the Polish insurrection of 1863 on American civil war diplomacy", *Historian*, XXVII, 1965, p. 575.

[117] Slidell to Benjamin, 15-XII-1863. *ORN*. Hotze to Benjamin, 26-XII-1863, ibid.

[118] . . . quoique spectateurs d'une révolution qui certes marquera parmi les événements les plus sérieux de notre siècle, l'attention générale s'est exclusivement fixée sur cette proposition inattendue d'un congrès Européen avec la mission, toute nouvelle, de régler non le passé mais l'avenir. L'appréciation de cette étrange initiative est en ce moment l'unique sujet de conversation et les commentaires les plus contradictoires circulent de toutes parts . . .J'entends répéter sans cesse: le congrès c'est la guerre".—Bergmans, Washington to Rogier, AE. B. Etats-Unis 7, 17-XII-1863.

[119] Pike to Seward 30-XII-1863, 6-I, 13-I-1864. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

[120] Benjamin to Hotze, 9-I-1864. *ORN*.

[121] Pike to Seward, 2-XI-1864. *Diplomatic correspondence.*

twofold. Its outbreak prevented Napoleon from taking any further step in his policy of mediation between the fighting States. At that time he was not accustomed to suffer any setback. What would be his next move? Several times in 1863 he pronounced the words, "recognition of the South." Was he planning it as his next proposition, after that of January 9?

The second result of the January uprising was the visit of the Russian fleet and the myth of Russian friendship. A majority of interested citizens at the time, and certainly an overwhelming majority later, appeared to have accepted the visit as primarily a gesture of friendship, with the strong possibility of an alliance and open assistance against common enemies.[122] The whole generation recalled the joy of their parents: "We are saved! The Russians have come." [123] Frederick Seward, assistant secretary of state, wrote in his reminiscences that when European mediation was threatening the Union, "two Russian fleets appeared in American waters, and passed summer and winter there." [124] It was believed later that the price of $7,500,000 paid for Alaska included the expenses of the naval demonstration.[125] "God bless the Russians"—noted Gideon Welles in his diary.[126] The exclamation stayed in American hearts for generations. An eminent American historian stated in 1930 that the feeling of gratitude toward Russia persisted as late as 1919 in the reluctance of the Department of State to recognize the dismemberment of Russia.[127] Yes, but with a correction as it concerned the independence of Poland and Finland. But the myth of Russian friendship is not dead; is still with us. As late as 1962 it appeared again in a book on the American civil war.[128] May we assume that during the Yalta conference when Eastern and Central Europe were handed over to Russia, this time Finland and Poland included, the myth of Russian friendship was still present in American hearts?

[122] Thomas A. Bailey: 'The Russian fleet myth re-examined". *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXVIII, 1951.

[123] Tarsaïdzé, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

[124] Frederick W. Seward: *Reminiscences of a war-time statesman and diplomat 1830-1915*, New York, 1916, p. 218.

[125] *The letters of Franklin K. Lane*, Boston, 1922, p. 261.

[126] *Diary of Gideon Welles*, I, p. 443, 25-IX-1863.

[127] Donaldson Jordan, Edwin J. Pratt: *Europe and the American civil war*, New York, 1969, p. 201. The opinion is that of E. Pratt.

[128] A. R. Tyrner-Tyrnauer: *Lincoln and the emperors*, London 1962, p. 78.

STUDIA II

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GERMAN PROPAGANDA FOR THE REVISION OF THE POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER IN DANZIG AND THE CORRIDOR; ITS EFFECTS ON BRITISH OPINION AND THE BRITISH POLICY-MAKING ELITE IN THE YEARS 1919-1933

The development of propaganda into an art is a striking feature of twentieth century life. It has been used primarily in authoritarian and totalitarian régimes to influence their public opinion on both domestic and foreign problems. Another form of propaganda is that employed by most countries today to build a positive image of themselves abroad, with the aim of attracting tourism and trade, or just with the aim of informing foreign opinion about life, culture and politics in the country involved. There have also been attempts by certain countries to influence opinion in other states with the object of gaining support for certain policy aims. The most striking case of this type was the German propaganda of the interwar period directed at the revision of the Versailles Treaty. The hey-day of this type of propaganda was in the period of the Weimar Republic; it was better organised and more effective than the Nazi propaganda which followed, because it represented a "respectable", democratic, Germany. Nazi political and racial excesses disillusioned many previous sympathizers of the German cause.

The first objective of this paper is to describe one aspect of Weimar revisionist propaganda, that aimed at influencing British opinion and policy-makers to accept and act upon the German demand for the revision of the Polish-German frontier. Here, German propaganda concentrated on demanding the return of Danzig and the Corridor—Polish Pomerania—to Germany. This focus was deliberately chosen over Upper Silesia for its greater appeal, the reasons for which will be explained later. The second and major objective is to study and analyze the impact of this propaganda on British opinion, in so far as this was reflected in the British press, and also its influence on the British Policy-Making Elite. This élite consisted of members of the Cabinet and officials of the Foreign Office. It should be noted that the term "policy-making élite" must, as in all democratic political systems, be understood in a restricted sense. Foreign Office officials did not actually "make" policy, but suggested it. The Cabinet "made" policy, but only in the sense that

it accepted or rejected policy suggestions made by Foreign Office officials within the context of public opinion and traditional British policy principles and objectives. The two key periods which will be considered in this paper are the years 1924-25 and 1931-33. In the first period, which saw the rejection of the Geneva Protocol and the acceptance of the Locarno Treaties, the British attitude to the German problem and, in this context, on the Polish-German frontier, became crystallized. It was also in this period that the British press for the first time expressed almost unanimous support for German claims. In the second period, which saw the breakdown of the so-called Locarno system in the maelstrom of the Great Depression and its devastating impact on Germany, the Polish-German frontier became the focus of debate on the German problem. Hopefully, this case study of German propaganda and its impact on Britain will provide an explanation for the widespread acceptance of German propaganda claims to Danzig and the Corridor by British opinion, and their partial acceptance by the policy-making élite.

In the first place, we must, of course, look at German revisionist propaganda within the context of German foreign policy. Here it should be noted that the rejection of the Polish-German frontier was a constant factor in German policy from May 1919, when the German Delegation protested against the Draft Treaty at the Paris Peace Conference, until the spring of 1933, when Hitler gave the first indication of willingness to establish normal relations with Poland without a prior revision of the frontier. German revisionist policy with regard to Poland in the Weimar period has been aptly described as not just a policy but as "a national mystique." [1] The German establishment refused to reconcile itself to the loss of Polish territories which had been held by Prussia and then the German Empire for a total period of one hundred and forty-six years as far as the Corridor was concerned (1772-1918), while Danzig had been held for one hundred and twenty-five years (1793).

This attitude stemmed from views on the status of Germany as a power and from a traditional contempt for the Poles. For one thing, most educated Germans accepted Bismarck's *dicta* that without the Polish provinces Prussia would not be able to survive; and that an independent Poland would be a French satellite on Prussia's back door which would automatically weaken her on the Rhine.[2] These views were repeated after 1871, with reference to the German Empire. We find them expressed, for example, by the well-known German historian Otto Hoetzsch who urged in 1913, that only a massive programme of Germanizing the Polish provinces by German settlers could prevent creeping polonization and thus the inevitable loss of these territories

[1] Harald von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations 1918-1933*, Baltimore and London, 1971, p. 226.

[2] Bismarck to Manteuffel (1848), cited in Hermann von Petersdorff, ed., *Bismarck. Die Gesammelten Werke, Politische Schriften*, v. I., Berlin, 1923, p. 430; Bismarck to Count Bernstorff (1863), cited in Horst Kohl, *Bismarck-Jahrbuch*, Leipzig, 1899, v. I., p. 175.

which would, in turn, weaken Germany's position on her western frontier.[3] Hoetzsch was then a member of the "Ostmarkenverein", an organization devoted to Germanizing the "German East", or Posnania and West Prussia.[4] After the war he became the director of the *Ost-Europa Institut* in Breslau and participated in German revisionist propaganda against the Polish-German frontier. The opinion that Germany could not regain her status as a European power without recovering the "German East", was also frequently expressed by German statesmen, politicians and journalists after 1919, as for example by Chancellor Hans Luther.[5] Secondly, aside from the shock experienced by the Germans in losing Posnania, most of West Prussia, Danzig, and part of Upper Silesia, the fact that a large German minority found itself within the borders of the Polish state, created something akin to moral outrage. The new situation reversed the traditional order of things in which Germans ruled Poles and not *vice versa*. The doctrine of German superiority over Slavs existed, of course, long before Hitler came to power. All these factors then contributed to a general attitude of resentment and outrage, although the impression carefully fostered by propaganda abroad, of the whole population breathing revenge and ready to march into another war, did not correspond to reality. The average German was not as concerned with the loss of the "German

[3] Writing of the possible loss of the Polish provinces of Prussia to the Polish element, Hoetzsch wrote: „Aus alledem ergibt sich die Stellung Deutschlands ohne weiteres. Wir sagen Stellung Deutschlands, denn es ist eine Zukunftsfrage des ganzen deutschen Volkes, ob dem preussischen Staat die Behauptung der Warthe-und Weichselgegenden bleibt. Die zentral-europäische Stellung Deutschlands beruht auf den beiden Flügeln westlich und ostlich der Elbe gleichmässig, und die Schwierigkeiten des östlichen Flügels, die in seiner nationalen Gliederung liegen, fühlt die westliche Flügel von selbst mit", Otto Hoetzsch, „Nationalitätenkampf und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Ostmark", in *Die Deutsche Ostmark*, Herausg, von Deutschen Ostmarkenverein, Lissa, 1913, p. 619. The book includes a map of Posen and West Prussia, allegedly based on the census of 1910, but with lower percentages than those shown in the map based on the census drawn by Jacob Spett and published by Perthes in Gotha, 1917. (see note 23 below).

[4] For the Ostmarkenverein, see Richard W. Tims, *Germanizing Prussian Poland. The H-K-T Society and the Struggle for Eastern Marches of the German Empire 1894-1919*, New York, 1941. The book has been largely superseded by research after World War II, see A. Galos, F. H. Gentzen and W. Jakóbczyk in Janusz Pajewski, ed., *Dzieje Hakaty* (The History of the H-K-T-), Poznań, 1966. The alternative name of H-K-T for the Ostmarkenverein, stemmed from the names of its founders: Heinrich Tiedemann, Ferdinand Hansemann and Hermann Kennemann.

[5] Dr. Hans Luther, Chancellor of Germany 1925-26, later President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Finances, said: "Without the lands of the German East a Germany that wishes to become again a great Power in the genuine sense of the word — politically, economically, culturally, and in defensive strength — is unthinkable. Since the World War, the German nation has remained united of its own free will and in its own strength. It has also survived the terrors of the fearful collapse of the currency without falling apart politically. The third great test will be that of its capacity to save the East and with it the basis of its power as a nation", cited by William H. Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1933, pp. 383-84. (This book will be discussed below).

East", as propaganda made him out to be. As late as 1928, Dr Strahl, the director of the key propaganda agency, the "Reichszentrale für Heimatsdienst", wrote that one of the tasks of home propaganda was to arouse the interest of the German population in the fate of the frontier Germans and of Germans abroad.[6] In fact, a mass propaganda campaign was constantly in effect in Germany to keep the population well aware of German losses and resentment. This was especially marked in the schools where history books and atlases pointed out the unnatural situation existing after 1918, due to the "injustice" of the Polish-German frontier.[7] There is no doubt that the average German, bombarded as he constantly was by this propaganda, accepted the justice of German claims; there is no evidence, however, that he was willing to risk another world war in order to make them good. In the end, of course, he had no choice. What matters here, is that from the mid nineteen-twenties, to the early nineteen-thirties, British opinion by and large accepted the German propaganda claim that German opinion was unanimously and passionately resentful of the Polish-German frontier. The Poles for their part consistently refused to discuss German demands. Aside from the fact that the Corridor and Polish Upper Silesia were preponderantly Polish-speaking, the Polish attitude had strategic and economic justifications. The Poles believed that the retrocession of Danzig and the Corridor would give Germany a stranglehold on their seaborne trade and maritime communications with Western Europe. As for Upper Silesia, its loss would mean the loss of Poland's industrial base. Thus, from the Polish point of view, the satisfaction of German territorial claims would inevitably lead to Poland's subjection to Germany, i.e., to the loss of Polish independence.

Let us now consider why the Weimar governments concentrated so much effort on revisionist propaganda abroad and particularly in Britain? The answer should be sought in the first place in the military weakness of Germany and in the conclusions drawn therefrom by the great German statesman, Gustav Stresemann, who directed German foreign policy from August 1923 until his death in October 1929. It was Stresemann who deliberately raised the Polish-German frontier to the rank of a major European problem, and it is possible that this was the

[6] *Aufgaben und Ziele der staatspolitischen Aufklärungsarbeit*, von Ministerialrat Dr Strahl, Leiter der Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst, Berlin, 1928, pp. 17-18, cited in Kazimierz Smogorzewski, "Propaganda 'korytarzowa' za granicą" (Corridor Propaganda Abroad), *Pamiętnik Instytutu Bałtyckiego*. Serja Balticum, no. 3, Toruń, 1930, p. 70.

[7] Smogorzewski cites from a few textbooks for schools published in the 1920's, for e.g. *Ausstaat. Deutsche Lesebuch für Höhere Schulen*, by Professors Panzer (Heidelberg) and Spranger (Berlin), published in 1929, which had an edition especially for East Prussia and Frontier Lands (Ausgabe für Ostpreussen und Grenzland). Here, the authors wrote that Germany must recover the lost provinces, cost what it may, Smogorzewski, *ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

key to his policy.[8] He chose to follow the policy of "fulfilment", that is, the recognition of Germany's postwar border in the West and the payment of reparations, with the aim of removing allied occupation troops from the Rhineland. He then envisaged proceeding to an Anschluss with Austria, and finally to the revision of the Polish-German frontier.[9] These goals could not be realized by a disarmed Germany without British and French agreement. The first stage of the policy of fulfilment was embodied in the Locarno Treaties, signed on 16 October, and ratified on 1 December 1925. Here Stresemann succeeded in separating the security of French and Belgian frontiers with Germany, which obtained an international guarantee, from the problem of Polish and Czechoslovak borders with the Reich. Poland and Czechoslovakia had to be satisfied with arbitration treaties with Germany; these were not guaranteed by France or any other power, but France signed mutual assistance treaties with her two East European allies.[10] Although Stresemann made no secret of the view that Locarno gave him "a free hand in the East", [11] he was too wise a statesman to raise the problem of the Polish-German frontier officially either at Locarno or later during his lifetime. He made his attitude on this subject quite clear to German journalists in June 1925, while negotiations for a Western Security Pact were in progress. He then advised them to leave the discussion of the "untenable" Polish-German frontier to—the London *Times*. He explained that even in a defensive war Germany could not hold her frontiers against Poland, while an offensive war was unthinkable with the resources at Germany's disposal.[12]

Stresemann's attitude did not mean, of course, that plans for the recovery of the Polish territories were in abeyance. In March 1925,

[8] Von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations*, p. 264. See also: Zygmunt Gasiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland before Locarno"; "Stresemann and Poland after Locarno", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, v. 18, nos. 1, 3, 1958.

[9] Lord D'Abernon, then British Ambassador in Berlin, who did much to bring Locarno about, noted already in 1924 that: "Stresemann considered that it was essential for the Rhineland to be frankly part of Germany, also for Danzig to be reincorporated. Without this, there could be no permanent peace. Viscount Edgar D'Abernon, *Ambassador of Peace*, v. III, London, 1929, p. 101, entry for 14 September 1924. Stresemann made no secret of his program; he told a German audience that only the French threat on the Rhine prevented the recovery of German territory (i.e., territory in the East), and an Anschluss with Austria, see *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik*, ser. B. v. I. pt. 1, p. 744, [henceforth: *ADAP*] cited in Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West*, 1925-1929, Princeton, 1972, pp. 30-31 .

[10] See Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925, French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno*, Minneapolis, 1962, sp. ch. 13. The Illusion of Locarno; and Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, Part Two. Appeasement Before and After Locarno.

[11] Stresemann held that the Locarno Treaties would allow Germany to recover unlimited sovereignty over the Polish Corridor, Danzig and Upper Silesia, see Z. Gąsiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland after Locarno", p. 299, (see n. 8 above).

[12] Stresemann to the Press, 7 March 1925, Henry Bernhard ed., *Gustav Stresemann. Vermächtnis. Der Nachlass in Drei Bänden*, v. II, Berlin, 1932, p. 72.

Herbert von Dirksen, then head of the East European section of the German Foreign Ministry, drew up German desiderata with regard to Danzig and the Corridor. Both were to return to Germany, the latter territory as far south as a line running between Schneidemühl, Bromberg and Thorn (Piła, Bydgoszcz and Toruń). In return, Poland was to obtain a free port in Danzig and guaranteed free access to the sea by river and rail; he also considered the possibility of Polish "corridor-rights" to Memel. Interestingly enough, from the point of view of German propaganda that the Corridor was ethnically German, Dirksen admitted that it was preponderantly Polish. Thus, he rejected the idea of fusing Danzig and the Corridor into an autonomous state, because this would lead to the "polonization" of Danzig. He also rejected a plebiscite in the Corridor as dangerous and a population exchange as impracticable. Finally, he noted that while German plans could only be realized if Poland fell into "complete decay", German missions abroad should be urged to propagate the idea of revision in private conversations.[13] He did not doubt, however, that even in such favourable circumstances, the final solution would have to be achieved by force.[14]

A year later, in April 1926, an elaborate memorandum was drawn up and sent to the German Embassy in London, outlining German arguments for revision. Significantly, the Danzig-Corridor question was placed first in order of importance; then came Upper Silesia. No partial or provisional solutions were to be accepted—although it was often pretended that they might be. The author of the memorandum noted that the only chance of accomplishing revision lay in connecting it with international financial aid to Poland, then struggling with inflation and the economic problems resulting from the German-Polish tariff war.[15]

[13] Herbert von Dirksen, "Aufzeichnung über die Aufrollung der Korridorfrage", 21 March 1925, Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Bonn, Pol. Abt. Staatssekretär, Po. Bd. 1. (4568H/E168384-5), mentioned in Christoph M. Kimmich, *The Free City. Danzig and German Foreign Policy, 1919-1934*, New Haven and London, 1968, pp. 72-3.

[14] Dirksen memorandum of 11 November 1925, Arch.d.Aus.Amtes, Bonn, Handakten Direktoren: Dirksen, cited in Janusz Sobczak, *Propaganda zagraniczna Niemiec Weimarskich wobec Polski* (The Foreign Propaganda of Weimar Germany against Poland), Poznań, 1974, p.16, n.16. Dr. Sobczak's book is the only work to date on this subject which is based entirely on German documents.

[15] Unsigned memorandum, probably written by Dirksen, enclosed with Stresemann's instructions for the Embassy in London, 19 April 1926, ADAP, ser.B.,v.II, pt.1, no.150. The variants for an "interim" solution, as set down in 1925, envisaged leaving Danzig as a Free City, but freed from its far-reaching dependence on Poland, and the possibility of making the Corridor or both Danzig and the Corridor a united autonomous territory under the control of the League of Nations. Also, eastern Upper Silesia could be an autonomous territory, under preponderant German control, Dirksen's notes for a conversation with Lord d'Abernon, 29 December 1925, Dirksen papers, Bonn, cited by Sobczak, p.18. For internal usage, however, the possibility of making the Corridor and Danzig an autonomous territory was ecluded ,since it would lead to the "polonisation" of Danzig by the Polish majority in the Corridor. Also ,the proposed autonomy of Eastern Upper Silesia was explained as camouflage for German annexation, Dirksen memorandum of 11 November 1925, Sobczak p.19.

Stresemann himself sent instructions to the German Ambassador in London, Friedrich Sthamer, to be very careful in raising the matter. A significant passage of the instructions read:

> We welcome the fact that influential English circles are interested in the Polish-German border question, and seem to understand that the solution of this question is not only the most important task of our policy, but also perhaps the most important task of European policy in general. The cooperation of England is absolutely necessary to obtain such a solution by peaceful means, and only such means can be considered.[16]

Stresemann's emphasis on England was shared by German revisionist propaganda on Danzig and the Corridor. While the United States and France were by no means neglected, the major propaganda effort was directed at British opinion. This is not surprising. Britain was not only the senior partner of the "Entente", but had played, under the leadership of Austen Chamberlain, the leading role in the negotiations which resulted in the Locarno Treaties. It was also a British statesman who had fought most strenuously against maximum French and Polish territorial demands against Germany in 1919. Prime Minister David Lloyd George had then opposed the cession of Danzig to Poland and had persuaded both Georges Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson to accept a compromise solution in the shape of the Free City. Lloyd George also opposed the cession of the Corridor to Poland, but had to accept it in the face of vigorous French and American pressure.[17]

It was in Britain that the Versailles Treaty came to be criticized more strongly and extensively than in any other country outside Germany. As early as 1919, the British economist, John Maynard Keynes had published his attack on the treaty under the title of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.* He criticized the reparations and territorial losses imposed on Germany, arguing that both would make German recovery, and thus European peace, impossible. The book

[16] ADAP, p. 363, (Transl. by Anna M. Cienciala).

[17] A good account of the discussions and decisions on the Danzig-Corridor problem is to be found in Harold I. Nelson, *Land and Power. British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers 1916-19*, London, Toronto, 1963. chapters VI and VII. A documented account of the Danzig question at the Paris Peace Conference is contained in James W. Headlam-Morley's "Papers and Correspondence dealing with the Establishment of Danzig as a Free City", Public Records Office, London, F. O. 608/66. The collection is dated 31 August 1919, and stamped as received 7 November 1919, no. 20216. Lloyd George's instruction of 27 March 1919, to Sir Eyre Crowe, Minister Plenipotentiary in the British and Imperial Delegation, that he should work out a project "cutting Poland off from the sea", is contained in Crowe's note of 28 March 1919. The note was made available to me by the daughter of Sir Eyre Crows, Dr. Sybil Crowe, Fellow of St. Hilda's College, Oxford, in 1969. For a short account of the Danzig-Corridor problem at the Peace Conference, see my article: "Problem niemiecki w świetle polityki mocarstw zachodnich wobec Wolnego Miasta Gdańska w latach 1919-1939" (The German Problem in the Light of the Policy of the Western Powers towards the Free City of Danzig in the Years 1919-1939), *Studia Historica Slavo-Germanica*, v. I., Poznań, 1973, pp. 71-75.

went through some twenty editions in the interwar period and had an enormous impact on educated English opinion; there was no adequate answer to Keynesian arguments until Mantoux's book was published posthumously in 1946.[18] It is often forgotten that Keynes's book was preceded by James L. Garvin's *The Economic Foundations of the Peace,* also published in 1919. Garvin, the brilliant editor of the *Observer,* an elite weekly with a circulation of some 200,000 in the interwar years,[19] was a passionate critic of the Versailles Treaty from the outset. His editorials exerted much more influence than can be indicated by circulation figures.

Garvin and Keynes were only the first of prominent members of the British establishment to criticize the Treaty and take up the German cause. By 1925, British opinion as expressed in leading newspapers and periodicals, generally advocated wholesale revision of the Versailles Treaty. Revision was part of the Labour Party programme in 1922; Conservative and Liberal politicians assumed that revision was inevitable at some future date. While German propaganda was already active in Britain at this time, other forces were at work which led to a wide acceptance of its claims. There existed, in fact, a "guilt complex" about the Versailles Treaty. It stemmed from a variety of factors. There was sympathy for Germany as the "underdog". The traditional British distrust of France was reinforced by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, by disputes over the Middle East, by French alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1921 and 1924, and by the size of the French armed forces which dwarfed those of demobilised Britain. Furthermore, Germany's resentment, coupled with her enormous industrial potential, convinced many British observers that the Treaty could not be enforced. Widespread belief that injustice had been meted out to Germany by the Treaty also led to the conclusion that it should not be enforced. Then, there was widespread belief that British and European security, and thus European peace, were unattainable without German recovery, and German recovery was considered impossible without a revision of the Treaty. There was also the traditional British aversion to "continental commitments", then represented by British participation in the occupation of the Rhineland.[20] It was thus natural that Britain should be the primary objective of German revisionist propaganda and be receptive to it.

[18] Etienne Mantoux, *La Paix Calomniée ou les conséquences économiques de M. Keynes,* Paris, 1946; English version, *The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes,* Stanford University Press, 1946.

[19] James L. Garvin was editor of *The Observer* in the years 1915-1942. See M. Barrington-Ward's article on Garvin, *Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-1950,* pp. 290-93; also Viscount Camrose, *British Newspapers and their Controllers,* London, 1947, pp. 86-7.

[20] For this aspect, see Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars,* London, 1972. For a good survey of British resentment and suspicion of France and sympathy for Germany, see Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement,* London, 1966.

Let us now look at the arguments and techniques employed by German revisionist propaganda in Britain. This propaganda focussed, as has been noted above, on the Danzig-Corridor question, rather than on Upper Silesia. This focus had greater emotional appeal; also, most informed British opinion did not have to be convinced of the "injustice" of the partition of Upper Silesia, which was seen as a French sleight-of-hand accomplished through the League of Nations.[21] The Danzig-Corridor question had more appeal because it concerned a preponderantly German city and an allegedly proponderantly German Corridor which, moreover, "cut Germany in half", i.e., separated East Prussia from Germany. Danzig was the strongest weapon in the German propaganda armoury. An undoubtedly German city, it was the symbol of German moral and political opposition to the Versailles Treaty. In Germany the streets and squares of countless towns bore its name. Despite its self-government it seemed to be living proof of violated self-determination. However, Danzig was only the tip of the revisionist iceberg. For all German governments, as for German propaganda, Danzig was indissolubly linked to the Corridor and both were known as the "Danzig-Corridor Problem". With respect to the Corridor, German propaganda claimed, in disregard of what German statesmen and Foreign Ministry officials knew to be the case, that the majority of the population was German, or "felt" German, or at least, that it had been preponderantly German in 1919.

The German character of the Corridor in 1919, was allegedly "proved" by the Prussian census figures of 1910. However, these figures applied to the old province of West Prussia which was not identical with the Corridor as created in 1919. In fact, the Corridor did not include the predominantly German "kreise" of Deutsch Krone, half of Flatow

[21] Sir Maurice P. A. Hankey, Secretary of both the Committee of Imperial Defence and of the Cabinet, a man consulted by all Prime Ministers since Lloyd George, accused Sir Eric Drummond, the British Secretary-General of the League of Nations, of having allowed France to manipulate the League Committee's decision on Upper Silesia. He based this accusation on the allegation that the Belgian representative, Paul Hymans, was a notorious Francophile, while two other members, Quinones de Leon for Spain and the representative of Brazil, Da Cunha, were both Ambassadors to Paris and did not want to lose these lucrative posts. Hankey called these two members „Dagoes", and the last member of the Committee, the Chinese Delegate to the League, Dr. Wellington Koo, a "Chink", see Hankey to Drummond, 21 October 1921, and Drummond to Hankey, 29 October 1921, Lloyd George Papers, Beaverbrook Library, London, F/25/2/35,39. Drummond denied these charges, as did Lord Balfour, then head of the British Delegation to the League of Nations; see also *DBFP, ser. I, v.* XVI, *nos.* 324, 329, 330. For a rather uncritical but informative biography of Hankey, see Stephen Roskill, *Hankey. Man of Secrets*, sp. v. II, 1919-1931, London, 1972, where the author mentions Hankey's accusations, though not in the form Hankey wrote them, and concludes that despite Drummond's defence — Balfour is not mentioned — Hankey's judgment, i.e., of French influence, "was much the more realistic" *(sic)*, p. 234. There is no evidence that the French Government actually tried to influence the League Committee, but the German Government tried to influence Spain, see F. Gregory Campbell, "The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919-1922", *Journal of Modern History* v. 42, no. 3, p. 383.

and three quarters of Schlochau in the West, nor the eastern districts of Elbing, Marienburg, Marienwerder, Deutsch-Eylau, which became part of East Prussia, and Danzig itself which became a Free City. Naturally, if the Corridor was identified with West Prussia before 1919, then the Germans had a slight majority.[22] Nonetheless, the Germans were well aware even before the war, that the area which later came to be known as the Corridor, was preponderantly Polish. This is clear from a very exact map representing the census of 1910, drawn by Jacob Spett and published by Justus Perthes in Gotha in 1917. The territory of the later Corridor is here coloured a deep, solid, green explained in the key as representing a Polish population of over 85%, and by a lighter, cross-hatched green representing the Polands as over 75% Polish. At the same time, the inset census figures which apply, of course, to the prewar administrative boundaries, show a German majority except for Posnania. This was the map used by British experts on the Commission of Polish Affairs for their proposed German-Polish frontier.[23] It was knowledge of this situation which led the German government in 1919, to decide against admitting plebiscites in this area and in Upper Silesia.[24]

Another German propaganda argument was economic; this was the claim that the separation of East Prussia by the Corridor from Germany was the cause of the economic decline of that province, and especially of its agriculture. In fact, East Prussian agriculture had not been well off even before the war, since it was placed at the extreme eastern point of the Reich and had to compete with the better developed agriculture of

[22] According to Polish estimates, which corrected the Prussian Census figures of 1910 by the census figures of school children taken in 1911, old West Prussia had a population of 754,000 Poles and 949,000 Germans. These figures apply to *prewar* West Prussia, including the districts which were not part of the Corridor after 1919, see Casimir Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea.* London, 1934, p. 155. On p. 156, the author gives the Distribution of Poles in West Prussia before the War, and discusses prewar election results (pp. 157-58), and German Propaganda use of population statistics on pp. 181-2.

[23] Ing. Jacob Spett, "Nationalitätenkarte der östlichen Provinzen des Deutschen Reichs", printed by Justus Perthes, Gotha, 1917. Jacob, or rather, Jakób Spett, was a Polish geographer living in Vienna. The colour key on his map is somewhat different than that given in the map enclosed in a folder in *Die Deutsche Ostmark* (see note 3 above). Spett differentiates areas where 75% and 85% of the population was Polish and also shows the large German districts around Bromberg (Bydgoszcz). The map of *Die Deutsche Ostmark* shows the Polish population as varying from 25-50% and going up to 75% and over. Spett's map was regarded by British experts at the Paris Peace Conference as the more accurate; they used it as well as the Foreign Office Handbook on *East and West Prussia,* which was based on the Prussian census of 1910. A map of 1911 census of school children given by nationality, for Posen and West Prussia, is found in Robert Machray, *The Polish-German Problem,* London, 1941. Here the Poles are indicated by various lines and cross-hatchings varying from 0.5 to 50% and over.

[24] In its deliberations of April and May 1919, the Cabinet agreed to admit a plebiscite only in Posen, where the population was clearly Polish except for some western districts. It opposed plebiscites in West Prussia and Upper Silesia because they would be dangerous to the German cause, Reichskabinett, 21 April, 15 May 1919, P.R.O., London, German Foreign Ministry Microfilms, Cabinet, frames 3438/2.

Posnania which was close to Berlin. Also, the problem of large Junker estates after the war was not confined to East Prussia, though it was probably worse there since the sparse population made labour very expensive. It should be noted that the "Osthilfe", or help to Junkers in the East, was not confined to East Prussia; it was also given to owners of large estates on the western borders of Poland. As far as communications were concerned, it should be noted that even before the war, at least half of East Prussian trade with Germany went by sea. After the war, the rail transport increased despite the existence of the Corridor. Finally, it should be borne in mind that East Prussia had lost important trade with Russia, a fact which was of particular importance to the port of Königsberg. British experts had seen East Prussia as a German "island", and had adduced all these arguments already at the time of the Peace Conference.[25] However, they were largely forgotten later.

What were the techniques of German revisionist propaganda with regard to the Danzig Corridor problem? They consisted of direct or indirect aid for books and articles written by German and non-German authors supporting the German cause; the financing of press information abroad; financial support for various German associations which maintained contacts with western politicians, writers, and journalists; the utilization of various international and binational associations, such as for example, the "All Peoples Union", founded by Sir Evelyn Wrench, also religious associations and the "Anglo-German society", founded in 1929; last, but not least, there were organized "study tours" of the Polish-German frontier, or what might be called "political tourism".

These propaganda activities have been described in detail in a book which has hitherto not received the attention it deserves; this is a book of reminiscences entitled: *Botschafterin des Guten Willens,* i.e.,

[25] In a memorandum entitled: "Memorandum Outlining Arguments For and Against the Inclusion of Danzig in the New Polish State", dated 1 March 1919, and prepared most likely by H. J. Paton of the Naval Intelligence Department, who was a recognized authority on Poland, it is stated that even after a century of land-union with Germany, East Prussia was economically largely an island. Its prewar goods traffic in 1914 was estimated at between 5,000 and 7,000 tons p.a., of which about 50% was assumed to be local traffic, one-third as trade between Germany and Russia and one-third between East and West Prussia. By far the largest item, 1,000,000 tons, was timber of Russian/Lithuanian origin, the second largest item was bricks, stone and earth, which figured in local traffic. Other principal goods were grain, flour, potatoes, iron-goods, fodder and livestock. Most of the trade with Germany was sea-borne, (p. 16). This memorandum is printed in James W. Headlam-Morley's compilation entitled: "Papers and Correspondence dealing with the Establishment of Danzig as a Free City", see note 17 above. Headlam-Morley was closely involved in drafting the Danzig and Upper Silesian clauses of the Versailles Treaty, see Sir James W. Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919)*, edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna Cienciala, London, 1972. Another of Paton's memoranda supported Polish claims to Danzig and West Prussia; it is in the same compilation, and is referred to in the *Memoir*, p. 39, n. 2. H. J. Paton later wrote a chapter on Poland at the Peace Conference in H. W. V. Temperley ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6 vols., London, Oxford, 1920-34, see v. VI, London, 1924, pp. 233-8.

"Ambassadress of Good Will", written by Margarete Gärtner and published in Bonn in 1955.[26] It should be noted, however, that she does not, by any means, "tell all" in her book. Detailed, documented accounts of her work, and particularly of the financial costs involved, are to be found in the German Foreign Ministry archives in Bonn, and in her papers which are deposited in the former Secret Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem.[27] Miss Gärtner, who had acquired experience in propaganda work during the First World War, became the Secretary of the *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft* (Economic-Political Association), which was set up in 1922. Its task was, as she tells us, "to enlighten foreigners on all the consequences of the Versailles Treaty for Germany, and to bring about better relations, especially with the Anglo-Saxon countries." [28] The WPG was originally financed by large German industrial concerns such as Krupp, whose representatives sat on the board.[29] Later, on, it received subsidies from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and, as far as tours and translations were concerned, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Reichszentrale für Heimatsdienst. In the first years of its existence, the WPG concentrated on winning British support for the French evacuation of the Ruhr and the evacuation of the Rhineland. It was here that the "study tours" were initiated for British V.I.P.'s. In 1927, when the evacuation of the Rhineland augured success in the near future and when it was clear that British opinion favoured it, the WPG turned its attention to the Polish-German frontier and, in particular, to Danzig, the Corridor and the "Vistula Frontier, i.e., the Vistula between Thorn (Toruń) and Danzig, where it formed the frontier between East Prussia and the Polish Corridor. As Miss Gärtner tells her readers, the WPG then set its sights on convincing Western, and in particular British opinion, that the separation of East Prussia from the Reich by the Polish Corridor was in the interests of neither Germany, nor Poland, nor Europe as a whole.[30]

[26] Margarete Gärtner, *Botschafterin des Guten Willens, Aussenpolitische Arbeit, 1914-1950*, Bonn, Athenäum Verlag, 1955.

[27] Auswärtiges Amt, Abteilung IV, Politik, Presse Abteilung, a nd Handakten Direktoren, Bonn; Hauptarchiv (ehem. Preuss. Geheimes Staatsarchiv), Berlin-Dahlem, Rep. 92, Nachlass, Gärtner Margarete, see Sobczak, *Propaganda*, Bibliography, pp. 334-35.

[28] Gärtner, *Botschafterin*, p. 84.

[29] The executive committee of WPG in 1922 was composed of Dr. Bruno Bruhn, the founder of WPG and a member of the executive of Krupp in Essen. After his departure for the United States, the executive committee consisted of two members: Mr. Janus, General Director of the Rhine-Westphalia Coal Syndicate, and Dr. Kruckenberg, Director of the Paris Office of the Committee for Franco-German Studies. Other members of the WPG were: Ottomar Strauss, Privy Counsellor, co-owner of the coal and iron firm of Otto Wolff in Cologne; Hermann Röchling, Commercial Counsellor; Dr. Völkingen from the Saar; Paul Kempner, co-owner of the Mendelssohn Bank, Berlin; Dr. Friedrich Hasselmann from Hamburg, who replaced Privy Councellor Dr. Cuno while he was in the United States; Dr. Paul Crass, a former employee of the Krupp firm in Berlin, and Dr. Hans Draeger, Administrative Director and member of the executive committee of the board of German associations in Berlin, data cited by Sobczak. *Propaganda*, 6. 59, according to the Gärtner Nachlass in Berlin-Dahlem.

[30] Gärtner, *Botschafterin*, p. 120.

Margarete Gärtner was a lady of undoubted powers of persuasion, and, born in Namslau (Namysłów), Upper Silesia, she was fired with a passionate devotion to the cause of German revisionism. She tells her readers that she "helped" to write several important books, in feeding information to a vast number of British newspapers through her press agents in London, and in guiding more British visitors to the Danzig-Corridor region than any other German propagandist or propaganda organization. The WPG was truly a "one woman show", and one of her charges called her, with justice, "the best propagandist for her Fatherland." [31] Let us look first of all at two of the most important books which she "helped" to write; they are also excellent examples of the German propaganda of the time. They are Sir Robert Donald's *The Polish Corridor and its Consequences*, published by Thornton and Butterworth in London in 1929, and William Harbutt Dawson's *Germany under the Treaty*, published by Unwin in London and by Longmans, Green & Co., in New York in 1933. Both became well known works on the subject; they were often cited by journalists in the nineteen-thirties and Dawson's book is still sometimes recommended to American students of interwar Germany.

Sir Robert Donald, born in 1861, was past the peak of his career in 1929, but he was still an influential member of the British establishment. A former editor of the *Daily Chronicle*, which was Lloyd George's paper, he had chaired or been member of many important British and Imperial committees on press and communications. In October 1924, the Polish Legation reported that he saw the Prime Minister, (Ramsey MacDonald) at least once a week.[32] He was a man of independent means, and had already published books advocating revision of the treaties with regard to the Saar and Hungary; [33] thus, his commitment to revisionism in general antedated his interest in the Polish Corridor.

[31] This accolade was bestowed on her by the American journalist, H. R. Knickerbocker, who went on one of her tours in spring 1930. He then represented the *New York Evening Post*, *ibid.*, pp. 178-79.

[32] J. H. Harley, a British journalist who worked for the Polish Legation, (he had edited the *Polish Review* in London during the war), reported this, Polish Legation, London, to Polish Foreign Minister, 7 October 1924, Warsaw, Archiwum Akt Nowych (henceforth AAN), Amb. Londyn, t. 113, pp. 95-8. In a later report of March 1926, the Polish Minister in London, Konstanty Skirmunt, wrote that Donald was very unfriendly to Poland, especially on Upper Silesia and the Corridor, which he had visited to gather material for a book on the subject, AAN, MSZ, 2659, p. 47. It was actually in September that Sir Robert Donald and his collaborator, Mrs. Mildred Canivet, visited the Corridor, or rather were guided on a tour to show them the favourable aspects of German settlements there as contrasted to the "poverty" and "dirt" of Polish farms. Report by the General Consul in Toruń (Thorn), 4 October, 1926, cited by Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations*, p. 233, n. 17. This was before Miss Gärtner's time. For detailed information on Sir Robert Donald see *Who Was Who, 1929-1940*, pp. 375-75. He died on 17 February 1933.

[33] *A Danger Spot in Europe; The Tragedy of Trianon*, *ibid.* In the report of 10 March 1926 cited in n. 32 above, Skirmunt wrote that Donald was very wealthy and completely independent. The Legation tried to maintain relations with him but could not "look after him", i.e., influence him.

A note written in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1929, however, listed his book among those sponsored or aided by the Ministry.[34] Miss Gärtner tells us that she cooperated closely with him on his book; she helped him with materials and with the correction of the proofs.[35]

Sir Robert's book, though entitled *The Polish Corridor and its Consequences,* was divided roughly half in half between the Danzig-Corridor problem and Upper Silesia. It was a very able exposition of German claims, and faithfully followed the lines of German propaganda. In support of German claims to the Corridor, he cited the census figures of 1910 for old West Prussia. He was, however, more honest than most German propagandists in clearly labelling his statistics as "Former West Prussia", and then adding the Netze river region, which was not in prewar West Prussia but in Posnania, and the Danzig and East Prussian districts which were part of old West Prussia, but not of the Corridor. By this arrangement, and by excluding the Cashubs and "bilinguals" from the Polish group, he came up with 919,102 Germans, 555,337 Poles, 106,598,000 Cashubs and 20,456 bilinguals for the total area. He alluded to the population change since 1919, by mentioning "the complete revolution" which had taken place in this respect since the war, but hinted at a large German population by stating that local and parliamentary elections indicated more Germans than the Polish census of 1921. He also claimed, in line with German propaganda, that in view of Polish interests, a plebiscite was not "risked" in 1919, though he admitted that "the middle portion of the corridor was predominantly Polish.[36] It should be noted here that apart from the fact that parts of western and eastern West Prussia were excluded from the Corridor and that their inclusion as an argument for its German character was not valid, the Cashubs, who spoke a dialect akin to Polish, had sided with the Poles against Germanization measures before 1918. Moreover, almost all "bilinguals" were Poles who spoke German; the Germans did not need to and did not bother to learn Polish. Finally, the German government in 1919 decided not to admit a plebiscite here.

[34] See Zygmunt Gąsiorowski, "German Revisionist Propaganda in 1925-1929. A Document", *Journal of Central European Affairs,* v. XIX, no. 4, January 1960, pp. 414; the document in question is entitled "Zur Frage der polnischer Propaganda", and dated 4 January 1929, was written by an official by the name of Roth. The same document is cited by Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations,* p. 232, and n. 12.

[35] M. Gärtner, *Botschafterin,* pp. 115-16, 160.

[36] Sir Robert Donald, *The Polish Corridor and its Consequences,* London, n d. (1929), population figures, p. 23; local and parliamentary elections pp. 23-4; risk of plebiscite to Polish interest, p. 24; "middle portion" of Corridor Polish, p. 29; by this he apparently meant the area a little south of the coast, stretching down to Bydgoszcz (Bromberg). He does not specify.

Sir Robert also followed German propaganda in blaming the economic problems of East Prussia on the Corridor, and in claiming that Danzig had fallen on bad times because it was now separated from its natural agricultural areas.[37] The fact was, of course, that Danzig could import what it needed from Poland, but that the already small agricultural production of the Free City area suffered badly from competition with cheaper Polish food products. Sir Robert, describing Danzig's "decline", did not notice that the port's annual turnover had risen from 2,112,101 tons in 1912, to 8,615,682 tons in 1928.[38] He did notice the neighbouring Polish port of Gdynia but called it "a bad business", an artificial creation. Interestingly enough, he did not think it could ever compete with Danzig, but claimed it was built to do so. Finally, he called it a "symbol of Polish imperialism", because, as he put it, in order to defend its small piece of coast, Poland had to build a navy and adopt an "aggressive" policy.[39] He did not notice that British observers were warning the public of a growing German navy which, in 1929 was building "pocket battleships" capable of sinking far larger enemy ships.[40] (Poland had a few torpedo boats, mine-sweepers, and a small destroyer; four submarines were built in the nineteen-thirties.) Donald's solution was that Poland should agree to Danzig's return to the Reich and to surrender the Corridor; in return, he proposed Polish transit facilities to Danzig and Gdynia.[41] This was, of course, the solution proposed by German propaganda. It is significant that Donald thought the frontier revision could only take place if and when England, France, and Germany established full cooperation and imposed their will on the League of Nations. In this way the provisions of the Covenant to remove conditions menacing to Europe would come into action.[42] This suggestion would often appear in the future.

The uninformed reader might conclude that Sir Robert Donald wrote the book merely to express his own convictions and accepted Miss

[37] *Ibid*, p. 132.

[38] For a table of Danzig traffic in metric tons, between 1912 and 1932, see Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access to the Sea*, p. 308. It should be noted that with the onset of the depression the Danzig turnover declined drastically between 1931 and 1932.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 143,145.

[40] Admiral Hector C. Bywater, in an article entitled "The Rebirth of German Sea Power", published in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, v. CV, January-June 1929, pp. 161-170, noted that the German Naval Budget for the years 1925-29, averaged £10,500,000 p.a. which he wrote was "a very respectable sum for a country that is burdened with reparation debts deemed to be beyond its capacity" (p. 164). He also noted that in 1927, provision was made for 4,979 officers and 9,932 men, or a ratio of 1 officer to every 2 men, which obviously pointed to plans for future naval expansion. Germany was also paying about twice as much per ship as other countries, but benefitting by higher quality. The "pocket battle ships", of which the first keel was laid down in September 1928, were to have heavy armour, six 11 inch guns, armoured triple turrets and diesel engines giving them a speed of 26 knots. Bywater commented that when the four planned were ready, Germany could dominate the Baltic and be felt elsewhere (166).

[41] Donald, *Ibid*, pp. 263-70.

[42] *Ibid.*, p.269.

Gärtner's help in a few cases. However, this was not the whole story. According to German documents, the book was, in fact, ordered by the WPG and its publication was paid for by that institution with funds allocated by the German Foreign Ministry. Not only that, but Donald sent his typescript to be checked by Miss Gärtner. She, in turn, forwarded it to Dr Carl Budding, the "Regierungprasident" of the province of "West Prussia", with headquarters of Marienwerder. Dr Budding, who was himself an active propagandist of the revisionist cause, and guided tours of important foreign visitors to the "Vistula Frontier" before Miss Gärtner began to do so, had met Donald on such a tour in 1927. Donald had, in return for the hospitality received, sent his articles on Polish-German questions to Budding for comment. His typescript was submitted to an editorial committee composed of Budding, the German Consul General in Danzig, Edmund von Thermann, Dr K. J. Kaufmann, Director of the Danzig Archives, Dr Walther Recke, also a member of the Archives administration and author of the anti-Polish book: *Die Polnische Frage,* and State Counsellor, Dr Ferber. This committee "vetted" the book on the orders of Department IV of the German Foreign Ministry. Department IV dealt with Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and partly with Asia. The Polish Desk, or "Referat" in this department coordinated all propaganda publications directed against Poland. It was also Department IV which entrusted Dr Recke with writing the final chapter of Donald's book which he had left blank with a question mark. Recke sent his draft as "suggestions" to Donald. Department IV also tried to persuade Donald to omit the suggestion that Poland should be compensated for the loss of the Corridor by gaining the port of Memel in Lithuania. Here, however, Donald refused to comply, arguing that such an omission would create the impression his book was directed exclusively against Poland. He, as a British publicist, had to preserve the appearances of objectivity! [43]

William Harbutt Dawson was, in 1933, already an established authority on Germany, having published several books on that country.[44] His pro-German sympathies were also deeply rooted before he wrote *Germany under the Treaty.* Born in 1860, Dawson had married two German wives in succession; the second was the daughter of a Dr Muensterberg, who had been a civil servant first in Berlin and then in Danzig.[45] Dawson had opposed the cession of Danzig and the Corridor to Poland in 1919, and even prided himself on having made a contri-

[43] This information is given by Sobczak, *Propaganda,* on pp. 90-1, 125-26, on the basis of documents in the Archiv des Aus. Amtes, Bonn, IV Polen Po 2, (Ostpreussen), Po 2 (G), Bd.1, Po 2 (Ostpreussen) Bd.10, Po 2 (G), Bd.2, Po 2 (G N 1) Bd.1,2, Po 2 (G) Bd.19.

[44] *The German Empire, 1867-1914,* 2 vols, 1919; *The Evolution of Modern Germany* 1908; *German Socialism and Ferdinand Lassalle,* 1888; *Prince Bismarck and State Socialism,* 1890; *Germany and the Germans,* 2 vols., 1894; *German Life in Town and Country,* 1901; *Protection in Germany (A History),* 1904; and several others, see *Who Was Who, 1941-1950,* p.299.

[45] See *Ibid., Gärtner, Botschafterin,* p. 161.

bution to keeping Danzig out of the hands of "the Polish robber state".[46] Margarete Gärtner organized a special tour of the Danzig-Corridor area for him in 1931, and supplied him with materials. She claims that her correspondence with Dawson filled five large files.[47] Finally, since he often failed to read his own writing, she dictated the manuscript to her Secretary, and later helped in the correction of the proofs.[48]

Dawson's chapters on Danzig and the Corridor are a passionate plea for the German case. He called the Corridor "a foreign body driven into the heart of Prussia", which cut Germany in two and made the cradle of old Prussia into an enclave surrounded by foreign territory.[49] However, in contrast to Donald and to German propaganda in general, Dawson did not cite any population figures for the Corridor, claiming that exact statistics never existed.[50] In his view, the only claim which Poland had to the Corridor was that of "occupation", i.e., the period 1450-1772 and then "military conquest", i.e., 1919.[51] He saw the Corridor as a "military highway" for French intervention, citing a Franco-Polish treaty of 15 September 1922, which allegedly envisaged French intervention in Danzig and even the landing of a French military force.[52] No such treaty was signed on the date given, while the Franco-Polish Military Convention of 19 February 1921, only mentioned French help to Poland, if she were attacked by Germany, including help by way of maritime communications. French troops were specifically excluded. The text of this convention was not known until recently, when it was reconstructed from Polish documents by Polish historians.[53] Dawson's suggested solution of the Corridor problem was more elaborate than Donald's. Like Danzig, it was to return to Germany, but Poland was to keep Gdynia and a little territory around it. He also suggested a population exchange; Poles who wanted to leave could do so; those who stayed would accept German citizenship. Germans would come in. Poland would have a guaranteed access to both Gdynia and Danzig.[54] It should be noted that the Polish census of 1931, showed the population

[46] Counsellor Ferber of Danzig wrote Margarete Gärtner on 15 November 1930, citing a letter by Dawson, in which the latter wrote: "Es hat mir ungeheure Freude gemacht, in Paris in April 1919 mitgeholfen zu haben, dass Danzig nicht in die Hand des Raubstaates Polens gänzlich fiel, und mit ebenso grosser Genutung würde ich die zakünftliche Blüte Danzigs und seine eventuelle Rückkehr zu Deutschland sehen", Ferber to Gärtner, 15 November 1930 Wojewòdzkie Archiwum Państwowe (State Provincial Archives) Gdańsk, Papers of Danzig Senate, I. 260/2826, pp. 3-7. On Dawson's alleged influence on Lloyd George in 1919, see Gärtner, *Botschafterin*, p. 161. No documents have come to light to substantiate Dawson's claim.

[47] *Botschafterin, p. 161.*

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[49] Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, p.102.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 164-6.

[53] See Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies*, Appendix III, pp. 394-5; also, Jan Ciałowicz, *Polsko--Francuski Sojusz Wojskowy*, 1921-*1939*, Warsaw, 1970 (1972), Appendix 4, pp. 403-05, who also reconstructs article IV more fully than Wandycz.

[54] Dawson, *Germany*, pp. 171-73.

of the Corridor was by then 80 to 90 per cent Polish with the exception of one southwestern district, Sempolno, whose population was only 59.4 per cent Polish.[55] Also, German Foreign Ministry memoranda in 1925 and 1926, had rejected any partial solution, such as leaving a Polish enclave around Gdynia; they also opposed a population exchange. As far as Upper Silesia was concerned, Dawson proposed a new plebiscite, perhaps in 1937, when the Upper Silesian Geneva Convention of 1922 ran out; however, residents who had settled there after 1919, were not to have the vote.[56]

In Dawson's case, as in Donald's, Miss Gärtner's account of her "help" to the author is not the whole story. According to German documents, Dawson volunteered to write the book. Armed with a letter of recommendation from the German embassy in London, he visited Ministerial Direktor Dr Loehrs in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, as soon as he arrived in Berlin on his trip to Germany in 1931. He gave Loehrs an exposé of his views on Danzig, the Corridor and Upper Silesia. After this talk, Miss Gärtner was instructed to look after Dawson and the publication of his book. This turned out to be so embarrassingly pro-German that the firm of Allen and Unwin was at first reluctant to publish it. However, this obstacle was overcome when the WPG, armed with Foreign Ministry funds, offered to buy 500 copies. The same funds made possible the publication of a second edition.[57]

No evidence has thus far come to light that either Donald or Dawson were paid large sums of money for their books. Is is probable that the German Foreign Ministry, working through the WPG, merely covered their travel expenses and assured them royalty payments for their efforts. In this respect then, they differed from such paid propaganda agents as Major General Graham S. Hutchison, who received £1,000.00 for his book: *Upper Silesia Revisited* (1929), and Major E. W. Polson-Newman, who signed an agreement with the German Embassy in London, including detailed instructions on how to write his book: *Britain and the Baltic* (1930), Major Polson-Newman was particularly valuable since he also had contacts with the Polish press and could, therefore, pose as an objective writer. His instructions for writing the book were to adopt a tone sympathetic to the Poles and, in almost the last words, advocate the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany as inevitable. While his price for permanent cooperation with the German Embassy was too high to be acceptable in Berlin, he continued to work for the German cause.[58] Dawson may possibly have

[55] See map illustrating 1931 Census in Smogorzewski, *Poland's Access*, p. 188.

[55] Dawson, *Germany*, pp. 225-26.

[57] Information given by Sobczak in *Propaganda*, pp. 272-74, on the basis of documents in the Archiv des Aus.Amtes, Bonn, IV Polen, Po 2 (G 1), Dawson, Bd.1.

[58] The information on Hutchison's payment is in AA/GA/3736/K175/K030, 047, cited in von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations*, p.233. For information on Polson-Newman, see Sobczak, *Propaganda*, pp. 267-69, Bonn, IV Polen, Po 2 (G) Bd.10; Sobczak also discusses Hutchison, pp.270-72.

earned some remuneration for acting as consultant to the German Embassy on English translations of German propaganda works. In particular, he advised very strongly against translations in "pigeon English", as was the case with at least one German propaganda effort directed at British opinion.[59]

We might note here that the Polish Legation in London made brave attempts to counter the flood of German propaganda. Konstanty Skirmunt, who was for many years Polish Minister in London (1922-1934), worked hard to gain British sympathy for Poland. He was ably aided in this task first by Jan Ciechanowski and then by F. B. Czarnomski, also by J. H. Harley, an Englishman who had worked for the Polish cause during the First World War, and who now used his contacts in British political and newspaper circles to counter German propaganda.[60] This was uphill work. In 1923, the Poles were told by the editor of the *Daily Chronicle,* for example, that he could not publish anything favourable to Poland, since Lloyd George would immediately come and ask him why he did so.[61] Charles Ewer, the editor of the Labour Party's *Daily Herald,* admitted in 1924, that the intellectual leaders of the Party were pro-German.[62] There were, of course, some British writers journalists who sympathized with Poland, but they were few. Both the Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc wrote on Poland's behalf[63] but

[59] This concerned Dr. J. K. Kaufmann's (Danzig) answer to a book by Dr. Slawski, *Der Zugang Polens zum Meer und Die Interessen Ostpreussens,* published in Polish, German, French, English and Italian, in 1925. Kaufmann was allotted 4,000 marks for his book and 2,500 for a translation into English. The book came out in German under the pen name of Dr. Johann Fürst, *Der Widersinn des polnischen Korridors,* published by the *Deutsche Rundschau,* the organ of the revisionist organization *Der Deutscher Schutzbund,* in 1926. The translation was so bad that the German Embassy in London, after seeing the first few copies asked that no more be sent. Dawson wrote to the Secretary of the German Embassy on 25 November 1926: "The translation is pitiful... It is stupid that so much money is expended on publications issued in 'pigeon English', when all that is needed to make them readable and effective is revision by some friendly English hand. It would be well if this warning could be kept in mind by the propagandist organizations". This correspondence (April 1925 to December 1926) is to be found in the German Foreign Ministry Archives in Bonn, Files of the German Consulate General in Danzig, 70/5.

[60] See Konstanty Skirmunt, *Moje Wspomnienia.* Typescript; for Skirmunt's account of his Ministry in London, see ch. XIII-XIV, pp. 113-158. On his attempts to influence the British press, see pp. 119-20, 145-47. I should like to thank the Librarian of the Catholic University of Lublin for making the microfilm of these memoirs available to me.

[61] Report by J. H. Harley, 10 August 1923, AAN, Amb. Londyn, t. 113, pp. 31-2. (For information on Harley, see n. 32 above).

[62] Ewer told Jan Ciechanowski that the Trade Union group wanted to preserve the Entente, but that the Intellectuals, the leaders of the Labour Party, were pro-German. As for Poland, most Labourites still viewed her in the light of 1920, as an imperialist power, Raport Polityczny nr. 1/24, Londyn, 2 January 1924, AAN, Amb. Londyn, t. 102, p. 4.

[63] A report of the Polish Legation in London, in May 1924, gave a list of journalists to whom it supplied materials and who wrote articles sympathetic to Poland. The list included Mrs. Chesterton, Dudley Heathcote, and Charles Sarolea. The first wrote for the *Yorkshire Post;* the second for the *New Statesman, The Manchester Guardian, The Daily Herald,* and *The Financial Review;* Sarolea, who was a Professor at the University of Edin-

Catholicism was still seen as a taint by many British readers and their help was not too effective. Henry Wickham-Steed, a former editor of the *Times*, and then owner and editor of the *Review of Reviews*, was a good friend. Vladimir Poliakoff, the active and well-connected journalist of Russian origin, was commissioned and wrote a book entitled *Eagles Black and White*, which was published in 1929, together with a French translation, *Les Aigles Luttent sur la Baltique* which came out in Paris that same year.[64] The brilliant Polish publicist, Casimir Smogorzewski, published two books on the Corridor: *Germany, Poland and the Corridor*, published by Williams and Norgate in London, in 1932, and the more detailed *Poland's Access to the Sea*, published by Allen and Unwin in 1934. But Poland could not make such headway against German propaganda in Britain. In the later nineteen-twenties as many as thirty-four German papers maintained correspondents in Britain; Miss Gärtner claims that her British press agents were able to supply news items to as many as one hundred papers at a time.[65] Finally, Poland was generally unpopular with the British press. Her western and eastern frontiers were seen as unjustified; her political system came under fire after Piłsudski's coup of 1926; the complaints of her German and Ukrainian minorities were often in the news with appropriate comments.[66] It should be noted that British ministers in Poland

burgh, wrote for *The Scotsman;* Raport Polityczny nr. 20/24, 20 May 1924, AAN, Amb. Londyn, t. 102, p. 126.

Hilaire Belloc wrote a favourable article on Gdynia in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, v. CV, January-June 1929, pp. 104-13, where he stated that even without Gdynia an attempt to re-impose Prussian rule on the Corridor would mean war, but with Gdynia, the German revisionist aim was completely unrealistic, p. 113. Belloc intended to write a book on Poland which, according to a letter of his to Skirmunt, was to appear in the spring of 1929. However, he seems to have given up this project, Belloc to Polish Minister in London, 5 January 1929, AAN, Amb. Londyn, t. 969, p. 24.

[64] Vladimir Poliakoff received £87.00 from Skirmunt in 1927, for 700 copies of his book, *Peace in Europe*, "Pro Memoria", Londyn, 14 October 1927, *ibid.*, t. 981, pp. 23-4. In 1929, Skirmunt asked the Polish Foreign Ministry to pay Poliakoff £75.00 for his trip to Poland, which he was undertaking to write a sequel to his *Eagles Black and White*, Skirmunt to Warsaw, 22 June 1929, *ibid.*, pp. 73-77. In 1930, Skirmunt wrote the Polish legation had financed that book and that Poliakoff asked for a monthly subsidy to cover his travel costs. Skirmunt suggested that the Foreign Ministry not pay him less than £50 per month in 1931, 6 November 1930, *ibid.*, pp. 98-103. The legation also financed his brochure: *The Polish Corridor. The Facts. A letter to the Members of The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1934, see *ibid.*, p. 130, Poliakoff turned against the Poles in 1938, witness his article in the *Daily Standard*, 24 November 1938, where he claimed the existence of a Polish plan to seize Ruthenia and Danzig, which were to be the price of Polish co-operation with Hitler. Needless to say, there were no such plans.

[65] M. Gärtner, *Botschafterin*, p. 178.

[66] The description of British press attitudes and public opinion on Poland for the period 1936-39, also fits the years 1926-36: "From the point of view of British public opinion, the government of Poland was the least attractive of the succession States. Pilsudski's dictatorship which had been imposed following his coup in 1926 was not very much to the taste of conservatives in Great Britain, and was utterly abhorrent to British liberals. Poland's treatment of her minorities was appalling, especially of the Jews,

deplored this press coverage and one even accused the *Manchester Guardian* of distorting news about Poland.[67] The *Guardian* was a particular thorn in the Polish flesh since its most brilliant foreign correspondent, F. A. Voigt, who, though based in Berlin, often covered Polish affairs, was of German parentage. He belonged to the German community in Manchester.[68] Voigt did not change his negative attitude towards Poland until the later nineteen-thirties. Above all, the general consensus that the Versailles Treaty was unjust to Germany included the view that the Polish-German frontier, particularly in Danzig and the Corridor, should be revised, if not immediately then at some future time.

It is clear that British opinion was already well prepared to welcome a more intensive German pressure for the return of Danzig and the Corridor by the time the WPG, personified by Miss Gärtner, turned its attention to this area in 1927. In fact, it was the year 1924-25, which witnessed a crystallization of British opinion on this subject both in the press and in the Foreign Office. A cursory survey of major British papers and their reactions first to the Geneva Protocol and then to the negotiations for the Western Security Pact is most instructive. Most of the press opposed the Geneva Protocol, with its guarantees of existing frontiers by members of the League on two grounds: in the first place, because Britain could not undertake commitments outside of her sphere of "vital interests", i.e., France, Belgium and the Mediterranean; in the second place, because the frontiers of Eastern Europe were viewed as unjust and thus requiring revision if any general settlement were to be made. The views expressed on both these issues by the *Manchester Guardian* which represented a liberal-inclined public and by the Labour *Daily Herald* representing the left, were typical of press opinion at that time. On 27 August 1924, the *Manchester Guardian* claimed that the Protocol would encourage the system of military alliances and thus provide a guarantee of the French "military hegemony" over Europe.[69] The *Daily Herald* of 21 November rejected the Protocol as well as the idea of a military pact between Britain, France and Belgium, since this

who were forced into the most degrading ghettoes" *(sic)*, Franklin Reid Gannon, *The British Press and Germany 1936-1939*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 19-20.

[67] The British Minister in Poland, Sir William Erskine, wrote in March 1929 that: ... "there is no reason whatever to regard (student demonstrations against foreign imports, A.C.) as a serious indication of anti-British feeling whatever may have been said about in Manchester, the leading newspaper of which place is notorious for its anti-Polish bias and occasionally descends to flagrant misrepresentation on the subject of this country". He was referring, of course, to *The Manchester Guardian*, Sir William Erskine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 March 1929, F. O. 371/14019, N1514, p. 313.

[68] Malcolm Muggeridge writes of Voigt: "To me, far the most interesting of the correspondents was F. A. Voigt from Germany. He did not need to dress up as a German; he was one (his family belonged to the sizeable German community in Manchester, and had a music shop there)"... Malcolm Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time. The Green Stick*, New York, 1973, p. 190.

[69] "Security and the League", *Manchester Guardian*, 27 August 1924.

would mean "entangling alliances".[70] In January 1925, the *Manchester Guardian* again criticized the Protocol; the gist of its comments was that revision of the status quo must take place before any new agreements were signed. It was noted that the crux of the proposed Security Pact lay in Eastern Europe; but Britain wanted no responsibility, for example, for Polish security.[71] In the House of Commons debate on the Security Pact on 5 March 1925, there was much criticism and statements were made to the effect that Britain could not obligate herself to maintain East European frontiers; these should, it was suggested, be revised as a precondition to the signing of a Security Pact.[72]

By this time, Stresemann had proposed a Western Security Pact, first to the British and then to the French Government; the proposals were made in January and February 1925.[73] In early March, Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary in the new Conservative Government of Stanley Baldwin, which came to power in November 1924, told the French Government of the Cabinet decision that Britain would not sign the Geneva Protocol.[74] Instead, he proposed negotiations on the

[70] "Britain and the Peace Plan", *Daily Herald*, 21 November 1924.

[71] "France and a Pact of Guarantee — Germany Suspect" — 28 January 1925. *The Manchester Guardian's* comments on the Polish-German frontier, particularly the Corridor, in March, 1925, are typical of that paper's attitude and of the attitude taken by a large part of the British press on this problem, when it was discussed in the context of a Western Security Pact. Thus, on 6 March, in "Lifting the Veil", we read "... it is obvious that Great Britain cannot incur the risk of assuring the integrity not only of France but of the States which are in military alliance with her". In the article "What Mr. Chamberlain Has Done — Effects of the Speech at Geneva", on 14 March 1925, we read: "The only hope for security is that France will be won over to a tripartite pact in the west and will be induced to sanction revision in the east... The problem of compensating Poland for her ill-gotten gains is one that deserves attention, for it generally happens, by the principle of compromise, that the disgorging of ill-gotten gains has to be rewarded in other ways".

[72] Thus Lt.-Col. Sir Edward Grigg (Former Private Secretary to Lloyd George) stated that any pledges Britain gave to guarantee European security should be conditional upon the "acceptance of arrangements for peaceable revision, where and when necessary, of the Eastern settlements"; Major-General Sir R. Hutchison, of later fame as the author of the book on Upper Silesia (see note 60 above) warned that some frontiers east of Germany might be the cause of trouble; Captain Garro-Jones, (who was later to take a guided tour with M. Gärtner of the "Vistula frontier") considered it preposterous that Britain should send her armies and navies around the Baltic to protect the integrity of Eastern European frontiers; Captain Ashmead-Bartlett thought the only way to avoid danger in the East was to revise the Treaty stipulations on East European frontiers. See Debate on the Security Pact, House of Commons, 5 March 1925, *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, v. 181, cols. 721-23, 759-60, 764, 788-89. It should be noted that Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain spoke favourably about Poland, stating she was "coming of age" and that "we can now look to her for surety of judgment that was not possible in the early days of her regained independence", *ibid.*, cols. 703-04.

[73] See Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West, 1925-1929*, sp. Part One, The Making of Locarno, 1925. For the role of the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, see F. G. Stambrook, "Das Kind". Lord D'Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact", *Central European History*, I, 1968, pp. 233-63.

[74] Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, p. 20.

Stresemann proposals. These negotiations, which took the form of lengthy exchanges of notes, were accompanied by press comment in Britain on the need to revise the Polish-German frontier. Even the London *Times* advised the Poles in guarded terms to seek a compromise.[75] There were calls for immediate revision or suggestions that Poland give up parts of the Corridor to Germany and build bridges over German roads and railways to East Prussia; there were even proposals that Poland sell Upper Silesia to Germany as an element of permanent reconciliation.[76] The *New Statesman* reiterated its stand that the Corridor was not a permanent arrangement and claimed that "reasonable Poles" knew it would not last.[77] The *Manchester Guardian* hoped for security if France joined a Tripartite Pact in the West and if revision took place in the East. Poland should be compensated, however, for

[75] "It may possibly be worthwhile for Poland and for the friends of Poland to consider whether the establishment of permanent friendly relations with a very powerful neighbour may not be worth a great and generous effort and a reasonable compromise in the matter of frontiers", „Guaranteed Security", editorial, *London Times*, 4 March 1925. It is significant that Austen Chamberlain spoke in this sense to the Polish Foreign Minister, Aleksander Skrzyński, at Geneva on 14 March 1925, when he told him: "Poland stood between two great nations in a position of danger which her tragic history must make only too plain. Surely it was in the interests of Poland to come to terms if possible with at least one of those Great Powers. Did he not think it would be easier to cultivate good, even friendly, relations with the German Reich than with the Soviet Union?", Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir Eyre Crowe, British Delegation, Geneva, 14 March 1925, F.O. 371/10728, C3753/459/18. Chamberlain also wrote he had been pleasantly surprised to find that Skrzyński spoke good English and showed none of the "swagger or conceit which had seemed to me a constant part of his public form".

[76] Reporting on a meeting of the "National Council for the Prevention of War", held at Lady Courtney's residence in Chelsea, *The Manchester Guardian* of 17 March 1925, in an article entitled "Germany's Unsettled Eastern Frontier — Mr. Gooch's Suggestion to Poland", wrote that the historian G. P. Gooch suggested Poland "sell" her part of Upper Silesia as an element of permanent reconciliation, while Germany in return, would recognize the permanence of the Polish-German frontier. Count Harry Kessler, (German Minister to Poland in November-December 1918), said he did not think Germany would wish to reopen the frontier question as yet, but that she would not abandon her demands.

[77] "In the Polish Corridor", *New Statesman*, 28 March 1925; see also Robert Dell's article "The Danzig Danger", *New Statesman*, 7 February 1925, where he claimed Poland planned to seize Danzig. The Polish Commissioner General in Danzig, Dr. Henryk Strasburger, wrote to Skirmunt that Dell's assertion he had said he considered a Polish military occupation of Danzig as desirable. was absolutely untrue. What he said, in fact, was that he thought the situation could be improved by a strict execution of the treaties. He asked Skirmunt to correct the matter and the Minister wrote to the editor, 11 February 1925, AAN. Amb. Londyn. t. 1460, pp. 125-27. Skirmunt thought Dell's article was inspired by German propaganda, *ibid.*, t. 103, p. 35. Robert Dell, b. 1865, was the son of an Anglican pastor; he became a Roman Catholic and later a free thinker; he was always politically to the left and was incapable of political restraint. He worked on and off for the *Manchester Guardian* and became its Paris correspondent in 1929, see David Ayerst, *The Manchester Guardian, Biography of a Newspaper*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1971, pp. 503-04.

"her ill-gotten gains." [78] It was frequently stated that British vital interests were involved in the security of the frontiers of France and Belgium, but not of Eastern Europe. There were signs, however, of recognizing that the revision of the Polish-German frontier was not something that could be accomplished at once. Thus, the *Manchester Guardian,* while condemning the Polish Corridor as a "geographic anomaly" and the partition of Upper Silesia as an economic disaster, cautioned that revision could not be negotiated because of adamant Polish opposition. Therefore, it advised that a settlement be reached in the West and silence be kept on the East.[79] The London *Times* was courageous enough to state that the Corridor was as Polish as Posnania, and to caution that while the problem might be straightened out in the future since the time for this had not yet come.[80] The signature of the Locarno Treaties on 16 October 1925, was received with general satisfaction. The House of Commons approved the treaties on 18 November by a vote of 375 to 13.[81] Press debate on the Polish-German frontier died down until late 1930.

In the meanwhile, it should be noted that British policy with regard to the Polish-German frontier crystallized in 1924-25. This was due primarily to Austen Chamberlain, the only Foreign Secretary of the interwar period who really "made" foreign policy, albeit he had to, and did, act in general agreement with British opinion and also with majority opinion in the Foreign Office itself. Chamberlain realized very clearly that no improvement was possible in Franco-British relations, nor in Franco-German relations, without providing adequate security for France. While personally in favour of a Franco-British alliance, he soon realized that opposition to this was too great, both in the Cabinet and in public opinion. His policy views in early 1925 were expressed in a

[78] "Germany's Eastern Frontiers", *Manchester Guardian*, 20 March 1925.

[79] *Ibid.* Here we read: "If the maintenance of Polish dominion, east and west, is sufficiently important to justify a permanent proscription of Germany and Russia by all means let it be maintained, but then let us abandon all hope of a peaceful future". The conclusion was, however, that since Poland would rather fight than give up this territory, i.e., the Corridor . . "for the time being, let us keep silent about the east and settle the west".

[80] "The Danzig Corridor — An Insoluble Problem", from a correspondent, *London Times*, 3 April 1925. Here we read that the Poles refused to consider the slightest alteration of their frontier and "There is no reason for the suppression of the 'Corridor' except that it annoys the Germans. The latter cannot seriously claim that it seriously interferes with their trade or that it removes a large number of Germans from German rule. Its population is as Polish as Posnania . . . If they (the Germans) get the 'Corridor' now, they will want Upper Silesia ten years later, and Posnania after that". The author's conclusion was that a solution of the Corridor problem was not "practical politics" at present; stability would be impossible unless this were realized. The matter would be straightened out some day, but the time was not ripe for discussion. It is significant, that this article reflected Austen Chamberlain's own views as expressed in the House of Commons in June 1925 and in official correspondence.

[81] *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, v. 188, col. 540.

memorandum of 19 February 1925, penned by Harold Nicolson and entitled "British Policy Considered in Relation to the European Situation." It was explicitly approved by Chamberlain himself as expressing his ideas and the consensus of the Foreign Office. It is an important document, for it contains basic principles of British policy with regard to Europe, including a consideration of the problem of the German-Polish frontier.

The policy set out in the memorandum was to guarantee the borders of France and Belgium, since Britain could not tolerate any threat to the Channel Ports, which would expose the British Isles to the danger of "aerial invasion." It was assumed that once France was satisfied on the point of her security, she would give up the policy of "encircling" Germany with the Little Entente system (sic). (Clearly what Nicolson had in mind here, were the French alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and confused these with the Little Entente which was an alliance between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia directed at containing Hungary.) With regard to the German-Polish frontier, it was assumed that Germany would never reconcile herself to the loss of East Prussia, "the cradle of the Prussian state", and to Upper Silesia on which, it was alleged, German prosperity was largely based. One can certainly see in this latter assertion, the effect of Keynes and of German propaganda, for Upper Silesia had produced only thirty-five million tons of Germany's total coal output of 153 million tons in 1910, and some 2 million tons of her 13 million tons of steel. Further, it was assumed that once France felt secure and Germany entered the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council, then "it may become possible eventually to revise by European agreement the dangerous conditions involved in the Silesian settlement and the Polish corridor." The main aim of this policy, in which the solution of the Polish-German question figured as a complement to Western security, was to reestablish the "concert of Europe". The concluding sentence on British interests as they affected European security read: "But until we can quieten France, no concert of Europe is possible, and we can only quieten France if we are in the position to speak to her with the authority of an Ally." [82] Chamberlain had to give up the idea of alliance; however, the combination of his policy assumptions with the Stresemann proposals was to result in the Locarno Treaties of October 1925. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that he favoured immediate revision. While the preparatory negotiations were in progress, Chamberlain personally and publicly took the stand that to revise the frontiers of Europe would be madness, since

[82] "British Policy Considered in Relation to the European Situation", Memorandum by Mr. Harold Nicolson of the Foreign Office; Prepared in Pursuance of Directions from the Secretary of State", February 20, 1925, F.O. 371/10727, (C2201/459/18), pp. 137 ff. The memorandum was somehow leaked to the American press, see W.N.E. (Ewer), "Britain and the Pact — A Secret Foreign Office Document", *Daily Herald*, 11 May 1925; Ewer gave a paraphrase of an article from the *New York World*, 10 May. See also *Manchester Guardian*, 11 May 1925.

it would jeopardize European stability.[83] While he consistently refused to undertake commitments East of the Rhine, he also held the view that a revision of the Polish-German frontier could only take place with the mutual consent of the parties involved. He hoped this would be possible after many years when national animosities had died down.[84] This came to be the official attitude of the Foreign Office and German attempts to open the question of the Polish-German frontier, as for example in 1926 and in 1929, were discouraged.[85]

[83] In the debate on the Security Pact on 24 June 1925, Chamberlain said: "... the idea that we should set to work within six years of the signature of the Treaties, and after all the labour they involved, to rewrite the boundaries of Europe and tear up the settlements then arrived at — to try to create a fresh one — seems to me to be an idea that cannot be conceivable to anyone outside Bedlam", *House Commons, Debates*, 5th ser., v. 185, col. 1563.

[84] Austen Chamberlain wrote to D'Abernon on 6 August 1926"... of course it is impossible to talk about revising or abolishing corridors at the present time. If anything is ever to be done on those lines, it could only be when the daily relations of the two Governments have long been friendly and have created a wholly different atmosphere from that which the war has left". F.O. 800/259, p. 702.

[85] Godfrey Locker Lampson, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1925-29) told Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, in August 1926, that "... it was the gravest mistake to start any discussion regarding the Corridor yet awhile. Our line here had consistently been to tell both sides to keep quiet and let time do its work". While Lampson predicted that Poland's economic dependence on Germany and the latter's need for Polish agricultural produce would lead to an accommodation, he warned that this could not happen unless Poland suggested it of her own free will, see "Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the Governor of the Bank of England", 12 August 1925, DBFP ser. IA, v. II., no. 248. Montagu Norman was then supporting Hjalmar Schacht's suggestion that Germany buy back Eupen and Malmédy from Belgium; Norman thought the same procedure could apply to the Corridor. Schacht was then Finance Minister.

On 1 April 1929, Schacht told the Young Committee that his proposal for German payment of reparations in annuities of 1.65 billion marks p.a. for 37 years, depended on Germany's obtaining raw materials to compensate her for the lost colonies, and on the elimination of detrimental conditions caused by the settlement in Eastern Europe, see Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, p. 256. This demand, apparently put forward by Schacht without consulting Stresemann, was later withdrawn. A memorandum by John V. Perowne, Second Secretary, member of the Central Department, of 1 May 1929, commenting on the German demands, contained the statement that: "The attitude of H.M. Government with regard to the question of the German-Polish frontiers was made clear at Locarno and has been reaffirmed subsequently more than once. It is briefly that H.M. Government can only agree to a modification of the Versailles settlement if Germany and Poland are willing at some future date to alter their common frontier by mutual agreement". Austen Chamberlain's hand-written note in the margin of this paragraph reads: "Any attempt to reopen the Treaty settlement at the present time would constitute a direct menace to peace". In a longer ,hand-written comment to the same document, he wrote: "I dream my own dreams; whether they will ever come true is another matter. If they do, it will be after my time. But I can imagine that after long years the relations between Germany and Poland might conceivably be so improved and their common interests so great, that both would be willing to put an end to their ancient feuds and that for this purpose Poland might make *some* territorial concession in return for reciprocal advantages. And it is conceivable that the League might be the decisive factor in bringing about such an agreement — on condition that it does not move until the right moment comes".

It should be noted that already at this time, a voice was raised in the Foreign Office warning of the consequences of a revision of the Polish-German frontier. In March 1925, James Headlam-Morley, the Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, who had been closely involved in drafting the Danzig clauses of the Versailles Treaty and the provisions for the Upper Silesian Plebiscite, warned that Britain could not disregard developments in Eastern Europe. He noted that conditions had changed since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Poland was so far removed from Britain and the three great East European Empires so strong, that no British Government would have been justified in undertaking a great war to help free Poland. Now, however, Britain could not allow a German-Russian alliance which would be cemented by an attack on Poland. The danger spot in Europe, he wrote, was not on the Rhine, but on the Vistula. The consequences of German eastern expansion to Western Europe were clear to him. He wrote "We cannot now be indifferent if Germany breaks through upon the East and there begins to acquire a new accession of territory and strength which would inevitably in the future be brought to bear upon the Rhine." And he asked:

> Has anyone attempted to realize what would happen if there were to be a new partition of Poland, or if the Czechoslovak State was to be so curtailed and dismembered that in fact it disappeared from the map of Europe? The whole of Europe would be at once in chaos.

He went on to outline a situation in which, besides the German dismemberment of those two countries, Austria would join Germany and Hungary would, in alliance with Germany, recover the southern slopes of Slovakia. He stated: "This would be catastrophic, and even if we neglected to interfere to prevent it happening, we should be driven to interfere, probably too late." Bearing in mind that Britain would not undertake commitments East of the Rhine, and that the League of Nations itself might be too weak to prevent these developments, Headlam-Morley suggested that the British Government officially state it would not tolerate any change of frontiers by force. Besides that, he thought that a "European Protocol" was needed.[86]

Chamberlain's comments on this memorandum are illustrative of his thinking. While opposed to a revision of frontiers at that time, he disagreed with Headlam-Morley's basic contention that Britain could not now be unaffected by developments in Eastern Europe. He noted that Britain was a "partner" in Western Europe, but that she could only play the role of "amicus curiae", or a friend of the court, in Eastern Europe. Britain's security was bound up with that of France and Belgium, but

"Former German Colonies and position of German-Polish Frontier". Memorandum, (Mr. Perowne), F.O. 371/13617, C 3244/45/18, and comments by Austen Chamberlain, pp. 59 ff.

[86] James W. Headlam-Morley, "The History of British Foreign Policy and the Geneva Protocol", 12 February 1925, F.O. 371/11064, W1252/9/98, p. 159 (7-8).

not, for example, with that of Rumania. He did not think that a German-Russian alliance was a possibility until Russia had recovered.[87] However, his attitude towards Poland was more friendly than his famous statement, that the Corridor was not worth the bones of one British Grenadier, might imply.[88] He was often irritated by German demands and by German attitudes towards the Poles. He thought that every Polish stupidity was matched by a German one, and that the Germans could not expect to gain anything from the Poles if they continued to treat them as "pariahs".

In a letter to D'Abernon, Chamberlain criticised the Germans for resenting Polish-Soviet conversations, while they themselves had a treaty with Russia. Also, the Germans did not thank the Poles for concessions, like the extension given to optants (Germans living in Poland who had the right of opting whether to leave or stay as Polish citizens). Chamberlain wrote:

> Ask Stresemann what is the German equivalent for the English proverb, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. As long as Germans persist in treating Poles as pariahs it does not lie in their mouths to complain of Polish ill-will to Germany. It is Germany's own fault if Polish-German relations do not improve, for Germans go out of their way to mark their contempt and hatred for Poles even to you and me.[89]

On 7 October 1926, Austen Chamberlain wrote a comment on the German statement of the Polish-German problem, which had been conveyed to the Foreign Office. His comment is worth citing *in toto*, since it is a good example of his private opinion. He then wrote:

> I. The Prussians not merely annexed a large part of Poland but oppressed it. They tried to Prussianize the Poles, they colonized with Germans. Every wrongful or stupid act of the Poles can be paralleled from Prussia's acts in the day of her power. This may not be justification or even an excuse. It is at least an explanation.
>
> II. Germany has done everything she could to make trouble in Danzig. I say this advisedly. She (personified in the President of the Free City) has not wanted an accord but a grievance.
>
> III. It is improper to describe as "Polish encroachments on Danzig" what the Court of International Justice has declared to be her rights.
>
> IV. The Silesian decision of the League may or may not have been the best possible. Lord Barfour who went closely into it thought it "very fair". In any case it is not our business to attack or excuse it.

[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-53.

[88] Austen Chamberlain to Lord Crewe, British Ambassador in Paris, 16 February 1925, cited in Sir Charles A. Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain*, London, 1940, v. II., p. 259; the original is in F.O. 371/10727, C2450/459/18, and F.O. 800.257, p. 322.

[89] Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon, telegram 24 April 1926, *DBFP*, ser. IA, v.I., no. 459.

> Finally, I do not say that the Versailles settlement will last for all time or that it necessarily should. I observe only that Germany has bound herself solemnly not to resort to war as a means of changing it. If it is to be changed eventually by agreement then Germany must alter her whole attitude to Poland. Being an optimist I sometimes allow myself to hope that in time she will see this.[90]

Thus, Chamberlain's attitude towards the revision of the Polish-German frontier was an honourable one, even though it was also unrealistic.

Although Headlam-Morley's views of the effects of German expansion at Poland's expense were discounted at the time, there were more warning voices, both in the Foreign Office and in the Diplomatic Service, in the years 1928-1930. Thus in October 1928, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador in Berlin, reported that he saw no diminution of the German craving for expansion and world recognition, so typical of prewar Germany. William Seeds, then British Consul in Coblenz, went further. He saw Germany as aiming at the economic domination of Europe, an aim which would ultimately clash with British interests. Furthermore, he wrote, even if this did not occur, the revision of the Polish Corridor and German union with Austria would touch the paramount British interest of peace very closely. He opposed the early evacuation of the Rhineland since he then expected Germany to turn to the revision of the Polish-German frontier.[91] In December, J. V. Perowne, thought that German policy was much like that described by Sir Eyre Crowe in his famous memorandum of 1907, that is, that Germany was making demand after demand and considered each concession as a sign of weakness.[92] In June 1930, Alexander Cadogan, then a Counsellor in the Foreign Office, reported on a visit he had paid to Danzig. The Gdynia-Danzig dispute, or "Full Use" debate had just begun, with Danzig claiming that Poland was not making full use of Danzig while favouring Gdynia. Cadogan was suspicious of the fact that President Sahm had raised the matter within a month of the final settlement in the West, that is, the allied evacuation of the Rhineland. He thought Poland was "morally wrong" in favouring Gdynia, but also that the Danzigers did not really want a settlement. He opined, correctly as it turned out, that the German Government kept Danzig as a key to reopen the whole Eastern question. He also saw President Sahm for what he was, an agent of Berlin.[93] These warnings, however, were not taken too seriously at the Foreign Office, and the atmosphere in European politics

[90] Note by Sir A. Chamberlain, October 1926, *DBFP* ser. IA, v. II, no. 245, note 3, p. p.428.

[91] Sir Horace Rumbold, 20 October 1928, William Seeds, 22 October 1928, *DBFP* ser. IA, v.V, no. 188 and enclosure.

[92] Memorandum by J. V. Perowne, 10 December 1928, *ibid.*, no. 277. The Crowe memorandum of 1907, had just been published in v. III, of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, H. W. V.Temperley et al. eds., 1928, pp. 379-440.

[93] A. Cadogan, Memorandum on Danzig, 6 June 1930, F.O. 417/27, no. 37, pp. 59-63 (N3856/250/55).

remained relatively calm. The Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Cushendun, told August Zaleski in September 1928, that he found the Polish Foreign Minister's forecast of Stresemann's plans "unconvincing". Zaleski had then told him that Stresemann's programme was: 1. Locarno, 2. The early Evacuation of the Rhineland, 3, The annexation of Austria, and 4, The elimination of the Polish Corridor.[94] It was a remarkably accurate analysis of Streseman's strategy, but it lacked the power of conviction in the balmy days of the Locarno period.

It was in this becalmed era that Margarete Gärtner initiated her "study tours" of the Polish-German frontier. From 1927 to 1933, most of the British personages treated to these tours can be found in the volumes of the British *Who's Who.* It is not possible to list them all here; they can be found in the pages of Miss Gärtner's book. Among the most prominent were: Arthur Greenwood, then a rising light in the Labour Party; Captain Victor Cazelet, then a Conservative M.P., who was to die so tragically with General Sikorski in 1943; and Sir Evelyn Wrench, founder of the English Speaking Union, the All People's Union, and owner-editor of the *Spectator,* an elite weekly periodical with a circulation of some 20,000. Members of Parliament, journalists, editors, professors, came and went. There were also large groups of Americans, particularly students, the latter sent by the Carl Schurz Foundation, whose business manager was Gertrud Ferber, sister of a prominent Danzig official.[95] French writers and journalists also came. They were all treated to the same tour. Miss Gärtner usually picked up her charges at Cologne airport; they were then wined and dined by the Mayor of Cologne, Dr Conrad Adenauer. They then proceeded by train to Berlin, where they were often received by members of th Government or the Foreign Ministry. Then they travelled by train, sometimes to Upper Silesia and then to East Prussia, but more often directly to East Prussia, to Marienwerder. Here they were received by the "Regierungspräsident", Dr Carl Budding, and enlightened by German experts on the decline of East Prussia, which was allegedly due to the Corridor. They visited the great Teutonic castle of Marienburg, some great East Prussian estates, like Schloss Schönberg belonging to the Finckensteins; they were then shown Danzig, where great attention was paid to its German character and to its economic "decline" since 1919. But the "pièce de résistance" was the tour of the "Vistula Frontier", starting a little south of Marienwerder and going up to the boundaries of the Free City of Danzig. Here Dr Budding was an unparalleled Cicerone. He had three prize exhibits for foreign visitors: the narrow access to the Vistula for Germans at Kürzebrack (Korzeniewo), the bad state of the Vistula dykes, and the dismantling of the bridge at Münsterwalde (Opalenie). To start with Kürzebrack, the access was, indeed narrow, and a pass did have to be obtained at Dirschau (Tczew), but it was hardly a much travelled

[94] Cushendun's record of a conversation with Zaleski, 13 September 1928, *DBFP* ser. IA, v. V, no. 157.
[95] M. Gärtner, *Botschafterin,* p. 135.

crossing point on the frontier. A Polish customs officer usually came over from the Polish side by ferry about 3 p.m. in the afternoon. There were no facilities for the transport of mass goods, and there had been none before 1918, when the place was a port used by the German river administration. However, when the Poles did propose modifications to facilitate access from East Prussia, Budding advised the German Foreign Ministry not to agree since, as he wrote, Kürzebrack was the core of German propaganda against the Corridor, showing everyone its "nonsense and monstrosity". As for the Münsterwalde bridge, it had been built in 1909, primarily for military purposes. It had a railway track 1,060 metres long and only 3 metres wide. Above it was a wooden track, which could easily be dismantled in time of war, which was 5.5 metres wide. The bridge was little travelled, with some 6,676 persons crossing it both ways in the first six months of 1927, or an average of 19 persons both ways per day. It was not necessary for the five Polish villages located at this point on the right-hand bank of the river. For this reason, the Polish Government decided to dismantle the bridge and relocate it at Toruń where another bridge was needed. However, German propaganda called this a "Kulturschande", or an affront to German culture. Finally, as far as the Vistula dykes running north from Marienwerder were concerned, the German claim was that the Poles, who controlled both banks of the river, allowed them to fall into neglect. Budding even hinted to his foreign visitors that the Poles envisaged flooding East Prussia in case of war. In fact, there were sometimes serious floods in the area, while in seasons of droughtsandbanks could be seen. This was the case in 1932, a prime year for political tourism. The truth of the matter was that the dyke administration was mixed, both Polish and German. The 35 kilometre stretch of dykes which was shown to foreign visitors was maintained and paid for by 19 village communes only five of which were Polish. The Dyke Inspector was always a German and for many years the post was held by Rudolf Dirksen, an old member of the H-K-T. He often accompanied Budding's visitors and told them the floods or sandbanks, whatever the case might be, were due to Polish neglect. The same man, however, reported to his superiors in 1927, that there were no problems with the Poles over the maintenance of the dykes. Also, in 1932, a commission of experts called by the German Foreign Ministry to report whether the Poles could be publicly accused of neglecting the dykes, reported that no proof of this could be given. In fact, the experts reported that the Poles regulated the Vistula and maintained the dykes adequately to allow the same extent of navigation as had existed before the war.[96] Still, to uninformed visitors, the tour of the

[96] For tours of the Vistula frontier, see Sobczak, *Propaganda*, pp. 115-19, based on documents in the Archiv des Aus.Amtes, Bonn, IV Polen, Po 2 (G) Bd.1-5. For the port at Kürzebrack (Korzeniewo), see Sobczak pp. 226-34; for the Münsterwalde (Opalenie) bridge, *ibid.*, 234-44; for the regulation of the Vistula, *ibid.*, 217-22, and for the Marienwerder dykes, pp. 223-26. For the report of the commission of experts on the regulation of the Vistula of 12 December 1932, see *ibid.*, p. 223, *n. 8*, Bonn, IV Polen, Po 2

Vistula frontier was often convincing as proof of the "nonsense" of the Corridor and of Polish neglect of the river. A member of the British Embassy in Berlin, Mr. M. Yencken, who had made the tour himself, but with eyes open, noted in September 1931:

> That cultured Rhinelander Dr Budding, Regierungspräsident of Marienwerder, naturally makes full use of it and is very successful in muddling his visitors, including numerous British M.P.s, into thinking that the whole of the Polish Corridor is, *ipso facto*, wicked and absurd.[97]

Earlier that year, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador in Berlin, remarked that:

> The Germans, who in these matters are usually clumsy to a degree, manage their eastern frontier propaganda pleasantly, wittily, and well. A visit to the Vistula is all smiles and motor cars, fine wines, good beer and magnificent East Prussian estates.[98]

Very few visitors, it should be noted, actually went into the Polish Cordor and, if they did, they often stayed with German landowners who convinced them of the "decline" of the area and its untenability in the long run as part of the peace settlement.[99]

It is difficult to calculate the exact number of foreign visitors to the Vistula frontier in these years, for they were seldom listed separately from the total figures. The "Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Grenzlandarbeit in Westpreussen", which carried out all the arrangements, listed figures for visitors, most of whom came from Germany, as follows—1928: 1,200, 1929: 3,400, 1930: 4,800, 1932: 5,000. One specific listing of foreign

(G) Bd.22, pp. 85-90; for Rudolf Dirksen's report on the Marienwerder dykes in 1927, see *ibid.*, p. 226, n. 13, where the quotation is taken from the *Elbinger Zeitung* no. 135, 1927, cited in Polish diplomatic correspondence.

[97] Notes on a Journey to East Prussia, September 4, 1931 — Memorandum by M. Jencken, H.M. Embassy, Berlin, F.O.371/15586, N6726/6726/55.

[98] Sir Horace Rumbold, Annual Report on Germany, 1930, 15 January 1931, F.O. 371/15223, C396/393/18, p. 21.

[99] Report by Col. J. H. Marshall-Cornwall on a tour of the Polish-German Frontier, 10 July 1931, F.O. 371/15222, C5169/173/18. Enclosure. Col. Cornwall was British Military Attaché in Berlin. He admitted that since his objective had been to find the point of view of Germans in the Corridor, he confined himself to this. His sympathies clearly lay with the Germans. He noted that most Germans, while regarding the loss of Upper Silesia as a bitter injustice, would be prepared to acquiesce in it, if they could thereby regain the Corridor (p. 2). Expressing his own opinion, he wrote: "Rightly or wrongly, every German of every political creed regards the loss of the corridor as a crying injustice, and will never accept peace under this condition except at sword's point. I regard the solution of the Corridor question as primary and vital in the achievement of European peace; no final settlement of political relations and no effective disarmament measures can be brought about without this problem being solved on the basis of mutual satisfaction". (p. 3). He was taken over the Vistula frontier by Carl Budding and could not help concluding the Germans had been most unfairly treated (p. 4). He concluded that German propaganda apart, the Polish-German frontier had been traced with a view of bolstering Poland with every economic and military advantage, oblivious of all mutual equity and fairness.

visitors for 19 April-6 June 1928, gives their number at 179. Budding was pleased with their published accounts. For the period 1 April-31 December 1927, the German Foreign Ministry listed 28 such articles. Miss Gärtner does not list all her British visitors, but it is possible to estimate that she guided some 80-100 V.I.P.'s to the "Vistula Frontier" in the years 1927-1933. Although her claim that these tours led to a better understanding of the Corridor problem by western public opinion and that it set in motion "a great movement" for the peaceful revision of the Eastern frontiers, is exaggerated,[100] they undoubtedly contributed powerfully to spread German propaganda claims among influential people in Britain. While the tours did not have the effect of creating a massive demand by British opinion for revision before 1931, they clearly helped prepare the ground for widespread support of German demands in the early nineteen-thirties.

It was in the Fall of 1930, that the Danzig-Corridor Problem again came to the fore. By that time, the Depression had struck hard in Germany causing massive unemployment. Stresemann had died in October 1929, having succeeded in obtaining the agreement of France and Britain for the early withdrawal of allied troops from the Rhineland. This took place in the spring of 1930, despite the fact that Germany had not fulfilled her disarmament obligations and without giving Poland any additional security to replace that lost by the Rhineland occupation.[101] Just as Locarno had been the logical consequence of Stresemann's acceptance of the first reparations settlement, the Dawes Plan, so the Rhineland evacuation was the result of German acceptance of a revised settlement, the Young Plan. Stresemann's success was great; he not only obtained a reduction of reparations by one quarter, but also the removal of allied troops from German soil. This success, however, was soon overshadowed by the economic and political chaos which enveloped Germany. All German political parties with the exception of the Social Democrats focussed on the revision of the Polish-German frontier, as if that were the panacea for all German ills. Hitler was only the most vocal political leader in this competition for votes on a platform of revision. The view that the revision of the Peace Settlements was necessary in order to provide economic and political stability was also widely accepted abroad. Even Senator Borah, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, stated in October 1931, that without a revision of reparations and frontiers—he specifically mentioned the Corridor, Upper Silesia, and Hungary—there could be no economic recovery in Europe.[102]

[100] M. Gärtner, *Botschafterin*, p. 122.

[101] For Polish attempts to obtain compensation from France for the early evacuation of Rhineland, see L. Grosfeld, "La Pologne face au problème de l'Evacuation de la Rhénanie (1926-1929), *Acta Poloniae Historica* v. XXX, Warsaw, 1974, pp. 213-28; also Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, pp. 154-56

[102] Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., *Survey of International Affairs*, 1932, London, 1933, p. 323. The statement was made during the visit of the French Prime Minister, Pierre Laval, to the United States.

The new German revisionist campaign was launched on 10 August 1930,with a speech by Gottfried Treviranus, formerly Minister of "Occupied Territories" and Minister of Transport. He stated that Polish-German relations could not improve without a prior revision of the frontier.[103] Five days later, he declared that the German eastern frontier was the next question which Germany had to solve.[104] While the German Government denied that these speeches expressed official policy, it was clear that a new phase of the German revisionist campaign against Poland had begun. Polish-German trade negotiations had resulted in the signature of a treaty, but while the Polish Parliament ratified it in March 1931, the German Government did not. This was the result of the chaotic political situation in Germany.[104] The mounting propaganda attacks on Poland, accompanied as they were by border incidents, intensified the already existing anxiety in France, Britain and the United States that the Polish-German frontier might at any moment be the scene of armed conflict and perhaps signal the outbreak of another war. Although the Foreign Office reassured the Poles that revision was unrealistic,[106] it rejected the request that the British Government make a protest to Berlin. A somewhat supercilious comment on this matter read: "We cannot make a *démarche* every time a blundering German transgresses the rule that 'toutes les vérités ne sont pas bonnes à dire... This is a relatively level country and we have no taste for going mountaineering on molehills." [107] This attitude was not, it should be noted, shared by the British Ambassador in Berlin, who wrote: "But now, after the liquidation of the Rhineland problem, the clearing up of the Eastern question has become acute. It figures on the next programme on foreign policy of the Government of the Reich." [108]

Rumbold was right. In March 1931, Dr. Julius Curtius, then head of the German Foreign Ministry, declared that while the time was not yet ripe for putting revision of the Polish-German frontier on the agenda, the time for active *diplomatic* action had arrived. After the evacuation of the Rhineland, the ground had to be prepared for changing the Polish-German frontier. The German embassies in London, Paris, Moscow, Rome and Washington received specific secret instructions in March. Their members were to concentrate on "enligthening" public opinion on the subject, but to avoid questioning the existence of Poland as such; this was to avoid suspicion that Germany desired a new partition of

[103] See Von Reikhoff, *German-Polish Relations*, p. 330; *London Times*, 12, 13, 14 August 1930.

[104] *Ibid.*, 15 August 1930.

[106] Józef Potocki, Polish Attaché in London, saw Sir Victor Wellesley, Deputy Under Secretary of State, gave him an aide memoire, and asked for the opinion of the British Government. Wellesley informed him as above, Raport Polityczny nr. 18/30, London 20 August 1930, AAN, Amb. Londyn, v. 1469, pp. 127-31.

[107] Note of 15 August 1930, F.O. 371/14370, pp. 83.4, cited by von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations*, p. 331.

[108] Sir Horace Rumbold's report of 15 August 1930, on German reactions to the Treviranus speech, F.O. 371/14370, C6462/680/18, p. 76.

Poland. The aim of the action was the recovery of Danzig, the Corridor, a large part of former Posen province and all of eastern Upper Silesia. These demands were to be made attractive by listing German "concessions" to Poland, such as: unrestricted access to the Baltic; a privileged transport system and no dues or tariffs; unrestricted military transport even in times of war (the one envisaged was a Polish-Soviet war), Poland's own port territory in Danzig, as long as Poland promised equal use of Danzig and Gdynia; free zones for Polish use in Koenigsberg, Stettin, and eventually in Bremen and Hamburg, the latter two for cotton. Simultaneously, the embassies were instructed to avoid discussion of any "partial solutions", such as the neutralisation of the Corridor and Danzig, and their union in one territory under joint Polish-German sovereignty or that of the League of Nations. Such a solution was unacceptable because of the danger of "polonising" Danzig since the majority of the population in the Corridor was admittedly Polish.[109]

The year 1931 witnessed increasing unemployment and political unrest in Germany. In 1932 there were five elections in which politicians vied with each other in condemning the Polish-German frontier and demanding its revision. Also, in 1931, preparations began for a Disarmament Conference which finally began its sittings in February 1932. It is against this background of world economic depression, mass unemployment and political turmoil in Germany, mounting tension in Polish-German relations and plans for a disarmament settlement, that we should view the increasingly vocal support of British opinion for the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, and also the suggestions which were made to this end in the Foreign Office.

While the British press as a whole tended to accept the necessity of frontier revision, especially in Danzig and the Corridor, the most vocal advocate of a comprehensive settlement with Germany in the years 1931-32, was James L. Garvin, the editor of the *Observer*. In March 1931, he wrote that the question for France and for Europe was what kind of European unity there should be: unity on the basis of Versailles and a French alliance with the Poland of the Corridor, or on the basis of reconciliation with Germany and Italy. Here he wrote:

> The question of Germany's Western frontier was settled at Locarno; that of her eastern frontier is still open, so that the Corridor has replaced Alsace as the Achilles' heel of the European question.

He thought that young Poles would, on consideration, reject another war as the condition for living a full national life.[110] In other words, he hoped they would give up the Corridor without war. In May, at the time of the crisis over the attempted German-Austrian Customs Union, Garvin wrote that this was a natural and a good solution. He wrote

[109] Curtius to German embassies in London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Washington, 17 March 1931, Bonn, IV Polen, Po 2 (G 2), Bd.1, pp. 78-113, cited by Sobczak, *Propaganda*, pp. 25-6.

[110] "Thoughts on Disarmament", *Observer*, 22 March 1931.

angrily that "The great German race in the heart of Europe is still being treated as a conquered race." France, Poland, and the Little Entente, he declared, must give up their doctrine of "armed ascendancy".[111] In July, at the time of World Economic Conference in London, he condemned the French proposal that Germany renounce her desire to revise her eastern frontiers. France, he claimed, had never done this after 1871. This was true, but Garvin failed to notice that the return of Alsace-Lorraine had never been the focus of French foreign policy. In any case, he stated: "The German race will never abandon its claim to the readjustment of its eastern boundaries as drawn by the ill-starred Treaty of Versailles." [112]

In September 1932, Garvin's appeals for justice to Germany became even more passionate. He thought that every reassurance to Germany that she was not a second rate power, would increase European security. It was only, he thought, if the Germans lost their self-respect that they could be provoked into war. He therefore called for British support of Germany and went so far as to write: ". . . we must keep faith with Germany as we kept faith with Belgium".[113] This was a very strange appeal considering no Power great or small was about to attack Germany. Garvin probably believed that denial of German demands would provoke a war in which Germany, disarmed as she then was, would be defeated unless Britain "kept faith" with her. However, though he spoke of the "armed ascendancy" of France and her allies, he admitted in October 1932, that France could not hold in artificial subjugation. . . "a nation naturally more powerful than themselves in numbers and weight". Nothing on earth, he wrote, could stop the Germans from getting full equality in the long run. In his opinion, therefore, "the supreme truth of the world" was that war was unavoidable, unless the Versailles Treaty was revised peacefully. Revision was the key to the whole question, for even if France disarmed to the German level, Germany would still demand the revision of her frontier with Poland. The latter had been given German territory with the sole aim of weakening the Reich. Therefore, he wrote, "we are heart and soul. . . with the just claim of the German people" for equality in arms and "some definite and sufficient revision of the Versailles Treaty as it concerns the eastern frontiers." [114] In November, he claimed that: "The Polish Corridor, thrust between East Prussia and the rest of Germany, is the most acute and dangerous irritant in the world". He thought the problem would be solved by a German Corridor across the Polish Corridor, with viaducts for Polish roads and railways across a German

[111] "Peace and Drifting Backwards", *Observer*, 17 May 1931.
[112] "Germany and the World — The London Conference", *Observer*, 19 July 1931.
[113] "Keep Faith with Germany", *Observer*, 18 September 1932.
[114] "Whither Europe — 'Revision' The Key Word to Peace", *Observer*, 9 October 1932.

zone. He saw revision here as the first step toward reconciliation and disarmament.[115]

While Garvin expressed the most extreme support for German claims, it should be noted that some major British newspapers expressed the view that all Polish territories could not simply be returned to Germany. *The Manchester Guardian* was fairly representative of this attitude in stating that while the Polish-German frontier, especially the Corridor, could not be altered, it should become less of a barrier to the transfer of goods and people.[116] The paper commented after the Treviranus speech of 10 August 1930, that it would probably be unwise to return territories which had become "polonized", i.e., the Corridor, but that the return of Danzig and an improvement of communications could be envisaged.[117] Even the *New Statesman,* a left-wing liberal weekly for intellectuals which generally favoured revision, stated that the only way to change the Polish-German frontier lay in negotiations and not in "noisy operations" like the Treviranus speech.[118] In early May 1932, both the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mail,* the former owned by Lord Beaverbrook and the latter by Lord Rothermere, himself an ardent supporter of revision, headlined an alleged Polish plan to seize Danzig. The *Manchester Guardian* condemned this as "silly or mischievous or both".[119] It should be noted that both the High Commissioner in Danzig, the Italian Count Manfredi Gravina, and members of the Danzig government, had conspired to persuade the reporters of the two papers of the imminence of a Polish coup. The German Consul General in Danzig, Edmund von Thermann, regretted that the reporters had set a date for the invasion, 1 May, and thus "devalued" the effect of the "news" on western opinion.[120] In general it can be said that the

[115] "How to Disarm", *Observer*, 13 November 1932.

[116] "A Tour in Poland". — How her Minority Peoples Live. I. The Germans of Poznań and Pomorze. *Manchester Guardian*, 19 June 1930.

[117] "France, Germany and the Peace Treaties", *Manchester Guardian*, 13 August 1930.

[118] Editorial comments, *New Statesman*, 30 August 1930, v. 35, no. 905.

[119] "Poland and Danzig: Aggression Reports Denied", by our own Correspondent, Berlin (F. Voigt, A.C.), *Manchester Guardian*, 3 May 1932. See *Daily Herald* headlines, 2 May: "Free City Waits all Day for Invasion — Scare of Polish Warships — It is time the World was Warned of Danger"; 3 May: "Germany keeps Watch on Danzig — Poles accused of Economic War Plot". The journalists involved were Greenwall of the *Daily Express* and Morrison of the *Daily Mail.*

[120] Consul General von Thermann reported the journalists had arrived in Danzig on 29 April 1932. They had been received by President Ziehm, the High Commissioner, Count Gravina, and a press officer of the Polish Commissioner General. Thermann reported they had been taken to Tczew (Dirschau), where they saw a group of Polish railwaymen doing military exercises. Danzig officials, and Gravina in particular, had stressed the danger of a Polish military occupation and the possibility of Polish warships entering Danzig on 1 May without giving notice (Danzig had abrogated the Port d'Attaché agreement with Poland, A.C.), Von Thermann, 12 May 1932, AAA, Bonn, Hand Akten Köster, Roland Köster, German Ambassador in Paris, A.C.), BW no.6496. Danzig IG. 521/32, Abschrift IV Po. 3383. Count Gravina himself was obsessed by the danger of a Polish military coup. He used this fear to justify his toleration of Nazi units in Danzig while the

Manchester Guardian's view that Gdynia and Corridor, though "folly", were here to stay barring a war, and that hope lay rather in League safeguards for Germany, represented the view of the more responsible British press.[121]

Nonetheless, pressure for revision, albeit conceived as peaceful and to be carried out through the League, mounted in Britain in 1932. At that time, the Danzig-Corridor problem was even to be found in speeches by Members of Parliament to their constituents, as was the case with Mr. Anthony Crossley, Unionist MP for Oldham, Lancs. Having just returned from a Gärtner tour of the "Vistula Frontier", he told his constituents in October 1932, that he was "appalled" by the border inconveniences and incidents in that part of the world.[112] On 10 November 1932, the question was discussed in the House of Commons. A Mr. Beaumont spoke of "all classes" in Germany finding life under the conditions of the Versailles Treaty as "perfectly intolerable". Miss Mary Pickford, Conservative, who had also been on tour with Miss Gärtner, stated that the eastern frontiers could not endure as they stood; that is why, she said, the Disarmament Conference was so necessary. Captain Cunningham-Reed stated that the dangerous conditions in Europe largely depended on the "hegemony" established by France together with her "satellite States".[122] Two weeks later, on 23 November, Winston Churchill advocated reopening such questions as the Polish Corridor and Transylvania in "cold blood", and in a cool atmosphere, while the victor states still enjoyed superiority over Germany.[124] Garvin approved. He noted that Churchill had mentioned Danzig, "the Polish wedge through Germany", and Hungary, and he wrote: "These things must be revised by peace or struggle. If Mr. Churchill sticks to that truth, he will be a rising voice in Europe.[125]

What was the effect of this mounting support for German claims to Danzig and the Corridor on the British policy-making elite in the years 1930-33? It can be said that there were two main currents of thought in the Foreign Office in those years: one in favour of forcing a solution of the Corridor-Danzig problem, and the other warning against concessions to Germany. The first evidence of support for a forced revision is to be found in a note by Mr. Philip Bouverie Nicols, then a junior member of the Central Department. In commenting on a report

Polish Government was urging him to suppress them. See René Massigli's comment on Gravina's letter of 23 April to League Secretary Sir Eric Drummond, Geneva 3 May 1932, Archives Quai D'Orsay ser. Europe, Danzig, Z931-1, I. 1930-V. 1932, p. 219. Massigli was then the Deputy Political Director at the Quai and French Delegate to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

[121] "Polish-German Friction: II. Danzig Dying", by Our Special Correspondent Berlin, *Manchester Guardian*, 15 November 1932.

[122] "Dangers of the Polish Corridor: M.P.'s County Forum Speech", *Manchester Guardian*, 17 October 1932.

[123] Foreign Policy Debate, 10 November 1932, *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, v. 270, cols. 549, 585, 602.

[124] 23 November 1932, *Ibid.*, v. 272, col. 89.

[125] "Mr. Churchill and Europe", *Observer*, 27 November 1932.

by Sir William Erskine, Ambassador to Poland, that Polish opinion unanimously rejected revision, Nicols wrote on 27 January 1931, that some way must be found to "force" a settlement on Poland. In support of this statement, he asked which of the two, Germany or Poland, was likely to make the greatest contribution to European civilization, and which country was therefore most worth preserving. This point of view did not, however, meet with approval. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Henderson, commented below that no action seemed possible at the moment. He was charitable to the Poles, noting they were as much worth saving as other Europeans.[126]

In May 1931, the question of revision was taken up on a higher level. Sir Maurice P. A. Hankey, the long-time Secretary of the Cabinet and of the Committee of Imperial Defense, and a man consulted by all Prime Ministers since Lloyd George,[127] gave the problem his personal consideration. He then wrote to Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, agreeing with him that "we must contemplate Treaty modification". He had, he stated, been of this opinion since the Treaty was drafted, but it was a conversation he had with the Polish Foreign Minister, August Zaleski, in August 1929, that had made him think of revision in more immediate terms. Zaleski then asked Hankey where Germany would turn after the final settlement in the West, i.e., the evacuation of the Rhineland. Clearly, wrote Hankey, Germany would turn East. He then realized that the next step in the stabilization of peace would be a "more durable and endurable settlement in Eastern Europe". He thought that this could take place through the agency of the League of Nations, but realized that it would "strain the League to its foundations." [128]

To acknowledge the necessity of revision and to carry it out were, however, two different matters. France would need a great deal of reassurance on her security before she would consider abandoning Poland. Britain had to work with France in the Disarmament negotiations and could not push her into one-sided concessions to Germany.

[126] Erskine to Sargent, 19 January 1931; Nicols comment, 27 January 1931, F.O. 371/15221, C560/173/18; Henderson comments p. 111. Nicols had already noted on 7 January, "my long-held opinion that the Eastern Frontier constitutes by far the most important *political* problem in Europe today". The Powers would have to find a solution and "... this solution, when it comes is bound to involve sacrifice on the part of Poland", F.O. 371/15222 C5169/173/18, p. 180.

[127] On Hankey, see note 21 above. Harold Laski wrote of him: "... Sir Maurice Hankey is, outside perhaps some dozen people, the most important political influence in the country". "The Mystery Man of Cabinets", by Harold Laski, *Daily Herald*, 3 September 1932. While this was, no doubt, an exaggeration, it is true that Hankey did exert an important influence by his advice, which was often called for.

[128] Hankey's letter was in response to the second edition of Vansittart's memorandum of 1930, known as the "Old Adam Paper". Here Vansittart had warned of the rising spirit of aggressiveness in Europe; he advocated treaty revision at some point, but thought it premature. See Vansittart, "An Aspect of International Relations in 1931", May 1931, Cab. 24/221, pp. 232-48; Hankey to Vansittart, 12 May 1931, Cab. 21/344.

Germany, for her part, was holding out for maximum gains. In July 1931, the German Government made it clear it would sign no Eastern Locarno treaty without a prior revision of the Polish-German frontier.[129] Finally, as far as the British Government was concerned, it could not undertake any new commitments. As Henderson had noted in January 1931, all British political parties were greatly reluctant to guarantee an Eastern Locarno, or even an agreed Polish-German settlement.[130] With Germany opposed to any agreement without prior revision, with France opposed to it without adequate security, and with British opinion opposed to any further commitments whatever, the situation in the fall of 1931, seemed to have reached deadlock.

It is presumably this impasse which inspired an important Foreign Office memorandum in November 1931, entitled "Changing Conditions of British Foreign Policy", which, though unsigned, was the work of Orme Garton Sargent, a Counsellor, and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, a First Secretary in the Foreign Office. Its importance can be gauged from the fact that it was submitted to the Cabinet by Vansittart, thus it can be taken as consistent with his views at the time. The two officials advocated a definite policy for Britain. She should, they believed, aim at a general settlement of the European crisis. To this end, they suggested that she adhere to a general protocol on the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1924 but, after first minimizing the risks involved by obtaining the disarmament of France and her allies, and the revision of the Polish-German frontier. They argued that the risk of war involved in the existence of the Corridor and the partition of Upper Silesia was greater than that inherent in other disputed boundaries in Europe. Here, they wrote, British power might be involved, by order of the League, "in the issue of a new Franco-German war arising out of a matter in which we have no direct interest whatsoever, and in which public opinion in this country is likely to be on the side of Germany". However, they thought a bargain was possible. Poland would return the Corridor to Germany, while the latter would agree to some increase of League of Nations control on the Rhine; this could take the form of a League committee of supervision in the demilitarized zone. While claiming that British, American and even French opinion thought revision of the Corridor advisable—Laval was cited as calling it a "monstrosity"—and noting that Germany claimed revision as essential, the authors of the

[129] The German Chancellor, Dr. Julius Curtius, told the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Henderson, on 21 July 1931, that no German Government could accept a "political moratorium" of the sort demanded by the French, nor an Eastern Locarno; although it would not raise the issues involved in the next few years, it could not "tie" its hands., *DBFP* 2nd ser. v. II., no 221.

[130] While noting that the Germans had no valid ethnic claim to the Polish Corridor, Henderson wrote: "I am afraid that there would be a very great reluctance in all British political parties to guarantee an Eastern Locarno, even an agreed German-Polish settlement", 19 January 1931, F.O. 371/15221, C173/173/18., p. 67. These notes were written in connection with the possible raising of the Corridor question at the League Council Meeting of January 1931.

memorandum then faced the objection that Poland would never give her consent. Their answer was that she should be forced to do so. In this connection they wrote:

> It is by no means impossible to conceive of a situation so developing in the course of negotiations which would unite such an array of forces as would overcome even Polish obduracy without bloodshed. Europe might come to realize that her salvation was being blocked by Polish pride, and that Polish pride must therefore be sacrificed.

By way of illustrating the mechanics of the proposed settlement, the authors cited a passage from *The Economist* of 14 November 1931. Here it was suggested that the risk of Britain being involved in East European commitments was probably no greater than involvement "here and now" in a political and economic breakdown of Europe. An "Eastern Locarno" was envisaged, suitably encased in declarations against frontier revision by force, provisions for the effective implementation of article 19 of the League Covenant (which dealt with frontier revision), and consideration of economic measures before revision was taken up. British opinion, argued *The Economist*, should start thinking about the eastern frontier "as one of Europe's burning issues". . . Finally, the authors argued that though it would be best to obtain Dominion support for such a protocol, it might be necessary to go ahead without them. After all, they had not signed the Locarno Treaties, which Britain was compelled to sign because the settlement involved interests vital to the heart of the Empire, i.e., the British Isles. Here they stated: "It is doubtful whether we could regard the eastern frontier of Germany in the same light." [131] Clearly, they rejected the argument of Headlam-Morley and William Seeds that an increase of Germany's power on the Vistula would strengthen her on the Rhine, and thus threaten the security of Britain herself.

These proposals clearly reflected both German propaganda and the increasing attention paid to it in the British press and in the Foreign Office. The procedure suggested, of revision through the League on the basis of article 19 of the Covenant, was to be taken up repeatedly in the future. What was envisaged here was some way of circumventing the provision in article 19 of the Covenant, of unanimous agreement by members of the League Council to frontier revision. The memorandum went considerably beyond Vansittart's own proposals, made in September 1931, that the British Government declare it would never consider frontier revision except within the framework of the League of

[131] "Changing Conditions of British Foreign Policy", 26 November 1931. Cab. 24/255, pp. 14, 17-8. The memorandum is unsigned, but Martin Gilbert ascribes it to Sargent and Ashton-Gwatkin, *The Roots of Appeasement*, pp. 130-131.

Nations.[132] Nonetheless, Orme Sargent and Ashton-Gwatkin obviously made proposals developing this idea and were, therefore, in basic agreement with Vansittart. The Cabinet, however, as Vansittart noted later, rejected the proposals of the memorandum in December 1931, on the ground that a "wholehog" acceptance of a European protocol by Britain was out of the question.[133] The objection was not to frontier revision *per se,* but to the undertaking of further commitments by Britain, particularly in areas East of the Rhine. British opposition to such commitments worked in two ways: on the one hand, it weakened the position of Poland because Britain refused to guarantee the *status quo;* on the other hand, it also prevented the British Government from taking up an active policy of revision.

Orme Sargent and Ashton-Gwatkin, who represented the group proposing revision at Poland's expense, were answered very ably by Walford Selby, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He held this position in the year 1924-32, and therefore served most of the period under Sir Austen Chamberlain. On 6 December 1931, Selby penned a note for the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir John Simon. He regretted that Chamberlain's "firmness" towards Germany was no longer practiced and deplored the pro-German attitude of British opinion. Of the latter, and here he specifically mentioned Garvin, he wrote:

> There is really no rhyme or reason in this attitude of British public opinion. It proceeds from a total misconception of the real position and prospects of Germany in relation to her neighbours on the European continent and ourselves, the outlook of her people, and her sentiments towards this country in particular.

This attitude existed on the part of British opinion, he wrote, despite information that Germany was strong behind a façade of weakness, and despite the opinion of the British General Staff that Germany was secretly arming and preparing for the day when she would emerge as a first rate military power. He also cited Sir Horace Rumbold's reports on anti-British feelings in Germany. In view of the above, he believed it was incorrect to view Germany as the "underdog" and urged British co-operation with France. A comment on this note read: "This is a remarkable statement and a worthy continuation of Sir Eyre Crowe's memorandum of 1907".[134] Orme Sargent defended his position rather weakly. He was perhaps aware of the fact that his and Ashton-Gwatkin's proposals did not have much chance of approval by the

[132] Vansittart refers to these proposals in his memorandum "The United Kingdom and Europe", of 1 January 1932, Cab. 24/227, see p. 10, where he also discusses the Sargent, Ashton-Gwatkin memorandum and its rejection by the Cabinet, without, however, naming the authors.

[133] *Ibid.*

[134] "Note as regards Anglo-German Relations", W. Selby, 6 December 1931, F.O. 800/285 (Simon Papers), pp. 114-44; a more clearly typed version is found on pp. 152-74. The note on the comparison with Crowe's memorandum is merely initialled with a capital letter that might be S or C, i.e., Simon or Cadogan.

cabinet. He wrote that there could be no British cooperation with Germany, for this would mean a concerted attack on the *status quo.* However, he did not think that this precluded sympathy with German "sufferings" and encouragement of German aims. He suggested "a more or less platonic advocacy of Treaty revision", which, he claimed, was consistent with the traditional British policy of maintaining the balance of power by throwing Britain's weight "on the side of what we think (perhaps shortsightedly) to be the weaker power". He agreed on the need for Franco-British co-operation. Simon simply noted that this co-operation should be established before the Disarmament Conference began.[135]

Although the Cabinet rejected a definite policy of revision in December 1931, it should be noted that this question was envisaged as part of the greatly desired Disarmament Convention. In this connection, British policy was sympathetic to German demands. In his memorandum: "The United Kingdom and Europe", of January 1932, Vansittart made some significant comments on British aims and views. Britain actually desired German recovery up to a point, on the basis of her own interests which were opposed to French "hegemony" in Europe. French "security", he stated, meant security for France's "satellites", since France was secured herself by the Locarno agreements; "*that* security", he wrote, "we cannot and will not give them". The German case for equality of armaments was, he thought, a very good one, on the grounds of both equity and morality. He then repeated his proposals of September 1931, i.e., that the British Government should, among other things, declare it would not consider Treaty Revision except within the framework of the League. However, he also supported British membership in a continental protocol if one proved unavoidable, but only as "country members" on "a reduced subscription". "For us", he wrote, loftily, "European politics are mostly other people's feuds and grievances". However, he also thought: ". . . It may be that the largest problem of our future will be to combine or reconcile a policy of Empire with a policy of Europe". Finally, he thought that if Britain did not take *some risk* now, she would have to accept a larger one in the future, for she had allowed her strength to deteriorate while basing her hopes on the strength of the League. If the Disarmament Conference broke down, he thought that Britain would have to opt for one of three courses, all of them repugnant to her: rearmament, acceptance of French hegemony in Europe, or, "A return to the old and vicious balance of power". In sum, he advised a policy of coercing France into treaty revision, by threatening her with isolation in a possible show-down with Germany at the Disarmament Conference.[136]

[135] Sargent note of 9 December 1931, *ibid.*, pp. 148 ff; Simon note, p. 151.

[136] "The United Kingdom and Europe" cited in note 132 above. Vansittart wrote: (par. 28) "If, then, it comes to a show-down between the two conflicting theses, neither international policy, nor Imperial policy, nor domestic policy will permit any British Government to side with the French against the Germans".

Vansittart's memorandum, penned on the eve of the opening of the Disarmament Conference, is very instructive from the point of view of the context in which he and like-minded members of the Foreign Office, such as Orme Sargent and Ashton Gwatkin, viewed the Polish-German frontier question. This question was set in the broad framework of a debate on British policy towards Germany at a time when Britain was, in fact, too weak to hold Germany down even if she wanted to, and was therefore, desperately seeking a broad settlement with a Disarmament Convention at its core. British military weakness was admitted quite frankly by Field Marshal Sir George Milne, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in a memorandum of 28 October 1932, entitled "A Military Appreciation of the Present World Situation". He stated here that the British army could not make any contribution to the implementation of the Locarno guarantees to France. However, while making this admission, and also admitting that Germany wanted "equality of rights" in order to demand Danzig, the Corridor, Upper Silesia, and then colonies, and while admitting that with such "equality", Germany would, given her industrial potential and manpower, in five years, have a "flying start" over the Powers, he did not counsel British support of France. On the contrary, he thought that Britain would have a greatly increased influence if she refused to join "either group" in what he regarded as an essentially Franco-German quarrel. How Britain was to exert such influence without rearming, he did not say. He only stated that "we must reconsider the position of the armed forces of the Crown if we desire to pull our full weight in the maintenance of peace on the Continent". However, it is clear from Milne's suggestions that his concern with imperial defence dictated a policy of neutrality in Europe. It is significant, moreover, that for Milne, Russia was still "our one declared enemy", since she would not hesitate to strike at Afghanistan and thus produce "a most dangerous situation in India". For this reason, he thought that Japanese rather than Soviet control of Manchuria would be less inimical to British interests, and thus concluded that a friendly Japan was the best antidote to a hostile Russia. Finally, he thought that since Germany could not be kept down indefinitely, Britain's best policy for future strength would be a policy of neutrality in Europe, complemented by co-operation with Japan in the Far East.[137]. No wonder General Weygand predicted historians would in the future say that the leaders of the various nations were blinded to facts and realities by a thick veil of idealism.[138] He might have added that they were also blinded by a misconception of their true interests. Indeed, there was no lack of warnings. In October 1932, the Cabinet studied a selection of excerpts from reports on Germany's aims to revise her eastern frontier. This document concluded with a warning from the French Prime Minis-

[137] "A Military Appreciation of the Present World Situation", 28 October 1932, C.P. 363(32), signed: "G.F.M., C.I.G.S.", Cab. 24/251, pp. 160-65 (1-12).

[138] Col. T. G. G. Heywood, British Military Attaché, Paris, report on conversations, Paris 8 November 1932, F.O. 371/15948, C9612/300/18, p.229.

ter Edouard Herriot and Alexis Léger, the Secretary-General of the Quai D'Orsay, that the situation in Europe was more dangerous than at any time since 1919. They predicted that Germany's next move would be a violation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland; "after that it would be the Polish Corridor, then Silesia, and finally the Colonial question". A note in parenthesis stated that the German Ambassador in Paris, von Hoesch, had told them as much "quite openly, and in terms which could only be described as studiedly offensive".[139])

Despite these warnings, and despite the Cabinet's reluctance to consider further commitments, the Foreign Office continued to meditate on the possibility of trading a revision of the Polish-German frontier in Danzig and the Corridor, for German concessions in a Disarmament Convention. As will be indicated later, this attitude was also shared by the French Foreign Ministry, at least to the extent of making soundings of German reaction to it through third parties. In a memorandum on the question of revising the Danzig and the Corridor settlement dated 1 February 1933, Robin Hankey, the son of Sir Maurice P. A. Hankey, and then a junior member of the diplomatic service, considered the proposals which had been made in the past and those made at the time. He rejected the possibility of returning the whole of the Corridor to Germany, or of making it a separate territory, together with Danzig, under League protection — as Gravina had privately suggested. He acknowledged that the Corridor was now 92 per cent. Polish. His proposed solution was as follows: Danzig was to return to Germany as the result of a plebiscite. He thought this would be just, since the Poles now had their own port at Gdynia. Danzig, however, even after its reunion with Germany was to have an equal share with Gdynia of Poland's overseas trade. As far as the Corridor was concerned, he saw the problem mainly as one of improving German transport facilities. He therefore suggested that the Berlin-Koenigsberg railway be returned to German ownership and that Germany should also be allowed to build a highway alongside of it; the railway would bypass Tczew (Dirschau), in a loop, since the town was now predominantly Polish. The Vistula, where it formed the frontier between East Prussia and the Corridor, would be made into a public thoroughfare and internationalized. Poland would have access to Gdynia by underground or surface bridges over the German highway and railway. Danzig would be neutralized to give Poland security. In conclusion, Hankey stated significantly, that British and American opinion had so far sympathized with Germany on the Corridor question and that, if Germany violated the existing Corridor, "few nations would be ready to re-establish a system which their public opinion thought unfair". Further he wrote:

> It is not suggested that the solution outlined above could solve Germany's sentimental claim to sovereignty over the Corridor ter-

[139] "Germany and the Revision of Eastern Frontiers", 8 October 1932. Cab 21/383. The extracts were apparently prepared by Col. Hankey.

ritory; that problem is obviously insoluble, for both sides cannot possess the same territory. But it is suggested that the solution recommended would remove all or most of Germany's material grievances and that world opinion might then come to disapprove of purely sentimental claims on Germany's part, and thus make it easier for the Governments to ensure the maintenance of the *status quo*. In this way a degree of stability might be achieved which is impossible under the existing system.[140]

Allan W. A. Leeper, a First Secretary in the Foreign Office and a member of the Northern Department, saw the whole question strictly in the context of the Disarmament Conference. He commented that Danzig could return to Germany only in exchange for a satisfactory Disarmament Convention, especially with regard to air armaments. While he admitted that Germany had no ethnic claim to the Corridor, the matter could, he thought, be raised if there were satisfactory prospects for a Disarmament Convention. Apparently, he also believed that if there was a Polish-German conflict over Danzig, Britain should stand aside.[141] He thus envisaged with equanimity what Sir Austen Chamberlain had always opposed, that is, a solution of the problem by force.

It was at about the same time that the French indirectly sounded the German Government on some compromise solution of the Danzig-Corridor problem within the framework of a general settlement involving armaments, reparations, economic co-operation and mandates. These soundings took place in private and secret talks between some French, Belgian and Luxemburg industrialists and one journalist on the one hand, and German industrialists on the other. The French group consisted of René P. Duchemin, president of the Etablissements Kuhlmann, Wladimid D'Ormesson, foreign editor of *Le Temps*, and Jean Parmentier a member of the French delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference. On the Belgian and Luxemburg side the members were the industrialists Barbanson, Guth, and Alois Meyer; the latter was a member of the League of Nations' Economic Consultative Committee. The German side was represented by Dr Hermann Bücher, president of the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft and by a certain Dr Bosch. The French, Belgian and Luxemburg representatives proposed and the Germans agreed, to consider the return of part of the Polish Corridor to Germany, down to a line somewhat to the south of the Berlin-Koenigsberg railway. Danzig was to return to Germany. There were to be rectifi-

[140] Memorandum regarding Danzig and the Polish Corridor, R. M. Hankey, 1 February 1933, F.O. 417/33 pt. XXVII, (C934/316/18). Conclusion on pp. 11-12.

[141] This belief can be deduced from Leper's comments on the possibility of a Dominion national becoming the new High Commissioner in Danzig (Gravina died in September 1932). Leper thought the British should first ascertain whether the Disarmament Conference succeeded, in which case the appointment would be a very short one; or whether it failed "in which case it might be highly undesirable to get a British subject entangled in the hostilities", A. W. A. Leeper, note dated February 1933, F.O. 371/17227, N704/82/55, p. 40.

cations of the Upper Silesian frontier in order to facilitate the operation of industrial enterprises, but without a substantial diminution of Polish territory. It should be noted that both Danzig and Gdynia were to pass under German sovereignty; Poland was to have free zones in both ports and guaranteed access to them. Germany was also to grant Poland an indemnity for Gdynia as well as build a new port for Poland — the location was not given — and assure the construction of a railway line to it. This probably involved Lithuanian territory, since Memel was also mentioned as a possible outlet to the sea under Polish sovereignty. Finally, Germany would sign commercial agreements with Poland to restore her economy and would, together with France, guarantee the new Polish-German frontier and the other frontiers of Poland. Such a solution was seen as "one of the essential conditions for the establishment of a European community, of which Poland would protect the eastern frontier". Proposals on armaments, reparations, etc. followed. These proposals were enclosed in a letter from Duchemin to Bücher, dated Paris, 30 January 1933.[142] It is not unlikely that they were made with the knowledge of the French Foreign Ministry. Three weeks later, Jules Laroche, the French Ambassador to Poland, approached Hans Adolf von Moltke, the German Minister in Poland, with a somewhat similar proposal. The Corridor was to be "eliminated", but unlike the „industrialists' " proposal, Poland was to retain Gdynia; also the portion of the Corridor returned to Germany was to be as narrow as possible; Poland was to obtain some unspecified compensation.[143]

These proposals, however, fell through because of German intransigence. Foreign Minister Constantin Freiherr von Neurath rejected the idea of a partial solution. Germany, he wrote to Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, demanded the return of the whole of the Corridor, including the Netze valley in the south. In Upper Silesia, she would demand the return of most of the industrial establishments then in Polish hands. He would not endorse any Polish port in the Memel area, since that would drive Lithuania into the arms of Poland. Finally, Germany would never guarantee all of Poland's frontiers.[144] State Secretary, Bernard W. von Bülow, informed the German Ambassador in Paris, Roland Köster, that the time was not ripe for such negotiations. Moreover, he thought public opinion abroad would have to be "enlightened" so as to see the Corridor problem not as a transport problem but a "demographic" (i.e., ethnic, A.C.) one. He thought the time to raise the whole question would come when German economic prosperity was restored and when Germany could absorb Polish exports, using this economic lever in negotiations. Until Germany's finances and economy were re-

[142] M. René Duchemin to Dr. Hermann Bücher, Paris 30 January 1933, *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (DGFP), ser. C. v. I., no. 2, pp. 2-5.

[143] The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry, 22 February 1933, *ibid.*, no. 34.

[144] Foreign Minister Neurath to Vice Chancellor Papen, 9 February 1933, *ibid.*, no. 19.

stored, and until her rearmament was accomplished, she could not, wrote Bülow, risk the political repercussions of such negotiations.[145])

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if German statesmen had been willing to settle for a "partial solution" in Danzig, the Corridor and Upper Silesia, as part payment for a Disarmament Convention satisfactory to France and Britain, then agreement by the two Powers was eminently possible in the first months of 1933. The occasion for just such a solution seemed to present itself when Mussolini proposed a Four Power Pact in March of that year. He suggested that the Powers agree upon a limitation of armaments and revision of frontiers. The frontiers envisaged by Mussolini for revision were not of course in the South Tyrol or on the Austro-German frontier; he meant to safeguard both by facilitating German claims to the revision of the Polish-German frontier. The key to this objective was to bypass the League of Nations and leave the Powers to settle the matter.

Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald and Foreign Secretary John Simon favoured the proposal. As Ramsey MacDonald put it in the House of Commons on 23 March 1933, Mussolini's proposed pact had "as its general purpose, peace, and as its big and almost only detail *(sic)* the revision of the treaties".[146]) Orme Sargent doubted that the Powers could reach agreement among themselves in order to undertake revision. However, he did not reject revision itself. He thought that if the Powers supported the British Draft Disarmament Convention, revision might be possible. Nevertheless, the Four Powers should not carry it out by agreement among themselves; this should be done through negotiations conducted by disinterested powers which should hear both parties. Assuming agreement on the Disarmament question, he did not exclude the possibility of Great Power pressure for such a settlement.[147]) It is clear that Orme Sargent assumed this settlement would go in Germany's favour. In a note written three days before the comments cited above, he agreed with Sir William Malkin, the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, that once the Great Powers had agreed on revision, the negotiations could take place in the League Assembly and "as it were, with the blessing of the Assembly". If this procedure were applied to the Polish Corridor, this would, Sargent thought, be "a great step forward in the direction of 'justice to Germany' ... and we ought to exploit it to the full with the German Government".[148])

These possibilities, however, did not mature because Hitler was not interested in pursuing them; he was just as unwilling to sign an agreement limiting German armaments as his predecessors had been. More-

[145] State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Köster, 10 February 1933, *ibid*,. no. 19

[146] 23 March 1933, *House of Commons Debates*, 5th ser., v. 267, col. 517.

[147] Memorandum by Mr. Sargent, "Some Reflections on Mussolini's Proposed Agreement for Co-operation between the Four Great Powers", 23 March 1933, *DBFP* 2nd ser. v. V., no. 49.

[148] Sargent note, 21 March 1933, F.O. 371/16683, C2680/2607/18, pp. 99-100.

over, he came to the conclusion that if he could detach Poland from France, this would strengthen his hand. It is interesting to note that he had given some thought to this alternative as early as 1931-32. At that time, Count Gravina had privately encouraged the Poles to get in touch with Hitler who, he said, was willing to give Poland part of the Ukraine *(sic)* and who considered Danzig and the Corridor as a secondary problem.[149]) Hitler probably made up his mind on this course in the spring of 1933. On March 6, of that year, on the day following the German elections which gave the Nazis a majority in the Reichstag, Piłsudski ordered a strengthening of the Polish garrison at the Polish munition depot in Danzig, Westerplatte. This was a move designed to show both Hitler and the Western Powers that Piłsudski would not tolerate any cession of Danzig to Germany.[150]) Shortly thereafter, newspapers headlined a "Preventive War" scare, that is, a Franco-Polish agreement to wage a preventive war on Germany. There is no evidence that such an agreement existed; it is more likely that Pilsudski exploited the rumour in order to make Hitler amenable to an improvement of relations with Poland.[151]) If this was so, the desired effect was achieved. On 3 May, 1933, the world was startled by a Polish-German *communiqué* stating that the Polish and German Governments would abide by the existing treaties.[152]) In Danzig, the Nazi leaders gave the High Commissioner, Hjalmar Rosting, a pre-election pledge to respect Polish rights and interests.[153]) They kept their word after the elections, and a whole series

[149] Henryk Strasburger's report to the Commission of Inquiry into the Polish Defeat of 1939, report no. 265, General Sikorski Historical Institute, London. An undated Polish note, written in 1931 or 1932, marked "Top Secret" and with an illegible signature, stated that the author of the note had had a conversation with Gravina on 15 June. Gravina then asked whether it would not be possible for Poland to initiate private conversations with Hitler's party, and preferably Hitler himself, with the aim of reaching an understanding. Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe, (WAP) Gdańsk, Archives of the Polish Commissariat General. I 259/915. Since Gravina also noted Hitler's party was growing and would soon come to power, and since he died in September 1932, the note could have been written either in June 1931, in which case the author could have been Strasburger, or in June 1932, in which case it could have been Kazimierz Papée.

[150] Reporting the views of foreign diplomats in Warsaw, Moltke wrote: "I am rather inclined to believe ... that the desire to give the advocates of the revisionist idea in Europe a warning sign was in the forefront as an intended secondary effect". The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry, 11 March 1933, *DGFP* ser. C, v. I., no. 74.

[151] For a discussion of this problem, see Anna M. Cienciala, "The Significance of the Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, in Polish-German and International Relations: A Reappraisal", *East European Quarterly*, v. I., nr. 1, pp. 1-30, sp. pp. 16-17; also Wacław Jędrzejewicz, "The Polish Plan for a 'Preventive War' against Germany in 1933", *Polish Review*, 1966, v. XI, no. 1, pp. 62-91.

[152] The communiqué was agreed upon after a conversation between Hitler and the Polish Minister in Berlin, Alfred Wysocki, on 2 May 1933, see *DGFP* ser. C., v. I., no. 201, Enclosure.

[153] *League of Nations Journal*, June 1933, p. 702. The leaders in question were Albert Forster, Gauleiter of the Nazi Party in Danzig, and Dr. Hermann Rauschning, who was the candidate for the post of President of the Danzig Senate.

of agreements was signed in September, including the most important one establishing Danzig-Gdynia parity in Polish overseas trade, and recognizing Polish minority rights.[154]) On 15 November, world opinion was again surprised by another Polish-German *communiqué* that the two Governments would deal with all disputes in direct negotiations and that both renounced the use of force.[155]) Finally, on 26 January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a Declaration of Non-Aggression.[156]) Hitler thus showed the world that a German Government could normalize its relations with Poland without a prior revision of the Polish-German frontier. He had also rejected negotiations with the Western Powers on this matter and on Disarmament; he withdrew the German Delegations from both the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations in the fall of 1933. It should be noted that Piłsudski made no deal, then, or later, with Hitler over the Ukraine.[157]) Poland remained an ally of France but the situation for her had changed for the better. According to an anecdote, the Marshal then said that Poland had moved on the German menu from the place of hors d'oeuvre to that of dessert.

In the meanwhile, independently of these developments, the attitude of many people in Britain began to change. This was largely due to revulsion against the terror Hitler had loosed in Germany. In April 1933, both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill spoke out in Parliament against the return of the Corridor to Germany. Sir Austen Chamberlain declared:

> What is this new spirit of German nationalism? The worst of the all-Prussian imperialism, with an added savagery, a racial pride, an exclusiveness which cannot allow to any fellow-subject not of "pure Nordic birth" equality of rights and citizenship within the nation to which he belongs. Are you going to discuss with such a Government the Polish Corridor? The Polish Corridor is inhabited by Poles: do you dare to put another Pole under the heel of such a Government?

Winston Churchill stated:

> I know that it is not always a fashionable opinion, but the facts

[154] *Ibid.*, October 1933, pp. 1156-60, November 1933, pp. 1330-33, 1541-45.
[155] *DGFP* ser. C., v. II., no. 69, note 2.
[156] *Ibid.*, no. 219.
[157] A report by Hermann Rauschning for the German Foreign Ministry, dated 14 December 1933, on his conversation with Marshal Piłsudski on 11 December, states Piłsudski had declared, on his own initiative, that Poland would never take up any German attempts to direct Polish interests to Russian Ukraine. It was true, he said, that Poland looked on her thinly populated eastern territories as an area of colonization. But that task lay in the far-off future and could not be considered now in any way, Rauschning to Foreign Ministry, 14 December 1933, AAA, Bonn, microfilm 6601H/E495072-77. The German text of this statement is cited in Anna M. Cienciala, "Problem niemiecki w świetle polityki mocarstw zachodnich wobec Wolnego Miasta Gdańska" (The German Problem in the Light of the Policy of the Western Powers toward the Free City of Danzig in the Years 1919-1939), *Studia Historica Slavo-Germanica*, v. I., Poznań, 1973, p. 88, n. 69; and in Anna M. Cienciala, "Marxism and History", *East European Quarterly*, v. VI. no. 1, 1972, p. 104, no. 23.

> repudiate the idea that a Carthaginian peace was in fact imposed on Germany. No division was made of great masses of the German people. No portion of Germany inhabited by Germans was detached, except where there was the difficulty of disentangling the population of the Silesian border... She underwent no serious territorial loss except the loss of Alsace and Lorraine... Many people would like to see, or would have liked to see a little while ago — I find that I was one of them — the question of the Polish Corridor adjusted... There again, however, the Hon. Members must think of the rights of Poland. The Polish Corridor is inhabited almost entirely by Poles, and it was Polish territory before the Partition Treaty of 1772... [158]

In the Foreign Office itself, Vansittart now changed from a supporter of treaty revision into the most vocal opponent of concessions to Germany. In August 1933, he warned that Hitler had chosen Austria as the first breakthrough, because it was the weakest point of the Peace Settlement. After Austria, he wrote, Poland would be next. If Italy was out of the picture, i.e., not allied with France and Britain, Germany could fight another war, this time on one front only. Czechoslovakia, he noted, could not by herself provide a second one. He defended Polish possession of the Corridor because it had been ethnically Polish for 2,000 years *(sic)*. Unless, he wrote, Germany underwent "a change of heart", she would, within a decade, be strong enough to attack Britain and France, or France alone if British opinion allowed it. He thought that Britain and France were already weaker than Germany. He therefore advocated a strong stand on Austria and an economic policy of "keeping Germany lean".[159])

However, no such policy was adopted and the British Government continued to hope for a general European settlement which would include an agreement on armaments and frontier revision in the East. A discussion of British policy in these later years, is, however, beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say here that the improvement of Polish-German relations in 1933-34, combined with a growing revulsion of British opinion against Hitler, marked the end of a period when at least a partial revision of the Polish-German frontier seemed acceptable to government and public opinion in both Britain and France.

What conclusions can be drawn from this case study of the effects of one's country's propaganda on the public opinion and policy-making elite of another? They may be stated as follows. In the first place, any effective propaganda must build on existing predispositions. Secondly, it is most likely to bear fruit at a time of severe crisis when the solutions it offers appear credible to broad strata of opinion. Thirdly, these solutions must fit into the policy framework of the country which is the target of

[158] 13 April 1933, *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, v. 276, cols. 2759, 2790-91.

[159] Vansittart, "Memorandum on the Present and Future Position of Europe", 28 August 1933, *DBFP*, 2nd ser., v. V. no 371, pp. 547-59.

propaganda. Fourthly, the country organizing the propaganda must be capable of accepting a compromise between its maximum and minimum objectives. These conclusions are illustrated by a study of the effects of German Danzig-Corridor propaganda on British public opinion and the policy-making élite in the period 1925-1933.

Such a study clearly shows that both British opinion and the policy-making élite were conditioned in the nineteen-twenties to accept German propaganda claims to Danzig and the Corridor. This conditioning bore fruit in the years of crisis, 1930-33, in the form of widespread support for German claims. However, this support was by no means the result of German propaganda alone. There was a strong predisposition in Britain to accept German claims. This predisposition stemmed in the first place from a distrust of France and from its correlative sympathy for Germany. Secondly, support stemmed, particularly as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, from the traditional British policy of avoiding continental commitments in general, and commitments East of Rhine in particular. Thus, German grievances against Poland reinforced and justified the policy of refusing any specific or general guarantees of the Polish-German frontier. Thirdly, support stemmed from the widespread belief, shared by both public opinion and the policy-making élite, that no lasting peace would be possible without a reconciliation with Germany, and this in turn was broadly accepted to mean a substantial revision of the Treaty of Versailles and its replacement by a general European settlement.

While these factors predisposed opinion and policy-makers to accept German claims, they were not in themselves sufficient to create strong pressure on the Government to take up frontier revision as a policy objective. For this pressure to arise there had to be a general and widespread opinion that some action must be taken. This opinion came into being in the crisis years of 1930-33; it was the result of widespread anxiety over the economic and politcal turmoil in Germany and its possible explosion into war. The fact, of course, that people believed in the possibility of war over the Polish-German frontier, was in itself the result of long years of conditioning brought to a head by the loud demands for revision emanating from almost all German political parties in the early thirties. It was in those years that the British policy-making élite passed from mere contemplation of revision as something inevitable in the future, to suggesting that it be implemented soon, by force if necessary, but preferably through the League of Nations. The revision of the Polish-German frontier in the Danzig-Corridor region was then seen either as the precondition to a general settlement, or as part of a bargain to obtain it, particularly with regard to a Disarmament Convention acceptable to Great Britain.

However, two factors militated against an active British policy in support of revising the Polish-German frontier. In the first place, both British opinion and policy-makers were opposed to undertaking the further commitments that would be necessary to achieve a revision of the

frontier. Such revision would, in effect, necessitate some guarantee of the settlement, either directly by the British Government or indirectly through the League of Nations. Secondly, French agreement was mandatory and this was impossible without the security guarantees on which the French Government insisted. At the time of the Disarmament Conference these guarantees consisted of an agreement by Germany to limited armaments, a five year "trial period" to prove German good faith, and a political moratorium for about ten years. The last governments of Weimar Germany were unwilling to accede to these demands; they also refused to consider a partial revision of the Polish-German frontier. It is very likely that if they had adopted a more conciliatory attitude on all these points, Poland would have been confronted with a united Franco-British-German bloc and tremendous pressure to make concessions to Germany. In any case, British and French opinion and policy-makers were ready to agree to the return of Danzig and at least part of the Corridor to Germany. It is also possible that British opposition to further commitments in Europe, particularly East of the Rhine, might have been overcome if these commitments were to be shared with other Powers within the League of Nations. One can only speculate on what might have happened in such a situation. However, given the good relations existing between Weimar Germany and the USSR, it is not unlikely that Poland might have found herself in the same situation as in 1939. But this was not to be. The intransigence of the last governments of Weimar and then Hitler's decision to sign a Declaration of Non-Aggression with Poland, removed the Danzig-Corridor question from the agenda of international politics. It did not reappear as Europe's number one problem until Hitler decided to take it up in the spring of 1939, and then launched his attack on Poland in September — an attack which led to the outbreak of the Second World War.

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MISCELLANEA

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THE STATE OF HEALTH OF POLES EVACUATED FROM RUSSIA TO PERSIA IN 1942

(The historical aspects of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran during the evacuation of Poles from Russia between 28.3.1942 and 1.1.1,43)*

INTRODUCTION

The history of the mass evacuation of Poles in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, India and N.E. Africa) is today definitely a closed book. Nonetheless those pages relating to events concerning the civilian population are worthy of scrutiny.

True, there are a few large and valuable works (and a number of minor papers) devoted to the question of the formation and activities of Polish military units and institutions in the Middle East (e.g. "The history of the Polish military postal system in the East"—Beirut file, Section "A", pp. 113-152); nevertheless we have almost no monographs or wider works on the subject of those institutions and questions which touch on the life of Polish civilians at that time. Only Lebanon (which had a large population of Polish evacuees during and after the war) possesses a few more general works on these subjects such as Rev. Fr. Kamil Kantak's, "The History of the Polish refugees in Lebonon 1943-1950" (Beirut 1955); or Prof. Stanisław Kościałkowski's, "The relation of the Poles to Syria and Lebanon within the context of History" (Beirut 1949)—though this last deals mainly with past associations, with only a few mentions of the Poles in Lebanon in recent times.

Even topical periodicals such as "Polak w Iranie" ("The Pole in Iran") 1942-44, "Kurier Polski w Bagdadzie" ("The Polish Courier in Baghdad") 1942-43 and many others, containing much useful material are extremely difficult to locate; at one time all these periodicals were kept in the library of the Polish Institute in Beirut (wound up in 1950), later deposited by the Polish Delegation in the Library of the Catholic

**Translator's Note:* Insofar as this is a documentary and factual record of certain events during World War II, I have attempted to reproduce the original as exactly as possible. Where the flavour of certain idioms (such as the formal opening and close of letters) cannot be rendered in translation without being clumsy and/or meaningless, I have used what I felt to be the nearest English equivalent, with the author's permission and approval.

M. J. Kruszyński, B.Sc., Grad. Cert. Ed.

University of St. Joseph in Beirut. This is of course apart from the many manuscripts on this question, many of which are now destroyed or untraceable.

It is a happy coincidence which dictated that Dr. Michał Kruszyński, the author of this study, found himself in the fortunate position of pos sessing and being able to use the basic documentary source material relating to the founding of the Polish General Hospital in Tehran, and its work from its inception in March 1942 to January 1943.

The main material source, is of course, "The Report of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran" 28.3.42-1.1.43, together with addenda, produced by the real creator and first Chief of Staff of the hospital, Dr. Zygmunt Grębecki.

This is a fairly short report, barely covering nine months of 1942 which in themselves do not present the overall picture of the work of this valuable institution which continued to exist later in different circumstances and environments. However, these early days were perhaps the most important in its history, showing as they do they basic character and work of the hospital.

Unfortunately, for all the assiduous searches of the author, materials relating to the further activities of the hospital, up to its eventual winding-up have never been found, nor is there any clue as to the whereabouts of these valuable source manuscripts.

Thus it was that Dr. Kruszyński was faced with a dilemma: should he leave his work until such time as the lost materials are found—in other words probably "sine die"; or should he use the available materials, thereby producing an interesting and informative portrayal of the early days of the hospital.

In the event the author decided on the second course of action, taking the view that such source material as he already possessed should not be treated lightly. In this view he was supported and encouraged by Dr. Z. Grębecki, whose rôle in the organization and maintenance of this important institution was of such great importance, and who had managed to keep what relevant materials were available.

The fruit of this decision was this conscientious and searching work, so well illustrated by the general title, "The state of health of Poles evacuated from Russia to Persia in 1942."

The author is particularly well-suited to the writing of such a work by his historical studies at Warsaw University before the war, and also his post-war work at the Polish University Abroad (PUNO) in London.

Against the background of a general lack of serious works relating to the Polish civilian refugees in the Middle East, I feel that Dr. M. Kruszyński's work is not only one of great academic merit, but also deserves a wider readership, both among laymen, and more particularly in the sphere of medicine.

Although the book only covers a limited time-span in the life of the hospital, it is worthy of note that within that time over thirteen thousand persons passed through it, suffering from a multiplicity of

diseases, in particular those related to general exhaustion, malnutrition, and often a total lack of resistance.

The graphs and moving photographs add visually to the considerable impact and implications of the text, and are in themselves serious historical documents.

In reading this book, written in a humble and particularly jargon-free manner, one is constantly made aware of what a little organizational good-will coupled with expertise may achieve, when combined with a strong will and a devotion to the good of the individual and the community at large. . . . At times one can see these qualities achieve veritable miracles, overcoming all those obstacles which the incompetence or envy of the petty and small-minded can devise, and even overcoming the dry formalism of bureaucracy.

Fortunately, the social instinct and devotion of courageous individuals can always be relied upon, so that like-minded individuals will always find sympathy and co-operation.

Even in situations where all physical and material resources are exhausted, where that which could not be foreseen becomes an immediate problem and must yet be improvised within the confines of a hostile environment, one finds occasionally totally unexpected institutions of incalculable social value, whose creativity (often a real life-line) must not be forgotten.

The reader will find many heartening proofs of such phenomena, and of the courage and creativity of his fellow-men within these pages devoted to a study of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran, as written by Dr. Kruszyński.

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AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE POLISH GENERAL CIVILIAN HOSPITAL IN TEHRAN

The state of health of Poles arriving in Persia from the U.S.S.R in 1942, is reflected in the history of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran (henceforth called simply the P.G.C.H.). In describing it I must at least in general terms explain what led to the establishment of that institution. This leads me back to 1939. Naturally, I am not going to describe the invasion of Poland, as this is outside the sphere of my work; nevertheless the main reason for the presence of so many Poles in Persia was of course Poland's catastrophe in 1939.

Following Russia's treacherous attack came the occupation, and the mass deportation which took two million Poles into the depths of Russia. I do not intend to describe the miserable poverty of these exiles, as it is

already well known. According to some arbitrary Russian plan, the Poles were split into three groups: one went to prison, the second was "resettled", and the third went to death-camps (supposedly "work-camps"), where masses of them died. In certain instances one's category was determined by "courts" (I use inverted commas advisedly, since these institution bear no relation to their Western counterparts)—usually the choice was made without recourse even to these "courts".

It seems to me miraculous that anyone ever returned from this bondage, which to any outsider is totally unimaginable—no one had ever returned before (nor has, I suspect, since).

Obviously Poland's non-aggression pact with Russia was not worth the paper it was written on, since there was absolutely no possibility of any negotiations with the invader, although equally obviously political contact was vital.

What led directly to Russian-Polish political contact was the war between Russia and Germany which broke out on the 22nd of June 1941,[1] and also "the enormous German successes and routing of the Soviet armies which necessitated the help of the Allies".[2] This led to the Soviet-Polish treaty.

The first contacts were established with the help of Great Britain.[3] The finalised treaty was signed on the 30th of June, 1941.[4] Immediately following this, the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. was formed,[5] as a result of a military treaty signed on the 14th of August, 1941,[6] and also as a result of high-level talks between General W. Anders and the Soviet government on the 16th, 19th, 22nd, 26th, and 29th of August, 1941.[7]

The next element which led to the Poles finding themselves in Persia was its occupation by British and Soviet forces,[8] the abdication of Shah Rez Khan Pahlevi,[9] and the renewal of diplomatic relations with the new Persian government, which was at that time, according to Churchill "inclined in our favour".[10] There can be no doubt that much of this pro-

[1] "The Second World War", W. Churchill, vol. 3, p. 328, (Macmillan and Co. Ltd.).

[2] "Bez Ostatniego Rozdziału", Gen. W. Anders, — translated as "An Army in Exile", (Macmillan and Co. Ltd.) page no.'s refer to the original in Polish. pp. 62-64, the treaty; p. 71, background to the treaty; p. 72 first Military Mission; p. 75 military treaty. See also "The 2nd World War", vol. 3, p. 347.

[3] "The 2nd World War", vol. 3. p. 348... "When the news of the German attack on Russia broke upon the world, the re-establishment of Polish-Russia relations, which had been broken off in 1939, became important. The conversations between the two Governments began in London under British auspices on July 5. Prime Minister gen. Sikorski, the Polish Ambassador, M. Maisky..."

[4] ibid, p. 349, "on July 30 after bitter discussions agreement was reached between the Polish and Russian Governments", and "An Army in Exile, pp. 72-73.

[5] "An Army in Exile", p. 73

[6] ibid, p. 75.

[7] ibid, p. 76.

[8] ibid, p. 77 and "The 2nd World War" (Churchill), vol. 3, pp. 359, 423-428, 431-432.

[9] "The 2nd World War", vol. 3, p. 432.

[10] ibid.

Allied attitude on the part of the new government was the result of social pressure from the general population, which had lost faith in the previous Shah and his radical ideas, and was pleased when he abdicated. I must add that this Shah had been extremely pro-German, and anti-British, and anti-Russian,[11] so I feel that his abdication was an important element in allowing the Poles to at least temporarily enjoy Persian hospitality. Actually, the abdication was not unexpected, as a consequence of the British-Soviet occupation of Persia. It is unlikely that these two governments would have been able to co-operate with a Persian government in the hands of a potential enemy.

These elements, then: the outbreak of war in 1939, the Polish-Soviet treaty, the occupation of Persia, and the abdication of the Shah, created the conditions under which the Polish army and some civilians could be evacuated from Russia to Persia.

In my opinion, the evacuation of the troops and their families was made possible by only one man, Gen. W. Anders. This can be seen from the evidence he presents in his book, "An Army In Exile".[12]

Here (that is, in Persia), the question of a hospital became a priority. An army always has its hospitals, but what was to be done about medical care of the civilians attached in many ways to the army (civilians whose evacuation had been allowed with theg reatest circumspection on the part of the Polish Government in London [13] in response to Gen. Anders absolute insistence on this point) and who needed medical attention above all else?

On Gen. Anders' orders "a unit of officers under Gen. Szarecki as Chief M.O. and Col. Okulicki as their leader travelled from the U.S.S.R. to Persia to organise and admit our people".[14] As can be seen, the result of these actons was the establishment of camps in Persia.

Meanwhile, another unit of officers travelled up from Egypt, from the Carpathian Brigade with the aim of making up their numbers with troops leaving the U.S.S.R. In this unit was Dr. Z. Grębecki [15], future Chief M.O. of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran.

No-one was expecting the civilians. Our own government [16] was

[11] "Iran and World Politics",— Prof. Dr. W. Sukiennicki, Iranian Studies, vol. p. 162.

[12] "An Army in Exile",—Stalin's agreement to the evacuation, pp. 105, 113, 131, 137. First wave of evacuation, pp. 145-146. Civilians involved, p. 148. Justification for the evacuation, p. 166.

[13] ibid, pp. 147-148.

[14] ibid, p. 147.

[15] Full name of the Carpathian Brigade: Independent Brigade of Carpathian Rifle. The Polish Army Middle East Command was established during the siege of the Carpathian Brigade in Tobruk, D. 45, p. 8. In Feb. 1942. on the orders of the Chief of Medical Staff for the Polish Army in the Middle East, Dr. Z. Grębecki was transfered from the Carpathian Brigade Hospital (Alexandria) to the Polish Army Evacuation Base, in Tehran. D. 45 p. 9.

[16] Telegram from Prof. Kot, Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., to Gen. Anders, on 26th March 42: "The news of the evacuation of civilians as well as miltiary personnel has already spread, and will cause a large influx of civilians ... Please issue orders that the evacuation be conducted

astonished when they were faced with this problem. No-one, including the C.O. of the Evacuation base in Tehran, had foreseen the massive numbers of the sick which arrived even with the first transport of evacuees. Thus it was that no-one had even thought of the need to establish a hospital for the civilians.

Among the facilities which the Poles received from the Persian authorities in order to help the evacuees arriving on the morning of the 28th March, 1942, were the buildings of a former Air Force training centre—later to be known as Civilian Camp No. 1. One of the buildings was a five-roomed bungalow with a large hall, which was turned into a hospital. Dr. Z. Grębecki was designated to be the first Commandant of the camp, and the help of a Polish Red Cross sister (later the Nurse-in-charge), Halina Wyderka. The Commandant together with his "personnel" found their first task was to clean up the so-called "hospital", which had been left in a very squalid state by a Hindu unit of soldiers who had been the previous tenants. Meanwhile, that same morning the first transport arrived. Two buses stopped outside the hospital buildings, and out of them shuffled a group of bedraggled skeletons dressed in what had been white nightshirts, now stained with blood and dirt, and black capes. With difficulty it could be seen that these were very sick children. The clothes had been donated by an American charity via the Red Cross, and these were the only garments which could be used for the children.

Some of the children emerged from the buses by themselves, but most had to be carried out of the buses, and all were covered with excrement, having lost the will and ability to keep clean. Their ages ranged from four to fourteen.

Obviously the drivers had not made many stops on their journey, though these would be meaningless, since all the children had acute diarrhoea, and many were too weak to move. In all probability the illness was caused by gulping down their food rations unchewed when they first received them. This would have been more than enough for individuals so close to starvation. There were 60 in this transport [17].

The children spent their first night huddled together on the floor in one room of the improvised hospital, with no covers and nightwear—none were available, and indeed there were no dressings or medicines

as discreetly as possible, in order to stop this news from spreading. Kot". Telegram from Gen. Klimecki (acting as Chief of Army Staff in the absence of Gen. Sikorski, then in Americа), to Gen. Anders, on 27th March 42: "The British authorities are alarmed at the news that the military evacuation transports have been joined by their families, who are not included in the evacuation plans ... further evacution of families to be *stopped regardless of circumstances* until and unless permission is received from the British authorities". "An Army in Exile", p. 148. The same day, two further telegrams arrived for Gen. Anders, one from Prof. Kot, and one from Gen. Klimecki, categorically forbidding further civilian evacuation. Ref. as above.

[17] D.'s 3, p. 1; 38, p. 1; also informatino from the former Chief M.O. of the P.G.C.Hosp.

either. The sick ate in the kitchens which were supplied in part by the army, and in part by the local population.

The following day (29th March) 30-40 more adult patients arrived suffering from *typhus exantematicus* [18]. These had to lie in the second room/ward, also on the bare floor. Meanwhile the medical personnel remained unchanged—two persons. There were still no medicines—such was the start of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran.

On March 30th a further 40 adult patients arrived suffering from typhus, all very seriously ill [19]. The ambulances bringing people from the port of Pahlevi [20] were so crowded that often patients literally lay on top of each other. Quite often a corpse could be found among the unconscious. Without more people, the situation was hopeless.

On March 30th the first two nurses volunteered to help: Bronisława Kondratka and Anna Macówna.

Representatives of the Polish and Iranian civil authorities began to come forward with help, which slowly provided food, clothing and medicines.

At last the medicines, which the 34th British Hospital had promised, arrived, together with ward equipment supplied by the British. Major Winter (an Australian) running the local quartermaster's stores saw to it personally that a greater quantity of blankets, mattresses, linen and utensils were supplied than had originally been released [21].

On the 31st March a new transport arrived — typhus again. These patients were put in the third and last ward in the building.

That day, on their own initiative, six volunteers arrived from the Polish Women's Army Service. They were split between the three wards. Their names were: Banszel, Olga, Chmielewska, Helena, Czapska, Władysława, Fornalewicz, Stanisława, Przystajko, Stanisława, Stec, Helena.

On the 1st of April the hospital received 150 tents left by a work-party at the entrance to the camp, and a few were filled with the sick that same day. Soon afterwards the hospital received 300 iron beds and mattresses borrowed from a British hospital. Major Winter also supplied 500 blankets, 40 bales of assorted woollen clothing (socks, sweaters, caps and scarves) and 10 cases of food [22].

Apart from the local Polish population, substantial help was given by the local Jewish Committee under Rabbi Bromberg, then a captain in the Polish Army.

Looking at the development of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran, from its beginnings one sees that far from being built to a previously prepared plan, it was very much an improvised institution. The hospital emerged as a result of the pressures on it. Hence the theme of the orders received from the Polish Legation in Tehran (21st April, 1942), was largely informational, since this order to establish the hospital

[18] Acc. to D. 3, p. 1, 40 sick; D. 38, 30 sick.
[19] D. 38, p. 1.
[20] D. 33, p. 1; D. 38; p. 1.
[21] D. 38, p. 2.
[22] D. 3, p. 1.

had been preceded by over a month by the hospital's existence [23]. The hospital was growing from day to day; from the orders quoted in the author's notes, I note that Dr. Z. Grębecki was made the Chief M.O. at the hospital, whilst the function of Commandant at Camp No. 1 was given to Cpt. Łappo.

In the early days of April a number of doctors volunteered their services to the hospital. Their work was terrifying—working with the most dangerous infections, with inadequate facilities and few medicines [24].

The volunteers were:

(A) Poles from Tehran: Dr. Wincenty Filipowicz, Dr. Marian Jankiewicz (2nd lieut.), Dr. Kazimierz Zapłatyński,

(B) Other local volunteers: Dr. Maria Khaczeturian (Russian), Rev. Dr. Włodzimierz Małyszew (Russian), Dr. Maria Lippman (Iranian citizen of German extraction), Dr. Fania Alesker-Zade (Iranian), Dr. Selma Khazin-Zade (Iranian, of Czech extraction), Surgeon's Assistant Anna Avidon (Russian), Sister Piori Lewin (Iranian, German extraction), Dr. Davis (English)—who also supplied many medicines from his own clinic.

(C) On 5/4/42 the Iranian Ministry of Public Health seconded the following to the Polish General Civilian Hospital:
Dr. Jafar Pezeshek (Iranian) as their representative, Dr. Servar Krymli (Tartar), Prof. Dr. Sulejman Khazimi (Turk).

(D) Volunteer doctors from the transport sthemselves, often still suffering the effects of severe illness:

Dr. Wiktor Huppert (immediately after a bout of typhus), Dr. Eliasz Perelman (2nd lieut.), Dr. Abram Goldberg (2nd lieut.), Dr. Maurycy Syrcta (Sgt.), Dr. Samuel Wieselberg (Pte.), Dr. Emilia Gutowska, Dentist (Pte.), Dr. Maria Dąbrowska, Dentist (Pte.), Zofia Dąbrowska, Dentist (Pte.), Jerzy Słomski (M.Pharm., Sgt. Cadet officer), Janina Michniewicz (M.Pharm., Pte.), Tatiana Bublejówna (M.Pharm., Pte.), Ludwika Lisocka (M.Pharm., Pte.), Zygmunt May (Grad.chem.eng., Pte.),

(E) These doctors flown in from Palestine on the orders of the C.O. of all Medical Services for the Polish Army in the Middle East:
Dr. Abraham Helfgot (2nd lieut.), Dr. Maksymilian Statter (2nd lieut.), Dr. Feliks Bronszten (2nd lieut.).

Apart from the above, every day brought in a few women volunteers [25] who were unruffled by the poor conditions, heedless of pay, food, or accommodation, and prepared to brave the violent epidemic of typhus in order to help their countrymen. I simply must mention here, the wonderful work done in the quarantine section, which dealt with delousing and disinfection, and where the volunteers were constantly exposed to real dangers.

After a hard day's work the nurses would find room to rest wherever they could—in the cellar, on the stairs, or in various corners. Only

[23] D. 2.
[24] D. 3, p. 2.
[25] D. 38, p. 3.

the convalescent word was barred, since the patients feared contamination from the nurses who had been dealing with the sick.

The energy and stamina of these women was truly unbelievable; particularly when it was obvious that some of them were themselves in need of intensive medical care. A small example of their devotion is shown by the fact that many of them used their first earnings to buy syringes and needles [26]—it is also a measure of the lack of basic facilities at the hospital. Naturally devotion is not everything. The hospital was forced to employ virtually all volunteers, even though many were totally untrained—and unfortunately not all were altruistically motivated. It is sad, but it must be said, that cases of corpse-robbing actually occurred [27].

At the most critical moment, when almost half the nursing staff was stricken by illness. Gen. Szarecki sent 27 volunteer nurses from the Polish Women's Army Service, and 10 auxiliaries from the 5th and 8th P.W.A.S. Divisions (20-22nd April 1942).

The British High Command in the persons of Brig. Crampton and Col. Dr. D. A. Drummond helped as far as possible in providing medicines and instruments [28].

The spiritual needs of the camp and hospital were looked after by the Military Chaplains: H.E. Bishop Józef Gawlina, Rev. Bronisław Chróstowski, Rev. Władysław Słapa, Rev. Henryk Miszkurka, for the Catholics, Rev. Dr. Włodzimierz Małyszew for the Russian Orthodox patients—for whom he was both chaplain and doctor, and Rabbi W. P. Bromberg for the Jewish patients.

The movement of the sick within the hospital was not uniform; one cannot give daily averages for admission and discharge, but the statistics show two definite waves corresponding to the two evacuations from the U.S.S.R.

In the first evacuation at the end of March and early April 1942 there were 40,000 persons [29], whose hospital admissions are as follows[30]:

Largest number sick on	27.4.1942	976
„ „	typhus on 28.4.1942	428
„ „	dysentery on 26.4.1942	25
„ „	T.B. on 1.5.1942	44
„ „	scarlet fever on 2.5.1942	58
„ „	typhoid on 2.5.1942	19
„ „	measles on 26.5.1942	149
„ „	mumps on 2.6.1942	66

Apart from this, there were cases of poliomyelitis, smallpox, infectious spinal meningitis, diphtheria and many others.

The most terribe disease, of course, was Asiatic cholera. On page 5 of D3 I found a mention of three cases, but I know this to be untrue since the true extent of the epidemic had to be hidden even in con-

[26] Acc. to D. 38, p. 3.
[27] D. 3, p. 3.
[28] D. 3, p. 2.
[29] "An Army in Exile", pp. 134-147.
[30] D. 3, p. 5.

fidential documents. However, in a supporting document among the recommendations for various military decorations sent to the 2nd Polish Corps Headquarters (C.O. Medical Services, Log. No. 169/tjn/46/san), dated 18.6.1946 (when this problem could be openly discussed), I found the following statement: . . . "during a furious epidemic of almost all the infectious diseases, such as: typhus, typhoid, maleria, scarlet fever, diphtheria, smallpox, dysentery, and even Asiatic cholera", — which confirms the cholera epidemic. This document is confirmed by the statements of the following:

Gen. Kopański, Inspector-General of the Polish Resettlement Corps, (29.9.1948.)

Col. dr. F. Bałaszeskul, former C.O. Medical Services of the Polish Army in the Middle East, (30.10.1948), confirming the fact that information was deliberately withheld from the civil authorities.

The former delegate of the Polish Government, and of the Ministry of Welfare in Tehran (11.12.1948), and others.

According to the former Chief M.O. of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran there were about 20 cases. I must add that diagnostic error is impossible, since the symptoms are very definitely characteristic of the disease. No-one who has been a cholera victim will ever forget the terrible sight of a corpse so dehydrated that the muscles are cramped, leaving the terrifying grin on the corpse's face.

The following is an extract from a citation relating to the Silver Cross of Merit for 2nd lieut. dr. Abraham Helfgot: "In 1942 he was the doctor in charge of the cholera ward at the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran (Iran), where he was closeted with the sick in total isolation, staying with them and helping, until the disease was brought totally under control. It is his resignation to the possibility of infection which in great measure stopped the spread of a dangerous epidemic".[31]

Only a very few people knew about the outbreak of the disease: the Chief M.O., the doctor in charge of the cholera ward, and Dr. Wasilewski, Chief of Medical Services for the Evacuation Base. This last named, on hearing the news, decided not to visit the hospital for a while.

Dr. Abraham Helfgot was placed in charge of the cholera ward—the circumstances of this are worth noting.

It is well-known that military orders must be obeyed, but in this instance the situation was presented rather differently. I have mentioned already that the professional medical personnel was under a great strain. Under these circumstances it was obviously impossible to increase this strain by isolating a doctor with the cholera patients.[32] The personnel lists contain the names and exact functions of the doctors at the Polish General Civilian Hospital. Around mid-April the Chief of Medical Services for the the Polish Army in the Middle East sent three doctors in to the P.G.C.H. in Tehran.[33] One of these is seen to have

[31] See "Author's Note", ref. B.
[32] D. 40, p. 5, list of doctors
[33] D. 3, p. 2.

been present in April only.[34] In fact this doctor only worked at the hospital for one night, after which he was removed as a result of his conduct whilst on duty—I mention this simply in order to preserve an exact historical record, since the actual incident was rather unimportant and personal, and the details are irrelevant. In any event, the doctor in question was transferred back to the Chief of Medical Services staff.

The second doctor, as a laryngologist, was placed in charge of the E.N.T. section.

The third was Dr. Helfgot, who was requested to take over the cholera ward. At first he refused, motivating his decision by his familial responsibilities. Obviously, the risk of infection was extremely high. However, when the Chief M.O. then told him to prepare to take over the responsibilities of running the Polish General Civilian Hospital instead, he briefly agreed, asking only for three hours in which to say his goodbyes to his family. There was no time to lose, but he was given a six-hour pass, then reported for duty. He survived, and ensured that none of the nurses were infected. He also managed to save five of the twenty patients,—unfortunately the rest were beyond help. His absolutely pedantic strictness in relation to hygiene and asepsis was probably instrumental in stopping the spread of the epidemic. It has to be added that his two "nurses" were totally unqualified, since they would otherwise have easily known what they were dealing with; although their ethics must have been extraordinarily high.

Absolutely no-one was allowed in the vicinity of the isolation ward, except the Chief M.O. who paid daily visits—more as a morale-booster than for any help which he could have provided.

Naturally all the other patients and personnel were immediately vaccinated against the disease, since although it was known that resistance to the disease is lowered for a short interval, there was no other way of dealing with the crisis.

The second evacuation, consisting of 70,000 persons [35] produced the following statistics: [36]

Highest number sick on 1.10.1942 - - - - - - - - -				1813
„	„	„	w/infectious illness on 30.9.1942 - -	723
„	„	„	transported from Pahlevi, 18.9.1943 -	77
„	„	„	from dysentery on 3.9.1942 - - -	189
„	„	„	„ T.B. (lungs) on 20.9.1942 - -	60
„	„	„	„ malaria on 29.9.1942 - - - -	414
„	„	„	„ typhoid on 17.10.1942 - - -	59
„	„	„	„ scarlet fever on 24.9.1942 - -	97
„	„	„	„ whooping cough on 26.9.1942 -	48
„	„	„	„ venereal disease on 20.12.1942 -	12
„	„	„	„ *erysipelas* on 21.12.1942 - - -	32

[34] D. 40, p. 2.
[35] "An Army in Exile", p. 158
[36] D. 3, p. 6,

There were also cases of psittacosis, dengue fever, Maltese fever, small pox (Variola vera), chickenpox (Varicella), poliomyelitis, diphtheria, pellagra, mange (scabies), and Oriental (Bubonic) plague.

In the instance of Oriental (Bubonic) plague, there is only one official mention in the hosiptal documents [37]—"one suspected plague-carrier". However, I have been told by the Former Chief M.O. of the hospital that there were a few cases, of which three at least were absolutely certain in view of their clinical symptoms, which could not be misconstrued. No bacteriological tests were performed, since only the Pasteur Institute in Tehran could have coped with them, and secrecy was vital. The only other person to know of these cases was the Rev. dr. W. Małyszew, on whose ward they occurred.

The illness took a terrifyingly short time to run its course, and the victim died in a few hours. Naturally, as far as possible, isolation was attempted, but this was about all that could be done. The plague burned itself out only with death. It was impossible to burn the tents, since this would have been an obvious sign of the presence of the disease, and would have led to the closure and burning of the entire hospital. The danger of the fire spreading also precluded the "accidental" burning of any tents. The only measure possible was massive disinfection of all washable articles with lysol, and a simultaneous spraying of the tents, inside and out, with formalin. All smaller articles touched by the victims were burnt some distance away from the hospital.

The Rev. dr. Małyszew showed a superhuman courage in all this. He examined the patients and helped them in whatever way was possible. He behaved as though they had some harmless minor infection rather than the plague. His entire salary was spent on fruit and other delicacies for his patients—indeed he lived for his patients. Often he was warned about the danger of infection, but he always replied that no illness would dare to infect him.

In fact, he did not die of any infection, but an unconfirmed rumour in 1946 said that someone had murdered him with an axe—no one knew who, or why.

Before moving on to look at the overall picture of illness and mortality within the P.G.C. Hospital, I must add that many transports contained a number of corpses.[38] These had presumably died as a result of exhaustion, and of the rigours of a very tough journey,[39] since I cannot accept that corpses would have been put on a live transport.

The evacuation from the U.S.S.R. consisted of a sea journey from Krasnowodzk to Pahlevi, with the exception of the final evacuation which came by land, via Ashkahbad. From Pahlevi the sick were taken by motor transport to Tehran, where they were placed either in the Polish General Civilian Hospital, or if they were military personnel, in the Polish Red Cross hospital. This latter hospital had a few hundred

[37] D. 3, p. 6.
[38] Mentioned on p. 32, D. 33, p. 1, D. 38, p. 1.
[39] "An Army in Exile", p. 174.

beds, was under military jurisdiction, and was supported by the Delegation of the Ministry of Social Welfare under the auspices of the Polish Government.[40] Unfortunately, I have been totally unable to find any archives relating to this hospital, but according to the information received from the former Chief M.O. of the P.G.C.H. in Tehran, (Dr. Z. Grębecki), it was a well-equipped and very efficient institution. In November 1942 the Polish Red Cross Hospital was designated Military Field Hospital No. 4, and in December it moved to Iraq where it joined the Polish Army.[41]

In the meantime, military personnel also made use of the Polish General Civilian Hospital, as I will show later.

The road from Pahlevi to Tehran winds its way through the Elbruz Mountain, with an extinct volcano, Demavent (5670 m.) as their highest point.[42] The road was built in 1899 [43] as a trade-route, and therefore is near-useless for modern vehicles, since the sharpness of the bends and the haphazard camber make it rough and dangerous. Of all the mountain roads I have known in Italy, France, Germany and Britain I have never come across the likes of the neck-breaking Pahlevi-Kazwin-Tehran route. It runs well above the railway lines, whose highest point is 2100 m.,[44] and is 397 Km. long.[45]

The sick were driven across this route by Hindu drivers who were more concerned with speed than with the comfort of their charges. In this situation, even one's organs of balance can become disturbed, as I found personally. Added to this is the fact that the journey took nearly twelve hours, and that the temperature often reached 43°C (120°F) in the shade [46]—God knows what the direct temperature was, but I know that one could not touch the metal of the vehicle even during motion, without burning oneself.

As if this were not enough, the air is terribly dry (Tehran's humidity is about 21%) [47], and when the terrible dry winds arrive (called by the natives "the 120-day wind") carrying dust and sand at 115 km. per hour (70 mph) in that blazing heat, the humidity drops to 14%, or even 6% in the desert.

In these conditions it is not surprising that many of the evacuees died en route, since, "the change to tropical conditions is so fundamental, that every aspect of life must adapt to this",[48], including dress, accommodation, food, and the body's metabolism. Moreover, the evacuees were often seriously ill, hungry, and their accommodation (the transport) could best be likened to the Big Dipper at a fair, or to an in-

[40] D. 3, p. 8.
[41] D. 3, p. 8.
[42] "Iranian Geography", A. Dubryk-Darlewski, Iranian Studies. p. 10.
[43] Ibid p. 27.
[44] Ibid p. 33.
[45] Ibid p. 27.
[46] Ibid p. 12.
[47] Ibid p. 12.
[48] "Hygiene in Tropical Countries", Dr. W. Hupert, p. 14.

fernal windmill—and this in temperatures rather akin to the blast from a bakery oven as the bread is withdrawn.

The following is a breakdown of the sick and the dead arriving at the P.G.C.H. from May 1942 to the 31st of December 1942: [49]

MILITARY PERSONNEL

	Soldiers		P.W.A.S.		Cadets (male)		Cadets (female)		Total	
	Infectious	Other	I.	O.	I.	O.	I.	O.	I.	O.
From Tehran -	124	231	193	348	110	144	59	112	486	835
„ Pahlevi -	40	61	12	18	30	71	10	24	92	174
Total - - -	164	292	205	366	140	215	69	136	578	1009
Died - - - -	10	6	4	2	11	5	6	3	31	16

Civilians

	Male		Female		Children		Total	
	Infectious	Other	I.	O.	I.	O.	I.	O.
From Tehran - -	430	1016	1663	3445	1871	2675	3964	7136
Pahlevi - - - -	62	94	154	232	79	119	295	445
Total - - - -	492	1110	1817	3677	1950	2794	4259	7581
Died - - - - -							710	406

Breakdown of Figures

Military personnel—Infectious diseases	578	
Civilians „ „	4259	
Total	4837	
Military personnel—Other diseases	1009	
Civilians „ „	7581	
Total	8590	
Total admissions	13427	
Highest daily no. sick	1813	
„ „ food provisions for	2465	individuals

[49] D.'s 39, p. 1 and 2.

Military—Infectious disease	31
Civilian „ „	710
Total	741
Military—Other diseases	16
Civilian „ „	406
Total	422

Total deaths (military and civilian) - - - - - - - - - - 1163
Deaths within 3-days of admission - - - - - - - - - - 175
Remaining deaths - - - - - - - - - - 988

Mortality in percentage terms after substracting those deaths which occurred within three days admission, and those dead on arrival [50]:

General mortality — 7.2%
Child „ — 6.3%

Normal child mortality in peace time in University Hospitals according to Prof. Jasiński was 4.5% before the Second World War.

Typhus deaths normally accounted for 10% of mortality in peacetime; whereas according to Prof. W. Osler it reached 50%, and 60% according to Prof. Jasiński during the war.

As to normal deaths from *typhus exantematicus* (typhus) in normal conditions, I would like to quote an important note made by Gen. Dr. Marian Dietrich, former Deputy Director of Medical Services of 2nd Polish Corps on this subject: "In Poland in 1919 during an epidemic of typhus, 375 doctors died (as I recall). I was one of those who was sent by the Ministry of Health to take over the typhus hospital in Przedborze. In Przedborze there had been five doctors, but two had died of typhus, and other three had fled—hence my appointment. Of the nearby small town of 3000 inhabitants about 1000 died. In my hospital, mortality was 50%. I had two nurses and a "feldcher", all of whom contracted the disease—two died. The figures of 10% mortality in Polish Gen. Civ. Hospital in Tehran is so low, that without questioning the figures, or expressing doubts as to the diagnoses I can only accept that this particular strain of the disease was extremely mild, concurring with my findings in the Middle East epidemic".

In order to describe the work done by the Polish Gen. Civ. Hosp. in Tehran I must give the details in relation to the individual reports of the doctors in charge of the relevant sections of the hospital.

[50] D. 3, p. 9.

TYPHUS (Typhus exantematicus) [51]

As I have said, the Polish Gen. Civ. Hosp. began its work on the 28th of March 1942. Typhus admissions were often in tens every twenty-four hours of April. In May the figures were as follows:

May	admissions		May	admissions	
	General	Typhus		General	Typhus
1	38	-	16	84	4
2	36	10	17	64	15
3	21	5	18	84	23
4	20	4	19	25	-
5	46	4	20	10	-
6	31	4	21	55	1
7	28	3	22	37	1
8	43	2	23	37	1
9	23	1	24	25	-
10	37	4	25	11	-
11	11	1	26	31	-
12	39	1	27	19	-
13	30	1	28	39	1
14	38	-	29	31	1
15	16	-	30	30	-
			31	26	-

The last case of typhus was admitted on May the 29th. By the 1st of June there were only 13 typhus patients. The last three were released on the 19th of June.

Over the last four days of March, and including April 1942 there were 457 typhus patients in the Hospital. In May there were 87 new admissions. By June there were no more cases.

The total number of sick was 543 cases of typhus out of 11,000 civilians, i.e. about 5%. Given that in its early days the hospital admitted only women and children, since the men were catered for in the British hospitals, the percentage must in fact be higher. In March and April there were 28 deaths, in May, 26 i.e. 10% mortality.

There were three main causes of death:

1) Circulatory failures, as a result of the general strain on the patients' metabolism,
2) Nervous system complications, including meningitis,
3) Respiratory complications, particularly bronchopneumonia.

TYPHOID (Typhus abdominalis) [52]

In April and early May 1942 the first cases of typhoid were observed, usually among the typhus sufferers. These were scattered in many tents but were later brought together in two tents.

[51] D. 33, p. 2.
[52] D. 33, p. 5.

In the time covered by the report, from March 1942 to 1.1.1943, 326 cases were treated, of which 30 died, 8 in the first three days of the hospital, so that statistics show 22 dead, i.e. 6.75%. The worst months were August/September (60 cases), the best was December (17 cases).

Major complications included:

Thrombophlebitis of the lower limbs - - - - -	3 cases
Femoral artery embolism - - - - - - - - - -	1 case
Psychopathological disorders - - - - - - - - -	3 „
Otitis media - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	8 „
idem, with complication of acute mastoid - - -	2 „
Virus pneumonia - - - - - - - - - - - - -	12 „
Cystitis - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	13 „
idem plus *haematuria* - - - - - - - - - -	3 „
Bowel haemorrhage - - - - - - - - - - -	5 „
idem with perforated bowel - - - - - - - -	1 „

Added to this was the separate disease of malaria, which 83 of the typhoid patients suffered from.

Two of the nursing staff, and one cook died in this epidemic. The worst problem was that dietary healing was made difficult by the lack of basic foodstuffs.

DYSENTERY [53]

So many evacuees arrived with this complaint, that from the outset a separate ward had to be prepared for these patients.

Between 28/3/42 and 1/1/43, 423 cases were admitted, of which 75 died, 16 in the first 3 days—i.e. before 1/4/42, so that statistics show 59 dead,—13.95%.

The arrivals were so totally drained and exhausted, that they were often beyond medical help, and their fate was obvious from the outset—hence 16 dead in the first three days of the P.G.C.H.'s existence.

The worst complication, not noticed initially, was the widespread pellagra.

TUBERCULOSIS [54]

In the early days of its existence the P.G.C.H. did not have a T.B. ward, since the whole of the doctors' attention was focused on the typhus epidemic, and other infectious diseases. Furthermore, the sick arriving from Pahlevi were in such a serious state that diagnosis was extremely difficult, particularly in view of the absence at that time of analytical facilities.

[53] D. 33, p. 6.
[54] D. 33, p. $.

In time, X-ray and analytical techniques allowed for accurate diagnosis, and the T.B. victims were grouped together.

Eighty-six patients went through the T.B. ward in all, most with simple T.B. On the basis of the information given by the patients, it was established that only about 4% had had T.B. in Poland—the rest had developed it as a result of the terrible conditions which they had suffered during their exile.

The breakdown was: 74% males, 26% females; all children were in a separate ward.

In general, the prognosis for the patients was good. Whether or not the climate and diet were important, and to what extent, is difficult to say, but usually the patients put on weight, their temperatures dropped, and the disease disappeared within a short time.

Most of the cases had bronchial tuberculosis, which by its nature was localised. Of these patients, the majority were young (12 to 30), and the disease was very serious in these cases. T.B. of the intestine was found only as a secondary infection in those suffering from T.B. of the lungs. Glandular T.B. was extremely rare. Unfortunately, pellagra was an added complication, and patients suffering from this combination often died.

Happily, deaths from T.B. were, however, far fewer than might have been expected.

MALARIA [55]

The first wave of evacuees was largely free from malaria (10 cases noted on 14.8.1942). The second wave, however, presented a different pattern. From the 15th to the 31st of August 1942, of 863 patients admitted to the hospital (267 children among them), 161 had malaria (of whom 41 were children), thereafter, as follows:

	Admissions —	children	with malaria —	children
Sept.	2572	755	638	125
Oct.	1805	544	344	73
Nov.	1031	383	124	35
Dec.	1145	263	87	10
Total from 15.8.-31.12.42.				
	7416	2212	1364	284

These figures are not conclusive, in that a number of patients were found to have malaria after admission for different diseases. There were 371 such cases, of which 73 were children. In general the percentage of patients with malaria was 23.4%. Among children the rate was 16.1%, and 26.5% among adults.

107 patients died, 34 with other diseases which could have contributed or caused their demise, such as cardiac irregularities, myocardial

[55] D. 33, p. 8.

failure, avitaminosis, pellagra, nephrosis and uraemia, pneumonia (especially in the elderly), and others.

Initially, diagnosis was based on physical examination, and the patients own comments, since microscopic examination of the blood (except in the most serious cases) was only performed on the day after admission.

Many patients initially diagnosed as having pellagra, typhoid, or gastroenteritis, were later found to be suffering from malaria, so that diagnostic error must be put at about 20%.

PELLAGRA [56]

According to the statistics for the period of the hospital report, there were 140 admissions with pellagra, of which 36 were discharged as satisfactory, and 44 died (36% mortality). On 1.1.1943 there were still 60 cases in the hospital. Again, the figures are not accurate, since pellagra was often masked by other symptoms. None of the doctors at the hospital had had occasion to come across this disease, resulting in misdiagnoses such, as *enterocolitis, avitaminosis,* malnutrition, etc.. Only with time was the true illness recognised, and medication directed into the proper channels. These figures also do not take into account numerous cases of pellagra on other wards.

The pellagra sufferers had all arrived from Central Asia, many looking like parchment-covered skeletons, without even an ounce of fatty tissue on them.

INTERNAL DISEASES [57]

As I have already mentioned, the infectious diseases initially took up all of the doctors' time. The major problems had to be dealt with first. To give some idea of how stretched the medical personnel was, the internal diseases ward was placed (in the initial stages of the Polish General Civilian Hospital) under the charge of dentists. It was only in May 1942 that the ward was organized as a separate entity. The following shows the scope of diseases treated and patients admitted between 1.5.1942 and 1.1.1943:

		Admitted	Died	%
a)	Respiratory diseases (except T.B.)	235	7	3
b)	Heart and circulatory diseases	205	37	18
c)	Digestive tract „	686	112	16
d)	Biliary „ „	158	-	-
e)	Urinary „ „	74	3	4
f)	Joints (diseases of)	82	-	-
g)	Metabolic disease—2 cases of diabetes, a few of diasthesis urica			

[56] D. 33, p. 13.
[57] D. 33, p. 15-18.

h) *Psittacosis*—201 cases. This is a subtropical disease carried by sand-flies. The incubation period is 5-10 days. The symptoms include high fever, headache, swelling of the face, cramps, and stomach disorders, Within three days these symptoms disappear, but for a further 2 weeks the patient feels weak and depressed.

i) *Febris Melitensis—Brucellosis:* 10 cases, orginally not diagnosed, but later cured.

j) 446 other cases, probably originally misdiagnosed, classified simply as "fevers". 10 of these died.

INTERNAL DISEASES
STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN [58]

Disease	Sick	Died
Acute *tonsillitis*	131	1
Bronchiolitis	101	3
Bronchopneumonia	89	4
Pleurisy	22	-
Emphysema pulm.	9	-
Influenza	21	2
Vitium cordis	52	4
Disease	Sick	Died
Myocarditis	151	31
Anemia	31	2
Arteriosclerosis	2	-
Enterocolitis	448	62
Inanitio	196	53
Gastritis	49	-
Ulcus ventriculi	6	-
Ulcus duodeni	3	-
Hepatitis	127	-
Cholelithiasis	21	-
Cholecystitis	22	-
Diabetes Mellitus	2	-
Thyrotoxicosis	1	-
Nephritis	54	4
Pyelitis	12	1
Cystitis	1	1
Nephrolithiasis	17	-
Arthritis rheum.	58	1
Lumbago	12	-
Sciatica	12	-
Taenia	2	-
Intoxicatio	21	-
Psittacosis	201	-
Febris Melitensis	10	-
Status febrilis	466	10

[58] D. 33, p. 37.

CHILDREN'S DISEASES [59]

At the beginning of the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hospital's existence, there was no children's ward as such. The children were simply scattered among the normal wards. Later, when the hospital moved to the Kazwin road, two wards were established (one of 200, another of 220 beds, in August). In October these wards were combined into one 500-bed ward. Nevertheless, some children were still placed in adult wards for lack of space.

At the end of October, however, the ward had to be reduced to 300 beds, since the British authorities ordered the return of the bulding used for part of the ward. As a result of this, 150 children were transfered to the Hindu hospital. Of these 150 children, 126 were cured, 9 died as a result of pellagra, and 15 returned to the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp.

Of 3059 children who passed through the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp. 263 died, 71 within the first three days of admission in the hospntal (i.e. 28-31st March 1942). When these are discounted, mortality is seen to be 6.3%.

About 60% of all cases were infectious diseases. The breakdown is as follows:

MEASLES [60]

Worst in April/May 1942, extremely serious. About 20% mortality, largely as a result of general exhaustion.

TYPHUS EXANTEMATICUS [61]

March-May 1942, about 100 cases, no fatalities.

WHOOPING COUGH (Pertussis) [62]

About 300 cases, most-complicated by pneumonia. Very serious for the children. 9.5% mortality.

SCARLET FEVER [63]

400 cases, no fatalities, very mild disease.

TYPHOID and PARATYPHOID [64]

Mild form, few fatalities.

DYSENTERY [65]

Very difficult course taken by this disease. About 50% mortality, worst in the first wave of evacuees.

MALARIA [66]

About 400 cases, mainly in the second wave of evacuees.

[59] D. 33, p. 18-24.
[60] D. 33, p. 20.
[61] D. 33, p. 20.
[62] D. 33, p. 21.
[63] D. 33, p. 21.
[64] D. 33, p. 21.
[65] D. 33, p. 21.
[66] D. 33, p. 22.

PELLAGRA [67]

About 500 cases. About 30% mortality. The disease took a very serious course, as seen from the mortality figures.

PAROTITIS EPIDEMICA [68]

About 150 cases. A child infection with no complications.

DIPHTHERIA [69]

About 50 cases, largely mild. One fatality within three days of admission.

ERYSIPELAS [70]

Very few cases.

SMALLPOX [71]

One case, the victim survived unaffected.

CHICKENPOX [72]

Very few cases, all cleared up successfully. Naturally all victims were inoculated against smallpox.

TUBERCULOSIS [72]

About 150 cases. 10% mortality.

NEONATAL WARD [73]

This ward was established beside the maternity ward. Of 62 births, one was still-born, and two were too premature to survive; the other 59 survived happily. This was in the period 28.3.1942-31.12.1942.

SKIN and VENEREAL DISEASES [74]

The hospital surgery was established by July 1942. The surgery dealt with civilians, and also military personnel sent from the Garrison Medical Reception rooms. 519 consultations were given up to 31.12.1942. Medicines were dispensed first by the hospital's pharmacy, then by the general camp pharmacy.

The main skin diseases noted were: *scabies, psoriasis, dermatitis, utricaria, scrofula, folliculitis, trichophytia, pruritus, furunculosis, acne, impetigo, alopecia, lupus, erythematosus.*

Veneral diseases mostly were lues and gonorrhoea. These two diseases accounted for 4% of all cases seen at the surgery.

There were few cases of *erysipelas* in the summer months, but with the onset of cooler weather, the number of cases, particularly among women, began to grow. By November, a special ward of 29 beds had to be set up for these patients.

[67] D. 33, p. 22.
[68] D. 33, p. 23
[69] D. 33, p. 23.
[70] D. 33, p. 23.
[71] D. 33, p. 23.
[72] D. 33, p. 23.
[73] D. 33, p. 24
[74] D. 33, p. 24.

Between 9.10.42, 132 patients passed through this ward, as follows.

Venereal diseases	11	*Erythema*	1
Scabies	18	Erysipelas	110
Leishmaniasis	3		

Of these, 103 were discharged as fit, and 19 were left in the ward on 31.12.42.

NERVOUS and MENTAL DISEASES [75]

I have found some difficulties in establishing exactly when this ward was set up, since the available documents are rather garbled. From what I can make out, the documents cover a period of some 3 and a half months, but which months are referred to is not made clear. Since I have found a comment which states that on 17.10.42 a recommendation was made to wind up this ward in two weeks, I infer that the ward was probably opened in late July (about the 24th).

A further scrutiny of documents has also shown that the statistics referring to the mentally ill are very inaccurate, so I will not quote them here.

In an entry made on 17.10.42, I find that 18 patients arrived from British hospitals, which would seem to indicate that, in the early stages at least, patients were directed to the British hospitals. Since the condition of these patients required a closed ward, they were transferred, together with those already present, to the Iranian Psychiatric Hospital, and thus the ward was disbanded.

The Neurological Ward statistics were as follows:

16 cases of nervous complaints relating to the C.N.S. (Cntr. Nrv. Syst.)
11 „ „ „ „ „ „ „ P.N.S. (peripheral N.Syst.)
88 „ „ epilepsy
5 „ „ metabolically caused disturbances.

SURGERY [76]

Originally, those patients who required major surgery were sent to Dr. Zapłatynski's private clinic, whilst the minor cases were dealt with in the hospital surgery/pharmacy. This surgery/pharmacy consisted of a wash-basin, two small unpainted tables, and a very rickety cupboard, all donated by the local civilian population. The surgical implements consisted of only the most basic tools in a surgical bag belonging to the Chief M.O., usually brought to the surgery, and some important surgical tools brought by consultant dr Zapłatyński, together with some sterile dressings.

The Surgeon's assistants at the time consisted of three dentists, Drs. Gutowska, Hafner, and Rosental. They worked from 7 a.m. through to the late night.

[75] D. 33, p. 25.
[76] D. 33, p. 27-29.

After some weeks the Polish Mission allowed some dressings and implements to be brought. After two months working in these conditions the P.G.C. Hospital was moved across the town, to an unfinished building with no windows, water, or toilet facilities, which was being built for the Persian University clinic. Here the sick were distributed in 40 tents of 30 beds each; in the garage; and in a stable. The surgery and major female intensive care ward were housed in the unfinished building, the rest of the surgical cases had to make do with the tents. Those capable of walking were treated in the surgery, the rest would have their dressings changed at their bedsides. At this time, with the permission of the Polish Mission, the P.G.C. Hospital authorities purchased six stools, a wooden table for dressings, an instrument cupboard, two large tables, and two metal tins for sterilising instruments. Finally a whole batch of surgical instruments was bought at a bargain price from various Polish doctors. Since there was no operating theatre as such, major cases were still directed to Dr. Zapłatyński's clinic, with dressings and minor surgery dealt with on the spot. There were about 100 such cases each day.

It was only in November that the P.G.C. Hospital received a few more surgical instruments as a gift from American charities, and the Polish Mission bought an operating table. After this time the gynaecological, oto-laryngology, maternity, opthalmic, and surgical wards began to do their own sterilisations, no longer having to rely on Dr. Zapłatynski's clinic. This was performed under the auspices of a well-qualified "feldcher", Margo Makaszwili.

Between 28.3.1942 and 1.1.1943 about 30.000 dressings were made, and about 2,000 surgical cases were dealt with. Dr. Zapłatyński's clinic performed 236 operations, as follows:

Men	39
Women	138
Children	59

The more serious problems dealt with included:

Laparotomies	41	Bone resections	4
Appendectomies	41	Tendon resections	6
Trephinations	23	*Mastectomies*	1
Sequestrotomies	6	*Tonsillectomies*	2
Herniorraphias	10	Major lacerations	7

The consultant surgeon, and surgeon-in-charge of the surgical ward, who had lived in Tehran for many years, gave sparingly his time and effort. He lent his instruments, sterilised dressing, gave free advice, operated in his own clinic on the more serious cases, allowed his oxygen to be used by the P.G.C. Hospital, and generally made himself indispensable.

MATERNITY [77]

This ward was estabilised on 17.7.1942. Prior to this, women had been directed to the Persian Maternity Hospital. The ward was generally well-organised and well-provided with all necessary facilities. As far as the new-born were concerned, this is dealt with in a separate section (see "Neonatal Ward").

GYNAECOLOGICAL COMPLAINTS [78]

The gynaecological clinic was established on 9.6.1942, and was open three times per week. 475 patients were dealt with up to 22.12.1942, mostly from the camps and the town, some from other sections within the hospital; grouped as follows:

pregnancy	36 cases
abnormal positioning of the uterus	100 „
„ uterine bleeding	34 „
inflammatory conditions of the urogenital organs	211 „
amenorrhoea	45 „
fibromata of the uterus	9 „
ovarian cyst	1 case
others	39 cases

Naturally, the gynaecologist also gave consultations to the rest of the hospital patients, as necessary.

The gynaecological ward, as mentioned above, was established on 1.6.42, with 25 beds, and a separate examination room. It had the necessary facilities and instruments. 201 patients passed through this ward, with the following complaints:

Parametricis	90 cases
Menopausal bleeding	38 „
Cancer of the uterus	6 „
Post-natal *septicaemia*	1 case
Septicaemia following miscarriage	4 cases
Gonorrhoea	18 „
Peritonitis	2 „
Prolapse of uterus	5 „
Cervical ulceration	37 „
Total	201 „

[77] D. 33, p. 29.
[78] D. 33, p. 30-32.

OPERATIONS PERFORMED:

Abdominal operations (at Dr. Zapłatyński's clinic, for lack of operating facilities)

Fibromyoma - - - - -	1 case
Ovarian cysts - - - - -	1 „
Colporrhaphy - - - - -	1 „
Therapeutic D. and C. - - -	18 cases
Posta-natal D. and C. as a result - - of atonia - -	3 „
Removal of polyps and D. and C. -	4 „
„ of submucous *fibromata* -	2 „
Cervical sections - - - -	4 „
Total	34 „

Further, 11 histopathological tests, of which 7 were cervical smears, and 4 were cervical sections.

EAR, NOSE AND THROAT COMPLAINTS [79]

The E.N.T. ward was set up in the second half of April 1942. The surgery was modestly equipped, but all necessary instruments were present. Since there was no operating theatre, all major problems had to be dealt with at Dr. Zapłatyński's clinic.

Up to 25.10.1942 the E.N.T. ward shared with the ophthalmic patients. Later, however, as a result of the increase in eye complaints, the section had to be moved into a number of tents, and the children placed in the general children's wards. The surgery also had to share with other specialisations.

The movement of patients was lesser in the warmer months: 15-20 per day at the surgery, 10-15 in the ward. Antrotomy was performed in 10 cases. With the onset of cooler weather, the frequency of complaints increased to 30-35 per day visiting the surgery. This pressure was largely relieved when the E.N.T. surgery for the 1st and 2nd civilian camps was opened. The number of admissions also increased, until about 40 were scattered throughout the hospital, as it was impossible to have a separate room for them. Most of these were long-stay patients, largely as a result of particular difficulties of living in the camps, which meant that patients had to have a totally clear bill of health before discharge. The majority of complaints concerned serious inflammations of the ear, but luckily few of these required surgical intervention. From 15.10.1942 to 31.12.1942 only 3 antrotomies were performed, and these were the result of patients being admitted in a state which required immediate surgery.

[79] D. 33, p. 32.

Diseases of the auditory nerve were common after *Typhus exantematicus*, or prolonged medication for malaria—oddly, though, few problems occurred as a result of the scarlet fever epidemic.

EYE COMPLAINTS [80]

The ophthalmic ward was established in the P.G.C. Hospital on 10.5.1942, together with a surgery for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd civilian and 4th military camps. The primitive surgery consisted of one deal table, a chair, two bottles of eyedrops, and a jar of cotton-wool.

After a few days, the hospital stores acquired some vital equipment and medicines. At first, the patients were few, but within two weeks this had increased to 20 per day. In July and August, at the time of the evacuation, with an outbreak of acute *conjunctivitis* up to 50 persons per day visited the surgery. There were 46 cases of trachoma, and a total of 480 pairs of spectacles were issued—220 at the cost of the Polish Mission.

The personnel consisted of one ophthalmic specialist and a part-time nurse. At first, the ophthalmic ward had 10 beds, treating patients as follows:

Cataract of right eye	1 case
Iridencleisis	1 „
Ectropion	1 „
Serpiginous ulcus cornea	1 „
Dacryocystitis	1 „
Phlyctenular keratitis	3 cases
Rheumatic *keratitis*	1 case
Scotoma	1 „

At the end of July the ward expanded to 20 beds, then 70 at the end of August, when the second wave of evacuees arrived; 50 of these had to be separated for trachoma cases. A further 110 cases of acute *conjunctivitis* were found in other wards, and these also had to be moved to an enlarged ophthalmic ward.

The fight with trachoma lasted almost two months. Non-infectious children were moved to the camps, where they were dealt with by the surgeries. Those suffering from acute *conjunctivitis, terapitis* with comtalized during the most serious stages of illness, then discharged to the plications, complex *iritis*, and other serious complaints were only hospicamps and treated by the surgeries. There was simply not enough room for all the patients in the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp. itself.

It seems likely that many inflammations were caused by pollen from the cotton-flower, since there were vast cotton plantations on the Russian-Persian border, and around Tehran.

[80] D. 33, p. 32.

The following cases were dealt with between 20.7.42 and 20.10.42 on the ophthalmic ward:

Deep trauma of the cornea and iris	1	case
Subluxation	1	„
Traumatic cataract	1	„
Membraneous *conjunctivitis*	1	„
Ulcus gonorrhoica cornea of the new-born	1	„
Serpiginous ulcus cornea	2	cases
Corneal ulcers	12	„
Phlyctenulær keratitis	20	„
Keratitis punctate	5	„
Rheumatic *keratitis*	3	„
Iridocyclitis	2	„
Small haemorrhages into *corpus vitreum*	5	„
Degeneration of the optic nerve	2	„
Scleritis	2	„
Acute *conjunctivitis* coupled with *keratitis* and *iritis*	30	„
Keratitis alone	20	„
Conjunctivitis gonorrhoica of the new-born	3	„
Dachryocysticis	3	„
Trachoma	65	„

(of which 50 were children, 10 adult females, 5 adult males)

Since a number of transports were taking the civilians to Africa, the ophthalmologist had to perform an examination of 3,000 of the inmates of camps, to eliminate the possibility of trachoma. Just before, and during this, an outbreak of acute *conjunctivitis* occurred, mostly among the children. From July 25th to August 15th about 250 persons per day applied for treatment.


Half-way through August, the second wave of evacuees brought a new outbreak of acute *conjunctivitis*. All four civilian camps needed extra special medical facilities (camps 1, 2, 3 and 5). The senior doctors seconded the necessary personnel to the ophthalmologist. Children were isolated in special tents and buildings, and trachoma sufferers were placed in separate tents. The sick were treated twice daily, the children being brought by their teachers, or by hospital nurses.

In September, there were over 2,000 cases undergoing treatment. Within a month this number had been halved. Acute *conjunctivitis* passed quickly, unless *iritis* and *terapitis* were present—within 10 days to 3 weeks. The arrival of another ophthalmologist in October also helped to relieve the situation.


DENTAL SECTION [81]

The dental surgery was open on 19th April 1942 in the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp., beside the No. 1 Civilian camp, using privately-owned in-


[81] D. 34, p. 1, 2.




1st site of the P.G.C.H. in Tehran nr. civilian camp.
2nd site at Kazwin Road.
3rd site in the former building of the Polish Red Cross.




1 and 2. Unknown. Diagnosis:— Pellagra.




Śliwińska Barbara, aged 2. Diagnosis: — Dysentery.
Swastyk Julian, aged 10. Diagnosis:— Entero-colitis, pellagra.




3 and 4. Unknown. Diagnosis:— Pellagra.





Orba Ryfka, aged 5. Diagnosis:— Pellagra.
Bełczęcki Zdzisław. Diagnosis:— Pellagra.



2nd wave of evacuation from the U.S.S.R.


GRAPH OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN THE POLISH GENERAL CIVILIAN HOSPITAL IN TEHRAN. BETWEEN 2-4 ~30-6 1942.
TYPHUS
MEASLES
MUMPS
APRIL
MAY
JUNE





Graph of infectious diseases in the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran between 2-4 — 30-6, 1942.

struments. On May 24th the surgery moved to a new building on the Kazwin road, together with the rest of the hospital. The equipment and even the dental couch were still on loan from private individuals. It was only on 21st June and 16th July that full dental equipment for the hospital was purchased. Two full surgeries were started with this equipment, and on 7th November another set of instruments was purchased for the paediatric ward.

The following is a list of treatment from 1st June 1942 to 1st December 1942: 8,024 appointments, of which 4,449 were hospital personnel, 3,575 from patients, and from the civilian camps.

Fillings	975
Extractions	504
Gum disorders treated	155
Dental nerves killed	630
Cleaning and polishing	149

Technical work performed between 1.X.42-1.XII.42 - 85 jobs.

Children's dental surgery 15.XI.42-20.XII.42

Appointments	452
Fillings	204
Extractions	41
Ulcer treatment	8

On 18th December the Dental Surgeries were moved to the new building (formerly the Polish Red Cross Hospital).

The data below shows the increase in one month (Dec. 1942) of work done—particularly on the technical side.

	Total	Medical personnel	Patients
Appointments	1208	747	461
Fillings	267	185	82
Extractions	139	86	53
Gingivitis and *Stomatitis* treated and cured	40	13	27
Plaque removal	43	26	17
Technical work	53	42	11
Totals	1750	1099	651

Total dental treatments (excluding 19.IV.42-1.VI.42, when overwork made records unreliable) 9,684.

It can be seen from the December figures, that 73% of dental work was carried out on hospital personnel; whereas dental treatment for the evacuees was vital, since most of them were suffering from the effects of prolonged avitaminosis.

BACTERIOLOGICAL LABORATORY [82]

Once the hospital had moved to new premises, a bacteriological analysis laboratory was set up. The equipment was as follows: one microscope without oil-immersion (borrowed), a few test-tubes and boiling tubes, some kidney-bowls, two tables, two chairs, a basin and a water-bucket.

The analysis was confined to urine samples.

In July, Dr. Achmed Zade, the Director of Tehran's Public Health Laboratory was engaged to help the hospital. In his private laboratory he performed serological analyses. The Hospital stores provided a haemocytometer, cedar oil, a burette, some pipettes, etc. which considerably widened the scope of analysis.

As a result of the necessity to control the health of hospital personnel, and that of potential blood donors, the hospital laboratory began to form basic blood-tests in mid-July 1942. Blood-typing, Wasserman, Kahn, and Hesch tests were performed at the Medical Faculty of Tehran University, thanks to the help of Prof. Dr. Sohrab. With the arrival of the second wave of evacuees in late August, the numbers of the sick rose drastically, forcing the laboratory to work a 12-hour day. Dr. Abdul Gasin Bahrami, Director of the Pasteur Institute, together with his assistant, Dr. Tejmur Dolat Schachi, took over the running of the laboratory. As a direct result of their co-operation, the laboratory was able to cope with the constant increase in analyses needed by the P.G.C. Hospital, particularly when the institute threw open all its facilities for analysis, vaccination, and provided basic drugs. With the help of these two doctors, two oil-immersion microscopes were purchased, and a third was borrowed from the Institute.

The laboratory was originally organised by Tatiana Bublejówna (M.Pharm.), then taken over by a dental graduate, Zofia Dąbrowska, and finally by qualified medical bacteriologists.

Laboratory staff:

June - - -	1	October - - -	8
July - - - -	2	November - -	9
August - - -	3	December - -	9
September - -	5		

The Central Analytical-Bacteriological Laboratory then set up a branch in the Paediatric Section of the P.G.C. Hospital. There is was hoped that the paediatricians could conduct their own tests, in their own time, and under their own supervision on urgent cases and mild illnesses.

[82] D. 35, p. 1, 2.

Below is shown the growth of laboratory work in the months from June 1942 to December 1942.

Test	June 10th onward	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Malaria	–	25	61	403	885	915	569	2858
Morphology	–	9	42	110	120	101	48	430
Widal	–	21	25	66	106	66	60	344
Wright	–	–	–	17	14	24	11	66
Weil-Felix	–	7	1	3	29	4	4	48
Wassermann Kahn	–	9	15	31	69	73	35	232
Urine analysis	46	102	138	295	402	264	193	1440
Stools	–	–	–	34	103	30	4	171
Saliva	–	–	10	27	44	49	34	164
Gonococci	–	16	18	34	26	23	12	129
Others	–	7	11	8	4	16	23	69
Total	46	196	321	1028	1802	1565	993	5951

VACCINATION SECTION [83]

Vaccinations were begun simultaneously with the establishment of P.G.C. Hospital. The first were anti-typhoid vaccinations; and the first to be vaccinated were the personnel of the Infectious disease wards, then the civilian population of camp No. 1 Sister H. Wyderka, the matron, performed the vaccinations, using Cox's vaccine.

In the last days of April, 1942 children below 10 years old were vaccinated against fever, and everyone received anti-cholera vaccine. This was done by Drs. E. Gutowska and M. Jankiewicz. Approximately 2,350 children and 3,000 adults were vaccinated. During the measles epidemic, hetero-haemotherapy was used. 20-30 cc. of maternal blood were given to children below the age of six. In May and June a British anti-typhoid vaccine was brought into use. The entire hospital personnel was vaccinated, as of course were all new arrivals among the personnel in the infective wards (especially the typhoid ward). The Rev. Dr. Małyszew performed this task. Besredkas method was used to vaccinate against dysentery.

A second vaccination against typhoid was performed after the arrival of a new wave of evacuees, in September 1942, with a Persian vaccine supplied by the Pasteur Institute in Tehran. Again, the hospital personnel, and also their families, were vaccinated. 340 vaccinations were performed by M. Czajkowska and E. Dudek (interns).

In November and December all hospital workers and their families were vaccinated against smallpox, using Persian vaccine again, with a 75% success rate. Where vaccination failed, cowpox was used three times at monthly intervals. This was at the time a serious problem in the Middle East, since smallpox was then virtually endemic, and sufferers showed dangerous tendencies towards haemorrhages.

[83] D. 36 p. 1, 2.

PHARMACY SECTION [84]

In the initial stages of the hospital's organisation, the pharmacy shared a small room with the general surgery in which all cases were dealt with. With the increasing number of patients the pharmacy had to be expanded, and more drugs purchased. The most important drugs were those needed to maintain blood-pressure and circulation. Then the pharmacy was moved to a building in the No. 1 Civilian camp, as a result of an even greater influx of patients. Here the main function of the pharmacy was the procurement of drugs and laboratory equipment. Tehran had no pharmaceutical wholesalers, only some chemical stockists, and their range of products was severely restricted, which meant that the pharmacy had to wait until basic supplies were delivered to the middlemen.

The outbreak of the Soviet-German war created a desperate situation, since these two countries supplied the majority of drugs. This led to great increases in the price of drugs, and a reluctance to sell them on the part of the importers. In the meantime, the number of sick rose daily. Finally the pharmacy had to prepare its own sterile glucose, caffeine, strychnine, and camphor.

Three people worked in the pharmacy. Within a short time they were required to supply not only the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp., but also the civilian camps, and the mobile army medical units. The Polish and American Red Cross did what they could to make up the needs for drugs and dressings, but the situation only eased when the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp. was moved onto the Kazwin road on the other side of Tehran.

The new pharmacy was put under the direction of J. Michniewicz, (M. Pharm.); and Cpt. E. Strzeszewski, (M. Pharm.), looked after the hospital stores. Only then did the pharmacy rid itself of the task of personally purchasing its own drugs.

The eradication of the typhus epidemic led to a reduction in the work of the pharmacy, but then came news of the second wave of evacuees from the U.S.S.R. Again drugs and basic equipment (dressings, syringes, needles, etc.) had to be acquired, against the ever-growing reluctance of local stockists to provide these necessities.

The new influx of patients caused an even greater need for sterile fluids,and powders such as quinine, tannalbine, and bismuth. The pharmacy was given a large amount of sterilising equipment and 100 cc. syringes, since intravenous apparatus was no longer sold in Tehran. The nurses soon learned how to inject large amounts of physiological saline with great facility, and approximating an intravenous apparatus—though this was very time-consuming.

Over 3,000 pills and powders were needed daily, and as a measure of the work done, it is interesting to note that Tehran ran out of distil-

[84] D. 37, p. 1, 2.

led water, and water from the towns electrical generating turbines had to be used. The power-station was run by very sympathetic Czechs, who refused any payment for the water. It contained traces of iron which deposited themselves on the vessels used as ferrous hydroxide, but otherwise, the water was far cleaner than that obtainable from the town's chemists.

At the end of September, over 25 litres per day of sterile physiological saline were being produced by the pharmacy, as well as nine different types of injections, since even the quinine ampoules had been used up. Over 300 prescriptions per day were dispensed, where eye-drops were ordered in 500 cc amounts, and pills at 300 per prescription, to avoid constant repetition of prescriptions. The situation was helped when a few workers joined the pharmacy, newly arrived from Russia, having allowed themselves no break for recuperation. The pharmacy worked on a 24-hr basis, partly to ensure no backlogs occured, and partly to cope with the demands on its resources.

The objective stated by the P.G.C.H's Chief Medical Officer was that every patient be given the necessary medicine even at the time of greatest admissions. Thanks to the work of the pharmacy, there was never any delay.

Cadet Officer J. Słomski (M. Pharm.) was in overall charge of the pharmacy throughout 1942, and Pte. (Womens' Auxiliary Service) Janina Michniewicz (M. Pharm.) was his deputy. Hospital stores, the chemical laboratory, and equipment were in the hands of Cpt. Z. Maj (Grad. Chemist). The vital section which provided instruments and drugs was at the edge of the P.G.C. Hospital perimeter, under the direct rule of the P.G.C.H. Quatermaster's Office.. Cpt. E. Staszewski originally set up the stores section, then J. Kęstowicz took over, after Cpt. Staszewski was recalled to the Army. The Pharmacy employed at various times a total of eleven pharmacists, one chemical engineer, two assistant pharmacists, and three clerks.

Below is a list of tasks performed by the pharmacy in Oct. 1942:

Prescriptions taken	8310
Immediate dispensations	3437
Sterilisations of injections in 100 cc. amount	1085
Sterile products prepared: Camphor 20%	
Strychnine 1%	
Glucose 40%	
Calcium chloride 10%	
Quinine hydrochloride 20%, etc.	
Physiological saline (sterile)	775 litres
Pills	59,369

The structure and growth of the hospital pharmacy is best shown by the stock-list made when the directorship of the pharmacy changed hands. The stock taking lasted from 4th January 1943 to 28th January.

There are 297 separate items on the list of disposable materials, such as dressings; and 64 items of permanent equipment (e.g. surgical instruments).

NURSING [85]

I have already mentioned this section, its difficulties, lack of qualifications and the marvellous work in the P.G.C.H.

The work of the nursing staff was organised according to the needs of the patients, and also the accommodation facilities for the sick. Thus, in the first phase, when the P.G.C.H. was situated beside the No. 1 Civilian camp in a three-roomed building, later with the addition of 35 tents, there was one nurse per room or tent, with the help of one or two auxiliaries per nurse (according to necessity). In April, the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp. already had five wards, which led to the creation of five ward sisters. As can be seen from the reports, at the end of April the P.G.C. Hosp. had 5 ward sisters, 50 nurses, and 100 auxiliaries. However, exact numbers are difficult to define, since "it was impossible in the early days to know the exact number of nurses, as no contracts existed. Many civilian nurses volunteered their spare time, but resigned after a day, or a few days, sometimes not notifying their departure".[86]

At night, the auxiliaries were on duty, supervised by one nurse for the whole hospital. The nurses were recruited from the civilian population, or from volunteers among the Polish Women's Army Service.[87]

When the P.G.C. Hosp. moved to the Kazwin road in mid-April, whilst the sick were being moved, the work was organised in such a way that the personnel was split into two groups, one going ahead to prepare the new site, the second helping to dismantle the original one. When the full personnel was assembled at the new site, there were found to be 62 nurses and 124 auxiliaries. A reorganisation took place, creating a Matron, two deputies—one for organisation. the other to deal with internal running of the hospital; there was one nurse per 25 patients, and auxiliary per 10 patients. The shifts were on a 12-hourly basis, with the day shift having a half-day per week free; the night shift worked 14 nights, then had two days free.

Pay scales: civilian nurses 800-1000 rials, board, lodging, and uniform; auxiliaries 350 rials.[88] Since the report speaks of salaries, the inference is that these were monthly allowances. All the Polish Womens' Army Service nurses and auxiliaries (some 75% of the staff) were paid by the Army.

Between 9th Sept. and 20th Oct. the work was again reorganised, after the arrival of 23 qualified nurses, and 115 auxiliaries from the army —this allowed up to three nurses per 50 patients, leading to normal

[85] D. 38, p. 4.
[86] D. 38, p. 4.
[87] D. 3, p. 3-20. On 22.4.42, Gen. Szarecki sent 27 nurses and 10 auxiliaries from the 5 and 8th Infantry of the Polish W.A.S. to P.G.C.H.
[88] D. 38, p. 7.

shifts and reasonable rest periods. In the last stages of the P.G.C. Hospital's existence, a nursing company was formed, composed of three platons.

On 3rd June 1942 the first 8-week nursing course was organised at the P.G.C. Hosp., with 101 entrants. After the examinations, which lasted from 22nd July to 26th July, only 78 passed, indicating a fairly high standard of requirements of the course. On 13th June 1942, a second, shorter (4-week) course was established, with 125 entrants. Of these, 49 entered the examination, and 43 passed.[89] The low numbers were largely the result of many leaving on transports to Africa and India.

With the Chief M.O.'s permission, external candidates were allowed to sit the examination after the second course. Only those with secondary or higher education were allowed to enter, and thirteen passed. In total, the hospital produced 134 nureses.

As a result of the transports to India and Africa, the hospital personnel kept decreasing. In the October and November transports, 88 nurses left the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp.[90]

From 1st April 1942 to 31st Dec. 1942, 176 nurses passed through the hospital of which 47 were reallocated by the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp.; 2 were dishonourably discharged; 10 were discharged on health grounds; and 2 died.

400 auxiliaries passed through the hospital on 1st June 1943, the nursing personnel was as follows:

Ward sisters	10
Nurses	105
Auxiliaries	130[91]

Jadwiga Kucharczyk, Maria Niewczas, Wladyslawa Stepniak, and Prakseda Meresz died in the typhoid epidemic. All four were awarded the Silver Cross Merit—posthumously.[92]

EQUIPMENT AND STORES[93]

The equipment and stores were paid for largely by the Polish Mission; the Polish, American, and Australian Red Cross; and the British Medical Corps. In the first days, when the hospital literally had almost nothing, many locally-living Poles in Tehran made small but very valuable contributions of money and surgical instruments.

In the first instance, local doctors and hospital staff gave much of their spare time. The British Army Medical Corps loaned tents, beds, blankets, fumigators, chlorinated-water tanks, and basic drugs. The Polish, Australian, and American Red Cross gave blankets, some instruments, drugs, and food, particularly tinned. but the bulk of the burden

[89] D. 41, p. 4.
[90] D. 41, p. 4.
[91] D. 37.
[92] D. 38, p. 11.
[93] D. 39, p. 2.

of equipment and stores was taken on by the Polish Mission. In time, the stores became capable of serving the needs of the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hospital's patients.

In December 1942, the hospital stores contained:

sheets	7273
pillow cases	3899
night shirts, female	3196
„ „ , children's	700
pyjama trousers	1165
„ tops	1172
dressing-gowns	1193
towels	3742
blankets	7579
mattresses	2195

This allowed up to 3 blankets and a dressing-gown per person during cold weather.

FOOD STORES [94]

This was one of the most important sections in the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hospital's administrative organisation. On the site of No. 1 Civilian camp, the sick were fed from a communal cauldron, together with the inhabitants of the camp. Obviously no form of diet, (often vital) could be prepared in these circumstances, so the Pol. Gen. Civ. Hosp. had to establish its' own kitchens. A few hearths were built, on which 40 litre cauldrons were placed. The whole was roofed in, and occupied the area formerly designated as a proposed morgue. Here the stores were also established, and in such a manner the kitchens were established. True, the wind, and lack of water created difficulties, but at least there was a measure of control over the diets of the patients.

On 20th April 1974, the first food was received:

bread	40 kg	eggs	1230	cheese	42 kg
sugar	103 „	butter	19.5 kg	tea	12.5 kg
meat	103 „	coffee	3 kg	cocoa	10 kg
milk	9 ltr	peas	100 kg	beans	100 kg

The first dinner was for 58 persons—31 patients, 27 staff. By the end of April, the occupants had increased to 166 patients, 50 staff; by the end of May, 731 patients, 285 staff; i.e. 1016 persons requiring regular feeding. Kitchen personnel—10.

In early August these numbers were reduced to 350 sick, 250 staff, but the expectation of the new wave of evacuees meant that kitchen staff were kept on. In mid-August the second transport produced 100-120 admissions daily. Two new kitchens had to be built. This time they were rather more suited to the needs of the hospitals. Each had a 400 l. and a 250 l. cauldron, with a few small saucepans. A special children's

[94] D. 39, p. 3.

kitchen was also organised, together with a staff canteen, for a staff of 477.

The crisis occurred on 1st Oct. 1942 with 1812 patients and 592 staff, a total of 2404 mouths [95] to feed, but the hard work of the 24 kitchen staff faced the task successfully, and all were fed.

The daily ration at the P.G.C. Hospital was as follows:

	General norm	Hospital norm	Children's norm
Bread	450 gm.	450 gm.	450 gm.
Meat	90 gm.	90 gm.	90 gm.
Milk	–	0.25 l.	0.25 l.
Butter	–	15 gm.	15 gm.
Cheese	10 gm.	10 „	10 „
Tea	1,5 „	1,5 „	1,5 „
Cocoa	4 „	4 „	4 „
Coffee	6 „	6 „	6 „
Flour	25 „	25 „	25 „
Eggs	–	0,5 „	0,5 „
Veg. (green	100 gm.	100 gm.	100 gm.
Potatoes	75 „	75 „	75 „
Fresh/dried fruit	100 „	100 „	100 „
Beans, peas, lentils, cereal	100 „	100 „	100 „
Butter (cooking)	15 „	15 „	15 „
Salt	10 „	10 „	10 „
Chocolate	–	–	15 „
Vinegar	0.0125 l.	0.0125 l.	0.0125 l.
Lemon	one	per week	
Sugar	50 gm.	50 gm.	50 gm.

From 21st April 1942 to 15th Jan. 1943 the P.G.C. Hospital used the following quantities: [97]

Bread	132273 kg	Oats	561 kg
Meat	37848 „	Other cereals	1578 „
Sugar	26313 „	Peas	782 „
Butter	7885 „	Beans	4148 „
Eggs	621013	Flour	11396 „
Milk	123986 l.	Chickens	36463
Green veg.	61646 kg	Wine	9688 bottles
Potatoes	59121 „	Marmalade	5598 kg
Onions	6408 „	Dried fruit	3972 „
Rice	8340 „	Fresh „	54780 „
		Oranges	20391 „

[95] In order to compare the proportions of medical personnel to patients I quote as my source, "The American Hospital", E. H. L. Corwin, Ph.D. p 119, 118.

[96] D. 9, p. 6.

[96a] D. 39, p. 3.

[97] D. 39, p. 5.

From the above figures, it can easily be seen that much more food was consumed (according to the second set of figures) than had been assumed by the Polish Mission, working on 2108 calories per patient per day. In general, a person needs between 2400 and 5000 calories per day, according to the amount of effort involving in his work. Bedridden patients are assumed to need 2000 cals./day (unless on special slimming diets, down to 800 cals./day). In the P.G.C. Hospital, as a result of extreme malnutrition, much more food was consumed, simply in order to bring the patients up to normal weight.

The critical reader will probably wonder about the reference to wine—9688 bottles in eight and a half months, or in other words 40 bottles per day. Was this for patients or personnel?

The answer is simple—everyone drank it. There was a need for large amounts of liquid in the Persian climate, and fruit juices such as are readily available today were not available then. The chlorinated water which was available was extremely unpleasant in taste, and this was remedied by adding small amounts of wine, which was cheap, pleasant and fortifying.

FINANCE SECTION [98]

Money paid out by the Polish Mission on behalf of the Ministry of Social Welfare:

Hospital personnel salaries	2,429,994	Rials
Benefits paid to civilian patients	268,020	„
Daily casual labour	72,352	„
Purchase of two microscopes	24,500	„
Hire of a microscope	3,600	„
Dental materials	12,240	„
Repair and decoration of buildings	5,479	„
Telephone bill	2,028	„
Personnel transport	1,790	„
Payment to the University for analyses	1,830	„
Electricity (lighting)	743	„
Total	2,822,542	„

Payments made by the Command of the Evacuation Base in Tehran:

To Polish Women's Army Service volunteers and military personnel:	953,341	Rials
Overall total	3,776,005	„

CANTEEN [99]

An important contribution to the P.G.C. Hospital finances was the

[98] D. 39, p. 13, 14. £=9 Tumans, varying between 8-12/£1. 1 Tuman =100Rls.

[99] D. 39, p. 13.

profit from the canteen opened in July '42 with the permission of the Polish Mission (22.9.42, log no. 7860/42)

Turnover		Profits to the Pol. Mission	Wages returned to the Pol. Mission
July 27th onwards	8100 Rls	162 Rls	192 Rls
Aug.	72000 „	1440 „	1150 „
Sept.	134000 „	2682 „	1150 „
Oct.	168613 „	3772 „	1200 „
Nov.	168450 „	3369 „	1200 „
Dec.	177000 „	3540 „	1200 „
Total	728163 „	14565 „	6092 „

TECHNICAL/CONSTRUCTION SECTION [100]

Work done from 15.4.1942 to 1. 11. 1942:

a) Building of a storeroom beside the laundry, 4.25 by 8.95 m, single-brick thickness, with a roof made of wooden boards covered with corrugated zinc-plate.
b) Kitchen hearths at the No. 1 building beside the Kazwin road, of 15.36 cu. m. in all.
c) Building outside walls in the joinery workshop, and internal walls in the food-store 6 cu. m.
d) Filling in holes in the No. 1 building walls (general stores and dental surgery), of 4.7 cu.m.
e) 6 shelters built of wood and canvas, of 380.8 sq. m. in area.
f) 2 communal lavatories (27 persons capacity) of wood and canvas.
g) Fencing off the kitchens and swimming-pool with wood.
h) Repairs to the kitchen hearths.
i) Placing netting on all windows in the No. 1 building.
j) Making doors and window-shutters from hardboard for Nos. 1 and 2 buildings.
k) 7 board trapdoors for septic tanks.
l) General small repairs.
m) Workshop production: 60 portable W.C.'s made of piping and zinc sheet, also (not mentioned in the stock-list) shelves in the storerooms, tables, benches, chairs, and clothes-hangers, not to mention the reconditioning of hand-pumps, door-locks and handles, and the fumigation apparatus. All surgical implements and tools were also sharpened here.

Work done in the former Polish Red Cross building between 1.11.1942 and 17.2.1942:

a) Making internal walls (single-brick) 2.6 cu. m.

[100] D. 39, p. 14.

b) Laying 9 m. of sewage pipe from the W.C.'s.
c) Lining the well with cement bricks.
d) Half-brick internal walls, 11.75 cu. m.
e) Making a wooden entrance gate.
f) Making 2 pairs of double doors.
g) Making 1 single door.
h) Covering 27 windows with canvas.
i) One three-cauldron hearth.
j) Workshops: 3 food-store shelves, frames for the food-store doors, doors and shelves for the Paediatric ward, main drains cleaning (3 times) in No. 1 building.

Building work between 17.12.42 and 1.1.43:

a) Food-store: shelving, meat-hooks, and floor-boards over the drains piping.
b) General stores: wooden partition, drains covered, shelving, and two doors glazed.
c) Store of patients' belongings: shelving, and partition.
d) Laundry: 2 hearths for 150 litre cauldrons, and a brick wall in the laundry store-room.
e) Plumbing and metalwork workshops: 2 partition walls, one brick, one wooden; a window-frame, a floor, and the bricking-up of a spare door and window.
f) Bricking up a door, covering the drains, levelling the earth beneath the floors.
g) Canteen: Brick floor, two doors, windows glazed, drains covered with boards.
h) Basement corridor: plastered, stairs repaired.
i) Field kitchen: 5 hearths and a hot-plate, a barn built with a hooped frame, covered with laths and boards, with zinc-plates around chimneys.
j) Civilian kitchens: Hearths for 6 cauldrons, and a hot-plate.
k) Brick outside W.C. for 15 persons.
l) Main building: glazing, framing and shaping the doors, positioning of 35 petrol heaters.
m) Bricking-round the rubbish tip.

MAIN OFFICE [101]

The organisation of specialised administrative sections in the P.G.C. Hospital was undertaken on the 12th of April 1942, when the hospital had moved to its new site. The main office began its work on the 23rd April, when the first document was logged. The P.G.C. Hospital personnel at the time consisted of 82 clerks and professional staff, and 64 manual workers, a total of 146 persons for 885 patients. The separate administrative sections functioned as follows:

[101] D. 39, p. 17.

a) CORRESPONDENCE

In the whole of the time dealt with in the report, 1828 letters were received, 1811 sent out. These were all unclassified material. Confidential letters were not noted in the report. At the busiest time, in October 1942, 402 letters arrived, and 341 were sent out.

On average approximately 21 letters and documents were dealt with daily. The highest daily number was 30 arriving and 26 sent off.

b) PERSONNEL RECORDS SECTION

This was the largest administrative task outside the correspondence section. The section leader was in charge of all personnel records, divided into civilian and military, and all daily records on patients and staff. Up to the end of December 1942, 1048 workers passed through the P.G.C. Hospital, 31 military personnel and 737 civilians. On 31.12.42 the P.G.C. Hospital personnel numbered 548, 111 military and 413 civilians; there were 1068 patients in the hospital that day.

c) PERSONNEL RECORDS [102]

P.G.C.H. Command:

No.	*Surname and name*	*Function*	*Period of employment*
1	Lieut. dr. Grębecki Zygmunt	Chief Med. Officer	from 29.3.42.
2	Cpt. dr Węgrzynowski Bolesław	Deputy Chief M.O. for military matters	from 17.9.42.
3	Sgt. dr. Syrota Maurycy	A.D.C. and Registrar who dealt with matters relating to auxiliaries	from 6.4.42.

CHAPLAINCY

a) present on 1.1.1943

1 Rev. Fr. Siepak Bronisław; Chief Chaplain; from 10.10.42.
2 Rev. Fr. Jankowski Antoni; 2nd Chaplain; from 20.10.42.
3 Rev. Fr. Jeskow Esiewłod; Orthodox Chaplain; no date.
4 Brother Szostak Hipolit; Organist; from 26.9.42.

b) left prior to 1.1.1943

5 Rev. Fr. Miszkurka Henryk; Chief Chaplain; from 14.4.-5.9.42.
6 Rev. Fr. Wojciechowski Marcin; Chaplain; from 14.4.-5.9.42.
7 Rev. Fr. Wojtas Tadeusz; Chaplain; October.

DOCTORS (Military)

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Mjr. dr. Kopeć Tadeusz; Paediatric Consultant; from 30.9.42.
2 Cpt. dr. Aleksandrowicz Izydor; Admission Med. Officer; from 1.10.42.

[102] D. 40, p. 1-19.

3 Cpt. dr. Polionis Bronisław; Surgeon; from 10.10.42.
4 Cpt. dr. Kolin Stefan; Senior Gynaecologist; from 1.10.42.
5 Sgt. dr. Szenberg Maksymillian; Sen. Paediatrician; from 19.7.42.
6 Sgt. dr. Wieselberg Samuel; Sen. Reg. in Gen. Med.; from 2.4.42.
7 Pt. dr. Kornela Helena; Registrar in Gen. Med.; from 7.9.42.
8 Pt. dr. Strzygowska-Alter Czesława; Registrar in Gen. Med.; from 11.10.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

9 Cpt. dr. Wyspiański Tad.; Surgeon; from September 42.
10 2nd Lieut. dr. Perelman Eliasz; Dep. Chief M.O.; Gynaecologist 9.4-20.10.42.
11 2nd Lieut. dr. Borenszain Feliks; Infectious Diseases Reg.; April.
12 2nd Lieut. dr. Goldberg Abraham; Infectious Diseases Reg.; April-August.
13 2nd Lieut. dr Helfgot Abraham; Consultant in Gen. Med. and Inf. Diseases; April-July.
14 2nd Lieut. dr. Jankiewicz Marian; Surgeon; 7.4.-21.7.42.
15 2nd Lieut. dr. Schweig Józef; Ophthalmic Surgeon; April.
16 2nd Lieut. dr. Statter Maksymilian; E.N.T Consultant; 14.4.-November.
17 Sgt. dr. Zaks Lemel; Reg. Gen. Med.; 5.4.-August.
18 Pt. dr. Trembałowicz Franciszek; Reg. Inf. Diseases; April-May.
19 Pt. dr. Bernasiewicz Janina; Reg. in Gen. Med.; September.
20 Pt. dr. Duczymińska Stan.; Sen. Obstetrician; 10.9.-November.
21 Pt. dr. Michniewicz-Wolicka Irena; Reg. Gen. Med.; 24.4.-August.
22 Pt. dr. Szwarcbart Maria; Reg. Inf. Diseases; July and October.
23 Pt. dr. Zamenhoff-Nietupska Olga; Reg. Gen. Med.; May-August.

Civilians

present on 1.1.1943

24 Dr. Doliński Eugeniusz; Deputy Chief M.O.; from 17.9.42.
25 Dr. Bujwid-Dzwill Helena; Sen. Obstetrician; from 15.9.42.
26 Dr. Cymbler Abram; Consultant of skin, venereal ward; from 8.9.42.
27 Dr. Głodzik Helena; Paediatrician; 13.9.42.
28 Dr. Hupert Wiktor; Consultant Gen. Med.; from 2.4.42.
29 Dr. Kanel Maksymillian; Consultant E.N.T.; from 15.10.42.
30 Dr. Mackiewicz Jakub; Consultant Psych.; from 7.9.42.
31 Dr. Mielnicka Eugenia; Paediatrician; from 10.9.42.
32 Dr. Podhajska Aleksandra; Paediatrician; from 5.9.42.
33 Dr. Peitzner Fryderyk; Paediatrician; from 14.9.42.
34 Dr. Sawicka Klara; Consult. Gynaec.; from 1.9.42.
35 Dr. Windisch-Seidler Wanda; Paediatrician; from 28.4.42.
36 Dr. Starzecki Romuald; Registrar Paed.; from 28.9.42.
37 Dr. Szpunar Danuta; Registrar Paed.; from 7.9.42.
38 Dr. Wasilewska Julia; Consult. Ophthal.; from 15.5.42.
39 Dr. Weintraub Anna; Consult. Gen. Med.; from 3.9.42.
40 Dr. Węgierko Stefania; Consult. Ophthal.; from 20.12.42.
41 Dr. Zapłatyński Kazimierz; Consult. Surgeon; from 10.4.42.
42 Dr. Zellner Edward; Reg. Inf. Diseases; from 25.10.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

43 Dr. Deutscher Włodzimierz; Hygiene Spec.; from April.
44 Dr. Filipowicz Wincenty; Reg. Inf. Diseases; April-October.
45 Dr. Graubart Fryderyk; Reg. Inf. Diseases; from 19.9.-Oct.
46 Dr. Hertz Stefan; Gen. Med.; October.
47 Dr. Kastelan Eugenia; Reg. Inf. Dis.; September-October.
48 Konecka-Kesler Irena; Director of Anal. and bact. lab; from 5.9.-December.
49 Dr. Przeworski Juliusz; Reg. Gen. Med.; from 16.9.-October.
50 Dr. Rymkiewicz Helena; Reg. Inf. Dis.; from Sept.-Oct.

FOREIGNERS

Present on 1.1.1943

51 Dr. Adler Aleksander, Russian Jew; Consult. Gen. Med. from 28.8.42.
52 Dr. Abdul-Gasim-Bahrani, Pers. Director of Lab.; from 25.8.42.
53 Dr. Bazargan Djajal, Pers.; Reg. Gen. Med.; from 28.8.42.
54 Dr. Hasratian Artaches, Armen.; Reg. Gen. Med.; from 10.10.42.
55 Dr. Khaczeturian Aram, Armen.; Reg. Gen. Med.; from 28.8.42.
56 Dr. Khazimi Sulejman, Turk.; Consultant T.B.; from 4.4.42.
57 Dr. Krymli Servar, Tartar; Consultant Gen. Med.; from 4.4.42.
58 Dr. Rev. Małyszew Włodzimierz, Russian; Consultant Inf. Dis.; from 7.4.42.
59 Dr. Petrozjan Ruben, Armenian; Reg:. Inf. Dis.; from 27.8.42.
60 Dr. Pezeszke Dżafar, Persian; Representative of Pers. Min. of Health; from 4.4.42.
61 Dr. Tejmur-Dolat Szachi, Persian; Lab. Assistant; from 25.8.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

62 Dr. Achmed-Zade Moim, Persian; Reg. Gen. Med.; from 28.8.-7.10.42.
63 Dr. Aftadilian Bahan, Armenian; Reg. Gen. Med.; from Oct.-Nov.
64 Dr. Alesker-Zade Fania, Persian; Cons. Paediatric.; April-15.5.42.
65 Dr. Khaczeturian Maria, Russian; Reg. Inf. Dis.; April-Nov. 42.
66.Dr. Khazim-Zade Selma, Persian; Paediatric.; April-Dec. 42.
67 Dr. Lewicki Piotr, Russian; Reg. Gen. Med.; October.
68 Dr. Lipman Maria, Jewish; Reg. nf. Dis.; Ajril-15.5.42.
69 Dr. Sawidis Piotr, Greek; Reg. Gen Med.; August-Oct. 42.
70 Prof. dr. Turkija Włodzimierz, Georgian; Consultant Tropic. Dis.; 20.5.-October 42.

DENTISTS

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Gutowska Emilia; Dental Clinic Director; from 29.3.42.
2 Grubert Zofia; Deputy-Director; from 13.9.42.
3 Kemler Rudolfina; Children Dent. Surg.; from 30.9.42.
4 Perekładowska Stanisława; Children Dent. Surg.; from 6.9.42.
5 Rosenthal Maksymilian; Dental Technician; from 10.4.42.
6 Rutkowska Maria; Dental Technician; from 15.9.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

7 Dąbrowska Maria; Dental Surgery Director; from 13.4.-Otc.
8 Nowakowska Stanisława; Dep. Dental Surgery Dir.; from 16.4.-Jul. 42.
9 Wiewiórska Halina; Dental Clinic Director; October 42.

PHARMACY

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Cadet. Off. M. Pharm. Słomski Jerzy; Director of Dispensary; from 4.4.42.
2 Cpl. Chemist May Zygmunt; Director of chem. store; from 9.4.42.
3 Pt. M. Pharm. Michniewicz Janina; Dep. Dir. of the Pharm.; from 24.4.42.
4 M. Pharm. Bublejówna Tatiana; Pharmacist; from 15.4.42.
5 M. Pharm. Dyszyńska Klara; Pharmacist; from 15.4.42.
6 M. Pharm. Korczewska Eugenia; Pharmacist; from 19.9.42.
7. M. Pharm. Mosżyńska Wanda; Pharmacist; from 20.10.42.

8. Pharm. Assis. Kozakiewicz Maria; from 28.9.42.
9. Pharm. Assis. Monkielewicz Stanisława; no date.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

10 M. Pharm. Czajkowska Jadwiga; Pharmacist; Sept.-Nov. 42.
11 M. Pharm. Kęstowicz Józef; Pharmacist; Sept.-Oct. 42.
12 M. Pharm. Kowalska Eugenia; Pharmacist; Sept.-Oct. 42.
13 Pt. M. Pharm. Lisocka Ludwika; Pharmacist; April-Oct. 42.
14 Cadet Off. M. Pharm. Rosenblat Maurycy; Pharmacist; April
15 Pte. M. Pharm. Rosenblat Maurycy; Pharmacist; April.
16 Pte. Kłos Janina, Assist. Pharm.; Oct.-Dec. 42.
17 Pte. Polankiewicz Maria; Assist. Pharm.; 18.4.-Nov. 42.
18 Pte. Słomska Janina; Clerk; 4.4.-Oct. 42.

Analytical and Bacteriological Laboratory

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Dąbrowska Zofia; Bact. Assistant; from 3.4.42.
2 Nusymowicz Róża; Chem. Eng.; Chemist; from 3.11.42.
3 Oppenheim Henrietta, M. Biol.; Chemist; from 1.10.42.
4 Wajdenfeld Czesława; Assistant; from 1.10.42.
5 Łobaczewska Felicja; Clerk; from 1.10.42.
6 Wochlfeilerowa Lola; Clerk; from 9.11.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

7 Borkowska Anna; Bacteriologist; Oct.-Nov 42.
8 Fruchtman Helena; Bacteriologist; Oct.-Nov. 42.

PRE-REGISTRATION DOCTORS

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Pt. Dudek Emilia; Assistant in the Internal Diseases ward; from 15.10.42.
2 Czekajowska Maria; Sanitary Inspector; from 15.10.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

3 Gray Marian in charge of transport of the sick and Assistant on the Gynaecol. ward; from 15.5. to October.

FELDCHERS

(Poles)

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Lipiński Edward; from 25.9.42.
2 Jabłoński Henryk, from 3.10.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

3 2nd Lieut. Schreiber Kazimierz; April-May 1942.

(Foreigners)

Present on 1.1.1943

4 Avidon Anna; Russian; from 1.4.42.
5 Deriabar Server; Tartar; from 16.7.42.

6 Łukianow Gabriel; Russian; from 19.6.42.
7 Makaschwili Margo; Georgian; from 1.7.42.
8 Merkazjan Asia; Persian; from 18.7.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

9 Iliasowa Eugenia; Russian; Sept.-Nov. 42.
10 Pajdar Miriam; Persian; Sept.-Oct. 42.
11 Saginian Asia; Persian; Oct.-Nov. 42.

SISTERS and NURSES

(Army)

1 Pte. Wyderka Halina; Matron; from 29.3.42.
2 Pte. Banaszel Olga; Assist. Matron; from 1.9.42.
3 Pte. Mirocznik Liza; Assist. Matron; from 2.5.42.

Present on 1.1.1943

4 Pte. Czarnota-Bojarska Zofia; from 20.4.42.
5 Pte. Januszowa Kazimiera; from 20.4.42.
6 Pte. Przystajko Stanisława; from 29.3.42.
7 Pte. Szot Kazimiera; from 1.4.42.
8 Pte. Unger Gizela; from 20.4.42.
9 Pte. Waygart Irena; from 22.4.42.
10 Pte. Zielińska Zofia; from 24.9.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

11 Pte. Gregorowicz Wiktoria; from 22.4.-Dec. 42.
12 Pte. Jabłońska Helena; April-Dec. 42.
13 Pte. Schmidt Janina; April-June 42.
14 Pte. Stawarska Maria; 20.4.-Dec. 42.
15 Pte. Szumowska Jadwiga; Sept.-Nov. 42.

(Civilian Nurses)

Present on 1.1.1943

16 Dudzik Danuta; from 2.4.42.
17 Epstein Anna; from 15.9.42.
18 Kucharska Helena; from 11.4.42.
19 Lewkowicz Cecylia; from 22.9.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

20 Radlińska Irena; May-Nov. 42.

WARD SISTERS and NURSES (Army) present on 1.1.1943

21 Pte. Banszel Wiktoria; from 1.10.42.
22 Pte. Banszel Aniela; from 1.10.42.
23 Pte. Banszel Danuta; from 1.10.42.
24 Pte. Banszel Halina; from 1.10.42.
25 Pte. Bączek Jadwiga; 1.5.42.
26 Pte. Brożkiewicz Janina; from 9.4.42.
27 Pte. Caputa Irena; from 2.4.42.
28 Pte. Czapska Władysława; from 30.3.42.

29 Pte. Czepiel Halina; from 15.10.42.
30 Pte. Czepiel Leokadia; from 8.8.42.
31 Pte. Czepiel Zofia; from 8.9.42.
32 Pte. Dobreńko Maria; from 23.9.42.
33 Pte. Duda Stanisława; from 12.10.42.
34 Pte. Dudzik Ewa; from 2.4.42.
35 Pte. Fitaszewska Jadwiga; from 2.5.42.
36 Pte. Garbacka Jadwiga; from 12.4.42.
37 Pte. Garbacka Zofia; from 1.4.42.
38 Pte. Hugot Franciszka; from 22.4.42.
39 Pte. Kaczkowska Jadwiga; from 24.9.42.
40 Pte. Kowalska Irena; from 12.9.42.
41 Pte. Kramer Dora; from 12.9.42.
42 Pte. Krupska-Dudkiewicz Antonina; from 20.4.42.
43 Pte. Krzyżanowska Bronisława; from 8.4.42.
44 Pte. Kulpa Helena; from 8.4.42.
45 Pte. Mackiewicz Zofia; from 20.4.42.
46 Pte. Panasowa Irena; from 2.5.42.
47 Pte. Przeździecka Wincentyna; from 1.8.42.
48 Pte. Przybyłowska Teodozja; from 2.4.42.
49 Pte. Rudek Weronika; from 21.4.42
50 Pte. Rutkowska Wanda; from 1.4.42.
51 Pte. Sawicz-Zabłocka Irena; from 25.9.42.
52 Pte. Serwacka Karolina; from 25.4.42.
53 Pte. Szafrańska Irena; from 7.4.42.
54 Pte. Tarasiewicz Albina; from 11.9.42.
55 Pte. Wiktorska Janina; from 23.4.42
56 Pte. Wojciechowska Zofia; from 2.4.42.
57 Pte. Wróblewska Janina; from 17.4.42.
58 Pte. Zdanowicz Barbara; from 10.10.42.

LEFT PRIOR TO 1.1.1943

(period of employment not given)

59 Pte. Bełkowska Seweryna
60 Pte. Bluj Jadwiga
61 Pte. Boumiłło Barbara
62 Pte. Bukowicka-Lipska Zofia
63 Pte. Chmiel Klementyna
64 Pte. Czaplińska Antonina
65 Pte. Czternastek Emilia
66 Pte. Fornalewicz Stanisława
67 Pte. Frosztega Maria
68 Pte. Godlewska Halina
69 Pte. Graff Irena
70 Pte. Grudzieńska Jadwiga
71 Pte. Grudzieńska Zofia
72 Pte. Janowska Maria
73 Pte. Januszewicz Halina
74 Pte. Jarzębek Janina
75 Pte. Juśkiewicz Janina
76 Pte. Kaźmierczuk Maria
77 Pte. Kowalska Janina
78 Pte. Krzemińska Janina
79 Pte. Kucharska Aleksandra
80 Pte. Leander Janina
81 Pte. Łopatniuk Irena
82 Pte. Nacówna Anna
83 Pte. Magier Amalia
84 Pte. Majewska Janina
85 Pte. Makowska Anna
86 Pte. Marusarzówna Bronisława
87 Pte. Motto Helena
88 Pte. Niżyńska Weronika
89 Pte. Olszewska Olga
90 Pte. Olszewska Maria
91 Pte. Pacanowska Edwarda
92 Pte. Pacanowska Stefania
93 Pte. Pietruszewska Irena
94 Pte. Porecka Zofia
95 Pte. Pyśniska Jadwiga
96 Pte. Sarwa Krystyna
97 Pte. Siatkowska Irena
98 Pte. Sikorska Danuta
99 Pte. Sitańska Jadwiga
100 Pte. Schmidt Krystyna
101 Pte. Smoleń Halina
102 Pte. Staszczak Maria
103 Pte. Steć Helena
104 Pte. Szletycka Małgorzata
105 Pte. Śliż Zofia
106 Pte. Średzińska Adela
107 Pte. Ustałkówna Stanisława
108 Pte. Wadlewska Halina
109 Pte. Wawrowska Maria
110 Pte. Wawrowska Wanda
111 Pte. Winiarska Barbara
112 Pte. Wojno Zofia
113 Pte. Wołyńska Halina
114 Pte. Wróblewska Zofia
115 Pte. Zaniewska Jadwiga
116 Pte. Zylberg Bluma

WARD SISTERS and NURSES (civilian)

Present on 1.1.1943

Present on 1.1.1943 (period of employment from:)

117 Atras Leokadia; from 4.9.42.
118 Baranowska Tekla; from 30.9.42.
119 Barenstein Renata; from 26.9.42
120 Blum Olga; from 24.10.42.
121 Broda Helena; from 20.4.42.
122 Ciążyńska Czesława; from 21.9.42.
123 Czogałło Wanda; from 15.9.42.
124 Chmielewska Helena; from 1.4.42.
125 Dunin-Wolska Halina; from 1.5.42.
126 Fuks Rywka; from 2.5.42.
127 Gicewicz Katarzyna; from 31.9.42.
128 Gołąbkowska Aleksandra; from 31.9.42.
129 Goraczko Regina; from 10.4.42.
130 Goślinowska Eugenia; from 10.4.42.
131 Góral Jadwiga; from 22.6.42.
132 Herse Zofia; from 4.12.42.
133 Huczko Jadwiga; from 4.12.42.
134 Jaroszewska Zofia; from 23.10.42.
135 Jóźwiak Paulina; from 23.10.42.
136 Kaczanowska Bengina; from 30.11.42.
137 Komarnicka Julia; from 14.11.42.
138 Konopa Jadwiga; from 28.9.42.
139 Korniak Jadwiga; from 1.12.42.
140 Kossowska Zofia; from 5.10.42.
141 Krajewska Maria; from 30.10.42.
142 Krupowa Bronisława; from 12.4.42.
143 Kucharowa Zofia; from 30.11.42
144 Kuźnicka Maria; from 7.10.42.
145 Martynów Zofia; no date.
146 Masłowska Irena; from 10.4.42.
147 Michajłow Dobrosława; no date.
148 Moszkowicz Franciszka; from 1.10.42.
149 Nabożna Maria; no date.
150 Neuman Ija; from 15.10.42.
151 Oliprowa Zbigniewa; from 4.4.42.
152 Onyszkiewicz Elżbieta; from 2.9.42.
153 Pastuszek Helena; from 15.4.42.
154 Pazderska Anna; from 10.4.42.
155 Petrulanis Helena; from 17.9.42.
156 Pęska Eugenia; from 5.10.42.
157 Reszczyńska Jadwiga; from 30.10.42.
158 Sabicka Maria; from 28.4.42.
159 Sawicz-Zabłocka Olga; from 5.5.42.
160 Skibowa Władysława; from 29.10.42.
161 Skorczyńska Ludwika; from 1.9.42.
162 Skracho Kamila; from 18.4.42.
163 Skracho Leokadia; from 18.4.42.
164 Skulska Jadwiga; from 16.9.42.
165 Szerer Zofia; from 1.5.42.
166 Tabertowa Anastazja; from 28.10.42.
167 Tintpulver Ida; from 15.10.42.
168 Urban Maria; from 23.10.42.
169 Warszawska Weronika; from 30.11.42.
170 Wyspiańska Janina; from 22.9.42.
171 Wyspiańska Alicja; from 4.12.42.
172 Zyndram-Kościałkowska Helena; from 22.4.42.
173 Żłobnicka Irena; from 13.4.42.
174 Żurakowska Eustola; from 30.10.42.

Left Prior to 1.1.1943 (period of employment unknown)

175 Algin Zofia
176 Augustowicz Helena
177 Bakenroth Maria
178 Binkiewicz Wanda
179 Lokar Helena
180 Ogrodowska Maria
181 Reznikow Zuzanna
182 Rosen Maria
183 Sikora Zofia
184 Trembałowicz Jadwiga

DIED

185 Pte. Kucharczyk Jadwiga
186 Niewczas Maria

AUXILIARIES (Military)

Present on 1.1.1943 (Period of employment unknown)

1 Pte. Ambrożkiewicz Maria
2 Pte. Cicha Stefania
3 Pte. Drozdowska Anna
4 Pte. Garbacka Serafina
5 Pte. Jankiewicz Ligia
6 Pte. Jankiewicz Kazimiera
7 Pte. Jankiewicz Franciszka
8 Pte. Juszczewska Felicja
9 Pte. Kopeć Sabina
10 Pte. Kopeć Aniela
11 Pte. Kopeć Helena
12 Pte. Kramarz Julia
13 Pte. Kądziołka Bronisława
14 Pte. Kulka Helena
15 Pte. Kołodziejczyk Felicja
16 Pte. Kołodziejczak Cecylia
17 Pte. Piątek Helena
18 Pte. Rydzowska Maria
19 Pte. Sosków Katarzyna
20 Pte. Starczewska Maria
21 Pte. Szafrańska Irena
22 Pte. Szuber Maria
23 Pte. Tumidajewicz Bronisława

Civilian

Present on 1.1.1943 (Period of employment unknown)

24 Adamowicz Maria
25 Andrzejowska Helena
26 Banaś Helena
27 Barańska Janina
28 Bara Stanisława
29 Bartyzel Maria
30 Bogdanowicz Felicja
31 Bojarczuk Zofia
32 Brzozowska Genowefa
33 Chmielewska Anna
34 Ciemochłowska Felicja
35 Cybulska Stefania
36 Dobrowolska Bogumiła
37 Dobrowolska Jadwiga
38 Dudzik Romana
39 Dworzak Maria
40 Gęszciecka Katarzyna
41 Garyś Helena
42 Gerc Wiktoria
43 Głodek Stanisława
44 Górska Helena
45 Graczkowska Stanisława
46 Griglik Maria
47 Halicka Grażyna
48 Iwanowska Helena
49 Jaworska Aniela
50 Johan Teodora
51 Jóźwiak Paulina
52 Klaudel Maria
53 Klecuk Maria
54 Kołodziejczyk Sabina
55 Komoda Emilia
56 Korniewska Stefania
57 Korniewska Ludwika
58 Kosiorek Klementyna
59 Kossowska Kazimiera
60 Kot Kazimiera
61 Kotnik Stanisława
62 Kotarba Zofia
63 Kowalska Ludwika
64 Kowalska Katarzyna
65 Kozikowska Stanisława
66 Kozłowska Halina
67 Kozłowska Jadwiga
68 Kozłowska Zofia
69 Krasnodębska Maria
70 Kuczerska Czesława
71 Kurela Franciszka
72 Kuszczak Maria
73 Laskowska Maria
74 Lemańczyk Jadwiga
75 Listek Leonarda
76 Łozowska Bronisława
77 Łukasińska Maria
78 Łuczyńska Karolina
79 Łuczyńska Waleria
80 Maksymowicz Maria
81 Marzec Maria
82 Masłowicz Maria
83 Maślińska Rozalia

84 Mazurkiewicz Adela
85 Mazurkiewicz Maria
86 Michałowska Maria
87 Miś Genowefa
88 Mureń Karolina
89 Muszyńska Maria
90 Muszyńska Stanisława
91 Oczepko Halina
92 Ostapowicz Jadwiga
93 Owsińska Franciszka
94 Pala Bronisława
95 Pałaszniuk Olga
96 Pietkiewicz Maria
97 Piotrowska Mieczysława
98 Plechawska Olga
99 Płotkin Wanda
100 Płusa Aleksandra
101 Porankiewicz Kazimiera
102 Reizel Marta
103 Rutkowska Regina
104 Siemiernik Weronika
105 Siergiejczyk Zofia
106 Skibicka Anna
107 Skibińska Marcela
108 Słomka Henryka
109 Smaciarz Janina
110 Sobczyńska Maria
111 Sopaczek Irena
112 Soska Helena
113 Sosnowska Stanisława
114 Starczewska Zofia
115 Szakalska Stanisława
116 Szander Natalia
117 Szejdzis Jadwiga
118 Szołomicka Leokadia
119 Szuberla Józefa
120 Sumska Janina
121 Szwarcowska Maria
122 Szymborska Helena
123 Świętorzecka Stefania
124 Tomaszewska Jadwiga
125 Trofimowicz Maria
126 Tur Bronisława
127 Tyburska Maria
128 Wiśniewska Maria
129 Wojciechowska Zofia
130 Wojczyszyn Stefania
131 Zaręba Maria
132 Ziarkowska Feliksa
133 Zyngut Stefania

ADMINISTRATION (Military)

Present on 1.1.1943

1 Cpt. Hehler Henry; P.G.C. Quartermaster; from 10.4.42.
2 Sgt. Major Zawistowski Czesław; In Charge of ordnance section; from 1.10.42.
3 Pte. Kapałczyńska Józefa; in charge of Stores (gen.); from 12.4.42.
4 Pte Borowska Anastazja; in charge of Food stores; from 12.4.42.
5 Pte Komarnicka Barbara; Secretary of the Head Office; from 12.4.42.
6 Pte Uhorczak Jadwiga; Admissions Clerk; from 12.4.42.
7 Pte Deutschberger Maria; in charge of the Canteen; from 18.7.42.
8 Pte Jurksztas Wanda; in charge of the Laundry; from 7.5.42.
9 Pte Jurksztas Petronela; in charge of the Kitchens; from 12.4.42.
10 Pte Andrzejewska Barbara; Quartermaster's clerk; from 12.4.42.
11 Pte Zajączkowska Czesława; Typist; from 11.5.42.
12 Pte Krawczyńska Halina; Typist; from 11.5.42.
13 Pte Baranowska Irena; Surgical clerk; from 12.4.42.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

14 Lieut. Tymczak Wiaczesław; Admin. Officer; from 15.4-Nov. 12.
15 Lieut. Haliński Konstanty; Supply Officer; from 15.5.-Nov. 42.
16 Sgt. Szczechuła Aleksander; San. Coy Sgt. major; from May-June 42.
17 Pte Bokun Helena; Wages Clerk; from 12.4.-Nov. 42.
18 Pte Sienkiewicz Danuta; Quartemas. Clerk; from 12.4.-Sept. 42.
19 Pte Grzeszyńska Helena; in charge of Laundry; from 12.4.-Sept. 42.
20 Pte Nowosielska Zuzanna; in charge of Kitchen; from 12.4.-Sept. 42.
21 Pte Gajdowa Janina; Surgery Clerk; from 12.4.-Dec. 42.
22 Pte Przysuska Ewa; Interpreter; from April 42.
23 Pte Lubczańska Krystyna; Quartermas. Clerk; from 12.4-Nov. 42.
24 Pte Reder Zofia; Quartermas. Clerk; from Oct.-Nov. 42.

Civilians

Present on 1.1.1943

25 Aleksandrowicz Halina; Clerk; from 20.12.42.
26 Aleksandrowicz Weronika; Telephonist; from 20.12.42.

27 Aniołkowska Janina; Clerk; from 25.11.42.
28 Bogchwalska Maria; Clerk; from 25.11.42.
29 Baras Eadwarda; Clerk; from 25.10.42.
30 Bogucki Wojciech; Technician; from 10.10.42.
31 Czyżycka Waleria; Clerk; from 6.6.42.
32 Dobrowolska Zofia; Clerk; from 16.4.42.
33 Górniewicz Maria; Telephonist; from 15.8.42.
34 Grzesik Maria; Clerk; from 20.4.42.
35 Jakimczuk Aleksandra; Chief Cook; from 1.4.42.
36 Klimkowska Maria; Store-keeper; from 25.4.42.
37 Krzywicka Genowefa; Q.M. Clerk; from 12.4.42.
38 Lalka Maria; Surgery Clerk; from 25.11.42.
39 Łopuszyńska Stefania; Store-keeper, food; from 25.11.42.
40 Kończa Ludwika; Welfare; from 25.10.42.
41 Makarianc Mary; Interpreter; from 10.4.42.
42 Oppenheim Irena; Q.M. Clerk; from 20.14.42.
43 Oszywa Henryk; Sup. Off. Clerk; from 1.10.42.
44 Pakosz Barbara; Welfare; from 20.10.42.
45 Pęska Olga; Surgery Clerk; from 28.4.42.
46 Pisulowa Janina; Welfare; from 10.10.42.
47 Pociejowa Maria; Surgery Clerk; from 10.10.42.
48 Popławska Zofia; Store-keeper (food); from 23.4.42.
49 Reh Teofila; Surgery Clerk; from 15.4.42.
50 Rutkowska Halina; H.Q. Clerk; from 18.9.42.
51 Stępień-Bojnowska Zofia; Clerk; from 26.9.42.
52 Szpaczyńska Jadwiga; Welfare; from 20.10.42.
53 Szwellengrebel Eufrozyna; Surgery Clerk; from 6.4.42.
54 Śliwa Andrzej; H.Q. Clerk; from 29.10.42.
55 Wenzel Danuta; Surgery Clerk; from 6.4.42.
56 Wodzicka Jadwiga; Telephonist; from 28.8.42.

Left Prior to 1.1.1943

57 Grim Emilia; Telephonist; October.
58 Gultman Karol; Storekeeper (food); July.
59 Dr. Herstein Adolf; Chief legal/testatory adviser; Oct.-Nov. 42.
60 Hołdanowicz Antoni; Chief Technician; October.
61 Niemętowska Olga; Surgery Clerk; July-Oct. 42.
62 Radecka Janina; H.Q. Clerk; April-May 42.
63 Schmidt Witalia; H.Q. Clerk; April-May 42.
64 Stepek Zofia; H.Q. Clerk; April-May 42.
65 Szancer Irena; Surgery Clerk; August-October.
66 Tabaczyńska Irena; in charge of Welfare Section; 20.10.-Dec. 42.

MILITARY POLICE POST [103]

Present on 1.1.1943 (Period of employment unknown)

1 Staff Sgt. Dizad Franciszek
2 Sgt. major Nudzkowski Józef
3 Sgt. major Tretuta Michał
4 Sgt. Górski Jan
5 Cpl. Grupa Wiktor
6 Cpl. Nagaj Marian

CENTRAL SANITARY STORES

Present on 1.1.1943

1 M. Pharm. Kęstowicz Józef; Stores Director; from October 42.
2 M. Pharm. Talarska Zofia; Deputy Director; from May 42.
3 Prof. Chemist. Cpl Cieśluk Mieczysław; Warehouseman; from Sept. 42.

[109] The numbers of administrative personnel do not tally with the numbers in D.40, pp. 1-19. The document lists each name twice where 2 functions were performed by the same person.

4 Chemist Cpl Maj Zygmunt; Warehouseman; from January.
5 Polankiewicz Maria; Assistant Chemist; Nov. 42.
6 Pte Słomska Janina; Book-keeper.

Left prior to 1.1.1943

7 Cpt. M. Pharm. Strzeszewski, Edmund; Head of Stores; May-Oct. 42.
8 2nd Lieut. Węgling, Artur; Dep. Head of Stores; May-Dec. 42.

Arrived in Jan. 1943

1 Mjr. dr. Rogowski, Julian; Chief M.O.
2 Lt. Col. dr. Brończyk Stanisław; Deputy M.O. Consultant for E.N.T.
3 Mjr. dr Banasz Artur; Consultant Urolog.
4 Mjr. dr. Peski Ernest; Consultant Gen. Med.
5 Lieut. dr. Durst Fryderyk; Consultant Gynaecol.
6 Dr. Siedlecki Marian; Consultant Surgeon.

REPORTS

A third and very important section of the administration dealt with statistics. The period from the 28th of April 1942 was a particularly difficult one, in terms of compiling data, since exact data about patients and personnel was not usually available. The section head would compile various sets of statements on a daily basis from the daily medical reports, and copies would be sent to all interested parties, including the Polish Mission (Ministry of Social Welfare), The Evacuation Base in Tehran. Copies were also sent to the Iranian Ministry of Public Health for inclusion in their reports, via their delegate, Dr. Pezeshek Dżafar.

Types of report:
1. Daily report on the state P.G.C.H. personnel
2. „ „ „ „ „ „ patients
3. Annotated reports on the sick beyond Tehran
4. „ „ „ „ personnel „ „
5. Reports on the state of military patients
6. Telephoned reports on the state of the sick, broken down according to sickness.

Also on the first and 15th of every month, a 15-day report on the state of the permanent and seconded personnel was compiled; and each month a new report on the movement of the sick, split up in sections according to ambulant and bedridden patients, together with details of the number of consultations given, and a full list of the dead that month, by name. Diagnostic inaccuracies also were noted, and this made the life of those working in the statistics section extremely difficult, since wrong diagnoses were often corrected after the publication of particular reports. As can be seen, the work was not easy. It is all the more creditable that it was done so successfully. One has to forgive the Administration the omission of some details about the period of employment of certain personnel, since these were not easy to confirm.

What astonishes me is the total disappearance of the list of the dead. Since each death had to be certified, the names of dead, as I have already mentioned, were presented in monthly reports. These names have simply disappeared, and in spite of prolonged searches on the part of a number

of persons, no trace of them has ever been found. It is rather sad to think that what may be simply an administrative blunder means that many of my brothers-in-arms have joined the ranks of the nameless dead—unknown, and unmourned.

Of many nations which have suffered and fought for their freedom, our own has probably more scars than most. We have fought also for the freedoms of others, and have had to stand by and watch these same people sell our freedom for "peace". Let us never forget those who gave up their lives in our fight—whether on the battlefield, in the labour-camps, or in the hospitals.

LEGAL (TESTATORY SECTION) [104]

The P.G.C.H. administrative headquarters arranged passports for the patients and personnel through the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy, in co-operation with the Embassy's legal department. This work was done by a special clerk, who also arranged all matters relating to wills. All documents and valuables were sent to the Consular department, where they were sorted out.

On the recommendation of the Chief M.O. of the P.G.C.H., objects up to a value of 1000 Rials could be given directly to the beneficiaries of a will, unless they were juveniles, in which case the guardians were given possession of the objects. Apart from this, the legal section clerk dealt with bread and sugar ration cards in conjunction with the permit cards issued to visitors by the Iranian Police Prefecture. He was also responsible for all legal advice to patients, personnel, and all their families.

ADMISSIONS AND CASUALTY SECTION [105]

In one sense this was the heart of the hospital, since all patients had to pass through it. The work was on 24 hour basis, with three twelve-hour shifts arranged so that every third change allowed one shift a full day off. All details of presenting symptoms for every patient, and a list of possessions and clothing deposited were carefully noted here. All money, documents, and valuables had to be deposited as a rule, and were looked after by the hospital's paymaster, who issued receipts for everything entering his possession.

Although the rule about depositing valuables was inflexible, it often occurred that patients hid their valuables about their persons, then had them lost or stolen, which caused untold difficulties, in spite of the fact that the P.G.C.H. clearly stated that it would bear no responsibility for loss or theft of any unregistered object. Often the problem was simple lack of trust on the part of the patient, which after their recent experiences was totally unsurprising.

[104] D. 39, p. 20.
[105] D. 39, p. 20.

All objects were stored in numbered compartments after disinfection. These stores were directly managed by the Director of the admissions section.

A doctor was present in Casualty between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. Outside these hours, the duty doctor would be on call for any problems. All the doctors performed rigorous examinations, particularly when a child was brought in, when a paediatrician would also be called, to ensure that no diagnostic error might occur which might lead to the spreading of a new infection on the Paediatric wards. Measles, with its often tragic aftermath was particularly looked for.

The Casualty section had its own pharmaceutical facilities, since often a caffeine and camphor injection was needed to bring round patients unconscious from the 379 km. journey from Pahlevi, who were also exhausted and emaciated. Only then could personal details be elicited, after which the patient was washed, shaved, given a haircut and clean clothing, and taken to the relevant ward.

Highest no. of admissions in one day - - - - 177
„ „ „ discharges „ „ „ - - - - 162

Over the whole of the time covered by the report there were 13,427 admissions and 12,359 discharges.

During the second wave of evacuation the storage in Admissions was geared to 1,200 patients, whereas the highest number on any one day was 1,812, many arriving direct from Pahlevi (sometimes as many as 77 per day) who arrived complete with all their worldly goods, such as quilts, cases, baskets, etc.

Since many of the owners of these goods were unconscious, and the Hindu ambulance drivers left the baggage on the ground without any explanation (generally they spoke no European language), within a short time a sizeable pile accumulated with unidentified owners. With the permission of the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare, these goods were stored in Civilian camp No. 2, where claimants could be examined as to their credibility.

Since many patients arrived semi- or totally naked, the P.G.C.H. took it upon itself to clothe them when they were discharged. This led to very unpleasant scenes in some cases where patients occasionally raised sheer hell as a result of nothing more than a dislike for the style or colour of the clothes which they had been given. On many occasions the Chief Quartermaster or even the Chief M.O. had to intervene personally.

Apart from all this, the admissions section had to compile daily reports on the movement of patients, broken down as follows:

a) Military and civilian patients

b) Male, female, and child patients

c) Infectious and non-infectious cases grouped according to particular illnesses

Finally, it was the responsibility of the Admissions section to provide the following:

a) Ration cards
b) Discharge cards signed by a doctor
c) Malarial "passport" for malaria victims
d) Stores and uniforms order cards for military patients.

HYGIENE (SANITATION AND ORDNANCE SECTIONS) [106]

In the reports of the P.G.C.H.'s activities these three sections submitted separate reports, but it is obvious from the documents that their activities were virtually identical, so I have grouped them together in my description. These activities were largely concerned with the erection and dismantling of the tents and beds, taking the dead to the morgue, digging latrines and septic tanks and disinfecting them, and the regular cleaning and disinfection of the portable latrines. The Hygiene section particularly was concerned with fumigation and disinfection. The disinfector was a 2000 gm/cm steam pressure store where the clothes of the patients (with the exception of leather, blankets, mattresses and pillows) were placed. Pillowcases, bedlinen, towels, nightwear and dressing-gowns were sent to the hospital laundry where they were soaked in a 4% creoline solution for some hours, then boiled. Blankets and nightwear from the infectious wards were sent to the British laundries.

Running mains water was only supplied to the buildings, so the rest of the area was supplied from a tank which was fed from an underground river [107]. Only boiled and chlorinated water was used for drinking.

Maintaining tidiness and cleanliness on the site of the hospital was particularly difficult because of the large numbers of outsiders who passed through the site regularly. In the initial stages, when the P.G.C. Hosp. was beside the No. 1 civilian camp, a public road went through the middle of the site. Later, at the Kazwin road site, the central building housed the British Army Command.

The Hygiene section was responsible for the cleanliness of the site, of the stores, and of all the personnel of the kitchen, laundry, sewing-rooms and workshops. Both sections had some tens of persons in their ranks, but neither names nor actual numbers are known.

Up to the end of 1942 there was a Military Police station on the site, which was responsible for general safety and order, but this function was later taken over by the Guard-house and sentries, together with a special unit responsible for safety.

Transport problems were dealt with by hiring a bus and a lorry. These were used to bring personnel to work and take them home, to take patients to the X-ray laboratory, to the psychiatric hospital, or to the civilian camps when discharged. They also brought stores and food from the town. A special bus-service ran between Tehran and the P.G.C.H a few times every day.

[106] D. 39, p. 22-24.
[106a] D. 39, p. 25.

The switchboard was manned 24 hours a day by three telephonists (mentioned in the personnel records earlier).

EDUCATION SECTION [107]

Apart from the overwork of a hospital, it is also in part a research laboratory where doctors widen their knowledge in both their own and other areas of medicine. In other words, a constant ongoing process of education takes place. At the P.G.Civ.H. the problems of keeping up with development were made much greater by the massive volume of work, and also the fact of having to deal with a number of diseases which they knew only on nodding acquaintance from text-books read during training. The lack of books at the P.G.C.H. was an additional problem. Diseases such as pellagra and avitaminosis were almost unknown, and even known diseases often ran a different course in this climate, as for example whooping-cough which here had a 9.5% mortality rate.

These problems were dealt with by organising a series of lectures from early June 1942 onwards. The average attendance was about 50. Up to the end of 1942 there were 23 lectures on the following topics: [108]

1. Typhus,	Dr. Hupert
2. Measles and its complications,	„ Jankiewicz
3. Typhoid,	„ Hupert
4. Paratyphoid,	„ Filipowicz
5. *Psittacosis*,	„ Wasilewski
6. Malaria,	„ Helfgot
7. Dysentery,	„ Grebecki
8. Dengue fever,	„ Wasilewski
9. Whooping-cough,	„ Szenberg
10. The course of venereal diseases,	„ Grębecki
11. *Otitis media*,	„ Statter
12. Measles,	„ Kopeć
13. Scarlet fever,	„ Kopeć
14. Pellagra,	„ Syrota
15. Pellagra — as seen in patients,	„ Adler
16. Hormonal mechanisms,	„ Kolin
17. Tumour of the coccyx,	„ Mackiewicz
18. The course of typhoid in the U.S.S.R.	„ Doliński
19. Malaria,	„ Mer (Brit. Army)
20. Trachoma,	„ Węgierko
21. *Lishmaniasis*,	„ Cymbler
22. Atypical malarial states,	„ Krimli
23. On treating malaria,	„ Khazimi

[107] According to information in D. 39: "a tank of water taken from an underground mountain river" — probably was not "mountain stream", but one of the many characteristic Iranian "kanat" — hydraulic system — c.f. E. Filia's article "Ghanats" — Beirut file, pp. 175-77, Beirut 1949.

[108] D. 41, p. 1.

During the second wave of evacuations of Polish civilians from the U.S.S.R., in September, as a result of growing numbers of malarial patients, three P.G.C.H.'s doctors were sent on a course organised by the British Army Medical Corps, run by the well-known malariologist, Professor Dr. Mer (Colonel). After completing the course, the three doctors then shared their knowledge with the others at the P.G.C.H. through a series of lectures given by them.

It must be admitted that although all the doctors throught they knew about malaria and its treatment, the course showed them the inadequacies of their knowledge, particularly of tropical malaria. The symptoms are so varied, and the diagnosis so difficult, that one must have much experience of dealing with the disease and great diagnostic skill in order to spotit. For example, suspected dysentery often turned out to be Haemocolitis malarica, schizophrenia and comatose states — *malaria cerebri*, and a number of cases of acute meningitis were cured by anti-malarial treatment. With consultations, lectures, specialist help, and the facilities of the Hindu Hospital's laboratories, diagnostic and curative techniques improved quickly.

Apart from the lectures for the doctors, I have already mentioned the two courses were organised for nurses. Their programme was as follows [109]:

Subject	*Hrs*	*Lecturer*
1. Anatomy and physiology	10	Dr. Hupert
2. Bacteriology	3	„ Perelman
3. Hygiene	3	„ Syrota
4. Infectious diseases	7	„ Perelman
5. Emergency first-aid	4	„ Grębecki
6. Aseptis and antiseptis	5	„ Jankiewicz
7. Tropical diseases	5	„ Filipowicz
8. Dressings and techniques	3	„ Jankiewicz
9. Medicines	2	„ Syrota
10. Basic nutrition	1	„ Syrota
11. The duties of nurses in relation to the sick	5	Sister Wyderka
12. Gases	3	Dr. Grębecki
13. "Taboo" subjects	4	„ Wasilewski
14. Basic general problems in midwifery	3	„ Perelman
15. Transporting the sick	1	„ Perelman
16. Nursing and the Christian ethic	2.	Rev. Fr. Miszkurka

Apart from these courses, there were lectures to broaden the knowledge of the nurses on subjects such as hygiene and feeding of newly born, prophylaxis and the treatment of venereal disease, and others.

[109] D. 41, p. 2.

SOCIAL/CULTURAL SECTION [110]

As spare-time activities, this section organised trips to the area around Tehran, and to the Archeological museum. Sometimes social evenings were organised at the Soldiers' Theatre, or cinema.

The Soldiers' Theatre was a particular attraction for both patients and personnel as was the Folk-Theatre, and the Scout shows. The joy in the faces of the sick was a great reward for the players. The children, of course, looked forward to St. Nicholas' Eve.

Others events were organised on Polish national and Iranian anniversaries, and church feast-days. In addition to this a number of books and periodicals were obtained with difficulty from Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Great Britain, written in French, English and Polish.

INFORMATION BUREAU [111]

In the early days, before this bureau was organised, hordes of people wandered aimlessly around the hospital site, hoping to find friends and relatives. The bureau was organised to meet these needs, and together with the Social and Cultural section was set up as a separate administrative unit under the auspices of the administrative H.Q. It was run with great devotion and enthusiasm by Zofia Dąbrowska, who helped everyone as best as she could with information and support. In nine months 7000 enquiries were dealt with, and 13,000 visitors passes were issued.

CHILDREN'S WELFARE SECTION [112]

The Polish Ministry of Social Welfare sent five volunteer youth-leaders to the P.G.C. Hospital. These girls put in a tremendous amount of work to organise and run a large children's playroom and decorate it. Often the decorations were done by the children themselves. The effect of this room on the children is best described in the words of Irena Tabaczyńska, who was in charge of the section: "We started by organising a playroom in a huge hall on the 2nd floor. Here the children came who were not seriously ill. At first a few would come and shyly peer through the door, but would only enter with a lot of coaxing. With each day the numbers grew, and they came more and more willingly. When one day I heared the sound of spontaneous laughter from the children, I knew we had achieved our goal. Now almost all the children were coming to us and those who could not get out of bed were regularly visited by us with books and toys for them".

The Children in the playroom gradually learned to read, write and sing. Music had such a fascination for them that they could sit by a

[110] D. 41, p. 4.
[111] D. 41, p. 5.
[112] D. 41, p. 6.

gramophone for hours listening to the records. The children in the isolation wards were also looked after.

Apart from the children of the sick, there was a fair-sized group of children of the P.G.C.H. personnel. A school was organised for about 30 of them [113], where two teachers gave lessons in Polish, arithmetic and basic French. The Chief Chaplain taught religion. Although there were problems with a lack of books and facilities and the variation in age of the children, the idea was to usefully fill the time in the years when formal schooling was nonexistent.

SCOUTING [114]

This was an important addition to the activities at the P.G.C.H., and the 56 young nurses who joined the grup, under the leadership of Jadwiga Góralówna did a lot to boost morale in the hospital with the events they organised.

CONCLUSION

I feel that on the basis of the material available to me, I have described the most important period in the work of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran, from its formation, through the two waves of evacuation from the U.S.S.R.

The documents I have used cover the period between the 29th of March, 1942, and 1st of January, 1943. After this date (and in fact at that time), a new period began — that of running down and closing the hospital.

After the peak number of patients (during the second evacuation) was passed the numbers diminished steadily as they were moved further, mainly to India and Africa.

Up to March 1943, the P.G.C.H. had two Chief Medical Officers: Lieut. dr. Zygmunt Grębecki, who was handing over the running of the hospital, and Mjr. dr. Julian Rogowski who was taking over this function. From the information given to me I found that the P.G.C.H. remained in Tehran for about a year, after which it was evacuated to Tanganyika [115], where it was finally disbanded. Shortly after the hospital's arrival in Africa the Chief M.O. died, so I was told by Dr. Grebecki (the former Chief M.O.). It seems likely that the rest of the personnel and equipment was then split up between various Polish communities in Kenya, Tanganyka and Uganda. In this way one of the largest Polish hospitals was disbanded. I call it one of the largest, since it had over 2,000 beds, which made it larger than military base hospitals (usually having 1,500 beds), and much larger than the prewar District hospitals

[113] D. 41, p. 7.
[114] D. 41, p. 7.
[115] It is difficult to give the exact date of evacuation of the Hospital, since this took part in stages. The final transport (those patients unable to move as a result of their illness) stayed in Tehran much longer.

in Poland, which rarely numbered over 100 beds. Corvin [116] in his classification of American hospitals defines them as follows: very small — below 25 beds, medium — 50-149 beds, large — 150 beds and over. Hospitals of 1,000 beds are not mentioned.

In ending my study of this short but important moment in our Polish history, I quote the words of the Papal Nuncio, who described the work done by the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran as "simply miraculous", produced by "reason and compassion"; for my own part, I wish to stress that I have given the full list of personnel at the P.G.C.Hosp. in Tehran in order that they may in this way perhaps be honoured and remembered.

I have recently been informed that the President of the Polish Government (at present in exile) has given a number of decorations to persons concerned with the work at the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran. Of course ,many cannot be contacted, or have died, and so will never receive their decorations, but the gesture has at least been made. The fact remains that all the personnel of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran fulfilled their obligation in the sight of God, their Country and their Fellowman.

POSTSCRIPT

In order to satisfy myself that I had not committed any major medical blunders in the text, I turned to General Marian Dietrich, former D.D.M.S. 2nd Polish Corps, and the P.R.C. (Deputy Director of Medical Services for the 2nd Polish Corps, and the Polish Resettlement Corps), with the plea that he comment on this study. Below I quote his opinion in full:

Dr. Marian Dietrich,
former D.D.M.C. 2nd Polish Corps, and P.R.C.
London, 10.12.1974

In analysing the admission and discharge figures in the period 28th March — 31st December 1942 — I see that the greatest number of sick arrived between 15th August — 31st December, at which time the hospital was to some extent at least equipped in materials and personnel. This meant a man of about 50 admissions daily, which on a three-shift 24 hour system is a large number, but absolutely possible to deal with.

What increased the difficulty was the parallel flow of discharges, which confirms the Herculean efforts of the personnel in coping with this.

I read Dr. Michal Kruszynski's typescript "The Civilian Hospital in Tehran", at one sitting.

I found it a fascinating description of the spontaneous efforts of a group of people facing extraordinary difficulties, who overcame them in almost an auto-suggestive manner by simply saying: we must, we must, we must; rather like troops going into battle.

Dr. Marian Dietrich.

[116] E. H. L. Corvin, "The American Hospital", — I use this reference since I do not know of any other serious pieces of research on the subject. Certainly within Polish historical literature, mine is the first, as far as I know.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Readers of the history of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran, which illustrates the state of health of Poles evacuated from Russia to Persia in 1942, might be interested why I wrote it.

In the first instance, as often happens, I found myself (by coincidence) in a position to read the reports of the hospital's activities, which were corroborated by a series of other documents.

Moreover, this is a fascinating chapter of history in which I myself took part. I know personally the depths of despair hidden in the camps of the U.S.S.R.; and I have known the moment of liberation, and the joy of crossing the Russian border into Persia. I have seen those human shadows for whom this hospital meant salvation.

Of one-and-a-half million Poles deported to the U.S.S.R. only an approximate 115,000 are in the happy position of having returned. (A).

These figures indicate the tiny percentage of the whole. However, if we bear in mind that 90% of these were Polish soldiers, destined within a few months to be fighting for the freedom of Poland, we will see their importance. If we also consider that these were people who had learnt the terrible secrets of exile in the U.S.S.R., and that these same people might — to some small extent — open the eyes of th West to the falsity of the Kremlin's propaganda — we begin to see their historical relevance.

It is worth noting that the emigré Poles today are in large measure from this group, and represent the only voice of a free Poland.

Another point — although the efforts of Gen. Anders were rewarded by the freeing of 115,000 people, it is questionable whether this would have proved worth-while were it not for the control of an outbreak of Asiatic cholera within the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Teheran by its own personnel — coupled with their necessary concealment of the outbreak from the authorities.

The events surrounding the incident occurred in the second half of April 1942 (B), before the arrival of the second transport of evacuees (August 1942). It seems to me that if the outbreak of cholera had not been concealed (which was not easy under the understandably wary eyes of the Persian medical team seconded to the hospital by the Persian Ministry of Health) then the further evacuations might have run into difficulties — or indeed been stopped. It should be remembered that most of this first evacuation consisted of troops who could only have strengthened the ranks of the Carpathian Brigade in Africa, with a few sailors, airmen and civilians (C). In other words the 2nd Polish Corps with its long and famous roll of honour might never have been formed, and the poorly-armed troops would in all probability have disappeared and died somewhere in Asian Russia — which was part of the Soviet strategy at that time (D).

I would even dare to suggest that the superhuman efforts of General Anders which led to the evacuation hung on a thread at the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran; — surely this is in itself a sufficiently important historical moment to justify this study.

The first transport of evacuees brought with them not only cholera, but also *Typhus exantematicus*. The second transport brought — Oriental (Bubonic) plague. This, too, had to be concealed, and was dealt with by radical disinfection.

These facts, obviously not generally known before, were what prompted me to write this book on the basis of the documents made available to me, particularly by the late Dr. Z. Grębecki to whom I am deeply grateful.

THE SOURCES

Since my sources have been completely unknown until now (with the exception of Gen. Stanisław's Kopański's "War Memoirs 1939-45", which have been used in part in some publications) I describe in detail:

In order to give the reader an idea of the conditions in which the hospital was set up and functioned, I have included here two letters in response to my request for further information, from General Anders, and from Mr. W. Styburski (former Delegate of the Polish Government in Tehran).

(A.)

General W. Anders

20, Princes Gate,
London S.W.7.
25th May, 1955.

My dear Mr. Kruszyński,

I have been rather late in answering your letter wherein you asked for further details regarding the preparations made by the Polish military authorities in Persia for the civilian population evacuated from the Soviet Union.

Not trusting my memory alone, I caused enquiries to be made in our personal archives. From these it would seem that your suppositions and conclusions are correct. The work of preparing the camps and of looking after our people arriving from Russia was largely the result of improvisation on the part of our military personnel in Teheran. As far as can at present be seen, our British allies in Persia were also taken unawares by the swiftness of the evacuation, whence arose the problems of accommodation, food, hygiene and medical attention for a large mass of people, which necessitated "ad hoc" solutions. The Medical units in particular had a task of unheard-of complexity to perform. Almost daily, doctors on the reserve officer lists, in Palestine, were pressed into service.

I also feel your general comments on the political aspects and other reasons for the speed of the evacuation from Russia to be correct. That particular question is reasonably well-known today, and in my book entitled "An Army in Exile" ('Bez Ostatniego Rozdziału") I have devoted a fair amount of space to this.

Kindly accept my deep respects and most cordial good wishes,

W. Anders.

2nd Lieut. Michał Kruszyński,
7, Wentworth St.
Huddersfield.

(2)

From the former Delegate of the Polish Government in Tehran:

117, Windmill Rd.,
Brentford, Mddx.
30th May, 1955.

Dear Mr. Kruszyński,

With reference to your letter and recent telephone call, I have the following observations to make about the creation and organisation of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran.

The position which you have taken in this matter is entirely correct, and agrees with the known facts. The first transport of civilian evacuees

to Tehran found — nothing. On March 31st 1942, when the first transport arrived from Pahlevi the Polish Mission in Tehran consisted of three or four people, including our government's representative. The army base which had had its headquarters up to that time in Tehran was moved to Pahlevi to prepare for the arrival of our transports. A small unit was left behind in order to deal with those troops sent to Tehran rather than to Khanaqin (in Irak). As can be seen from this, on the day of the arrival of the first transport of civilians in Tehran there was no organised unit present to look after their welfare. On April 1st a telegram arrived from London nominating General Zając and myself as Government Delegates responsible for the Welfare of the civilian population. This was the beginning of the welfare orgaisation.

Thanks to the energy and goodwill of a small group of people we soon had a welfare organisation which was later seen, passed all its tests with flying colours.

As far as the organisation of the General Hospital was concerned, the situation was identical — there was nothing at all. The army delegated two people — Dr. Z. Grębecki and Sister Wyderka to deal with this. These two persons, with rare and superhuman devotion and effort laid the foundations for a medical service which was without doubt the pride of our entire Welfare organisation, and which performed miracles in saving so many of our people in fantastically difficult circumstances.

As far as our instructions from our government in London were concerned, these could only be very general in the circumstances, which placed the major responsibility on their delegates present at the actual hospital site.

The history of our civilian welfare organisation is a great epic and a proof of our national strength, so it was with great joy that I heard that you have decided to write an account of some aspects of this history, and I wish you every success with all my heart.

I have in my private archives a large amount of material relating to the work of our welfare organisation between early April and late December 1942. I am extremely sorry that I cannot send this material to any third party, but I am prepared to allow any interested parties to look into the material here, and also to give them my personal addenda as the former Polish Government Delegate on the spot at that time.

In writing these few and rather vague remarks I would like to apologise for taking so long in dealing with your request.

Kindly accept my most cordial good wishes,

Wiktor Styburski.

(3)

Gen. S. Kopański "War Memoirs 1939-45".

I should like to express my gratitude to Gen. Kopański for allowing me to use his work for source material.

The memoirs have not been published in full, and only certain parts are known from articles by Gen. Kopański, which were published in the book "Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Karpackich" — a collective work, and from the "Carpathian Courier" a pamphlet commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division, 3rd May 1952.

There are only three full copies of the memoirs in existence: one was held by Gen. Kopański, the author, the second is in the Gen. Sikorski Institute in London, and a third "wandering" copy — at present in my hands. Although these memoirs are not directly relevant to my study, they have helped me to analyse a whole series of facts in the light of the historical perspective of those years.

The memoirs comprise 521 typewritten pages pages relating to the facts and events which Gen. Kopański knew of personally, first as the C.O. of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division, and later as the Chief of Staff G.O.C.'s Headquarters. All these facts are based on documentary evidence. I have studied in particular the following passages from the memoirs: "The 3rd Carpathian Ritle Division in Palestine as a unit of the Polish Army in the East, in Iraq".

"In the General Headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces during certain significant International Political decisions".

"With the Polish Armed Forces after the War"; and "the Withdrawal of Recognition of the legal Polish Government by the Western countries (Epilogue)".

The memoirs although very compact, are nevertheless very detailed, and trew ritten sincerely, honestly, simply and objectively. Wherever Gen. Kopański puts forward his own opinion or point of view, he very carefully makes this clear. What makes these memoirs so tragic is their mirroring of our reality.

I have often wondered why this valuable historical source has never been published in full.

(4)

Activities Diary of the Chief Medical Officer of the 2nd Polish Corps Colonel Dr. Marian Dietrich (now Brigadier-General).

Started on 1/9/1943.

I am very grateful to General M. Dietrich for allowing me to use this material.

Although this material did not give me any direct help in my work, it deals however with the fate of many patients of the former General Polish Civilian Hospital in Teheran, who later passed into the rank of the 2nd Polish Corps, many of whom have been able to give me valuable source material about the Hospital itself.

This source also enabled me to learn more in detail about the Medical Service — probably the most important of all the Services; and about the attitude towards it of the High Command. Each and every soldier fighting for a free Poland with the 2nd Polish Corps did everything possible for this cause, knowing well that at any moment his life might be forfeit — and the Medical Serice had its own battles to maintain that life — often winning where even hope had gone.

The 2nd Corps knew that it had no reserves on which to draw, and losses could only be filled by those who returned from hospital — or were left unfilled.

To count on those Poles who found themselves fighting on the side of the enemy was a pipe-dream which only reached fruition after the Polish victory at Monte Cassino — and as for officers, it was only after the 2nd Polish Corps had finished its work that those freed from P.O.W.

(Prisoners of War) camps could be found a place in the command structure.

Apart from all this, the Activities Diary of the Chief of the 2nd Polish Corps' Medical Services is an unpublished and invaluable historical source, and as such merits deeper description.

The Diary covers in detail the activities of the Chief of Medical Services, beginning with a nine-page introduction to the Medical Section, its individual units, positions, responsibilities and a description of the regions where the Polish Army was stationed.

Malaria was the real Achilles' heel of the 2nd Polish Corps. For example, — "during the stay in Iraq we had 380 fresh cases of malaria including the C.-in-C. and Divisional Commander. There would have been many more, but the majority . . . already had malaria from Russia". (1). During 1943 27,000 cases of malaria were dealt with by the Medical Services, and they conducted 85,000 blood micro-analyses. But was this all? For example, on 16th Dec. 1943 there were mentioned 52 cases of Bubonic plague in Suez (2), also typhus (3), dysentery (4), etc. If we add to this complications such as 3,600 beds (5) according to the report of the 2nd Polish Corps (22.3.1944) as agreed at a quartermasters' conference on 12.11.1943 (6), transport troubles (7), and a complete lack of co-operation and understanding on the part of both General Headquarterms, and individual commanders, the true picture of the work of the Medical Services begin to emerge (8). Unfortunately there is almost no mention of the Medical Services in any of the known works on the history of the 2nd Polish Corps. There is not even a mention of their work during battle, so much are they taken for granted.

In the Diary we also find detailed statistics of our losses in the 2nd Polish Corps — one cannot help thinking that the Medical Services have been deliberately omitted from most works lest we equate our losses with our "victories". For example, for the period between the 11th and 18th May 1944 (the Monte Cassino attack) we find the following figures (9):

3rd Carpathian Rifle Division:	12,831	Losses:	1,130 =	9.1%
5th Kresy Infantry Division:	13,663	„	1,256 =	9.2%
Other Units:	798	„	165 =	20.7%

Also 230 missing presumed dead, a total loss of 2,780 lives. Comparative statistics of 2nd Polish Corps losses (10):

Killed	Wounded	Missing in Action	Total
376	1,673	502	2,551
15.2%	68%	16.4%	100%

Wherever one looks the Diary brings to light evidence of Polish sacrifice.

The Diary is written meticulously, first, day-to-day, then hourly (11), as life becomes more hectic. One soon understands, looking at the figures, just why it is that the Diary is occasionally written hourly rather than daily.

The author of the Diary is interested not only in the Polish 2nd Corps, but rather the whole 8th British Army.

This is merely one painful but characteristic extract from the Diary:

(12) Week ending 13th May 1944

	Losses
Canadians	24
New Zealanders	54
Hindus	154
Poles	1,246

Week ending 20th May 1944:

	Losses
Canadians	325
New Zealanders	58
Hindus	375
Poles	1,432

Losses July-August 1944: 3,049; in this 2,042 Poles (13)

Further figures (14):

12.5.1944. 00.01hrs to 24.00 hrs, 3rd, 5th and 6th Field Hospitals: — 2,459 wounded brought in for treatment.

The Advanced Divisional First Aid Stations took in 2,293 wounded, 732 seriously.

31.5.44. "Tomorrow we move from our present position . . . we leave about 1,000 graves behind us".

Details are also given of cause of particular types of wound.

Mortars	50.3%
Artillery Shells	27.6%
Mines/Booby Traps	5%
Hand and Machine Guns	17%

Operations:

Central Field Hospital:	897
Advanced First Aid Stations:	189
Others reported:	97
Total:	1183

402 pints of blood were used (15).

Of those brought to the Advanced Divisional First Aid Stations 57 died. Only 14 died in the Central Field Hospital.

The diary is in two volumes, of 349 and 154 pages respectively, and is hand-written. It was written at the time when the events occurred, in a simple style, but with all details and documents appended, and so far it has never been used as a historical reference. I feel that a few typed copies at least should be made, in order to preserve much of the history of the Polish 2nd Corps for the future.

Although it could be said that the Diary is not relevant insofar as it starts from 1.9.1943, and the General Civilian Hospital report ends at 1.1.1943, I would defend myself by stating that 80-82% of the 2nd Polish Corps had been evacuated from Russia, and most of these originally passed through the Tehran Hospital. (16).

What is true, is that within a few months these people underwent a complete transformation from exhausted wrecks to enthusiastic soldiers, ready for action.

Beyond this, I have tried to illuminate the relationship between the High Command and the Medical Services, which may make it easier to understand why only Dr. Z. Grębecki and Sister H. Wyderka were delegated to look after the Polish Civilians arriving in Tehran.

Their resources: two pairs of hands.

(5)

Report of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran
28. 3. 1944 — 1. 1. 1943

Document 1 = D1.

The report begins with acknowledgements for help in the hospital's difficulties to the following:

Dr. Karol Bader as a Representative of the Polish Mission in Tehran,

Lieut.-Gen. W. Anders and Brig.-Gen. Prof. Dr. B. Szarecki as representatives of the Polish High Command in the East,

The Polish Army Evacuation Base in the East,

The Headquarters of the Tehran Garrison,

The Polish Red Cross Legation, and all local Poles.

Surnames given with each institution, signed: Chief M.O. of the General Civilian Hospital, Dr. Z. Grębecki, Lt.

I have mentioned this document because I find it interesting in that it shows how many people helped the hospital (without going into the details of who gave what help, and which acknowledgements are matters of courtesy rather than fact). It is of special interest insofar as we see that a civilian hospital is being run by an Army doctor — on the express orders of the Polish Government's Mission in Tehran dated 21.4.1942. It is not usual for subordinate officers to officially thank their superiors, but this was hardly an everyday situation.

Further, although originally subsidised by the Polish Government, the hospital contained both civilian and army personnel, and although the army personnel were responsible to the Tehran Garrison, reports were under the jurisdiction of the Evacuation Base Headquarters. Another point — according to British Army regulations the Chief M.O. of a hospital of 1,200 beds or over should have the rank of Colonel. Our own hospital had at times over 2,000 beds, yet the Chief M.O. was a lieutenant. Also, the condition of the patients was indescribable, as can be seen from the photographs included at the end of this work.

Document 2 — D2. (Partly described above).

Orders from the Polish Mission in Tehran. Since when does a Mission give orders to troops? Given the extraordinary circumstancse which defied all normal regulations, when one comes acrcss volunteers who are prepared to work under these conditions, it is understandable that little is made of the distinction between army orders, civilian regulations, and information bulletins.

Mjr. Kram— (17) real name Mieczysław Mickaniewski — was devoted to his work, which consisted of the organisation of camps for the evacuated civilian population, feeding and clothing these people, and ensuring their future transport to other countries. The work literally kept him up all night on many occasions.

Document 3 — D3.

"An outline of the History of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran", written by Dr. Z. Grębecki (Chief M.O.).

This consists of the following:

An outline of the hospital's history with detailed descriptions of those individuals and institutions which helped create it. (One page).

A full list of personnel, state of health of the patients and causes of death. (Seven pages).

Medical stores and equipment provided by the Polish Red Cross — exact description in quantities. (Two pages).

General stores and medicines (One page).

Equipment and stores donated by the American Red Cross via the Delegate of the Polish Government. (One page).

On page eleven, scanty details about nursing courses, together with details of materials received from the Australian Red Cross.

On page twelve, details of whose active help aided the hospital.

Pp. 13 — 15, a list of inspectors and visitors, followed by a few more names of people who helped the hospital, with a description of their variety of backgrounds. In all, this is more a stock-list and fact-list than a history, since after eliminating all names and materials one is left with less than two pages of typescript. Nevertheless, it is a document of great value, indicating who helped, why, and how, in the creation of the hospital.

D4. A letter from the Ministry of Public Health in Iran thanking the Delegate of the Polish Government for his letter and informing him of a government directive giving permission for the admission of Polish subjects to Persian hospitals.

D.5 and D.6. Reports of infectious diseases.

D.7. The plan for the original structure of the hospital.

D.8. Extracts from Daily Orders in the Hospital: Nos. 29-35, 37, 39-41, 47-49, 54, 59, 60, 64, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 83, 100, 106, 112, 125, 126, 128, 139, 142, 151, 155, 159, 166, 170, 171, 176, 180, 181, 185, 186, 192, 194, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 218, 221, 222, 228.

GENERAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE HOSPITAL.

D.9. Thanks for work done 8..1943 extended to the Chief M.O. by the Polish Consul, Bader.

D.10. Extracts from the orders of the Polish Army in the Middle East Evacuation Base No. 42, 29.5.1942.

D.11. Extracts from inspection notes for 16-18th May 1942.

The inspection was performed by Brig.-gen. Prof. Dr. B. Szarecki. It would seem that the inspection was extremely thorough, but I could only find the results in these notes, not in the orders. It may well be that the reason for this is that Gen. Szarecki was acting on behalf of Gen. Anders as the Chief of the General Inspectorate of the Army, and both were based at that time in the U.S.S.R. The inspection was performed at the request of the Evacuation Base, and the results could not have gone into the orders, since at that time Gen. Szarecki had no authority over the units stationed in Persia. Therefore, the results were sent in a memorandum, copies being sent to the C.O. of the Evacuation Base, General Anders and the hospital. There are also possibly certain behind-the-scenes reasons why this remainded a memorandum only, as seen from Gen. Szarecki's subsequent letter.

D.11a. A letter from Gen. Szarecki to Col. Jastrzębski, C.O. Evacuation Base, Polish Army in the Middle East: "I enclose a memo relating to the inspection made at the Colonel's request 19.5.1942..." so it seems that Gen. Szarecki was acting on his own initiative, not as Gen. Anders' second-in-command. There is a particular reason for the requested inspection. Although the C.O. of the Evacuation Base had his own inspectors available, the gossip about the hospital was becoming so intolerable, that he preferred, if possible, to put paid to this by requesting an independent inspection by the Chief Medical Services himself [18]. The results of the inspection proved the gossip to be absolutely false, so I will not pursue the matter, save to mention what led to it in the general text.

D.12. Extract from Daily Orders in the Hospital, No. 125 (8.9.1942).

D.13. Extract from Daily Orders, Evacuation Base, No. 98 (4.11.1942).

D.14. The opinions of the Chief M.O. 7th Division as the second-in-command for the Chief M.O. Evacuation Base (27.1.1943).

D.15. Letter from the Chief Army Chaplain Log. No. 145 ref. Duszp./43 (31.12.1942).

D.16. Letter from Chief M.O. of Garrison (30.1.1943).

D.17. Letter from the Delegate of the Polish Red Cross in Iran (13.2.1943).

D.18. Letter from the Polish Association in Iran (17.2.1943).

D.19. Letter from the Delegate of the Ministry of Labour and Welfare (10.1.1943).

D.20. Letter from the former Chief of Medical Services for Civilian Camps (24.2.1943).

D.21. Letter from the former Chief of Medical Services for Civilian Camps Log. No. 4661/43/San. (23.2.1943).

D.22. Letter from the Senior Doctor i/c. Civilian Camp No 2 (10. 12. 1942).

EXTERNAL OPINIONS:

D.23. Letter from the Papal Nuncio to Dr. Z. Grębecki, in French 24.7.1942).

D.24. Letter from the Iranian Ministry of Public Health to Dr. Z. Grębecki, in Persian, translated into Russian, with other documents written by Dr. Pezeszko, a Persian of American origin, delegated to the Polish General Civilian Hospital by the Iranian Ministry of Public Health, (16.3.1943).

D.25. Letter from the Director of Hospitals, Medical Care and Preventive Medicine, at the Iranian Ministry of Public Health, to Dr. Z. Grębecki, in Persian. (17.2.1943).

D.26. Letter from the Director of the Pasteur Institute, as above (21.3.1943).

D.27. Letter from the Official Representative of the Iranian Ministry of Health as Controller of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran (as above, 25.12.1942).

D.28. Report from the British Liaison Officer with the Polish Medical Service with reference to the organisation of medical help for the Polish civilian evacuees, in English (10.3.1943).

D.29. Letter from the Free French Assoc. to Dr. Z. Grębecki, in French (2.3.1943).

D.30. Letter from Dr. W. Turkij (paediatrician) to the Chief Medical Officer, Polish General Civilian Hospital, in Russian (15.11.42).

D.31. Letter from the Matron 18th Hindu Hospital to the Matron of the Polish General Civilian Hospital, in English (21.12.1942).

The above documents D.9-31 inclusive, show the phenomenal amount of work done by the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran.

D.32. Detailed report from Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox clergy relating to the hospital.

D.33. Detailed report of medical activities (37 pages of typescript) related to the following (in order):

a. Typhoid
b. Typhus
c. Dysentery
d. T.B.
e. Malaria
f. Pellagra
g. Internal complaints
h. Children's complaints
i. Newly-born
j. Skin/venereal diseases
k. Nervous/mental illness
l. Surgery
m. Maternity
n. Gynaecological complaints
o. E.N.T. complaints
p. Eye diseases

This included 22 photographs of children at the hospital.

D.34. Dental section: — detailed description of work in this field (two pages).

D.35. Collated laboratory data (two pages).

D.36. Immunization section (two pages).

D.37. Hospital pharmacy section (two pages).

D.38. Nursing section, giving detals of the work of auxilliary hospital personnel (twelve pages).

D.39. Administrative/quartermaster's section as below:

a. equipment
b. food
c. canteen facilities
d. catering management
e. buildings/technology
f. administration
    i. correspondence
    ii. evidence
    iii. reports
g. legal/testatory section
h. admissions
i. hygiene/sanitation
j. maintenance

(25 pages type-script).

D.40. Personnel (19 pages).

D.41. Report from the Social Welfare section as below:

Subsections:

a. education
b. leisure/entertainments
c. information
d. recreation/culture
e. Scouting

(75 pages in all).

D.42. Press section (half a page plus ten articles) 4 pages in all.

D.43. Diaries section where there are four short diaries,

a) Dr. K. Zapłatyński — "The General Hospital then and now" (two pages).

b) Wiktor Hupert — "Fragments of the work at the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran" (10 and a half pages)

c) Dr. M. Szenberg — untitled — (4-5 pages).

d) Dr. Bazaragan — memo from the diary "The Polish General Hospital in Tehran", titled "Iranians and Poles" (4-5 pages).

There are also memoranda attached to the report which bring the whole to 240 pages of typescript. The documents are all present in the original, or in attested copies. I have had the opportunity to see all the originals myself. I employed translators for certain documents, since

they had originally been translated from Persian to Russian, then to Polish, and I felt that certain discrepancies might have crept in. However, I found this was not the case. I would like to add that I am sorry to have seen only four diaries of a total of thirty-five, which according to the press section (D.42) were at one time present — as attested to by the Hospital Chief M.O. All but the four mentioned have disappeared.

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons why the Chief M.O. compiled such an extensive report. From the dates on the various documents we can see that they were largely written and collected between December 1942 and March 1943. The report deals with the time between 29.3.1942 — 1.1.1943. The last document, containing his final orders was written by Dr. Z. Grębecki on 4.1.1943. Undoubtedly one reason is that the instigator (and part author) of this work wanted a record of having completed a difficult task satisfactorily and to the best of his abilities, and the second reason is that this person was also fully aware of the historical significance of this hospital at that time. I have had the opportunity to peruse other reports compiled by Dr. Z. Grębecki in Italy, and I have found them to be detailed but nowhere near as exact as the "Report on the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran", which includes illustrations and statictical data which illuminate the subject in great depth. It is obvious that Dr. Grębecki wanted to show what he had accomplished as Chief M.O., and what the hospital had had to cope with during the period of his command. However, this could have been illustrated much more briefly, rather than by compiling a 240 page report. To a historian, this poses the question of why such a massive report was compiled, other than the reasons mentioned previously. I have earlier mentioned certain rumours about the hospital which were circulated for some time, and these also interest me, not in themselves, but in why they occurred. Obviously, such rumours would concern the Chief M.O. in the first instance, and could be the result of hatred, envy, genuine grievance, or plain dislike. These are murky and unpleasant waters in which to dabble, but in order to present a full and honest picture, this must be done.

Obviously malingerers would harbour grudges, but they were dealt with by a medical board, not by an individual.

As to grievances, I have found no instances of such cases within any of the materials available to me, and I should have thought that those who recovered would leave the hospital with feelings of gratitude, so this too cannot be a reason for the rumours.

I will simply quote here two documents which confirm my opinion: D.24. The Ministry or Public Health in Iran, 25th Esfanda 1321 (16th March 1943). From the Minister's Office, Ref. 48132. Dr. Z. Grębicki, former Chief M.O. Polish Hospital in Tehran:

"Thanks to your co-operation and efforts in the fight against infectious diseases, and thanks also to your vigorous quarantine and isolation, the Polish sick were not responsible for the spread of the epidemic among

the inhabitants of the city of Tehran; therefore — in my capacity as Minister of Public Health — I am taking this opportunity to express my gratitude and respect for your results.

Ardalan,
Minister of Public Health in Iran.

D.26. 21 March 1943.

. . . . . " it's (the hospital) organisation was so good, that infectious patients did not pass on the disease to other patients, nor to the healthy, and in the end did not spread the epidemic to the inhabitants of Tehran . . . . "

Dr. Abul-Gasim Bahrami,
Director of the Pasteur Institute.

The report, then, obiously did much good to the Polish cause. To a historian writing about World War II, and one who is interested in more than simple military actions and their participants (often more pawns in the hands of so-called "great statesmen"), a description of military effect on social history is of great importance.

As far as the Polish armed forces are concerned, their social and welfare activity was on a massive scale, particularly in view of their uncertain position at the time (one wonders why virtually nothing is written about this in the relevant literature). For example, apart from the problems of feeding Polish civilians in Russia and evacuating them to Persia, the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran was a massive achievement in itself, as was the creation of camps there and later in Italy, and also hospitals, orphanages, etc. The Army also did much on the educational side, through the setting up of primary, secondary and technical schools — even going so far as to make it possible for many to study at local universities. There are still many people who can testify to the fact that their studies, completed long after the 2nd Polish Corps had left Italy, were paid for, from a special fund set up by the 2nd Corps for that purpose.

D.44. Transcript from a case brought by Military Tribunal No. 12 based with the Polish Army Command in the Middle East.

D.45. Report of the Medical Services in the Polish Armed Forces during Word War II, broken down as follows:

a. Poland 1939
b. Syria — Palestine 1940
c. Egypt — 1941/42
d. Persia — 1942/43
e. Iraq — 1943
f. Egypt — 1943/44
g. Italy — 1944
h. France — 1944/45
i. Italy — 1945/46

The report is largely written by the C.O. of Medical Serices for all Polish settlements in Italy, Captain Dr. Z. Grębecki.

Written on the basis of personal observations, as ordered (Daily orders Log. No. 296/Zdr./I/46 dated 28.1.46), and also by the personal

order of the C.O. of Medical Services to the 2nd Corps (Log No. 45/Med/46 dated 19//346).

Point "d" (Persia) is a short version of the Report dealt with in this work.

D.46. Stock-list at the handover of the Pharmacy of the Polish General Civilian Hospital in Tehran, written at the pharmacy on 28.1.1943. Signed by Slomski Jerzy (sub-lieut.), who was handing over to the other witness, Zundelewicz Michal (lance-rop.), both being M. Pharm.

ELEMENTA AD FONTIUM EDITIONES (cont.)

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(A.D. 1419-1564) pp. VIII+301, 4 tab. 1971.

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ANDREIS, 145 doc. (A.D. 1559-1589), p.p. VIII+
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